Pond v The Queen - [2020] NZSC 37

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI MANA NUI

SC 124/2019
[2020] NZSC 37

BETWEEN	LINDA JUDITH POND Applicant
AND	THE QUEEN Respondent

Court:	Glazebrook and O’Regan JJ
Counsel:	N Levy QC for Applicant R K Thomson for Respondent
Judgment:	20 April 2020

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

The applicant was charged with the attempted murder of her daughter. The background to this was that the applicant suffers from a delusional disorder and on an occasion when she was suffering from an insane delusion, she stabbed her daughter in the back. Simon France J determined that the only available verdict at trial would be that the applicant was not guilty by reason of insanity and entered a verdict to that effect.[1]
[1]R v Pond [2018] NZHC 501 at [21].
In a subsequent decision, Simon France J made an order under s 24(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 (the CPMIPA) that the applicant be detained in a hospital as a special patient under the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (the MHA).[2] In the same decision, Simon France J refused an application by the applicant for name suppression. He noted that the victim opposed suppression.[3] He determined the matter under s 200 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (the CPA).[4]
[2]R v Pond [2018] NZHC 1075 at [13].
[3]At [15] and [18].
[4]At [16] and [21].
The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal against the High Court Judge’s refusal to make an order suppressing her name. The essence of the argument before the Court of Appeal was that the High Court Judge had erred in determining the matter under s 200 of the CPA. Rather, it was argued, the application for name suppression should have been determined under s 11B of the Family Court Act 1980 (the FCA).
As mentioned earlier, the order that the applicant be detained as a special patient was made under s 24(2)(a) of the CPMIPA, which refers to an order that a defendant be detained “in a hospital as a special patient under the [MHA]”.
Section 25 of the MHA provides that ss 11B to 11D of the FCA apply to the publication of a report of any proceedings under the MHA in the Family Court or in any other court. The argument for the applicant in the Court of Appeal was that because the order made under s 24 of the CPMIPA required that the applicant be detained as a special patient under the MHA, the proceeding in which the order was made was a proceeding “under” the MHA, and thus ss 11B–11D of the FCA applied. If that were correct, publication of the applicant’s name would have been automatically restricted.
The Court of Appeal recorded that there had been a divergence of view on this issue in the High Court.[5] The Court of Appeal concluded that the proceedings before Simon France J were…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Pond v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Pond v The Queen [2020] NZSC 37
Case: [2020] NZSC 37
Decision Date: 20 April 2020

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of New Zealand, Linda Judith Pond applied for leave to appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal. Pond was charged with the attempted murder of her daughter, who she stabbed while suffering from an insane delusion. The Court of Appeal had previously dismissed Pond's appeal against the High Court's refusal to suppress her name. Pond's grounds for leave to appeal were: (1) that the Court of Appeal incorrectly determined that the proceedings were not "under" the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (MHA); (2) that suppression was appropriate because publication would endanger Pond's safety; (3) that policy reasons for suppressing the names of mentally disordered persons were relevant to both steps of the inquiry into a suppression application; and (4) that Pond's daughter, who opposed suppression, was not a "victim." The Court found that Pond's first ground did not have sufficient prospects of success to justify the grant of leave for a further appeal. The Court found that Pond's second ground was not argued below, and there was no evidential basis for a finding of endangerment. The Court found that Pond's third ground did not truly arise in this case. The Court found that Pond's fourth ground was rejected by the Court of Appeal and did not have sufficient prospects of success to justify the grant of leave for a further appeal. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed. The Court was satisfied that no matter of general importance arose and there was no risk of a miscarriage of justice if leave to appeal was not granted.

The legal issues that the Court was required to decide were whether the Court of Appeal's determination that the proceedings were not "under" the MHA was correct, whether suppression was appropriate because publication would endanger Pond's safety, whether policy reasons for suppressing the names of mentally disordered persons were relevant to both steps of the inquiry into a suppression application, and whether Pond's daughter was a "victim." The Court's reasoning was that the Court of Appeal's determination that the proceedings were not "under" the MHA was correct, suppression was not appropriate because publication would endanger Pond's safety, policy reasons for suppressing the names of mentally disordered persons were not relevant to both steps of the inquiry into a suppression application, and Pond's daughter was a "victim." The Court's outcome was that the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

Orders