Prue v Police - [2015] NZHC 1606

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

CRI-2015-409-000049 [2015] NZHC 1606

BETWEEN
KEVIN JAMES PRUE

Appellant

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent

Hearing: 9 July 2015

Appearances:

L Drummond for Appellant
C Butchard for Respondent

Judgment:

9 July 2015

ORAL JUDGMENT OF GENDALL J

What this appeal is about

[1] Mr Kevin Prue was charged with dangerous driving in contravention of s 35(1)(b) of the Land Transport Act 1998. He came before Judge Couch in the District Court on 20 April 2015 for sentence.1 He was convicted on the charge and sentenced to disqualification from driving for a period of six months (the statutory minimum) together with reparation of $464 and court costs of $130.

[2] This appeal focuses solely on whether Judge Couch erred in declining to dispense with the statutory minimum disqualification period under s 81 of the Land Transport Act 1998. Section 81 states that where a provision of the Land Transport Act stipulates a minimum period of disqualification, “the court must order that the person be disqualified accordingly unless for special reasons relating to the offence it thinks fit to order otherwise”. The special circumstances claimed here emerge
clearly from the facts, to which I now turn.

1 New Zealand Police v Prue [2015] NZDC 8985.

PRUE v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2015] NZHC 1606 [9 July 2015]

Facts

[3] On Sunday 28 September 2014, Mr Prue was driving his motor vehicle on Athelstan Street, Spreydon. After driving for only a short period of time, a male cyclist came up to Mr Prue’s vehicle and told him that his vehicle had a flat tyre at the rear left-hand side. In order to tell Mr Prue this, the man opened the front passenger door, at which time he grabbed Mr Prue’s bag off the seat whilst saying “I’ll have that too”. The man then fled on his bicycle.

[4] Mr Prue is 70 years old. He had a stroke several years ago which left him with a limp. He was therefore unable to pursue the man on foot. He made a decision however to pursue the thief in his vehicle. In the course of this pursuit, Mr Prue has driven over a curb, onto a footpath (narrowly missing a pedestrian) and then attempted to swerve back onto the road, hitting a bus stop sign in the process.
In an affidavit filed in support of his s 81 application, Mr Prue stated:

8. [The man] … took off across the road on a bike, and I knew I could not run after him. I thought if I followed him I might be able to head him off going down the footpath. I never had any intention of running him over, I wanted to keep up with him.

9.

My bag had all my important personal belongings in it like my glasses, my wallet with my credit cards and my mobile phone.

[5]

Mr

Prue says further that this event left him stressed and flustered.

Additionally, because the man…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Prue v Police

Details

AGLC: Prue v Police [2015] NZHC 1606
Case: [2015] NZHC 1606
Decision Date: 9 July 2015

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Kevin James Prue appeals against his conviction for dangerous driving and the sentence imposed by Judge Couch in the District Court. The central issue in this appeal is whether Judge Couch erred in declining to dispense with the statutory minimum disqualification period under section 81 of the Land Transport Act 1998. The appeal hinges on whether there were special circumstances justifying a departure from the mandatory minimum disqualification. Mr Prue, who is 70 years old and had a stroke leaving him with a limp, pursued a man who stole his bag containing personal belongings, leading to dangerous driving. The High Court undertook a three-step assessment to determine if special reasons existed: whether the circumstances were legally capable of constituting special reasons, whether special reasons existed on the facts, and whether the Court should exercise its discretion. While the High Court agreed that in a broad sense special reasons existed, it concluded that on the specific facts, Mr Prue's driving was neither confined to putting his own safety at risk nor objectively reasonable. The High Court found no error in Judge Couch's decision and dismissed the appeal.

Orders