Propellor Property Investments Ltd v Moore

Case

[2015] NZHC 863

29 April 2015

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV-2015-404-000456 [2015] NZHC 863

BETWEEN

PROPELLOR PROPERTY

INVESTMENTS LIMITED Applicant

AND

TREVOR WAYNE MOORE First Respondent

MICHAEL RICHARD HACKETT Second Respondent

Hearing: 16 April 2015

Appearances:

S Gazley for Applicant
MC Donovan for Respondents

Judgment:

29 April 2015

JUDGMENT OF WOOLFORD J [On Application for Interim Injunction]

This judgment is delivered by me on Wednesday, 29 April 2015 at 3.00 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

..................................................... Registrar / Deputy Registrar

Solicitors/Counsel:           Steindle Williams Legal, Auckland

M Donovan, Auckland

PROPELLOR PROPERTY INVESTMENTS LIMITED v TREVOR WAYNE MOORE [2015] NZHC 863 [29

April 2015]

Introduction

[1]      In proceedings filed on 11 March 2015, the applicant, Propellor Property Investments Limited (Propellor), seeks a permanent injunction and damages against the respondents, Trevor Wayne Moore and Michael Richard Hackett.  Mr Moore and Mr Hackett are two former independent contractors who terminated their contracts with Propellor by giving the requisite one month’s notice on 24 and 27 December

2014.  Their contracts had a 12 month restraint of trade clause.  Propellor alleges that Mr Moore and Mr Hackett are in breach of that clause because they are acting in competition with Propellor through their current employment as independent contractors to Positive Real Estate (NZ) Limited (Positive Education) and Positive Real Estate Sales Limited (Positive Real Estate) respectively.

[2]      Propellor now seeks an interim injunction, prior to the hearing of their substantive claim, restraining Mr Moore and Mr Hackett from working for the Positive companies on the basis that they are in continuing breach of the restraint of trade clause and that the substantive proceedings will not be heard for many months.

Factual background

[3]      Propellor provides property investment advice to its clients and recommends certain promoted investment properties.  Propellor does not charge a fee to its clients for property investment advice, but earns a commission for introducing a purchaser to the vendor of the promoted investment properties (often a residential property developer).  Its focus is therefore very much on securing sales of property.

[4]      Mr Moore was an independent contractor to Propellor providing the services of a senior mentor and property strategist pursuant to an Independent Service Agreement dated 5 October 2013.  Mr Hackett was also an independent contractor to Propellor providing the services of a senior investment consultant pursuant to an Independent  Service Agreement  dated 29 April  2014.   The  agreements  were in similar form.  Both contained a restraint of trade clause in the following terms:

10.      Restraint of trade

The Contractor agrees that for a period of 12 months following the termination of their contract for whatever reason, they shall not, either personally, or as an employee, consultant or agent for any other entity or employer, carry on business in competition with the Company within New Zealand.

[5]      Both  agreements  also  contained  clauses  relating  to  the  protection  of Propellor’s intellectual property and the confidentiality of information relating to the company’s business.  In particular, the agreements provided that after termination for whatever  reason  neither  party  would  attempt  to  solicit,  divert,  appropriate  to

themselves or any other competing business, any existing clients of the other party.1

[6]      On 24 and 27 December 2014, Mr Moore and Mr Hackett gave the requisite one month’s notice to terminate their respective agreements.   Mr Moore says he started working for Positive Education on 26 January 2015.   Mr Hackett says he started work for Positive Real Estate on 27 January 2015.  The two companies are complementary.   Positive Education runs seminars giving overviews of property investment and describing how Positive Education can teach people to build a long- term property portfolio.  At the end of seminars, attendees are offered a one-on-one session and/or an invitation to attend a monthly group meeting with existing clients. At the one-on-one session, or after the group meeting, attendees are invited to join a lifetime mentoring programme for a fee of $9,995.   About 90% of Positive Education’s revenue is the one-off fee that clients pay to join the lifetime mentoring programme.   Other sources of revenue for Positive Education come from referral payments received from firms to whom property coaches refer clients for such things as financing, accounting, insurance, property management and real estate assistance.

[7]      Positive Real Estate is a licensed real estate agency under the Real Estate Agents  Act  2008  and  generates  its  revenue  from  marketing  fees  and  sale commissions paid by vendors.   Positive Real Estate sells properties to clients of Positive  Education,  clients  of  third  party  providers  and  clients  who  respond  to

advertisements  of  their  listings  in  the  open  market.    It  advertises  its  properties

1      Clause 8.4.

through digital and print based advertising channels as well as seminars attended by

Positive Education customers and others referred by third parties.

