Protect Pauanui Incorporated v Thames Coromandel District Council
[2013] NZHC 1944
•2 August 2013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND HAMILTON REGISTRY
CIV 2012-419-001542 [2013] NZHC 1944
BETWEEN PROTECT PAUANUI INCORPORATED Applicant AND
THE THAMES COROMANDEL DISTRICT COUNCIL
First Respondent
AND
PAUANUI SPORTS AND RECREATION CLUB INCORPORATED
Second Respondent
Hearing: 18 July 2013 Appearances:
R B Enright for the Applicant
D J Neutze for the First Respondent
G Milner-White and N J Amos for the Second RespondentJudgment:
2 August 2013
[RESERVED] JUDGMENT OF WYLIE J
This judgment was delivered by Justice Wylie on 2 August 2013 at 4.00 pm
Pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date:
PROTECT PAUANUI INC v THE THAMES COROMANDEL DISTRICT Council & ANOR [2013] NZHC
1944 [2 August 2013]
Introduction
[1] The applicant, Protect Pauanui Incorporated (Protect Pauanui), seeks to review a decision made by the first respondent, the Thames Coromandel District Council (the Council), on 30 August 2006 in relation to a variation to the Council’s proposed district plan. Inter alia, it rezoned land owned by the second respondent, Pauanui Sports and Recreation Club Incorporated (the Club), on which tennis courts are situated.
[2] The application for review is ambitious. Both respondents have asserted by way of affirmative defence that s 83 of the Resource Management Act 1991 (the Act) provides a complete answer to Protect Pauanui’s challenge. There is a significant body of authority in support of this assertion. Moreover, the proceedings were not filed until November 2012. The challenged decision was made on 30 August 2006. Issues of delay and prejudice arise. Even if the Council’s decision can be impugned, the exercise by the Court of its discretion to grant relief will be in issue.
[3] Broadly, the application raises the following issues:
(a) Did the Council make a reviewable error in preparing and approving the variation, which was the subject of its decision on 30 August
2006?;
(b)If the Council did make a reviewable error, is its decision beyond challenge pursuant to s 83 of the Act?;
(c) Was there apparent bias by the Council?; and
(d) Should the Court exercise its discretion to decline relief to
Protect Pauanui?
Relevant Facts
[4] In 1967, Pauanui Ocean Beach Resort Limited was formed to undertake the development of the Pauanui area. Work got underway and the area was
progressively developed for residential and recreational purposes from the late 1960s through to the mid 1980s.
[5] The Club was incorporated in 1972. It is a membership-based private club.
[6] Tennis courts were constructed on the land that is now the subject of the application for review by Pauanui Beach Resort Limited in January 1982 or thereabouts. The land was zoned residential A at the time in the then operative Thames County Council’s District Scheme.
[7] A separate lot — lot 1 DPS 35191 — was created for the land on which the tennis courts are situated, and that lot (generally referred to in this judgment as the tennis court land) was sold to the Club in 1984. The Club acquired the tennis court land, and Pauanui Ocean Beach Resort Limited acquired 200 memberships from the Club, which it on sold to the purchasers of sections in the Pauanui development.
[8] The Club also owns two nine-hole golf courses within the Pauanui development, along with other tennis courts, bowling greens and recreation facilities, including dining and bar facilities.
[9] In 1986, the Council (which includes the former Thames County Council as a result of local body amalgamation) notified a review of its district scheme. That review proceeded and the scheme statement and code of ordinances became operative, presumably as the Council’s district scheme, in September 1990. The tennis court land was zoned as “Housing Zone (Outside all Policy Areas)”. There was a notation recorded on the relevant planning map, pursuant to s 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977. The words “Tennis Courts” were noted on the planning map and there was an asterisk which recorded that this was a “use of value to the community”. The two pieces of land on which the golf courses owned by the Club were situated were subject to similar notations.
[10] When the Act came into effect on 1 October 1991, the Council’s district
scheme became its transitional district plan, pursuant to s 373.
[11] A draft Thames-Coromandel District Plan was approved for public consultation in June 1996. All ratepayers were advised and extensive consultation was undertaken.
[12] The proposed district plan was notified in March 1997. It was proposed to rezone the tennis court land as “Conservation Zone”. There was a general submission against this proposal. Moreover, it seems that there was a specific submission lodged by the Club, but only in relation to the golf course land owned by it, and not in relation to the tennis court land.
[13] In the event, and after public hearings, in October 1998, the Council decided not to proceed with conservation zoning in respect of land which was privately owned, where the landowner did not agree to the zoning, and where the land did not have identifiable conservation values. The Club did not agree, and the tennis court land had no identifiable conservation values. It was zoned “Housing Zone (Recreation Policy Area)”. At the same time, the Council resolved to introduce a variation to its proposed plan to address recreation policy areas generally.
[14] The Club’s submission in regard to its golf course land was successful. Both pieces of land were zoned “Housing Zone”, without any notation or reference to recreation policy areas.
[15] In 1999, an options paper was prepared in relation to recreation policy areas, and it was followed up by a draft variation. The draft variation proposed to include the tennis court land in a recreation policy area.
