Patel v Tailor
[2021] NZHC 3164
•26 November 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CIV-2021-409-000308
[2021] NZHC 3164
BETWEEN YOGESHKUMAR KANAIYALAL PATEL
Applicant
AND
KAVITA MAYURKUMAR TAILOR
First Respondent
AND
MAYURKUMAR MANILAL TAILOR
Second Respondent
AND
KAVITA MAYURKUMAR TAILOR as
trustee of the Kavita Family Trust Third Respondent
Hearing: On the papers Counsel:
J A van der Zanden and J S Lim (as instructing solicitor) for Applicant
P N Allan for Respondents
Judgment:
26 November 2021
COSTS JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAULSEN
This judgment was delivered by me on 26 November 2021 at 3.00 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:
PATEL v TAILOR Costs Judgment [2021] NZHC 3164 [26 November 2021]
[1] This judgment concerns an application for costs by the third respondent (Mrs Tailor) following the discontinuance of this proceeding by the applicant (Mr Patel).
[2] Mrs Tailor seeks an award of costs against Mr Patel and also against Mr Patel’s solicitors, A.B. Lawyers Ltd (A.B. Lawyers) and counsel, John van der Zanden.
Background
[3] In 2018, the Labour Inspector took proceedings in the Employment Relations Authority against Indy Supa Store Ltd and the first and second respondents (Mr and Mrs Tailor) in relation to breaches of minimum standards of Mr Patel’s employment.1 Indy Supa Store Ltd was Mr Patel’s employer but penalties were sought against Mr and Mrs Tailor as persons involved in the breaches.2
[4] The Employment Relations Authority ordered Indy Supa Store Ltd to pay or enter into a payment plan acceptable to the Labour Inspector in respect of sums owing to Mr Patel amounting to $103,013.60 along with a penalty of $61,600. Mr and Mrs Tailor were each ordered to pay a penalty of $12,000. From the penalties the Labour Inspector was to transfer $20,000 to Mr Patel and the balance into the Crown account.3
[5] On 5 May 2020, the Commissioner of Police obtained a without notice restraining order under the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 in respect of properties at Lower Styx Road and Marshland Road. These properties were assets of the Kavita Family Trust (the Trust). Mrs Tailor is the trustee. Indy Supa Store Ltd, Mr and Mrs Tailor in their personal capacities, and Mrs Tailor in her capacity as a trustee of the Trust were the respondents in the proceeding. The ANZ Bank and Mr Patel were interested parties.
[6] On 8 March 2021, counsel for the Commissioner of Police and the respondents advised the Court that they consented to the making of a profit forfeiture order in the sum of $65,000 and that upon receipt of that sum the Commissioner would apply to
1 A Labour Inspector v Indy Supa Store Ltd [2018] NZERA Christchurch 166.
2 At [209].
3 At [210]-[212].
release the Marshland Road and Lower Styx Road properties from the restraining order. Mr Patel was to be paid $23,900 in partial satisfaction of the orders made by the Employment Relations Authority. Dunningham J made the profit forfeiture order on 8 March 2021.
[7] Mr Lim, of A.B. Lawyers, says in April 2021 Mr Patel advised A.B. Lawyers that it appeared the Marshland Road property had been sold and was awaiting settlement. Mr Patel instructed them to find a way to prevent the sale.
[8] On 6 April 2021, Mr Lim consulted with Mr David Barker, a conveyancing practitioner. Mr Barker advised Mr Lim to send him a letter addressed to the Registrar- General of Land stating:
I act for the applicant in the attached court order. We can confirm that an application for a 2nd restraining order with notice has been made to the court.
[9] I infer the “court order” referred to is the restraining order obtained by the Commissioner of Police and that based on the discussions between Mr Lim and Mr Barker, and in circumstances where the restraining order was to be released over the Marshland Road and Lower Styx Road properties, the intention was to apply for a second restraining order to prevent the sale of the Marshland Road property. Mr Lim says Mr Barker also sent him a form of restraining order to complete in due course.
[10] On 23 April 2021, Mander J made an order releasing the Marshland Road and Lower Styx Road properties from the restraining order.
[11] This proceeding was filed on 16 July 2021 purportedly under the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 and r 17.41 of the High Court Rules 2016. Mr Lim signed the application as solicitor on the record and Mr van der Zanden was named as counsel.
