Peterson v Attorney-General - [2015] NZHC 1336

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND ROTORUA REGISTRY

CIV 2015-463-000022 [2015] NZHC 1336

BETWEEN
CARL JAMES PETERSON

Plaintiff

AND

ATTORNEY-GENERAL Defendant

Hearing: 8 June 2015

Appearances:

C J Peterson the Plaintiff in person
M McKillop for the Defendant

Judgment:

12 June 2015

JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE CHRISTIANSEN

This judgment was delivered by me on
12.06.15 at 4:30 pm, pursuant to
Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date……………

C J PETERSON v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2015] NZHC 1336 [12 June 2015]

[1] The Attorney-General applies to strike out Mr Peterson’s proceeding. That proceeding was filed on 21 January 2015. Mr Peterson’s claim is brought under s 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA). It asserts “misfeasance and non-feasance” by a High Court Judge. Mr Peterson claims $3M in damages.

Background

[2] Mr Peterson’s issues began in 1998 when he was involved in litigation relating to the manufacture of a log grabber. Mr Peterson and his company were involved in the design, manufacture and sale of portable sawmills. The plaintiffs in that litigation, Rex Lucas and G W Lucas and Sons Limited (collectively “Lucas”) claimed Mr Peterson and his company (collectively “Peterson”) had infringed their patent.

[3] On the first day of trial on 26 February 2001 Peterson’s counsel withdrew. The following day Mr Peterson applied for an adjournment to allow him to instruct new counsel. Over strong objection from counsel for Lucas, Rodney Hansen J granted the adjournment and also made an injunction to restrain Peterson from producing machinery alleged to infringe the Lucas patent. The learned Judge noted:

[11] I have come to the view that the interests of justice require that an adjournment be granted. Among the factors which have persuaded me to this view are the following:

[a] This is undoubtedly a highly technical area calling for specialist expertise. It is obvious that Mr Peterson does not have the technical expertise or legal skills to represent himself or his company whatever he may have believed in the past. That became evident in the course of yesterday’s hearing.

[b] There have indeed been shortcomings in the conduct of this litigation, notwithstanding the involvement of counsel. It is unnecessary for the purposes of this judgment for me to apportion responsibility for the errors which have occurred but plainly, as a result of either deficiencies in advice or a failure to act on advice, steps were not taken which have been very much to the disadvantage of the defendants.

[c] I do not see any of the exceptional circumstances contemplated by the authorities which could permit Mr Peterson to represent the first defendant in the conduct of this litigation.

[d] Although there will obviously be some limited prejudice to the plaintiffs as a result of the adjournment, I am of the view that it can be substantially met by appropriate conditions. The plaintiffs will obviously be entitled to an order for costs. I have been informed by Mr Peterson that the defendants have not been…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Peterson v Attorney-General

Details

AGLC: Peterson v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1336
Case: [2015] NZHC 1336
Decision Date: 12 June 2015

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Peterson v Attorney-General involved a plaintiff, Carl James Peterson, who brought a claim against the Attorney-General for damages, alleging misfeasance and non-feasance by a High Court Judge. The plaintiff sought $3 million in damages under section 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA). The defendant, the Attorney-General, applied to strike out the plaintiff’s proceeding, arguing that the claim disclosed no reasonably arguable cause of action and was an abuse of the Court’s processes.

The legal issues before the court were whether the plaintiff's claim was barred by judicial immunity, whether it disclosed a reasonably arguable cause of action, and whether it constituted an abuse of process. The court considered the arguments presented by both parties, including the plaintiff’s assertion that the High Court Rules required an undertaking for damages when granting an interim injunction, and the defendant’s submission that the claim was barred by judicial immunity and the Supreme Court judgment in Attorney-General v Chapman.

The court held that the plaintiff's claim was barred by judicial immunity, as monetary compensation from the Crown for breaches of the Bill of Rights Act by judicial officers was not available. Additionally, the court found that there was no reasonably arguable cause of action, as the interim injunction granted by the judge was within jurisdiction and a bona fide exercise of judicial powers. The court further concluded that the proceeding was an abuse of process, as it was a collateral challenge to the outcome of previous litigation. The claim was therefore struck out and dismissed, with costs awarded to the defendant.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim against the Attorney-General, finding that it was barred by judicial immunity and did not disclose a reasonably arguable cause of action. The proceeding was also deemed an abuse of process, leading to the claim being struck out and dismissed.

Orders