[16] Local government elections intervened, and the newly elected Council redrafted the variation. Inter alia, it was proposed to rezone the tennis court land as “Recreation (Passive) Zone”. This zoning was intended to provide for informal recreation activity.
[17] The variation became known as variation 3. In December 2004, a letter was sent to a number of persons considered to be affected and to statutory authorities
advising that the variation to the proposed plan was to be notified, and on 20/21
December 2004, variation 3 was publicly notified.
[18] On 24 February 2005, the Club lodged a submission in relation to variation 3. It opposed the Recreation Passive zoning proposed, and requested that it be changed to Housing, with removal of the notation, “tennis courts — use of value to the community”, contained in the transitional plan.
[19] A summary of submissions was notified on 20 May 2005, and the Council called for further submissions. The Club lodged a further submission on 3 June
2005. The period for lodging further submissions closed on 24 June 2005.
[20] Hearings into variation 3 were held in May 2006 before a Commissioner and a small number of appointed councillors. The Club submitted that its assets had been purchased from Pauanui Ocean Beach Resort Limited for the use of its members, and that the assets had not been gifted or vested in the Club for public recreational purposes. It argued that it was inequitable for facilities owned by the Club to be zoned for public recreational use. It was noted that this argument had previously been accepted in relation to the golf course land owned by the Club.
[21] The Commissioner and appointed counsellors reported to the Council and, on
30 August 2006, the Council resolved to allow the Club’s submission, and to zone the tennis Court land “Housing Zone”, with the transitional plan notation removed. The Council’s decision noted that although the land was developed with tennis courts, it was suitable for residential development, and that the housing zoning was consistent with other land owned by the Club that provided recreational facilities for its members.
[22] A letter was sent out to submitters advising them of the various decisions made on 5 September 2006, and the Council’s decisions were publicly notified on
6 September 2006.
[23] Six appeals were lodged. None of them affected the tennis court land.
[24] On 27 August 2007, the proposed district plan became operative in part. In particular, variation 3 became operative. Thereafter, the tennis court land was zoned Housing Zone.
[25] All appeals were ultimately disposed of and the proposed plan became fully operative on 30 April 2010.
[26] In October 2010, the Club reviewed its various facilities, and determined that there was an oversupply of tennis courts in Pauanui. It considered that the cost of maintaining the tennis courts on the land was significantly greater than the revenue from tennis memberships, and from casual players paying a fee to use the courts. The courts were considered to be underutilised.
[27] At a special meeting of the club held in October 2010, members voted in favour of selling the tennis court land. However, a group of members took legal proceedings. They successfully challenged the decision on procedural grounds.1
[28] The matter came back before members at the Club’s Annual General Meeting on 30 January 2011. A fresh motion to sell the tennis Court land was passed; a counterproposal to seek rezoning of club facilities to recreational zoning was defeated.
[29] The tennis court land was advertised for sale in early 2012, and in October
2012, an agreement for sale and purchase was entered into, conditional upon the purchaser obtaining resource consent for subdivision of the land.
[30] The purchaser subsequently lodged a four-lot subdivision application with the Council. As a result of the issue of these proceedings, the Council required that the subdivision application be notified. The purchaser considered that the expense and uncertainty of a notified application was untenable. He elected to cancel the
agreement for sale and purchase, and withdrew the subdivision application.
1 Reeves v Pauanui Sports and Recreation Club Inc HC Hamilton CIV 2010-419-1599,
16 December 2010.
[31] Following cancellation, the Club determined to proceed with its own subdivision of the tennis court land into four allotments. It has lodged a further application with the Council for subdivision consent. The Council has required that this application also be notified for public submissions on the basis of special circumstances — principally because of the challenge the subject of these proceedings.
The Pleadings
[32] The statement of claim identified that there were two decisions being challenged:
(a) The decision made by the Council on 30 August 2006 to rezone the tennis court land, and
(b)Such decision as it was anticipated the Council might make in relation to the subdivision application lodged by the conditional purchaser of the land.
As noted, the subdivision application was withdrawn, and Mr Enright for Protect Pauanui accepted that, in the circumstances, he could not pursue the application for review in this regard. Hence, before me, the application for review was limited to the first decision made by the Council on 30 August 2006 in relation to the rezoning of the land.
[33]
the A
It is ct as i
(a)
alleged that the Council breached various obligations imposed on it by t stood at the relevant time. In particular, it is asserted that:
The Council failed to send a copy of the public notice in relation to
variation 3 to members of the society, who it is said were persons directly affected by the proposed variation. (b)
The public notice was misleading because it did not disclose the
possibility that the tennis court land might lose its recreation policy
area “overlay”, or be rezoned as a Housing Zone.
(c) The Council should not have accepted the submission lodged by the Club, because the relief the Club sought, namely rezoning the tennis court land to a Housing Zone, was not “on” variation 3, and was outside its scope.
(d)There was bias by members of the committee which inquired into the variation, and reported on the same to the Council, because the Council was the recipient of Club assets on a winding up.
Protect Pauanui
[34] Protect Pauanui was incorporated in September 2012 for the purpose of advocating for and protecting what is said to be the original vision for Pauanui, including the retention of open space and recreational amenities.