[12] The application sought orders that the Lower Styx Road and Marshland Road properties not “be disposed of, or dealt with, other than as provided for in the Restraining Order”, and “be in the Official Assignee’s custody and control.” It was accompanied by an affidavit of Mr Patel and given a first call date of 16 August 2021.
[13] Mr Lim says, on 16 July 2021, relying on the advice of Mr Barker, a letter was written by Mr van der Zanden as follows:
To David Barker
Registrar General of Land [email protected]
…
RE: Patel v Tailor LEAVE TO ISSUE A CHARGING ORDER PURSUANT TO
Rule 17.41 HIGH COURT RULES 2016
I act for the applicant, Yogeshkumar Kanaiyalal Patel in the attached Court Order.
Mr Patel’s Solicitor John Lim and I are able to confirm that an application for a second restraining order without notice has been made to the court.
Kind regards,
John van der Zanden
Barrister of the High Court of New Zealand [Mr van der Zanden’s contact details]
[14] This letter was forwarded to the Registrar-General of Land and received by LINZ as e-dealing 12190849.1. On 9 August 2021 the e-dealing was requisitioned in the following terms:
12190849.1. Instrument incomplete – Please resubmit the dealing on the correct form being Form 5 of the Schedule to the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Regulations 2009 and have the order signed under Seal…
The time for complying with this notice is by the 04 October 2021 being 40 working days after the date of this notice. After that date fees may be forfeited under Section 37(6) of the Land Transfer Act 2017.
[15] Mrs Tailor deposes that due to the document submitted to LINZ on Mr Patel’s behalf, the purchaser of the Marshland Road property refused to settle and the Trust incurred penalties for late settlement as well as interest and costs.
[16] There were then emails between the Trust’s solicitor and Mr Lim in which Mr Lim was advised the property was owned by a trust. Mr Lim replied in an email of 27 July 2021 which included:
Point 1. The property is owned by family trust and therefore our attempt to charge on that may turn out to be invalid…
A1. We know that and thus we kindly… advise you… may wish to advance that argument to the High Court. The court will easily dismiss tht [sic] argument.
[17] On 10 August 2021, the respondents filed a notice of opposition to Mr Patel’s application and an affidavit of Mrs Tailor. The notice of opposition reflected the fact that it was not clear whether Mr Patel was seeking a restraining order or a charging order and, in either case, on what basis he was doing so. The grounds of opposition included:
(a)if the application was for a restraining order, Mr Patel had no standing under the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 and the properties had already been the subject of a restraining order which had been released;
(b)if the application was for a charging order, the High Court had no jurisdiction to enforce a decision of the Employment Relations Authority;
(c)the properties against which orders were sought were not owned by Indy Supa Store Ltd or Mr and Mrs Tailor in their personal capacities but by Mrs Tailor as a trustee in which capacity she owed no duty or obligation to Mr Patel;
(d)the Marshland Road property had been sold and the application was interfering with settlement.
[18] Mr Patel’s application came before Mander J on 16 August 2021. For the respondents, Mr Allan asserted the application was “totally and fatally flawed” and asked that the proceeding be dismissed with costs. Mr Lim appeared for Mr Patel and advised Mander J he had no knowledge of the substance of the proceeding.4 Mander J set the case down for a hearing before me on 10 September 2021 to determine the respondents’ argument the application should be struck out.
[19] Upon reviewing the file, I convened a teleconference with counsel on 25 August 2021 to identify the issues before the hearing. Mr van der Zanden appeared for Mr Patel and said he was not able to discuss the issues in the absence of his instructing solicitor, Mr Lim.5 I further adjourned the matter to 30 August 2021. I
4 Patel v Tailor HC Christchurch CIV 2021-409-308, 16 August 2021 (minute).
5 Patel v Tailor HC Christchurch CIV 2021-409-308, 25 August 2021 (minute).
directed Mr Lim to attend the next teleconference and also the filing of a memorandum addressing these issues:
(a)what application was being made and what relief sought;
(b)any statutory basis for the application; and
(c)upon what basis had Mr Lim lodged the dealing with LINZ.6
[20] Mr van der Zanden did file a memorandum for the 30 August 2021 teleconference but it left me none the wiser in respect to these issues.
