Preserve New Chum for Everyone Incorporated v Thames Coromandel District Council
[2025] NZHC 2688
•16 September 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2025-404-578
[2025] NZHC 2688
UNDER the Resource Management Act 1991 IN THE MATTER
of an appeal against the decision of the
Environment Court in [2025] NZEnvC 036
BETWEEN
PRESERVE NEW CHUM FOR EVERYONE INCORPORATED
Appellant
AND
THAMES COROMANDEL DISTRICT COUNCIL
Respondent
AND
DEIDRE MEAR
First Interested Party
AND
NORTHLAND LAND PROPERTY LIMITED
Second Interested Party
Hearing: 10 June 2025 Appearances:
R B Enright, T M Urlich and M R Enright for appellant A M B Green and R H Ashton for respondent
J L Beresford for first interested party H A Atkins for second interested party
Judgment:
16 September 2025
JUDGMENT OF JOHNSTONE J
Solicitors:
This judgment was delivered by me on 16 September 2025 at 3pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Richard Allen Law Associates Limited, Auckland Brookfields, Auckland
Atkins Holm Majurey, Auckland Beresford Law, Auckland
PRESERVE NEW CHUM FOR EVERYONE INC v THAMES COROMANDEL DISTRICT COUNCIL [2025]
NZHC 2688 [16 September 2025]
[1] On 11 February 2025, the Environment Court decided to confirm a change to the Thames-Coromandel District Council’s proposed district plan.1 The change involves incorporation, into the plan, of an overlay map depicting areas of both “outstanding natural character” and “high natural character” within the coastal environment surrounding Wainuiototo Bay, also known as New Chum(s) Beach, Coromandel. In effect, the Court decided to approve the overlay.
[2] Preserve New Chum for Everyone Incorporated (Preserve New Chum) appeals against that decision, raising questions of law. It says that the Environment Court’s interpretation of the “natural character” of the coastal environment — as a concept informed by consideration of its “naturalness”, independently of Māori relational and cultural values — is wrong. It says the Natural Character overlay should be informed by such values.
Why, in the context of this appeal, is “natural character” and its correct interpretation significant?
[3] The phrase “natural character” appears in two places in the Resource Management Act 1991 (the RMA):
(a)Under s 6, persons exercising functions and powers under the RMA are required to recognise and provide for various matters of national importance, which include “the preservation of the natural character of the coastal environment [and other places]” and its protection from inappropriate subdivision, use, and development.
(b)And under s 58, a New Zealand coastal policy statement may state objectives and policies about “national priorities for the preservation of the natural character of the coastal environment of New Zealand, including protection from inappropriate subdivision, use, and development”.
1 Northern Land Property Limited v Thames-Coromandel District Council [2025] NZEnvC 036.
[4] The New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 2010 (the CPS) thus relevantly states as an objective:2
To preserve the natural character of the coastal environment and protect natural features and landscape values through:
• recognising the characteristics and qualities that contribute to natural character, natural features and landscape values and their location and distribution;
…
[5] And amongst the 29 policies set out in the CPS are “Policy 13 Preservation of natural character” and “Policy 14 Restoration of natural character”. These policies are addressed further, below. For now, most relevant is that Policy 13 refers to preservation of “the natural character of the coastal environment … including by … assessing the natural character of the coastal environment … by mapping or otherwise identifying at least areas of high natural character”.
[6] Territorial authorities such as the Council are required to prepare and change their district plans in accordance with the provisions of Part 2 of the RMA (which include s 6), and the CPS.3 Interpretation of the phrase “natural character” is therefore significant, in the context of this appeal, because:
(a)this appeal amounts to a further episode in a long and unfinished story relating to the Council’s endeavour to change its district plan; and
(b)the Council has been required, in doing so, to assess the natural character of the Wainuiototo Bay environment by mapping or otherwise identifying areas of “high natural character”.
[7] In short, the Council’s amended district plan needs to map, or otherwise identify, areas of “high natural character” within its coastal environment.
2 “New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 2010” (4 November 2010) 148 New Zealand Gazette
3710 [NZCPS], Objective 2.
3 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 74(1) and 75(3).
Episodes to date in the endeavour to change the Council’s district plan
[8]Relevantly, in previous episodes:
(a)The Council promulgated a proposed plan in December 2013, and a variation to that proposed Plan in November 2015.