[35] Although the incorporation documents have been exhibited, it is not clear how many members it now has. Nine affidavits have been sworn by residents in support of its application for review. Most of these deponents do not however make it clear whether or not they belong to the Society.
[36] It is noteworthy that neither defendant has put in issue Protect Pauanui’s standing to bring these proceedings. Accordingly, I have not taken this issue any further.
[37] The common theme running through the affidavits which have been filed in support of the application is that the owners of land adjoining or near to the tennis court land were not informed of variation 3 by the Council. The deponents fall into two groups — those who say they only became aware of the change in 2010 or later, and those who became aware at an earlier stage:
(a) A Ms McDougall asserts that the intention to remove the notation from the tennis court land was not notified to the community. A Mr Allan, who, together with his wife, owns land adjoining the tennis court land, says that he only found out about variation 3 in a series of email exchanges with Council officers in late November 2010. A
Ms Fleming, who owns land adjacent to the tennis court land, says that she only became aware of the variation or when the tennis court land was put up for sale by the Club. As already noted, that occurred in early 2012. A Ms George says the same thing. Similarly, a Mr Angus first heard of the change of zoning when he heard that the Club intended to sell the tennis court land.
(b)In contrast, a Mr Hartstone, who is the Chair of Protect Pauanui, says that he first heard of the change of zoning from a neighbour in late
2006. A Mr Moffitt, who was a member of the Club, became aware of the Club’s intention to oppose the Council’s proposal to rezone the tennis court land at its AGM in January 2006. He spoke to Council officers about the issue in February 2006, but then did no more about it. A Mr St Leger-Reeves, who owns properties adjoining the tennis court land, says that he became aware of rumours about the rezoning as early as 2003/2004. He says that he telephoned the Council at the time, and was told then that the zoning had been changed.
For the sake of completeness, I note that there was also an affidavit from a
Ms McDonald. It does not address notification or timing.
Analysis
[38] The First Schedule to the Act dealt with the preparation, change and review of policy statements and plans. Clause 16A in the Schedule provided that a local authority could initiate variations to a proposed plan, at any time before the plan was approved. Once notified, a variation was treated as if it were a plan change.2 It had immediate effect, and it merged in and became part of the proposed plan, as soon as the variation and proposed plan were both at the same procedural stage.
[39] As at the date of notification of variation 3, the tennis court land effectively had three zonings:
2 Clause 16A(2).
(a) The operative zoning under the transitional plan — Housing Zone
(Outside all Policy Areas) — with the notation on the planning map;
(b) The proposed zoning under the proposed district plan — Housing
Zone (Recreational Policy Area); and
(c) The proposed zoning under variation 3 — Recreation (Passive) Zone. Any application for land use or subdivision at that time would have been considered
by reference to all zonings.3 The weight attributed to the operative and proposed zonings would have depended on the stage reached in the statutory process.4
[40] I now turn to consider whether the Council made a reviewable error in preparing and processing variation 3, leading to its decision to rezone the tennis court land in August 2006. I do so by reference to the three allegations made in the statement of claim and set out in [33](a) to (c) above.
a) Notification of Persons Directly Affected
[41] Clause 5 of the First Schedule required a territorial authority, not earlier than
60 working days before or later than 10 working days after public notification, to send a copy of the public notice to “any other person who in the territorial authority’s opinion, is directly affected by the plan”.
[42] Mr Enright asserted that the Council did not turn its mind to the question of directly affected ratepayers, and that it did not notify the owners and occupiers of properties directly adjacent to the tennis court land. He asserted that it did not undertake “a spatial planning exercise” to identify who might be impacted by the rezoning proposal.
[43] The leading authority in this area is the decision of this Court in Creswick
Valley Residents’ Association Inc v Wellington City Council.5 MacKenzie J there
3 Sections 9 and 11.
4 Section 104(1); Keystone Ridge Ltd v Auckland City Council HC Auckland AB 24/01, 3 April
2001.
5 Creswick Valley Residents’ Association Inc v Wellington City Council [2012] NZHC 644.
considered a Council’s obligations in relation to notification under cl 5. He held that it is not sufficient for a Council to generically notify ratepayers as a whole, and that a Council must in addition decide which ratepayers are likely to be directly affected by a proposed plan, and what (if any), further information should be sent with the public notice to those ratepayers. On the facts before him, MacKenzie J held that no specific consideration had been given by the Council to the question of whether any ratepayers were likely to be directly affected by the change of zoning there in issue. He also observed that it is for Councils to determine which ratepayers are likely to be directly affected and that it is not for the Court to decide what decision the Council
should have reached in this regard.6
[44] In the present case, it is clear from the evidence of the responsible Council officer, a Mr Baker, that the Council did turn its mind to the question of which ratepayers were likely to be directly affected. Twenty five persons were considered to be directly affected because they had submitted on similar issues in the proposed district plan (which the variation was intended to alter). These persons were sent an explanatory letter advising that variation 3 was to be notified. In addition, various statutory authorities, all community boards, Thames-Coromandel District Council area managers, and all local iwi authorities were directly notified of the variation in a letter sent to them along with the public notice.
