Prescott v Police

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CRI 2012-404-400 [2012] NZHC 834

BETWEEN  PETER RICHARD PRESCOTT Appellant

ANDTHE POLICE Respondent

Hearing:         26 March 2012

Appearances: Appellant in person

K C Francis for respondent

Judgment:      30 April 2012

JUDGMENT OF ALLAN J

Solicitors/party:

P R Prescott, Auckland  libertynz@hotmail.co.nz

Crown Solicitor Auckland  kim.frances@meredithconnell.co.nz

PRESCOTT V POLICE HC AK CRI 2012-404-400 [30 April 2012]

[1]      On 12 October 2011, the appellant was convicted by two Justices of the

Peace on charges of:

(a)      Displaying a registration plate that was not authorised to be affixed to the motor vehicle (pursuant to reg 85(1)(a) of the Land Transport Motor Vehicle Registration and Licensing Regulations 2011) (the regulations);

(b)      Operating an unlicensed motor vehicle (reg 77(1)(a)); and

(c)       Displaying no evidence of vehicle inspection (s 34(1)(b) of the Land

Transport Act 1998 (the Act)).

[2]      He was ordered to pay a fine of $200 in respect of each charge and directed to pay Court costs of $132.89.  He now appeals against conviction and sentence.

[3]      The appellant’s notice of appeal, filed on 3 November 2011, is a voluminous document containing more than 20 grounds of appeal.  However, during the course of the appeal hearing, he indicated that he relied only on the following arguments:

(a)      The statutory and regulatory provisions relied on by the respondent are  invalid  and  of  no  effect  because,  since  1920,  Parliament  has lacked the power to make laws binding on the people of New Zealand and Judges appointed since then have no authority;

(b)He is not a “person” for the purposes of the legislative provisions under which he was charged and in consequence cannot be liable thereunder;

(c)      He had a “lawful excuse” for the acts and omissions for which he was charged, and accordingly, is not criminally liable by virtue of s 107(1) of the Crimes Act 1961;

(d)The plate, or “public notice” to use the appellant’s words, was not reasonably likely to be mistaken for an authorised plate for the purposes of reg 85(1)(a).

Parliamentary sovereignty

[4]      Mr Prescott mounted a detailed argument in support of the proposition that this country has had no lawful government since January 1920.  As I understand it, his argument runs as follows:

(a)      On 10 January 1920, New Zealand became a foundation member of the League of Nations;

(b)Membership  was  restricted  only  to  fully  self-governing  states, dominions or colonies;

(c)      Accordingly “ …the Constitution Act in New Zealand passed prior to independence became legally void under international law” to use the appellant’s language;

(d)Upon subscribing to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the government of New Zealand, being hitherto a colonial government subject to the Parliament of Great Britain, ceased to have any power, save perhaps in a caretaker capacity;

(e)      The   government   was   required   in   that   capacity   to   conduct   a referendum in 1920, in order that the people of New Zealand might determine what method of government was to apply henceforth. Because it failed to hold a referendum, the government…

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Details
Case
[2012] NZHC 834
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Prescott v Police, the appellant, Peter Richard Prescott, appealed against his conviction and sentence imposed by the District Court. The charges related to displaying an unauthorised registration plate, operating an unlicensed motor vehicle, and displaying no evidence of vehicle inspection. The court was required to decide whether the statutory and regulatory provisions relied upon by the respondent were invalid, if Mr. Prescott was a "person" for the purposes of the legislative provisions, if he had a lawful excuse for his actions, and whether the registration plate in question was reasonably likely to be mistaken for an authorised plate. The court found that Mr. Prescott's arguments challenging the sovereignty of Parliament, his status as a "person" under the legislation, and his claim of lawful excuse were all unsuccessful. However, the court did not substitute a conviction under the appropriate regulation for displaying an object reasonably likely to be mistaken for an authorised plate. The appeal against conviction on this charge was dismissed, as was the appeal against sentence.

The court held that Mr. Prescott's arguments regarding the sovereignty of Parliament and the validity of laws passed since 1920 were not tenable, as the court was bound to accept the validity of Acts of Parliament. The court also found that Mr. Prescott was indeed a "person" for the purposes of the legislation, as the definitions of "person" in the relevant statutes were non-exhaustive and included natural persons. Additionally, the court held that Mr. Prescott had no lawful excuse for his actions, as the relevant statutory provisions explicitly identified certain lawful excuses, and the court had no power to extend the ambit of these provisions. However, the court did not substitute a conviction under the appropriate regulation for displaying an object reasonably likely to be mistaken for an authorised plate, as it found that the "LIBERTY" plate was not reasonably likely to be mistaken for an authorised plate.

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