(b)In April 2016, the Council responded to public submissions. In essence, it declined to incorporate, within the proposed Plan, a Structure Plan setting out planning provisions for the use, development and protection of land in the area around Wainuiototo Bay. Instead, the Council decided to adopt its planner’s various overlays relating to that area, including the Natural Character overlay.
(c)In June 2016:
(i)Northern Land Property Limited appealed against the Council’s decision to the Environment Court, seeking removal or redefinition of the high natural character aspect of that overlay;4 and
(ii)Preserve New Chum joined that appeal, opposing relief which would decrease the size of the Natural Character overlay, but not formally seeking its extension.5
(d)In May 2018, the Environment Court issued a decision in another proceeding, directing the Council under s 293 of the Resource Management Act 1991 (the RMA) to prepare changes to the proposed plan.6
(e)The Environment Court then heard and received evidence in respect of the appeal brought in June 2016, including expert evidence, and
4 Northern Land also sought removal or redefinition of aspects the subject of a separate Outstanding Natural Features and Landscapes overlay.
5 Preserve New Chum also opposed other relief sought be Northern Land.
6 Vernon v Thames-Coromandel District Council [2018] NZEnvC 76.
submissions. In November 2021, the Environment Court delivered an interim decision:7
(i)finding itself not to have jurisdiction to alter the planning maps that the Council had adopted, including the high natural character aspect of the Natural Character overlay; but
(ii)allowing the appeal to the extent of directing the Council to include the Structure Plan in its proposed Plan, subject to amendment.
(f)Preserve New Chum appealed to this Court against the Environment Court’s decision.
(g)In October 2023, this Court issued its judgment, granting Preserve New Chum’s appeal. Amongst other things, it found:8
(i)The Environment Court was wrong in its finding as to jurisdiction; that is, this Court found that the Environment Court had jurisdiction, under s 293, in effect to confirm or amend the Council’s Natural Character overlay.
(ii)The Environment Court gave effect to the objectives and policies of the CPS and the Waikato Regional Policy Statement (WRPS) relating to the Treaty of Waitangi and the relationship of tangata whenua to the land, when considering the question of the Structure Plan’s compatibility with ss 6(e), 7(a) and 7(aa) of the RMA.
(iii)But, since the Environment Court did not make a decision about the identification and mapping of Natural Character areas, it did not consider whether there were Natural Character areas beyond
7 Northern Land Property Ltd v Thames-Coromandel District Council [2021] NZEnvC 180.
8 Whangapoua Beach Community Association and another v Thames-Coromandel District Council
[2023] NZHC 2899.
those already mapped. And this determination needed to be made in order to ensure that the Structure Plan gave effect to the relevant policies of the CPS, or the provisions and development principles of the WRPS.
(h)This Court’s judgment of October 2023 was therefore remitted to the Environment Court for:
(i)the determination of the identification and mapping of the Natural Character areas surrounding Wainuiototo Bay; and
(ii)any consequentially required reconsideration of whether the Structure Plan gives effect to the CPS and the RPS.
(i)The Environment Court accordingly proceeded to determine whether it should confirm or amend the Council’s Natural Character overlay.9 The Court confirmed the overlay. As indicated at [1] above, this is the decision under appeal. The Environment Court was not thus required to reconsider whether the Structure Plan gives effect to the CPS and the RPS on the issue of natural character.
(j)Other aspects of the Structure Plan remain under consideration pending the determination of this appeal.
The Environment Court’s decision in more detail
[9] At the outset of the decision under appeal, the Environment Court acknowledged this Court’s judgment of October 2023, and observed the matters remitted for its attention. The Court noted that it had since held a hearing on the issue of mapping natural character, and it wrote that the focus of the parties’ legal argument at that hearing was on the relative scope of Policies 13 and 15 of the CPS.10 The particular issue was the extent to which the mapping of natural character should
9 Northern Land Property Limited v Thames-Coromandel District Council, above n 1.
10 At [6].
include matters relating to natural landscape or otherwise relating to cultural associations for Māori including matters relating to mauri, whakapapa and tikanga.11
[10] The Court then set out parts of s 6 of the RMA, and the whole of Policies 13 and 15. And it addressed the WRPS, the parties’ submissions, and the evidence that had been produced, before turning to its assessment of the mapping of natural character.