[45] While there is no appeal against a Council’s decision under cl 5, the Council’s observance of the Schedule 1 requirements could have been raised before the Environment Court by way of an application for an enforcement order under s 316(3).7 That did not occur in the present case. For the reasons which follow below when considering s 83, the Council’s decision on who was directly affected is now well beyond challenge.
[46] I agree with MacKenzie J in Creswick that it is not for this Court, on an application for review, to decide what decision the Council should have reached on whether any particular neighbouring ratepayer was likely to be affected by the
proposed rezoning.
6 Ibid at [63], [69]–[75].
7 And see s 314(1)(f).
[47] While I agree with Mr Enright that the Council could reasonably readily have identified property owners adjacent to or within a defined distance from the tennis court land, the fact that people resided close to the tennis court land does not compel the conclusion that they were directly affected. Indeed, where people lived, is in my view, irrelevant in this case. It is clear from their affidavits that the deponents in support of this application consider that they are affected because of the potential loss of the open space amenity presently offered by the tennis courts. This argument however overlooks the fact that the land was and is privately owned, and that it has long been zoned for housing purposes. It is not a reserve. It is surrounded by residential development. There can be no legitimate expectation of permanent or continued open space amenity on private land zoned for development. Adjoining landowners have no right or interest in the tennis court land by virtue of their proximity to the property.
b) Notification Misleading?
[48] Once again, the Council’s notification obligations were set out in cl 5 of the
First Schedule.
[49] Pursuant to cl 5(2), any public notice was required to state: (a) where the variation could be inspected;
(b) that any person could make a submission on the variation;
(c) the process for public participation in the consideration of the proposed variation;
(d) the closing date for submissions; and
(e) the address for service of the local authority.
There was no specific requirement to describe the plan change or to detail what it addressed.
[50] Here, the public notice read as follows:
The Thames-Coromandel District Council gives notice that it wishes to initiate a variation to its Proposed District Plan, to propose appropriate standards and activity status for activities in each of the newly created Recreation and Open Space zones.
The new plan provisions will introduce zones over existing Recreation and Open Space Policy Areas. Existing Recreation Policy Areas will become Recreation (Passive) Zone, and Open Space Policy Area (sic) will become Open Space Zone, unless shown otherwise in the schedule and maps attached to the variation. The Recreation (Active) Zone is on land used for purposes such as sportsfields.
The Recreation and Open Space variation provides the opportunity to introduce appropriate standards for development and use of these areas. Recognition is given to reserve management plans as an effective way to manage the development and operation of reserves within their site boundaries.
These new zones will be placed in Section 6 of the plan along with their own objectives, policies, methods of implementation, and rules.
The notice went on to say where the variation could be inspected. It invited members of the public to make submissions. It recorded the form that submissions should take, and detailed that all submissions would be recorded, and that a summary would be prepared. It advised that a public notice would advise of the summary, that it would be available for public inspection, and that copies of the original submissions would also be made available for inspection. It noted that persons would be given the opportunity to make further submissions, and once again, detailed the appropriate form to use in this regard. It then went on to note that the Council, or a committee of Council, would consider all submissions, and that persons who wished to be heard would be given the opportunity to do so. It noted that the Council would ultimately make a decision, and that any person who disagreed with the Council’s decision could refer the matter on to the Environment Court. A time was put in place for the lodging of submissions. The address for service of the local authority was given.
[51] As can be seen, the Council went well beyond the minimum statutory requirements.
[52] Mr Enright suggested that there was no indication that the “recreation overlay” was at risk or that the land might be rezoned “Housing”.
[53] With respect, these arguments are flawed. The Council was, inter alia, seeking to rezone the tennis court land. This meant that the recreation overlay was likely to go. The appropriate zoning, and necessarily the recreation overlay, was in issue, and any reasonable reader could and should have appreciated that.
[54] In my judgment, there was nothing in the public notice which was misleading.
c) Scope of Submission
[55] Pursuant to cl 6 of the First Schedule, once a proposed plan was publicly notified, any person could make a submission “on it” to the relevant local authority.
[56] Mr Enright submitted that the Club’s submission on variation 3 was not “on” the variation, and that it would only have been “on” the variation, if it had addressed the extent to which the variation changed the pre-existing status quo.
[57] Mr Neutze for the Council, and Mr Milner-White for the Club, disputed this assertion. They argued that variation 3 was a district wide variation, all about zoning, not only of the tennis court land, but also of other sites. They submitted that the Club’s submission about the zoning of the tennis court land was clearly “on” the variation.
[58] The leading authority in this area is the decision of William Young J in Clearwater Resort Limited v Christchurch City Council.8 He held that an assessment of whether or not a submission is on a variation can only be made in the general context of the scheme and purpose of the Act.9 He considered that a submission can fairly be regarded as “on” a variation if it is addressed to the extent to which the variation changes the pre-existing status quo. If the effect of regarding a submission
as “on” a variation would be to permit a planning instrument to be appreciably
8 Clearwater Resort Ltd v Christchurch City Council HC Christchurch AP 34/02, 14 March 2003.
9 At [58].
amended without real opportunity for participation by those potentially affected, this will be a powerful consideration against finding that this submission was truly on the
variation.10
n
10 Ibid at [66] and [69]; and see Halswater Holdings Ltd v Selwyn District Council (1999) 5
[59]
the fo
In
llowi
(a)
my judgment, the Club’s submission was “on” the variation. I say this for
g reasons:
Variation 3 was wide ranging. It sought to introduce new zoning and
zone provisions for recreation and open space areas throughout the
district. All land within recreational policy areas was to be placed in
either the Recreation (Active) or Recreation (Passive) Zone,
depending on each piece of land’s characteristics, and its current or
future recreational use. All of this was made clear in the variation.