[21] On 30 August 2021, Mr Lim did not attend the teleconference. Mr van der Zanden did attend but was, again, unable to take matters further.7 I directed the hearing would proceed on 10 September 2021 and that Mr Lim was to file a memorandum explaining his non-appearance at the teleconference. Subsequently, Mr Lim filed a memorandum explaining that he did not receive a call to connect him to the teleconference although he was waiting for that call. I accept that explanation.
[22] Mr Allan filed submissions in support of striking out the proceeding on or around 3 September 2021.
[23] On 9 September 2021, Mr Patel discontinued the proceeding. The discontinuance was accompanied by submissions from Mr van der Zanden in relation to costs.
[24] On 16 September 2021, Mr Allan filed submissions applying for costs against Mr Patel, A.B. Lawyers and Mr van der Zanden. Since then I have received further memoranda addressing, in particular, the claim for costs against A.B. Lawyers and Mr van der Zanden.
6 This was a reference to the dealing that was preventing the sale of the Marshland Road property.
7 Patel v Tailor HC Christchurch CIV 2021-409-308, 30 August 2021 (minute).
Discussion
Costs against Mr Patel
[25] The starting point is that issues of costs are in the Court’s discretion but the discretion must be exercised on a principled basis. Relevant in the present context is r 15.23 of the High Court Rules which provides:
Unless the defendant otherwise agrees or the court otherwise orders, a plaintiff who discontinues a proceeding against a defendant must pay costs to the defendant of and incidental to the proceeding up to and including the discontinuance.
[26] Rule 15.23 creates a presumption that a plaintiff who discontinues a proceeding will be liable for costs without the need for the defendant to establish the plaintiff acted unreasonably in commencing and then discontinuing the proceeding.8 The presumption is designed to give a certain and predictable outcome upon discontinuance but may be displaced if the Court finds there are circumstances which make it just and equitable that it should not apply.9
[27] In Powell v Hally Labels Ltd the Court of Appeal recognised the Court does not lightly allow a plaintiff to displace the presumption that costs follow discontinuance.10 The presumption may be displaced “in a clear case” where the plaintiff may have achieved its ends by other means or otherwise discontinued for reasons not connected to the merits such as where a proceeding was reasonably brought, but due to some intervening event or decision rendered redundant.11 The Court does not invite a general enquiry into the reasonableness of a party’s conduct and its reluctance reflects the objectives of the High Court Rules:12
… which allow a plaintiff by discontinuance to end its proceeding unilaterally and fix its liability for costs at that point, and further contemplate that the liability should be predictable and the quantum readily calculable.
8 The terms “defendant” and “plaintiff” are defined in r 1.3 of the High Court Rules 2016 and in accordance with the definitions the applicant is the plaintiff and the respondents are defendants for the purposes of r 15.23.
9 Andrew Beck and others (eds) McGechan on Procedure (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [HR15.23.01].
10 Powell v Hally Labels Ltd [2014] NZCA 572 at [20].
11 At [21] and [22].12 At [24] (footnote omitted).
[28] Mr Allan argues there are no circumstances which displace the presumption in r 15.23. I agree with that submission. This proceeding was fundamentally flawed. Mr Patel had no standing to seek a restraining order under the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act.13 There was also no basis to seek leave to issue a charging order under r 17.41 of the High Court Rules. The rule permits the Court to grant leave to issue a charging order before judgment and in just two circumstances, neither of which applied. Further, Mr Patel was seeking to enforce orders of the Employment Relations Authority. Such orders are enforceable in the District Court not the High Court.14 As far as the third respondent was concerned, Mr Patel had no claim against the assets of the Kavita Family Trust.
[29] This proceeding was doomed from the outset and nothing has been achieved by it other than to cause the parties to incur considerable expense and, in the case of Mrs Tailor (as trustee), loss through the inability to complete the sale of the Marshland Road property timeously.
[30] Mr van der Zanden submits costs should lie where they fall. The first argument advanced appears to be that Indy Supa Store Ltd owes Mr Patel a substantial sum. I do not see how that fact renders Mr Patel immune to pay costs to Mrs Tailor as trustee of the Kavita Family Trust in respect of a proceeding that should never have been commenced. Mr Patel has no claim against Mrs Tailor in her capacity as a trustee or the assets of the Trust.