[11]Its essential finding was as follows:12
The primary difference which appears from ss 6(a) and (b), and then from Policies 13 and 15 of the NZCPS and from the definitions and policies in the WRPS, is that natural character relates essentially to the environment considered largely in the absence of effects of human activity, while natural landscape clearly includes both that natural character and the perceptual or associative values that people share in that environment. The sub-sections and the policies may well overlap, but the differentiation of them in both the RMA and the NZCPS indicates that natural character and natural landscape are different and should not be merged.
[12] Having made that finding, the Court reflected on the evidence it had been offered, and found that:13
… a clear distinction can and should be drawn between the quality of the natural character of the escarpment behind the beach and the headlands with that of the land behind the escarpment. In light of our findings as to the distinction that must be drawn between natural landscape and natural character, we prefer the expert evidence of Mr Frost and Ms Ryder to that of Ms Lucas as to the identification and mapping of the extent of the structure plan area that is of high natural character.
[13]And on that basis, the Natural Character overlay was confirmed.
Preserve New Chum’s position
[14] Preserve New Chum submits that the way the Environment Court characterised the issues for its determination (outlined at [9]) was wrong. Preserve New Chum says that the issues included:
11 At [6].
12 At [63].
13 At [73].
(a)the proper interpretation of “natural character” (in s 6(a) and in the CPS) in light of the balance of pt 2, including s 6(e); and
(b)the failure by two of the three mapping experts to address evidence of tangata whenua and mana whenua when offering their opinions as to the mapping of natural character in the area.
[15] More substantively, Preserve New Chum submits that the Environment Court erred:
(a)in its definition and approach to “natural character” in s 6(a) of the RMA, and consequentially in approving the Natural Character overlay;
(b)by failing to consider that expert witnesses agreed natural character mapping includes perceptual and experiential elements, informed by mātauranga Māori; and
(c)in finding that Objective 2 and Policy 13 of the CPS exclude consideration of the relationship of tangata whenua with the natural character of natural and physical resources.
[16] Preserve New Chum says that the Environment Court’s approach disregards mātauranga and tikanga which hold that the tangata whenua are part of the natural environment (including its natural character), and are not separate from “nature / natural character”. It says s 6(e) of the RMA must influence the reading of s 6(a) and (b). And it adds that the Court was wrong to find that various judicial decisions did not establish the significance of Māori cultural values in the assessment of natural character.
[17]Strikingly, in my view, Preserve New Chum submits that this Court:
… does not need to resolve or provide a definitive definition of NC [natural character] and NL [natural landscape], as those expressions are used in both [pt 2 of the RMA and the CPS]. That would better reflect the ever-present requirement for consideration of context.
However, and in order to resolve this appeal, … [this Court] should confirm that there is a mātauranga dimension to natural character, which includes both tikanga and Māori relational elements, such as mauri. This Māori cultural element is a mandatory relevant consideration and must be addressed as part of any mapping exercise for high natural character in the coastal environment, when raised by relevant probative evidence. The Environment Court applied the wrong legal test, failed to consider this mandatory relevant consideration, or wrongly disregarded it as irrelevant.
[18] Preserve New Chum seeks referral back to the Environment Court “with appropriate directions”.
Assessment
[19] I accept that the issues before the Environment Court included the proper interpretation of “natural character”, as that phrase appears in s 6(a) of the RMA and in various places in the CPS. And I accept this required consideration of contextual material, such as the balance of pt 2, including s 6(e). Indeed, the meaning of primary legislation such as the RMA, and secondary legislation such as the CPS,14 must be ascertained from its text and in the light of its purpose and context.15
The s 6(a) meaning of “natural character of the coastal environment”
[20] A first-principles interpretation of the meaning of the phrase as it appears in s 6(a) must therefore start with the most relevant text:
6 Matters of national importance
In achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons exercising functions and powers under it, in relation to managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources, shall recognise and provide for the following matters of national importance:
(a)the preservation of the natural character of the coastal environment (including the coastal marine area), wetlands, and lakes and rivers and their margins, and the protection of them from inappropriate subdivision, use, and development:
(b)the protection of outstanding natural features and landscapes from inappropriate subdivision, use, and development:
…
14 Resource Management Act, s 52(4).
15 Legislation Act 2019, s 10(1).
(e)the relationship of M[ā]ori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi tapu, and other taonga:
…
(emphasis added)
[21] As can be seen, s 6(a) requires persons exercising functions and powers under the RMA to recognise and provide for the preservation of “the natural character of the coastal environment [and other listed areas]”, and its protection from inappropriate subdivision, use, and development. Further, the preservation and protection of the “natural character” of areas such as the coastal environment appears as one of a list of “matters of national importance”, which such persons are required to recognise and provide for “in achieving the purpose of [the RMA]”. The purpose of the RMA is “to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical resources”.16
[22] The phrase “natural character of the coastal environment [and other listed areas]” therefore operates as a legal construct — a placeholder — which establishes a concept, to which the obligation to “recognise and provide for” preservation and protection may attach, so as to facilitate achievement of the RMA’s purpose. It is highly desirable that the meaning of the phrase, and thus the scope of the obligation owed by persons exercising functions and powers under the RMA, should be settled. The rule of law requires that laws are, amongst other things, clear, predictable and stable.17
[23] I note that the preservation and protection of the natural character of the coastal environment (and other listed areas) is but one of eight “matters of national importance” described, and made the subject of, mandatory recognition and provision under s 6. Other such matters include the protection of “outstanding natural features and landscapes”, and the “relationship of Māori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi tapu, and other taonga”.
16 Resource Management Act, s 5(1).
17 See for example, Tom Bingham The Rule of Law (2nd ed, Penguin Group, England, 2011) at 37; Richard Ekins (ed) Modern Challenges to the Rule (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2011) at 10; JD Heydon “What Do We Mean By the Rule of Law?” in Richard Ekins (ed) Modern Challenges to the Rule (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2011), at 19–20; Philip A Joseph Joseph on Constitutional and Administrative Law (5th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2021) at [8.2] citing J Raz “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” in J Raz (ed) The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979) at 213–214.
[24]The Environment Court recognised, in making its essential finding (cited at
[11] above),18 that the important matters listed in s 6 overlap. The overlap relates to the way in which the subjects of each matter overlap. For example, preserving and protecting the natural character of the coastal environment will frequently preserve and protect an outstanding natural landscape. And recognising and providing for these things will frequently recognise and provide for the relationship of Māori with their ancestral lands.19 But giving effect to one of the matters of national importance does not require that other matters of national importance be adjusted, in terms of their interpretation. Instead, as the Court also recognised, the differing statutory descriptions of each of the matters reflects conscious differentiation on the part of those who drafted the RMA (and, as will be seen later) the CPS. And in each case, it is essential that the descriptions are given meaning and effect. It is thus essential that persons exercising functions and powers under the RMA can understand what they are required to recognise and provide for. Failing to identify a clear, predictable and stable meaning for each of the matters of national importance risks them being undermined.
[25] Returning to the text, neither the phrase “natural character of the coastal environment”, nor words such as “natural” and “natural character”, are defined in the RMA or CPS. But, in the context of an Act with the purpose of sustainably managing “natural and physical resources”, the phrase and its constituent words carry an adequately clear (and obvious) meaning.
[26] In the context of s 6 (and indeed s 5), “natural” is a word used to distinguish natural resources from those which derive directly from human activity. And “character” is used to refer to the quality of an area. “Natural character” which derives from indirect human activity should not be excluded from the scope of an area’s natural character, because human activity has had such a pervasive effect that to apply such an exclusion would likely undermine the purpose of the Act. So, the “natural character of the coastal environment” is that quality of the coastal environment which derives otherwise than directly from human activity. It is that character of a particular coastal environment which is borne of nature. It is, in a word, its naturalness.
18 At [63].
19 See also Western Bay of Plenty District Council v Bay of Plenty Regional Council [2017] NZEnvC 147 at [130].
Authorities
[27] Previous decisions of the Planning Tribunal and the Environment Court, in Harrison v Tasman District Council, in Pigeon Bay Aquaculture Ltd v Canterbury Regional Council, and in Wakatipu Environmental Society Inc v Queenstown-Lakes District Council, support this interpretation.20
[28] In Harrison, the Planning Tribunal allowed an appeal against the granting of consent to develop and operate a refuse transfer station, in the place of what had previously been a refuse tip, on the banks of an estuary. One of the reasons given for granting consent had been that the “objective of the [RMA] to site future refuse tips out of the coastal environment is fulfilled if a refuse transfer station is not equated to a refuse tip”.21
[29] The Tribunal found the estuary to present “a largely natural character with few signs of structures or human habitation at present visible from the grassed reserve to the north of the tip site”. In this regard, it observed:22
The word “natural” does not necessarily equate with the word "pristine" except insofar as landscape in its pristine state is probably rarer and of more value than landscape in a natural state. The word “natural” is a word indicating a product of nature and can include such things as pasture, exotic tree species (pine), wildlife both wild and domestic and many other things of that ilk as opposed to man-made structures, roads, machinery etc.
