Prescott v Police

[2018] NZCA 16

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA708/2017
[2018] NZCA 16

BETWEEN	PETER RICHARD PRESCOTT Appellant
AND	NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent

Counsel:

Appellant in person

Judgment:

(On the papers)

16 February 2018 at 10.00 am

JUDGMENT OF BROWN J
(Review of Registrar’s decision)

AThe application for review of the Deputy Registrar’s decision not to waive the filing fee on the application for leave to appeal is declined.

BThe time for the payment of the filing fee of $1,100 on Mr Prescott’s application for leave to appeal out of time is extended to Friday 23 February 2018.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

1. On 12 December 2017 Mr Prescott filed an application for leave to appeal out of time against a judgment of Associate Judge Bell delivered on 25 October 2017 declining Mr Prescott’s application to set aside a bankruptcy notice.[1]  At the same time Mr Prescott filed an application for waiver of the Court filing fee.  His application was declined in a decision of the Deputy Registrar dated 3 January 2018.  Mr Prescott now applies for a review of the Deputy Registrar’s decision.

   [1]Prescott v New Zealand Police [2017] NZHC 2701.

2. The Deputy Registrar may only waive the filing fee for an appeal in the specific circumstances provided for in reg 5 of the Court of Appeal Fees Regulations 2001.  Mr Prescott’s application was made on the ground in reg 5(2)(b) that his appeal concerned a matter of genuine public interest.  He contended that his appeal involved a central question of law concerning the interpretation of the Insolvency Act 2006 which has and continues to significantly affect the rights of other parties.  Indeed he stated that the question of law affects the rights of hundreds of people each year and is of extreme public importance and on those grounds should be permitted to proceed without payment of the filing fee on the genuine public interest ground.

3. The point which Mr Prescott took before Associate Judge Bell was whether Mr Prescott was a “person” subject to the Insolvency Act.  As his application for leave to appeal out of time states, his contention is that the High Court had no lawful jurisdiction over him because the Insolvency Act does not apply to him as a natural person.

4. In the decision declining the fee waiver application the Deputy Registrar stated:

   Your appeal is based on the argument that you are not a “person” who is subject to the Insolvency Act 2006.  You contend that a judicial determination of this issue is required.  I disagree.  In my view, there is no ambiguity in the meaning of “person” in the Insolvency Act 2006 which could require resolution by a judicial determination.  In my view, your reliance on the definitions of “person” in s 29 of the Interpretation Act 1999 and s 29 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is misconceived.  Those definitions are non-exhaustive; their use of the word “includes” plainly does not exclude natural persons, but instead serves to extend the meaning of “person” beyond a natural person to include a corporation sole, a body corporate, and an unincorporated body.  Those extended definitions are not relevant and do not need to be considered here because s 6 of the Insolvency Act 2006 makes it clear that the Insolvency Act 2006 only applies to natural persons instead of corporations and other entities.  The point raised by you has been dismissed unreservedly by both Associate Judge Bell and Allan J.

   As it seems that this point is not arguable, I do not consider that the appeal can be said to involve any question of law that will be (or is required to be) determined.  Similarly, I also do not consider that the appeal raises issues of significant interest to the public or to a substantial section of the public.

5. Mr Prescott’s application for review of the Deputy Registrar’s decision is extensive and raises several grounds including lack of jurisdiction, lack of procedural fairness and due process and reasonable apprehension of bias.  In particular Mr Prescott focuses upon passages from the decision quoted above, contending that they are absurd and nonsensical.

6. In my view the Deputy Registrar’s conclusion, which is the same as that of Associate Judge Bell,[2] is plainly correct.  I agree with her conclusion that Mr Prescott’s proposition as to the meaning of “person” in the Insolvency Act is not arguable.  His proposed appeal does not raise a matter of genuine public interest.  

   [2]At [28].

7. Consequently the application for review of the Deputy Registrar’s decision not to waive the filing fee on the application for leave to appeal is declined.

8. The time for the payment of the filing fee of $1,100 on Mr Prescott’s application for leave to appeal out of time is extended to Friday 23 February 2018.  If the fee is not paid by that date no further action can be taken on his proposed appeal.

Solicitors:
Meredith Connell, Auckland for Respondent