[31] Then, it is submitted the application was made because Mr Patel misinterpreted information that he found on the Companies Register that the Registrar had initiated action to remove Indy Supa Store Ltd from the Register. This, it is said, led Mr Patel to believe the respondents had sold Indy Supa Store Ltd and disposed of the proceeds in India. In relation to this, Mr van der Zanden submits, incongruently, on the one hand Mr Patel’s conclusion was not unreasonable but on the other that there was nothing on the Companies Register to say the store had been sold and this was one of a number of “speculative possibilities”. If Mr Patel did misinterpret information on the Companies Register that does not explain why his lawyers did not correct his
13 Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009, s 18.
14 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 141.
misunderstanding rather than file an application for which there was no legitimate basis in law.
[32] Further, shortly after the commencement of the proceeding the Trust’s lawyer, Mr Coumbe, advised Mr Lim that the Marshland Road and Lower Styx Road properties were owned by the Trust. This was acknowledged by Mr Lim in his email of 27 July 2021 and yet Mr Patel persisted with the application.
[33] Mrs Tailor is entitled to the costs of the proceeding, there being no basis to displace the presumption in r 15.23. She seeks costs on a 2B basis in the amount of
$12,667 together with disbursements of $110. A calculation of costs has been provided.
[34] In my view costs on a 2A basis are appropriate except in relation to the preparation of submissions for which I award costs on a 2B basis bearing in mind this incorporates submissions for the hearing and in relation to costs. Mr Allan commendably maintained a focus on the real issues and as a result the proceeding was determined quickly, potentially saving all parties considerable costs. That said, the claim was so deficient and misconceived that for most steps a comparatively small amount of time should have been required to complete them.
[35] In the result I allow Mrs Tailor’s claim for costs against Mr Patel in the amount of $8,843 plus disbursements of $110.
A.B. Lawyers and Mr van der Zanden
[36] The principles upon which the Court may award costs against lawyers personally when acting for parties in a proceeding are set out by the Privy Council in Harley v McDonald15 and summarised by Wylie J in Yelcich v Davies & Co Solicitors Nominee Co Ltd as follows:16
[6] The High Court Rules only deal primarily with costs orders between parties to proceedings. That is in contrast to the position in a number of other jurisdictions. The Court can, however, order costs against a
15 Harley v McDonald [2001] UKPC 18, [2002] 1 NZLR 1 at [45].
16 Yelcich v Davies & Co Solicitor Nominee Co Ltd [2013] NZHC 433 (footnotes omitted).
practitioner, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The jurisdiction was confirmed by the Privy Council in Harley v McDonald. The Court there held as follows:
[45] The undoubted inherent jurisdiction of the courts in New Zealand to make a costs order against a client's solicitor rests upon the principle that, as officers of the court, solicitors owe a duty to the court, while the court for its part has a duty to ensure that its officers achieve and maintain an appropriate level of competence and do not abuse the court's process. The court's duty is founded in the public interest that the procedures of the court to which litigants and others are subjected are conducted by its officers as economically and efficiently as possible. In New Zealand barristers also are officers of the High Court. This being so, there would seem to be no reason in principle why the court should not exercise the same jurisdiction over them as it does over solicitors.
[7] The inherent jurisdiction enables the Court to design its sanction for breach of duty in a way that enables it to provide compensation for the disadvantaged litigant. Its purpose is, however, to punish the offending practitioner for a failure to fulfil his duty to the Court. An indemnity order can be appropriate.
[8] The facts that justify the order must be readily available to the Court. A costs order against a practitioner is not a substitute for disciplinary proceedings, or for a suit based on negligence…
[9] Mere negligence or errors of judgment will not justify an order for costs against a practitioner. Rather, there has to be a serious dereliction of duty….
[10] The Privy Council also cautioned that a Court must be cautious not to punish a practitioner for doggedly following his or her client’s instructions.
[57] … a duty rests on officers of the court to achieve and maintain appropriate levels of competence and care and that, if he is in serious dereliction of such duty, the officer is properly amenable to the costs jurisdiction of the court. But care must be taken not to assume that just because it appears to the court that the case was hopeless there was a failure by the barrister or solicitor to achieve the appropriate level of competence and care. As Sir Thomas Bingham MR said in Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205, 234C- E:
Legal representatives will, of course, whether barristers or solicitors, advise clients of the perceived weakness of their case and of the risk of failure. But clients are free to reject advice and insist that cases be litigated. It is rarely if ever safe for a court to assume that a hopeless case is being litigated on the advice of the lawyers involved. They are there to present the case; it is... for the judge and not the lawyers to judge it.