Similarly, the public notice recorded that it was intended to introduce
new zones over existing recreation and open space policy areas. It
was patently obvious that the zoning of each piece of land affected by
the variation was in issue. (b)
The variation and public notice made it clear that Recreation (Active)
or Recreation (Passive) zoning was proposed in respect of all existing
recreation and open space policy areas, unless shown otherwise in a
schedule and maps which were attached to the variation. There were
no attachments to the variation which covered the tennis court land, or
which indicated proposed zoning for it other than Recreation (Passive)
Zoning. It was clear that the proposed rezoning extended specifically
to the tennis court land. (c)
The Council’s intent to rezone the land, including the tennis court
land, was subject to the submission process detailed in the Act. (d)
The tennis court land was zoned for housing in the transitional plan
and in the proposed district plan. The Council had initially suggested ELRNZ 192 (EnvC); Option 5 Inc v Marlborough District Council (2009) 16 ELRNZ 1 (HC);
Palmerston North City Council v Motor Machinists Ltd [2013] NZHC 1290.
in the proposed plan that it be in the conservation zone. It had decided against this early in the proposed plan process, and put in place, effectively on an interim basis, housing zoning subject to the recreation policy area overlay. It decided at the same time to introduce a variation to address recreation policy areas. The zoning of the tennis court land and other land in recreation policy areas was
clearly evolving. As noted by William Young J in Clearwater,11 the
scheme of the Act contemplates a progressive and orderly resolution of planning issues. That is precisely what was occurring in this case.
(e) At no stage was housing on the tennis court land a non-complying or prohibited activity. Preservation of the existing zoning, either with or without the recreation policy area overlay, was always a possibility. The Club’s submission was effectively seeking no more than confirmation of the Housing Zone contained in both the operative and proposed plans, but with removal of the community use notation in the transitional plan and the recreation policy area overlay in the proposed plan.
[60] In my judgment, the submission was “on” the variation. There was no error by the Council in accepting the Club’s submission. Indeed, the Council had no alternative but to accept it.
[61] I now turn to consider s 83 of the Act.
Section 83
[62] Section 83 of the Act provided as follows:
83 Procedural requirements deemed to be observed
A policy statement or plan that is held out by a local authority as being operative shall be deemed to have been prepared and approved in accordance with Schedule 1 and shall not be challenged except by an application for an enforcement order under section 316(3).
11 Clearwater Resort Ltd v Christchurch City Council, above n 8, at [68].
Section 316(3) provided as follows:
316 Application for enforcement order
…
(3) An application for an enforcement order under section 314(1)(f) may be lodged—
(a) by a local authority (or the Minister of Conservation in regard to a regional coastal plan) at any time; or
(b) by any other person, no later than 3 months after the date on which the policy statement or plan becomes operative.
Section 314(1)(f) provided as follows:
314 Scope of enforcement order
(1) An enforcement order is an order made under section 319 by the
Environment Court that may do any 1 or more of the following:
…
(f) where the court determines that any 1 or more of the requirements of Schedule 1 have not been observed in respect of a policy statement or a plan, do any 1 or more of the following:
(i) grant a dispensation from the need to comply with those requirements:
(ii) direct compliance with any of those requirements: (iii) suspend the whole or any part of the policy
statement or plan from a particular date (which may
be on or after the date of the order, but no such suspension shall affect any court order made before the date of the suspension order).
[63] It is clear that any of the alleged errors discussed in (a) to (c) above, could have been raised with the Environment Court under s 316(3) either by Protect Pauanui if it had existed at the relevant time, or by any of its members on an individual basis. No-one took advantage of that opportunity within the relevant timeframe — namely three months from 30 April 2010.
[64] Both Mr Neutze and Mr Milner-White relied on s 83. They argued that whether or not the matter was properly notified, whether or not the public notice was
misleading, and whether or not the Club’s submission was on the variation, were all procedural arguments and part of the preparation and approval process. They argued that they were clearly caught by s 83, and that it provides an answer to Pauanui’s claims in regard to these matters.
[65] Mr Enright argued that the Court should read strictly any attempt to shut out its ability to review the exercise of statutory powers by statutory bodies, particularly where it is asserted that persons with a direct interest have been excluded from public notification. He argued that it is unnecessary to read s 83 in a literal sense, and that the review proceedings in this case do not challenge the plan itself, but are focussed upon the rezoning of a single site. He argued that the grounds on which the plan is challenged, do not involve the preparation and approval process. Alternatively, he argued that they raise issues that go to jurisdiction, and that s 83 is not intended to preclude review proceedings in relation to jurisdictional challenges. He argued that the section should be read consistently with s 27(1) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and that it does not constitute a privative clause depriving Protect Pauanui of its ability to issue judicial review proceedings.