Application for interim injunction

[8]      In  the  application  for  an  interim  injunction,  Propellor  seeks  orders  that

Mr Moore and Mr Hackett:

(a)      Be restrained from carrying on as a contractor or by any other means providing services to Positive Education or Positive Real Estate in competition with Propellor for 12 months from 24 January 2015.

(b)Be restrained from either personally, or as an employee, consultant or agent for any other entity or employer, carrying on business in competition  with  Propellor  in  New  Zealand  for  12  months  from

24 January 2015.

(c)      Return to Propellor all information relating to Propellor’s business gained in their dealings with Propellor that is confidential or which should reasonably be assumed to be confidential.

(d)Be restrained from attempted to solicit, divert or appropriate to themselves or any other competing business, any existing clients of Propellor.

(e)      Deliver to Propellor full records, documents, plans, letters, papers and material of any description (including all copies or extracts from the same) within their possession or control relating to the affairs of Propellor.

[9]      Both Mr Moore and Mr Hackett have sworn affidavits in which they have undertaken:

(a)      That all confidential information and intellectual property (as defined in their Independent Contractor Agreement with Propellor) has been either returned to Propellor or deleted or destroyed.

(b)That they will not use any confidential information or intellectual property of Propellor.

(c)      That until 24 January 2016, they will not attempt to solicit, divert or appropriate   for   themselves   or   any  business   in   competition   to Propellor, any clients of Propellor, or any property developers they had dealings with while working for Propellor.

[10]     Counsel for Propellor acknowledges the undertakings and notes that the only remaining issues are whether Mr Moore and Mr Hackett can each continue to carry on business as a contractor to Positive Education or Positive Real Estate in competition  to  Propellor  and  whether  Propellor  is  entitled  to  damages  for  both Mr Moore  and  Mr  Hackett’s  breach  of  their  agreements.    Counsel  submits  that damages will be determined in the course of the substantive proceedings, meaning that  the only issue for this  Court to  consider  on  the application  for an  interim injunction, is the restraint of trade.

Principles of interim injunctions

[11]     The principles relating to interim injunctions are well settled.   The Court must consider whether there is a serious question to be tried in the proceedings and where the balance of convenience lies.  As stated by Cooke J in Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd v Harvest Bakeries Ltd:2

Whether  there  is  a  serious  question  to  be  tried  and  the  balance  of convenience are two broad questions providing an accepted framework for approaching these applications… Marshalling considerations under them is an aid to determining, as regards the grant or refusal of an interim injunction, where overall justice lies.  In every case the Judge has finally to stand back and ask himself that question. At this final stage, if he has found the balance of convenience overwhelmingly or very clearly one way … it will usually be right to be guided accordingly.

2      Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Limited v Harvest Bakeries Limited [1985] 2 NZLR 129.

Serious question to be tried

[12]     Counsel for Mr Moore and Mr Hackett submits that that Propellor does not have a seriously arguable case that the restraint of trade clauses in the agreements are enforceable because:

(a)       There is no proprietary interest in need of protection;

(b)      Mr Moore and Mr Hackett are not acting in competition; and

(c)       Propellor may be trading unlawfully.

[13]     On the other hand, counsel for Propellor submits that:

(a)      A  specific  proprietary  interest  is  not  necessarily  required.    The restraint is plainly reasonable. Agreements are meant to be kept.

(b)Both   Positive   Education   and   Positive   Real   Estate   are   direct competitors of Propellor, which offers property investment advice and guides investors to a stock list of suitable properties;

(c)       Propellor is not trading unlawfully, having received approval from the

Real Estate Agents Authority to the way in which it operates.

Balance of convenience

[14]     Counsel  for  Mr  Moore  and  Mr  Hackett  submits  that  the  balance  of convenience lies in his clients’ favour because:

(a)      Mr Moore and Mr Hackett have been transparent in their dealings with Propellor.

(b)      Their undertakings give Propellor adequate protection. (c)     Damages would be an adequate remedy for Propellor.

(d)      Damages  would  be  an  inadequate  remedy  for  Mr  Moore  and

Mr Hackett.