It is, however, one thing for a legal representative to present, on instructions, a case which he regards as bound to fail; it is quite
another to lend his assistance to proceedings which are an abuse of the process of the court. It is not entirely easy to distinguish by
definition between the hopeless case and the case which amounts to an abuse of the process, but in practice it is not hard to say which is which and if there is doubt the legal representative is entitled to the benefit of it.
The essential point is that it is not errors of judgment that attract the exercise of the jurisdiction, but errors of a duty owed to the court.
[11] Thus, the focus is on whether the practitioner seriously failed in his or her duty owed to the Court. The conduct need not be so serious that the practitioner would be struck off.
[37] This is not a case where there is doubt about material facts. Both Mr Lim and Mr van der Zanden made submissions in relation to costs. Regrettably, their submissions remove any doubt they both failed to achieve and maintain a proper level of competence in respect to the initiation and conduct of this proceeding to a degree that they should pay costs. There are several matters that lead me to this conclusion.
[38] Plainly, the strategy of applying for a restraining order and/or charging order was decided upon by Mr Lim (apparently after consulting Mr Barker). Mr Lim says in his memorandum of 14 October 2021:
… based on my enquiries carried out by myself and also through Mr Barker, I have learned that Criminal Proceedings Act can be relied on and also learned that the applicant needs a court order. I also realised that this was the same statute the 2020 High Court relied on when the Court granted a order. Accordingly, I had reasonable assurance that this was the right way of doing it.
I believe, on the other hand, the real question from the court is how can I put a charge without a order granted, in other words, whether it is allowed procedure to put a charge when an application is filed with a court. I advise and repeat that the required wording [of the letter requested by Mr Barker] is clear that I am allowed to put the charge before the court makes the final decision…
…
I would like to advance another point to the court. I personally, as a solicitor, have not had an opportunity to practice on this statute. Therefore, on instruction, I engaged a barrister and relied on the barrister’s expertise. Thus, I then circulated all the correspondence between this office and Mr Barker with the barrister engaged, John van der Zanden.
[39] As I have noted above, the application had no prospects of success. It was so fundamentally flawed as to be an abuse of the Court’s process. Mr Lim’s memorandum
demonstrates he did not take any reasonable steps to research the law and determine that the application was viable. There is no reference to him, for instance, having taken the most basic step of reading the relevant provisions of the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act or the High Court Rules. There is no reasonable explanation how, based on his own research, he could have considered the application was a proper one to make. There is nothing to suggest Mr van der Zanden gave any meaningful consideration to the matter either. As a result, there occurred the extraordinary situation where both Mr Lim and Mr van der Zanden attended consecutive teleconferences and denied knowledge of the substance of the application.17
[40] This, then, is not a case where Mr Lim and Mr van der Zanden have pursued a hopeless case on the dogged instructions of Mr Patel. To the contrary, Mr Lim decided upon a strategy and Mr van der Zanden lent his assistance to it.
[41] It should have been quickly apparent from the opposition filed to the application (which included a substantial affidavit of Mrs Tailor), the email correspondence that passed between the parties’ lawyers and the matters discussed at the teleconferences that the application should be immediately discontinued. However, it appears from correspondence disclosed by Mr van der Zanden that it was not until on or around 4 September 2021 that he advised Mr Patel that the application could not succeed. It was then not until 9 September 2021, the day before the hearing, that Mr van der Zanden filed documents discontinuing the application. By that stage Mr Allan had filed his submissions for the hearing in accordance with the Court’s directions.
[42] The standard of the documents filed on behalf of Mr Patel fell well below what the Court would expect from legal practitioners. The application is unclear as to whether what is sought is a restraining order or a charging order. The affidavit of Mr Patel is inadequate and misleading. It does not address the grounds for the making of the orders sought. It asserts the sale of Indy Supa Store Ltd by the respondents was initiated and completed in India when Mr van der Zanden acknowledges this was speculative. The documents filed did not disclose relevant information, such as that
17 Patel v Tailor HC Christchurch CIV-2021-409-308, 16 August 2021 (minute) and Patel v Tailor
HC Christchurch CIV-2021-409-308, 25 August 2021 (minute).
the Restraining Order obtained by the Commissioner of Police had been released over the Marshland Road and Lower Styx Road properties. The memoranda filed by Mr van der Zanden were discursive and most often confusing.