[66] There is a formidable body of authority in relation to this matter. It is against the arguments made for Protect Pauanui.
[67] There was a provision similar to s 83 in the now repealed Town and Country Planning Act 1953. It was s 28(2A). In Wellington City v Cowie,12 the Court of Appeal, referring to s 28(2A), observed as follows:13
Now I think it is plain enough that once the district scheme has become operative in accordance with the provisions of s 28, no Court is entitled to examine into the question whether there had been any failure on the part of the council to comply with any of the requirements of the Act or regulations in the preparation, completing or changing of its district scheme. But prior to that point of time, a person attacking the legality of a district scheme is not faced with a conclusive presumption that all the steps taken by the council had been observed and complied with…
12 Wellington City v Cowie & Ors [1971] NZLR 1089 (CA).
13 At 1103.
[68] In Ellett v Manukau City Corporation,14 Mahon J held as follows:15
… As I have said, the applicants understandably failed to detect from the massive summary of advertised objections the particular objection here in issue, and in that regard they suffered a fate which has been common to many landowners throughout New Zealand. But the regulation authorises a summary of these objections to be advertised in this manner and subject to the relevant local authority taking care to comply with subcl (2) of reg 20, which prescribes the contents of publication of objections, the landowner has no legal complaint if he fails to identify his own land as being the subject of a particular objection. In the present case I think the objections were sufficiently notified. Because the applicants were unaware of the objection lodged by the Auckland Institute and Museum, they took no action in that matter and were neither notified of nor were present at the hearing of that particular objection and, as I have already said, they did not become aware of the fact that part of their land was subject to the registration until 1972.
…
I can have no doubt that Mr Bollard is right in his argument that s 28(2A) is indeed a bar to the submissions in the present case founded upon locus standi and upon the alleged breach of the rules of natural justice. The natural justice point is the material argument in this context and while it may seem on the surface a severe construction of the statute to say that the transformation of a proposed scheme to an operative scheme completely bars any recourse to the courts against a restriction placed on an owner's land without his knowledge, nevertheless the words of s 28(2A) must be given their plain effect.
…
By s 28(2A) of the Town and Country Planning Act, in which the phrase "conclusively presumed" is also used, the legislature has determined that the presumption of validity is to be conclusive for all purposes except in the case of an application to the board under s 28A. The point seems to me to be free from any doubt. No matter what injustices an owner of land may have sustained and no matter what remedies he may have had at common law or under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 or under the Town and Country Planning Act itself arising out of the procedures adopted to impose restrictions upon the use of his land, all such remedies disappear as from the date when the relevant district scheme becomes operative. His only recourse from that time is to apply to the Town and Country Planning Appeal Board under s 28A within the time limited for that purpose. No doubt extreme injustices may occur, just as they may and do occur under the penal provisions of the Transport Act governed by the same type of conclusive presumption to which I have been referring. But in the case of each statute the legislative policy has been to subordinate occasional individual injustice to the wider interests which each statute is designed to effectuate. For the various reasons given above, I therefore conclude that the application cannot succeed.
14 Ellett v Manukau City Corporation [1976] 1 NZLR 343 (SC).
15 At 350 – 352.
[69] The leading decision in this regard under the present Act is M R Wylie & Ors v Clutha District Council.16 In that case, the District Council had included land in a coastal resource area on various planning maps. The land was not within the coastal environment. No submission had suggested that the land should be included within the coastal marine area. The appellants sought a declaration. The Environment Court held that it was not open to them to do so, because of s 83. The
appellants appealed to the High Court. The issue in this Court was whether s 83 precluded the grant of relief, notwithstanding that the Council’s actions were accepted to be ultra vires. John Hanson J confirmed the Environment Court’s finding that the word “deemed” in s 83 carries the usual meaning of “conclusively presumed”. He stated:
[36] … Given the matter is outside the three month timeframe, the Plan, which has clearly been held out as operative since 1998, is conclusively presumed to have been prepared and approved in accordance with the First Schedule. The time has passed for the Appellant to challenge pursuant to s316(3)(b).
The Judge also noted as follows:
[40] I do not consider Mr Withnall’s reliance on Anisminic (supra) assists. There the House of Lords was dealing with a privative provision that prohibited review by the courts of a decision of the Foreign Compensation Commission at any stage. That must be distinguished from the present situation. Section 316(3)(b) of the Act provides opportunity to apply for an enforcement order. While that section imposes a limitation period, the provision in Anisminic did not allow for a review at any stage. Statutory limitation periods are accepted methods of providing for degrees of certainty, while granting limited opportunity for affected persons to take action.