(e)       The worth of Propellor’s undertaking as to damages is questionable.

(f)      Third  parties  such  as  the  Positive  companies  would  be  adversely affected if the injunction is granted.

(g)      Propellor’s substantive claim can be determined quickly through the

arbitration process.

(h)An interim injunction would have an adverse affect on Mr Moore and Mr Hackett in that they would then be prevented from earning a living in the profession of their choosing.

[15]     On the other hand, counsel for Propellor submits:

(a)      Mr Moore and Mr Hackett have been less than transparent in their dealings with Propellor.

(b)Their  undertakings  provide  no  comfort  to  Propellor  in  terms  of restraint.

(c)       Damages would be difficult to quantify if the Court found in favour of

Propellor.

(d)Any losses by Mr Moore and Mr Hackett could be easily quantified by looking to the amount they could expect to earn over the period of restraint by comparison with their Propellor commissions or the amount earned by staff in the same role at the Positive companies.

(e)       Propellor’s undertaking as to damages is supported by evidence of the

company’s turnover in the last financial year.

(f)      The only third party to suffer from an enforceable restraint would be Positive companies, but they hired Mr Moore and Mr Hackett with their eyes open.

(g)Propellor’s substantive claim is not a “dispute” capable of arbitration under its agreements with Mr Moore and Mr Hackett and therefore relief will have to be sought through the Court process, which will take some time.

(h)The fact  that  Mr Moore and  Mr Hackett  may be prevented from earning a living in their chosen profession is common across all restraint of trade clauses and is not determinative.

Discussion

[16]     The first question to be considered is whether there exists a serious question to be tried in relation to this restraint of trade claim.  In my view, the answer to this question is yes.

[17]     For a restraint of trade to be valid, it must be reasonable and there must be a proprietary interest requiring protection which goes beyond the purpose of limiting mere competition.3   This must then be demonstrated to meet a standard of a serious question to be tried.

[18]     The  affidavit  evidence  of  Ms  Connors  (a  principal  and  senior  property strategist at Propellor) explains the basis of Propellor’s proprietary claim.   Most relevantly, she suggests that Mr Moore and Mr Hackett were the core of Propellor’s presence in the Auckland area, and given that, Propellor invested significant time and  money in  training  Mr  Moore  and  Mr  Hackett,  and  in  advertising  them  as Propellor’s representatives in Auckland.

[19]     The  investment  in  training  and  advertising  supports  the  existence  of  a proprietal  interest  sufficient  to  sustain a breach  of restraint  of trade claim. The

claimed interest is not just about limiting competition, but is based on protecting the

3      Dhanapala v Jackson (1999) 9 TCLR 67 at 93.

reputation  and  branding  of  Propellor,  through  protecting  the  investment  that Propellor made in associating itself and it’s business with Mr Moore and Mr Hackett. There are evident links between the Propellor business in Auckland and Mr Moore and Mr Hackett personally to support the basis of a restraint of trade claim.

[20]     To support an action for breach of a restraint of trade agreement, the Court must further consider whether the parties are acting in competition with each other. Here, despite the arguments of Mr Moore and Mr Hackett, I consider that through Positive Education and Positive Real Estate, the parties appear to be in competition as the companies are rivals for investors in new property developments.  The target clients that each seeks to attract are substantively the same types of individuals, because each business targets and develops new property investors in order to profit

– in various ways – from those investors’ subsequent property purchases.  Although, as Mr Moore and Mr Hackett have sought to argue, each company’s strategies and overall approach to harnessing the profit from these investors differ to some extent they seem to be in competition to obtain the same potential clients.   Clients who engage with Positive Education/Positive Real Estate services are unlikely to engage with Propellor’s services, and vice versa.

[21]     As Propellor has a proprietary interest that could sustain a restraint of trade clause, and the parties appear to be in competition with each other, there is prima facie a serious question to be tried in relation to the restraint of trade clause.

[22]     Finally on the issue of a serious question to be tried, despite the allegations made by Messrs Moore and Hackett, it has not been proven that Propellor is in fact acting unlawfully.  Propellor’s business evidently has some similarities to real estate work, but no actual breach of the Real Estate Agents Act 2008 is demonstrated on the facts.   The evidence from  both  sides  is,  in  fact,  not  overly disparate:  both acknowledge that the work undertaken by Propellor has some similarities to real estate agent work, with Ms Connors’ affidavit claiming that it was within the scope of the legislation and that the Real Estate Agents Authority had taken no issue with it.  Although Mr Moore and Mr Hackett have sought to draw parallels between the types of work they carried out and the work of a real estate agent, more would be necessary to show Propellor is acting unlawfully and to demonstrate the effect of that

on the legitimacy of the restraint of trade clauses.  The allegation does not overcome my earlier assessment that these facts present a serious case to be tried.