[30] This informed the Tribunal’s disagreement with the above reason for granting the consent. The Tribunal’s view was that any distinction to be drawn between a refuse transfer station and a refuse tip had no bearing on issues “of national importance under s 6”, adding:23
That section would suggest that a refuse transfer station, being an industrial activity with utilitarian buildings, should be prevented from establishing itself within the coastal environment or upon the margin of a wetland or river.
20 Harrison v Tasman District Council [1994] NZRMA 193 (PT), Pigeon Bay Aquaculture Ltd v Canterbury Regional Council [1999] NZRMA 209 (EnvC), Wakatipu Environmental Society Inc v Queenstown-Lakes District Council [2000] NZRMA 59 (EnvC).
21 At 198.
22 At 197 (emphasis added).23 At 199.
[31] Plainly, these comments were directed to the requirement under s 6(a) to protect the “natural character” of the estuary from inappropriate use. And they demonstrate that the Tribunal considered “natural character” to amount simply to a way of describing the natural, rather than manufactured, qualities of the estuary.
[32] It can be noted, also, that the Tribunal’s interpretation of the phrase “natural character of …” did not exclude Māori values from its decision-making. Indeed, it noted that the tip was “an anathema to the M[ā]ori people”,24 and it proceeded to demonstrate how the subsections of s 6 overlap, setting out its reasoning relating to pt 2 of the RMA as follows:25
In our opinion in terms of s 5 the estuary is a natural resource which should be sustained to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations both from an environmental viewpoint and from the viewpoint of being part of the sustainable chain of marine food resources. To achieve that objective in terms of s 5 one is required to safeguard the life supporting capacity of the water, soil and ecosystems and to avoid any adverse effects of activities on that environment. When considering s 5 in conjunction with s 6 we also have the question of preservation of the natural character of the coastal environment and rivers and their margins which we have already addressed. Combined with that in terms of s 6 is the protection of outstanding natural features and significant habitats of indigenous fauna. Also as a further element of s 6 is the most important relationship of M[ā]ori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral water, wahitapu, and other taonga (treasures).
…
All the elements of [pt 2] to which we have referred mitigate against siting this particular facility which has every potential for environmental offence if poorly managed within an environment which the RM Act seeks to protect.
[33] In Pigeon Bay Aquaculture, the Environment Court heard two conjoined appeals, one against the granting of consent to a marine farm in a Banks Peninsula bay, and another against the refusal of a similar consent. In addressing the “matters of national importance” arising in the appeals, the Court observed that Banks Peninsula as a whole might well be an outstanding natural feature and landscape. But it thought the appeals were “most usefully considered in terms of the local character of Pigeon Bay but not overlooking the contribution that has to the overall landscape”.26
24 At 197.
25 At 200.
26 Pigeon Bay Aquaculture Ltd v Canterbury Regional Council, above n 20, at [55].
[34] The Court then noted the subjectivity of various aspects that it described as “relevant to assessment of the significance of a landscape”, including the landscape’s “aesthetic values including memorability and naturalness”, and its “value to tangata whenua”.27 I note that the Court was here addressing the issue whether any particular landscape is assessed as significant, or in terms of s 6(b) “outstanding”. It was not, as appears commonly to be misunderstood, suggesting that aesthetic values have particular relevance to the existence of landscape, or whether a landscape is natural.
[35] Addressing the subjectivity of any aesthetic response to a landscape, the Court referred to its prior observation (made when assessing the facts in Browning v Marlborough District Council) that:28
The experiential recognition of what is natural character and a landscape worthy of protection goes not to the matter of tasteful subjective judgment but to a recognition that the dominant land patterns on the landform consist of scrub and regenerating forest uncluttered by buildings or jarring colours, and an unencumbered land/sea interface.
[36]And the Court (in Pigeon Bay Aquaculture) added:29
That passage is, in our respectful view, important because it distinguishes the completely subjective aesthetic assessment from a less subjective (but by no means value-free) assessment of the 'naturalness' of the landscape or, in this case, coastal environment. We consider the aesthetic criterion needs to be qualified in that way by Councils and by this Court. In a sense the really difficult (political) question has been answered by Parliament [—] if not in the clearest terms [—] in enacting Part II of the Act.