[41] I think Mr Page was correct to submit that such an interpretation is supported by analogy in Kirkland v Dunedin City Council (supra). At issue in that case was the restriction on challenges to the s32 process contained in s32(3). In its decision the Court of Appeal held that the legislative policy was to prevent challenges after a plan had come into force (paragraph 17); that Parliament had intended challenges to the plan to be limited to the substantive merits of a provision and not procedural deficiencies (paragraph
18); that Parliament did not provide for the Environment Court to exercise powers as if it were judicially reviewing council’s decisions. Mr Page correctly submitted that is the practical effect of what the Appellants contend for in this proceeding. Mr Page submitted that if the declaration was made that the map was ultra vires that would have the same effect as an order quashing a provision in a judicial review proceeding. Finally, if an Environment Court was able to strike down provisions for procedural non-
16 M R Wylie v Clutha District Council HC Dunedin CIV 2004-485-1839, 29 September 2005.
compliance a council would be left with no operative plan for the relevant area.
[42] All of those findings have relevance here. Notwithstanding Mr Withnall’s submission, it seems to me it is not simply a matter of substituting what is set out in clause 4.2.1 on the plan. As an example, it is conceded that in some areas, involving headlands, this would not apply. Consideration would also have to be given as to the effects of sub-clause (ii). In my view it would cause a planning hiatus in relation to a plan that has been operative since 1998. I do not consider Parliament intended this, and given that the line was drawn on the map was part of the First Schedule process I consider the provisions of s83 a complete answer.
[70] Wylie has been followed in subsequent decisions in the Environment Court.17
[71] In my view, s 83 is clear in its terms. The grounds advanced by Protect Pauanui, and detailed in (a) to (c) above, each involve the preparation and approval process under Schedule 1. Section 83 applies in its terms. Unless there is a challenge by way of an application for an enforcement order under s 316(3) brought within the applicable time limit, the variation is deemed to have been prepared and approved in accordance with Schedule 1. If no challenge is made, that is the end of the matter. The policy behind the section is clear. All who deal with district plans, including Councils, landowners, developers, purchasers, lessees, and the like, need certainty once a proposed plan, (which by definition at the time, included a
variation,18) is held out as being operative and the timeframe put in place by
s 316(3)(b) has expired. It would be intolerable if a disgruntled litigant could challenge the validity of a plan on procedural grounds some years later. The need for certainty provides ample public policy justification for s 83, and requires that it be given its clear meaning. There is, in my judgment, no justification for reading the section down. Rather, there is every reason for not doing so.
[72] I reject the arguments advanced on behalf of Protect Pauanui in this regard. In my judgment, its challenges to the Council’s decision making processes in respect of variation 3, insofar as that challenges involve the procedural requirements put in
place by Schedule 1, must fail.
17 Waiareka Valley Preservation Society Inc v Waitaki District Council ENC Christchurch C159/07,
30 November 2007 at [30]–[34]; Re Thames-Coromandel District Council ENC Wellington
W 034/09, 15 May 2009 at [4].
18 Section 2.
Bias
[73] Rule 28.2 of the Club’s rules read as follows:
In the event of the Club being wound up the funds and assets of the Club remaining after payment and satisfaction of its debts and liabilities and costs and expenses of winding up shall be vested in the Thames-Coromandel District Council for the benefit of the Pauanui areas sporting and recreational activities.
[74] This clause was inserted following the Club’s 1979 AGM. It was recorded in the minutes that the purpose of inserting the clause was to ensure that the Club was not liable for tax.
[75] Mr Enright submitted that it followed that the Council had a potential financial interest in the rezoning of the tennis court land for housing, and that it failed to take appropriate steps to address this interest in the variation 3 process. As a result, it was said that the Council acted with apparent bias in making its decision to rezone the land. He referred to Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue,19 and
Saxmere Co Limited v Wool Board Disestablishment Co Limited.20
[76] Mr Neutze and Mr Milner-White submitted that, in relation to decision making by local authorities carrying out statutory duties, something more than the appearance of bias must be shown.
[77] I start by noting that there is no evidence that the hearings committee knew about the Council’s potential interest on any winding up of the Club. Nor can it be realistically suggested that the Council’s decision advanced such financial interest as it had. The decision potentially strengthened the Club’s financial position, making its winding up even more unlikely.
[78] Once again, there is applicable law in this area.
19 Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2007] 3 NZLR 495 (CA).
20 Saxmere Co Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Co Ltd [2009] NZSC 72, [2010] 1 NZLR 35.
[79] In Travis Holdings Limited v Christchurch City Council,21 it was argued that the Council had a vested interest in approving a medical centre, on land which it owned, and which the applicant wished to purchase. Tipping J noted as follows:22
The full council must come to the meeting at which the s 230 resolution is to be considered with an open mind as to whether the land in question should be sold. The councillors must be prepared to give a fair and open-minded hearing to anyone who appears at the meeting and submits for whatever reason that the land should not be sold. If it could be shown that the council had not approached the meeting on that basis, then the resolution to sell would prima facie be invalid and, subject to any relevant discretionary matters, liable to review. What I am saying is that in my judgment, in the particular statutory and factual setting with which this case is concerned, anyone challenging a s 230 resolution on the basis of predetermination or fettering of discretion is required to show actual predetermination or fettering rather than the appearance of the same.