[23]     Given this finding, I now consider where the overall balance of convenience lies.  This question focuses on whether one party will be overwhelmingly or clearly most inconvenienced if an interim injunction is granted or refused.4   Overall, I am of the view that the balance of convenience favours Mr Moore and Mr Hackett, despite the case against them, and leans ultimately against allowing an interim injunction for the following reasons.

[24]     Firstly,  I  consider  that  the  undertakings  must  be  taken  at  face  value. Mr Moore and Mr Hackett have committed to not attempting to solicit, divert or appropriate any clients or property developer relationships that they had with Propellor clients, as well as toward keeping Propellor’s confidential information private.   There is no reason that these promises, which have been signed and witnessed and entered as affidavits to the Court, should not be considered to be legitimate.   Moreover, if evidence can be provided that the undertakings were not upheld, and Mr Moore and Mr Hatchett are found to have breached the restraint of trade clauses, it may increase their liability in damages.

[25]     There has also been no evidence provided of substantive damage to Propellor through loss of sales or in any other tangible way.  This implies that, although Mr Moore and Mr Hackett’s actions may have had  some effect  on the business of Propellor, the impact is not particularly direct or extensive.   It will therefore not unduly inconvenience Propellor for Mr Moore and Mr Hatchett to continue in their current employment, which is unlikely to cause any losses which cannot be subsequently remedied through damages.

[26]     Conversely, Mr Moore and Mr Hatchett require a steady income.  Not having an income from their contracts with the Positive companies will directly inconvenience them in a way which may prejudice their ability to engage with these proceedings.   Neither is in a position to support themselves if they are unable to

work until the end of this proceeding.  The inconvenience of not being able to pay

4      Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Limited v Harvest Bakeries Limited [1985] 2 NZLR 140.

monthly bills and having a steady income, even if subsequently remedied by a damages  claim,  will  be  significant.     Although  both  parties  will,  due  to  the commission nature of their work, have some difficulty showing the specific quantification  of  their  losses  over  a  certain  period  it  is  only  Mr Moore  and Mr Hackett who will suffer directly and immediately if they are precluded from working, and in a way which will be difficult to rectify in damages.  While this is a feature which is common to all restraint of trade clauses, it is also a reason that restraint of trade clauses have strict requirements in order to be upheld, and that the assessment of where the ‘balance of convenience’ and ‘interests of justice’ lie in interim injunction applications are particularly important.

[27]     Finally,  arbitration  is  available  in  terms  of  the  agreements  entered  into between the parties, which remain binding despite the termination of the agreements that they lie within.5    Despite the contention that the only clauses which “survive” the termination of an agreement for any reason are those stated in the agreement, s 6 of the Arbitration Act makes Schedule 1 of that Act binding on all arbitrations taking place in New Zealand.  This means that the provisions in art 16(1), as they were not specifically excluded, apply so as to make the arbitration clause valid.

[28]     Under arbitration, the matter can be dealt with promptly.   This is another factor in favour of not granting an injunction.   There is no need for the court to intervene on an interim basis where a matter is likely to be resolved quickly at a more substantive hearing.6

[29]     Standing back and assessing where the overall justice in the matter lies, I am of the view that Mr Moore and Mr Hackett should not be restrained from continuing their employment while the outcome of these proceedings is determined.  The status

quo should be preserved.

5      Arbitration Act 1996, Schedule 1, art 16(1).

6      Green Acres Franchise Group v Reube [2014] NZHC 402 at [43]; TMA Group of Companies v

Coleman HC Auckland CIV-2011-404-3208, 22 July 2011.

Conclusion

[30]     In summary, although there is a serious issue to be tried, the balance of the convenience  weighs  against  allowing  an  interim  injunction  four  months  into  a

12 month  period  within  which  Mr  Moore  and  Mr  Hackett  are  restrained  from working for a competitor.   I decline to grant the relief sought by way of interim injunction.  Costs are payable by Propellor on a 2B basis for this application.

……………………………….

Woolford J

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