[43] Mr Lim submits he should not be liable for costs because he acted on the advice of Mr van der Zanden and Mr Barker. I do not accept the argument. As the solicitor on the record Mr Lim owed a duty to the Court to ensure that the proceeding was conducted responsibly. In Harley v McDonald the Court of Appeal said:18
… Solicitors who brief counsel, or who, unconventionally, are asked by counsel to act as solicitors still have continuing responsibilities, both to the client and to the Court. Solicitors on the record are there for a purpose. They are responsible to the Court for the due prosecution of the case and they are obliged to apply their own minds to the viability of their clients' contentions: see Ward LJ in Count Tolstoy-Miloslavsky v Lord Aldington [1996] 2 All ER 556 (CA) at p 571. A solicitor who goes on the record as solicitor for a party thereby represents to the Court that he or she has the necessary level of competence to act as solicitor in those proceedings. Going on the record is not a mere formality.
[85] Ordinarily the advice of counsel will be a powerful factor upon which solicitors can rely, but only if the advice comes in properly reasoned form and the solicitor is satisfied, after appropriate consideration, that the advice is tenable: see Davy-Chiesman v Davy-Chiesman at p 332 per May LJ; at pp 335 – 336 per Dillon LJ, Sir John Donaldson MR concurring; Locke v Camberwell Health Authority [1991] 2 Med LR 249 (CA) at p 254 per Taylor LJ; Ridehalgh v Horsefield at p 237 per Lord Bingham MR and Yates Property Corporation (in liquidation) v Boland (1998) 157 ALR 30 (Full Federal Court) at p 53. This does not mean that solicitors must replicate the consideration which counsel has given to the matter; obviously not because the solicitor will not usually have the experience or the skills possessed by the barrister. That is why the barrister is briefed. In this case however there is no evidence that either the instructing solicitor or counsel had any particular experience, skill or specialised knowledge. Solicitors should at least satisfy themselves that counsel's advice and proposed course of action is not obviously wrong: see Yates Property. There is no evidence that Mrs Harley gave her instructing solicitors anything approaching a reasoned opinion as to how Mr McDonald could successfully sue FAI, and as to the evidence necessary to do so. In the present case the solicitors cannot in our view rely with any force on their having briefed counsel. In that light the discussions which took place from time to time were of little moment. The lack of reasoned advice concerning the difficulties was no doubt because counsel did not see them as difficulties, at least not to the extent they obviously were. That leads to the question whether the solicitors should nevertheless themselves have seen the difficulties and their extent.
18 Harley v McDonald [1999] 3 NZLR 545 (CA) at [84]. Although the result in this case was overturned on appeal in Harley v McDonald, above n 15, the Privy Council did not express any disagreement with these principles.
[44] Not only am I satisfied Mr Lim did not take reasonable steps to consider the viability of Mr Patel’s application himself but when the solicitors for the Trust attempted, in email correspondence, to draw to his attention the weakness of Mr Patel’s position he responded bullishly. There is also no evidence Mr Lim obtained a reasoned opinion from either Mr Barker or Mr van der Zanden as to whether the application was an appropriate one to make. It can be readily inferred he did not in light of his advice to Mander J at the teleconference of 16 August 2021 that he had no knowledge of the substance of the application. There is also nothing to suggest that he exercised oversight over the documents that were filed with the Court, which were so obviously substandard.
[45] While an award of indemnity costs against Mr Lim and Mr van der Zanden is justified, Mrs Tailor has sought costs on the same basis as against Mr Patel. I make an award on that basis.
Result
[46] The third respondent is awarded costs jointly and severally against Mr Patel, Mr Lim and Mr van der Zanden on a 2B basis in the amount of $8,843 along with disbursements of $110.
O G Paulsen Associate Judge
Solicitors:
Jong Lim, Barrister & Solicitor
J van der Zanden, Barrister & Solicitor
Mobile Legal Services (Graham Coumbe), Christchurch
Phillip Allan, Barrister & Solicitor
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