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Quigley v The King

Quigley v The King

Case [2024] NZHC 481 7 March 2024

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND NELSON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHAKATŪ ROHE

CRI-2024-442-3

[2024] NZHC 481

BETWEEN
LACHLAN QUIGLEY

Appellant

AND

THE KING

Respondent

Hearing: 6 March 2024

Appearances:

S Zindel and A N Sacheun for Appellant J M Webber for Respondent

Judgment:

7 March 2024

JUDGMENT OF CHURCHMAN J

Introduction

[1] The appellant, Lachlan Quigley, was sentenced to 11 months’ home detention,1 with conditions including psychological assessment, for charges of unlawful sexual connection with a young person under the age of 16,2 making an objectionable publication,3 knowingly distributing an objectionable publication,4 possession of an objectionable publication5 and supplying alcohol to a minor.6

1      R v Quigley [2023] NZDC 27518.
2      Crimes Act 1961, s 134(1).
3      Films, Videos and Publications Classifications Act 1993, ss 123(1)(a) and 124.
4      Sections 123(1)(d) and 124.
5      Section 131.
6      Sale and Supply of Alcohol Act 2012, ss 241(1)–(2).

QUIGLEY v R [2024] NZHC 481 [7 March 2024]

[2] The appellant sought permanent name suppression on the grounds that publication of his name would be likely to cause him and his father extreme hardship.
On 7 December 2023, Judge Rielly declined that application.7

[3] The appellant appeals that decision. He submits that the Judge failed to consider that publication could risk the appellant’s rehabilitation and ability to reintegrate into the community. The appellant also submits that the element of personal deterrence is absent in this case and so publication would not prevent reoffending. The appellant also argues that the Judge failed to properly take into account the appellant’s youth and the impact of publication on his father’s employment.

[4] The respondent opposes the appeal. It submits that the Judge made no error in her assessment of the evidence or in finding the threshold of extreme hardship was not met.

Background

[5] The appellant’s convictions concern offending in June 2021 and sometime between 13 and 15 August 2021, where he had sex with the victim, who was 15 years old at the time, and filmed and distributed a recording of that sexual interaction via the social media app Snapchat.

[6] The appellant pleaded guilty, and was granted interim name suppression up until sentence.

District Court Decision

[7] In declining the appellant’s application for permanent name suppression, the Judge found that the extreme hardship threshold was not met. She was not satisfied that there was a risk of the appellant being bullied and being “called out” on social media and found that any such risk fell far short of the threshold of extreme hardship. She reasoned that negative social media attention is a risk for all young people charged with criminal offending.

7 R v Quigley [2023] NZDC 28382 [Decision under appeal].

[8] The Judge noted that the appellant’s father was genuine in his concerns about the potential adverse effect on his career, and his community’s perception of him as a manager in a local organisation and as someone involved in Civil Defence in a small community. However, the Judge…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Quigley v The King

Details

AGLC: Quigley v The King [2024] NZHC 481
Case: [2024] NZHC 481
Decision Date: 7 March 2024

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Quigley v The King involved Lachlan Quigley, who sought permanent name suppression on the grounds that publication of his name would likely cause him and his father extreme hardship. Quigley's appeal against the District Court's decision to deny his application for permanent name suppression was heard by Churchman J in the High Court of New Zealand. The appeal hinged on the interpretation of the threshold for "extreme hardship" under section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Act and the discretionary factors considered by the District Court.

The legal issues centred on whether the District Court correctly assessed the threshold for extreme hardship and whether it appropriately considered the appellant's arguments regarding the impact of publication on his rehabilitation, reintegration into the community, and his father's employment. Quigley argued that publication could risk his rehabilitation and ability to reintegrate into the community and that the element of personal deterrence was absent, making publication unnecessary to prevent reoffending. He also contended that the District Court failed to properly consider the appellant's youth and the impact of publication on his father's employment.

Churchman J found that the District Court did not err in its decision. The High Court upheld the District Court's assessment that the threshold for extreme hardship was not met. The Court found that the appellant was unable to establish a real or appreciable risk of extreme hardship due to publication. The High Court noted that while there was some negative social media attention, it did not reach the level of extreme hardship as seen in other cases. The Court also concluded that publication would not gravely affect the appellant's ability to reintegrate or rehabilitate, as his friends and proximate social circle were already aware of his offending due to his own actions. Additionally, the Court found that the appellant's youth did not warrant a different outcome, as the appellant already had employment and there was no evidence that his employment prospects were at risk due to publication.

Regarding the appellant's father, the Court determined that the District Court did not err in finding that publication would not cause the father extreme hardship. The Court found that there was no evidence to support the appellant's claim that his father would suffer significant professional consequences. The High Court also addressed the issue of suppressing the father's name and employment details, finding that the threshold for undue hardship was not met.

The appeal was dismissed, and the High Court affirmed the District Court's decision.

Orders