[80] This dictum was cited with approval by Baragwanath J in Friends of Turitea Reserve Society Inc v Palmerston North City Council.23 This case concerned a challenge by the Friends of Turitea to a grant of permission to Mighty River Power to build wind turbines on Council reserve land. The Friends of Turitea argued that a wind farm could not be established on a local purpose reserve, and that the Council was biased and had unlawfully fettered its discretion by entering into an agreement to receive payments from Mighty River for changing the purpose of the reserve. Baragwanath J held that the rule against bias by decision makers generally applied to
the judicial sphere, and rejected an argument by the Society that “a mere appearance” of bias was sufficient to establish its case. He considered relevant authorities and noted as follows:24
…certainly the decision of any judge who received payment whether or not it was made in contemplation of a particular result, would be set aside (Dimes v Grand Junction Canal Proprietors (1853) 3 HL Cas 759). But a judge has no role as proprietor or as local body. The notion of bias for reasons of self-interest does not travel comfortably across from the role of a judge to that of a council which is in substance a trustee for its ratepayers.
21 Travis Holdings Limited v Christchurch City Council [1993] 3 NZLR 32 (HC).
22 At 47.
23 Friends of Turitea Reserve Society Inc v Palmerston North City Council [2008] 2 NZLR 661 (HC) at [97].
24 At [105].
He also noted that unless a Council failed to adequately perform its statutory function:25
…the manner of its accountability is to electors at the next election, not by an application of bias rules taken from another context.
The Judge also quoted the following passage from R v Sevenoaks District Council, ex p Terry26 in support of the proposition that judicial impartiality is to be viewed as being in a different context from local authority decision making:
… Of course, the council must act honestly and fairly, but it is not uncommon for a local authority to be obliged to make a decision relating to land or other property in which it has an interest. In such a situation, the application of the rule designed to ensure that a judicial officer does not appear to be biased would, in my view, often produce an administrative impasse.
[81] Much the same stance was recently taken by Kós J in Back County Helicopters Limited v Minister of Conservation,27 and by Duffy J in Whakatane District Council v The Bay of Plenty Regional Council.28
[82] In the present case, there is nothing to suggest actual bias by the Council’s hearing committee. The mere fact that the Council had a remote and contingent interest in the financial position of the Club is not sufficient to establish actual bias. The cases cited by Mr Enright — Muir, and Saxmere — both of which deal with judicial recusal, have no application. Once again, this ground of challenge is rejected.
[83] It may also be arguable that s 83 precluded challenge in relation to this allegation as well. The issue was not fully argued before me. Given this, and given
my finding that there was no bias, I take the issue no further.
25 At [103].
26 R v Sevenoaks District Council, ex p Terry [1985] 3 All ER 226 at 233.
27 Back Country Helicopters Limited v Minister of Conservation [2013] NZHC 982 at [130]–[131].
28 Whakatane District Council v Bay of Plenty Regional Council [2009] 3 NZLR 799 (HC) at [112] (subsequently overturned by Court of Appeal on other grounds — [2010] 3 NZLR 826).
Discretion
[84] If I am wrong in any of the conclusions which I have reached above, I nevertheless record that I would have declined relief in the exercise of the inherent discretion available to me on the application for review.
[85] It is clear that some members of Protect Pauanui were aware of the rezoning, perhaps as early as 2003/2004, but certainly by 2006. There is no explanation advanced for the delay through until November 2012 when the proceedings were issued.
[86] There has been significant prejudice to the Club in the interim and as a result of the delay. It sold its land conditionally to a purchaser, who applied for subdivision consent. The purchaser withdrew the application and cancelled the contract when the present proceedings were issued. The Club’s accountant has filed an affidavit, which records that as a result of its inability to sell its land as originally intended, the Club has been unable to refurbish its clubrooms as planned, and additional debt servicing costs have been incurred in the sum of approximately $40,000. The Club has been forced to abandon its plans to sell the land while these proceedings have been on foot, and it has reluctantly decided to apply to subdivide the land itself. That is not the core business for the Club, and it has incurred significant consultant’s expenses as a result.
[87] Even if I had found that there was a jurisdictional error, I would have declined relief to Protect Pauanui on the basis of its delay, and on the basis of prejudice to the Club as the affected landowner.
Summary
[88] I summarise my conclusions as follows:
(a) There was no reviewable error made by the Council in preparing and processing the variation under Schedule 1 of the Act;
(b)Even if there had been a reviewable error, and a failure by the Council to follow the procedural requirements set out the First Schedule to the Act, s 83 of the Act precludes a challenge at this stage;
(c) The allegation of bias made by Protect Pauanui is not made out.
There was no actual bias;
(d)In any event, relief would have been declined in the exercise of the Court’s discretion, given Protect Pauanui’s inordinate and unexplained delay, and the prejudice which would result to the Club were relief to
be granted.
Costs
[89] The Council and the Club are entitled to their costs and reasonable disbursements. In this regard, I direct as follows:
(a) Any memoranda in support of applications for costs are to be lodged within 20 working days of the date of release of this judgment; (b)
Any memorandum in reply from Protect Pauanui is to be lodged within a further 20 working-day period;
(c)
Memoranda are not to exceed 10 pages in length.
[90]
I wil
l then deal with the issues of costs on the papers, unless I require the
assistance of counsel.
Wylie J
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