[37] I understand the Court at this point of its decision in Pigeon Bay Aquaculture to be drawing a well-founded distinction between those matters (of national importance) which Parliament has decided require preservation and protection under s 6(a) and (b), and other, even more subjective, matters which may require action but only to the extent provided for elsewhere, in the RMA or in successively cascading policy statements or plans. The former matters are comprised of:
(a)the natural character of the coastal environment (and other stated areas); and
27 At [56].
28 Browning v Marlborough District Council EnvC Wellington, W20-97, 10 March 1997 at 7.
29 At [58].
(b)outstanding natural features and landscapes.
[38] I endorse the view that this is a choice made by Parliament, which must be implemented.
[39] In Wakatipu Environmental Society, the Environment Court observed that “to qualify under [s 6(b)] a landscape must not only be outstanding, it must also be ‘natural’”.30 The Court then set out the Concise Oxford Dictionary definition of “natural”, as follows:31
(a) existing in or caused by nature; not artificial (natural landscape)
(b) uncultivated; wild (existing in its natural state)
[40] But the Court considered that definition a little simplistic, since “much more landscape has been affected by human activity than is commonly understood”.32 The Court proceeded to cite, with agreement, the above passage in Harrison, where the Planning Tribunal wrote that “the word ‘natural’ is a word indicating a product of nature”, and held that:33
the criteria of naturalness under the RMA include:
• the physical landform and relief
• the landscape being uncluttered by structures and/or 'obvious' human influence
• the presence of water (lakes, rivers, sea)
• the vegetation (especially native vegetation) and other ecological patterns.
[41]The Court added that:34
The absence or compromised presence of one or more of these criteria does not mean that the landscape is non-natural, just that it is less natural. There is a spectrum of naturalness from a pristine natural landscape to a cityscape.
30 Wakatipu Environmental Society Inc v Queenstown-Lakes District Council, above n 20, at [87].
31 At [87], citing the Concise Oxford Dictionary (1990) at 906.
32 At [87].
33 At [89].
34 At [89].
[42] I consider the Court’s pragmatic observations as to the widespread effect of human activity on the environment to support my view (at [26] above) that indirect human influence should not be thought to affect the naturalness of an area.
[43] On the other hand, the Environment Court’s relevant decisions are not all consistent. I refer, in particular, to the Court’s decision in Wilson v Waikato District Council, to which I return below having addressed the relevant policies of the CPS.35
The New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 2010
[44] The most relevant objective outlined in CPS is Objective 2, cited at [4] above. That objective’s references to the “natural character of the coastal environment” and to “natural features and landscape values” are broadly consistent with the interpretation of natural character and outstanding natural features and landscapes discussed above.
[45] However, the introduction of the word “values” is notable. The purpose of doing so — with the result that the CPS states as an objective the protection of landscape values, rather than (in this respect) the protection of a natural or physical resource such as a coastal environment with natural character, or with natural features or a natural landscape — is unclear. It may be to assist with the recognising and providing for the relationship of Māori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi tapu, and other taonga. But in any event, the need for different/alternative wording, specifically to incorporate values, confirms that without such wording the “natural character of the coastal environment [and other s 6(a) areas]” and “natural features and landscapes” are concepts most readily understood as informed by their naturalness, and not their significance to any particular observer.
[46]Similarly, the most relevant CPS policy is Policy 13, which reads as follows:
Policy 13 Preservation of natural character
(1)To preserve the natural character of the coastal environment and to protect it from inappropriate subdivision, use, and development:
35 Wilson v Waikato District Council [2021] NZEnvC 131.
(a)avoid adverse effects of activities on natural character in areas of the coastal environment with outstanding natural character; and
(b)avoid significant adverse effects and avoid, remedy or mitigate other adverse effects of activities on natural character in all other areas of the coastal environment;
including by:
(c)assessing the natural character of the coastal environment of the region or district, by mapping or otherwise identifying at least areas of high natural character; and
(d)ensuring that regional policy statements, and plans, identify areas where preserving natural character requires objectives, policies and rules, and include those provisions.
