IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 85/2009
SC 86/2009
SC 87/2009
SC 88/2009
[2009] NZSC 107MICHAEL WAUCHOP PORTER
MILES GAISFORD ELLIOTT
DHARMINDER SINGH
SURJIT SINGHv
THE QUEEN
Court:Tipping, McGrath and Wilson JJ
Counsel:R B Squire QC for Applicants
N P Chisnall for Crown
Judgment:20 October 2009
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The applications for leave to appeal are all dismissed.
REASONS
[1] These four applicants seek leave to appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal upholding an order made in the District Court that all four be tried by Judge alone. They are charged with conspiracy to assist illegal immigrants to stay in New Zealand or others to work in New Zealand contrary to their work permits. The District Court Judge exercised his discretion under s 361D of the Crimes Act 1961 to order trial by Judge alone, being satisfied that the criteria for such an order were satisfied. The Court of Appeal, after considering a number of grounds upon which the District Court order was attacked, expressed itself as satisfied that the Judge did have jurisdiction to make the order and was justified in exercising his discretion in the way he did.
[2] Section 361D came into force on 25 October 2008 and is in the following terms:
361D Judge may order trial without jury in certain cases that are likely to be long and complex
(1)This section applies only to a person (the accused person) who is committed for trial for an offence that is not—
(a)an offence for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for life or imprisonment for 14 years or more; or
(b)an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit, or of being a party to the commission of, or of being an accessory after the fact to, an offence referred to in paragraph (a).
(2)The Judge may, on a written application for the purpose made by the prosecutor to the Judge and served on the accused person before the accused person is given in charge to the jury, order that the accused person be tried for the offence before the Judge without a jury.
(3)However, the Judge may make an order under subsection (2) only if the prosecution and the accused person have been given an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application, and following such hearing, the Judge is satisfied—
(a)that all reasonable procedural orders (if any), and all other reasonable arrangements (if any), to facilitate the shortening of the trial, have been made, but the duration of the trial still seems likely to exceed 20 days; and
(b)that, in the circumstances of the case, the accused person's right to trial by jury is outweighed by the likelihood that potential jurors will not be able to perform their duties effectively.
(4)In considering, for the purposes of subsection (3)(b), the circumstances of the case, the Judge must take into account the following matters:
(a)the number and nature of the offences with which the accused person is…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Porter, Elliott, Singh and Singh v The Queen and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2009] NZSC 107
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The applicants sought to raise a point concerning the relationship between section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the terms of section 361D of the Crimes Act 1961. The applicants contended that the Courts below erred in failing to bring to account the terms of section 5 in the section 361D assessment. The Court found that the alleged "failure" of the Court of Appeal and the trial Judge to make specific reference to section 5 and to apply its terms expressly, as an additional requirement, before exercising the discretion in favour of trial by Judge alone, was of no moment. Once the statutory criteria were present and the trial Judge was properly satisfied, in accordance with the section's requirements, that the discretion should be exercised in favour of trial by Judge alone, the limitation on the right to trial by jury must be regarded as a justified limitation.
The Court dismissed the applications for leave to appeal, finding that the applicants had not made out any ground for the grant of leave. The Court did not consider it to be reasonably arguable that the substantial miscarriage of justice ground might apply to this case. The Court held that the concurrent views of the trial Judge and the Court of Appeal that this was a case for an order under section 361D could not reasonably be attacked in this Court on account of any error of principle or on any other basis representing a point of general or public importance.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.