(2)Recognise that natural character is not the same as natural features and landscapes or amenity values and may include matters such as:
(a)natural elements, processes and patterns;
(b)biophysical, ecological, geological and geomorphological aspects;
(c)natural landforms such as headlands, peninsulas, cliffs, dunes, wetlands, reefs, freshwater springs and surf breaks;
(d)the natural movement of water and sediment;
(e)the natural darkness of the night sky;
(f)places or areas that are wild or scenic;
(g)a range of natural character from pristine to modified; and
(h)experiential attributes, including the sounds and smell of the sea; and their context or setting.
…
[47] Policy 13(1) largely restates the obligation created by s 6(a), to recognise and provide for the preservation and protection of the natural character of the coastal environment. And, as indicated above (at [5]), Policy 13(1) requires the Council to map or otherwise identify at least areas of high natural character.
[48] Policy 13(2) appears to stem from the fact that s 6(a) is directed to the preservation and protection of the natural character of the coastal environment (and other stated areas), whether that natural character is outstanding or not. Whereas s 6(b)
is directed to the preservation and protection of “outstanding” natural features and landscapes. It thus reminds the reader that “natural character” is not the same as “natural features and landscapes or amenity values”. And it helpfully offers its drafters’ interpretation of the “natural character of the coastal environment”, asserting that it is informed by matters which share a unifying theme (consistently with Harrison, Browning and Pigeon Bay Aquaculture) which goes to the relevant environment’s quality of naturalness.
[49] The matters listed in Policy 13(2) can be perceived to feature varying degrees of objectivity and subjectivity. The “wild or scenic” nature of a coastal environment, and its “experiential attributes” such as sounds and smell, are plainly highly subjective. But this is the point made in Pigeon Bay Aquaculture, with which I respectfully agree: Parliament has mandated the preservation and protection of the natural character of the coastal environment. Decision-makers under the RMA are required to map or at least to identify areas of high natural character, so that they may then preserve and protect it. Since mātauranga Māori and tikanga do not affect the naturalness of an environment, decision-makers to whom s 6(a) and Policy 13 are directed are not required to adjust this aspect of their decision-making.
[50] Mātauranga Māori and tikanga are instead to be recognised and provided for when decision-makers engage with other aspects of decision-making under the RMA and the various cascading policies and plans which flow from it. For example, Policy 15 contemplates the protection of natural features and natural landscapes of the coastal environment. And it does so, apparently recognising that Objective 2 of the CPS seeks to protect “natural features and landscape values”, by mandating their identification and assessment having regard, amongst other things, to both their “naturalness” and to “cultural and spiritual values for tangata whenua”.
[51]To elaborate:
(a)Naturalness goes to the heart of whether character of the coastal environment is natural. And it goes to whether features and landscapes are natural features and natural landscapes.
(b)Cultural and spiritual values strongly inform the identification and assessment of features and landscapes within the coastal environment, which is required by Policy 15. But they do not inform whether such features and landscapes are natural: their naturalness does.
[52] As counsel for Preserve New Chum points out, the clarity and consistency of this legislative scheme is somewhat compromised by one of the phrases that appears in Policy 14. To explain, Policy 14 is headed “Restoration of natural character”. It sets out various ways in which restoration or rehabilitation of the natural character of the coastal environment is to be promoted. Amongst a list of “possible approaches” to the imposition, where practicable, of conditions on resource consents and designations in respect of degraded areas is “restoring cultural landscape features”.
[53] But restoring cultural landscape features may indeed facilitate the restoration of their naturalness, in the narrow sense outlined above. The fact that the restoration of cultural landscape features as a strategy to restore natural character does not necessarily imply that natural character is a concept informed by culture. And, in any event, any such implication cannot be attributed greater significance than the express assertion in Policy 13(2) that natural character is “not the same as” natural features and landscapes”. Ultimately, the reference to restoring “cultural landscape features” as a strategy for restoring “natural character” appears simply to be a drafting anomaly.
[54] Similarly, I consider the Environment Court, in its decision in Wilson v Waikato District Council, to have confused the distinct concepts of “natural character” and “natural features and landscape values” when reaching its view that “in this case, mātauranga Māori should ‘be considered integral for defining natural character’”.36
[55]It did so on the basis that, amongst other things:
[263] … we find it would be contrary to the intentions of the NZCPS to treat its relevant policies on natural character, landscapes and mātauranga Māori as compartmentalised. Inasmuch as we are to consider shared and recognised and associative values when applying Pols 13 and 15, we should do so in light of evidence from the range of world views and cultural perspectives before us. Nothing in Pols 13 or 15 or the NZCPS more generally directs otherwise. On the contrary, Pol 2 relevantly includes the following directions:
36 Wilson v Waikato District Council, above n 35, at [263].
a. recognise that tangata whenua have traditional and continuing cultural relationships with areas of the coastal environment, including places where they have lived and fished for generations;
…
c. with the consent of tangata whenua and as far as practicable in accordance with tikanga Māori, incorporate mātauranga Māori … in the consideration of applications for resource consents …
[56] But a definition of “natural character” which focusses on the naturalness of the area in question does not “compartmentalise” the policies of the CPS, or for that matter the matters of national importance set out in the Act. Such a definition simply follows the text, purpose and context of the wording, and permits the policies and matters of national importance to work cohesively, and occasionally in overlapping ways. For example, the Environment Court in Wilson drew from what it described as a “similar approach”, applied in Western Bay of Plenty District Council v Bay of Plenty Regional Council, commonly referred to as Matakana.37 But, as the Court in Wilson stated:38
charageographic extent of an ONF/L [outstanding natural feature/landscape] along the seaward edge of Matakana Island. Relevant to that issue was a question as to:
Whether the relationship of the tangata whenua to the island should be considered as part of the assessment for the purposes of s 6(b) or whether it should be excluded from such consideration because it could be considered under either s 6(e) or s 6(f) or both.
The court [in Matakana] found unsound the approach that some witnesses took of treating ss 6(b) and (e) “in isolation” when both were engaged on the evidence. The court rejected submissions that treating the provisions together would be “double counting”.
[57] As the above passage recognises, the issue in Matakana related to whether a feature/landscape was both natural and outstanding. The scope for overlap in the evidence did not arise in respect of the issue of naturalness. It arose in respect of the task, addressed in Pigeon Bay Aquaculture, of assessing the “significance” of the landscape (see [34] above). Clearly, evidence of the relationship of Māori to a landscape will influence assessment whether that landscape is outstanding.
37 Western Bay of Plenty District Council v Bay of Plenty Regional Council [2017] NZEnvC 147 [Matakana].
38 At [261]–[262] (footnotes omitted).
Conclusion
[58] Preserve New Chum’s submission that the Environment Court “erred in finding that Objective 2 and Policy 13 of the CPS exclude consideration of the relationship of tangata whenua with the natural character of natural and physical resources”, while not entirely clear, appears to be overbroad. The Environment Court’s essential findings are outlined above (at [11] and [12]). The Court found the requirement under Policy 13, that the Council should map or at least identify areas of the coastal environment which display “high natural character”, to require consideration of its character absent of the effects of human activity.
[59] I have found the phrase “natural character of the coastal environment”, as it appears in s 6(a) of the RMA, and in Policy 13 of the CPS, to refer to that quality of the coastal environment which derives otherwise than directly from human activity. It is that character of a particular coastal environment which is borne of nature — in a word, its naturalness.
[60] In this respect, I interpret the phrase in substantially the same way as the Environment Court in its decision the subject of this appeal. I do not accept the submission that it erred.
[61] Further, since the Environment Court’s decision as to the meaning of “natural character of the coastal environment” (as it appears in the legislation) was not in error, it follows that expert evidence asserting a different meaning did not require consideration. It was for the Court to determine the meaning of the phrase and to apply that meaning to the evidence it received. The opinion of the experts on the meaning of the legislation was not relevant.
[62] For the avoidance of doubt, these interpretations do not suggest that the relationship of tangata whenua with the coastal environment of Wainuiototo Bay was excluded from the Environment Court’s consideration, whether by legislation or otherwise. The relationship needed to be recognised and provided for, both indirectly (when the Court considered the appropriateness of the overlay depicting areas of “outstanding natural landscape”), and directly (when the Court considered the overall appropriateness of the Structure Plan responding to the various overlays). But, as the
above description of the way in which this proceeding has developed should make clear, those aspects of the Court’s decision-making are not the subject of this appeal. Instead, this appeal has targeted the Court’s interpretation of “natural character”, albeit without suggesting a stable, much less better, alternative.
Result
[63]Preserve New Chum’s appeal is dismissed.
[64]If costs cannot be agreed:
(a)the Council and the interested parties may file and serve memoranda no more than five pages in length by 5 pm on 26 September 2025; and
(b)Preserve New Chum may file and serve a memorandum of no more than five pages in length by 5 pm on 10 October 2025.
[65]I will determine the issue of costs thereafter on the papers.
Johnstone J
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