Patel v Patel
[2014] NZHC 1381
•19 June 2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2012-404-2593 [2014] NZHC 1381
BETWEEN RENUKA PATEL
Plaintiff
AND
NARENDRA HIRABHAI LALABHAI PATEL
First Defendant
PRAFUL PATEL Second Defendant
VIADUCT WATERFRONT INVESTMENTS LIMITED Third Defendant
CITYMED HEALTH CARE LIMITED Fourth Defendant
[continued over page]
On the papers Appearances:
Lady Deborah Chambers QC and E Eggleston for Plaintiff
A E Hinton QC and DCS Morris for First Defendant
M Heard and S Ma Ching for Fourth to Ninth Defendants
J McBride for Tenth DefendantJudgment:
19 June 2014
JUDGMENT OF TOOGOOD J [Costs]
This judgment was delivered by me on 19 June 2014 at
Pursuant to Rule 11.5 High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
PATEL v PATEL [2014] NZHC 1381 [19 June 2014]
CHANCERY PROPERTY INVESTMENTS (NO. 1) LIMITED Fifth Defendant
CHANCERY PROPERTY INVESTMENTS (NO. 2) LIMITED Sixth Defendant
CHANCERY PROPERTY INVESTMENTS (NO. 3) LIMITED Seventh Defendant
CHANCERY PROPERTY INVESTMENTS (NO. 4) LIMITED Eighth Defendant
CHANCERY PROPERTY INVESTMENTS (NO. 5) LIMITED Ninth Defendant
APEX MEGA CENTRE LIMITED Tenth Defendant
Table of Contents Paragraph
Number
Introduction [1]
Background and relevant procedural history [2]
Mrs Patel’s application for costs on discontinued defamation/declaration proceeding
[12]
Mrs Patel’s submissions [12] The plaintiffs’ position [15] Discussion [16] Incidence of costs [23]
Order [24]
Narendra Patel’s claim for costs on his successful protest to jurisdiction
[25]
Mr Patel’s costs claim [32] Mrs Patel’s arguments [38] Discussion [40]
Order [48]
Mrs Patel’s application of 21 February 2013 for costs
against Praful Patel
[49]
Summary of orders [51]
Introduction
[1] This judgment addresses outstanding issues of costs arising out of interlocutory applications in a complex set of four separate but related proceedings which have now been consolidated. The nature and some of the history of the proceedings have been set out in earlier judgments but they bear repeating in the context of the three costs applications which fall for determination.
Background and relevant procedural history
[2] Mrs Renuka Patel and Mr Narendra Patel are a wife and husband who are domiciled in Australia. They are estranged and Mrs Patel is living in the family home in Sydney with at least one child of the relationship. She commenced proceedings in the Family Court of Australia (New South Wales Division) under the Family Law Act 1975 (“the AFLA”), an Act of the Commonwealth of Australia, seeking orders for the division of property, spousal maintenance and child support (“the Australian proceedings”). The assets which are the subject of those proceedings are said to comprise shares in New Zealand-registered property-owning companies having a total value of some NZ$30 million; two residential properties in Sydney, including the family home occupied by Mrs Patel; a commercial property in Sydney which operates a BP service station; various bank accounts in Switzerland and Singapore said to contain deposits equivalent to approximately NZ$8 million; and other bank accounts in New Zealand, Australia, the Isle of Man and the United Kingdom containing the equivalent of approximately NZ$450,000. There is also said to be other property valued at over NZ$750,000, including motor vehicles and the shares in a partnership.
[3] At the heart of the proceedings in this Court is an allegation by Mrs Patel that the shares in the New Zealand-registered companies which are held by Praful Patel, Narendra Patel’s brother, are in fact shares which are held in trust for her former husband, either solely or jointly with Mrs Patel, and which are susceptible to orders for the division of property in the Australian proceedings.
[4] In support of claims in respect of the shares in the New Zealand companies and the companies’ assets, Mrs Patel registered caveats against properties owned by the companies and filed notices of her claims under s 42 of the (New Zealand) Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (“the PRA”).
[5] In the first of the proceedings to be filed (CIV-2012-404-1500), the companies applied for orders removing the caveats and the s 42 notices. In a separate proceeding (CIV-2012-404-1502 – “the defamation/declaration proceeding”), Praful Patel and two of the companies sued Mrs Patel in damages for alleged defamation and applied for declarations as to the ownership of the companies’ shares. The defamation claim was based on allegations of fraud made by Mrs Patel in a letter to her husband, copies of which she sent to a firm of solicitors, a real estate agency and a bank. It was asserted in the letter that changes to the shareholding in the named companies were fraudulent. The declarations were sought in order to establish that Praful Patel had legal and beneficial ownership of 80 percent of the shares in the named companies and other related companies.
[6] In a proceeding issued subsequently (CIV-2012-404-2316), Mrs Patel applied for orders sustaining the caveats.
[7] In the fourth proceeding (issued under CIV-2012-404-2593 – “the substantive proceeding”), Mrs Patel asserted claims under the AFLA for division of all of the assets of the marriage, wherever situated; interim and substantive relief related to the Australian proceedings; a claim under the PRA; and equitable claims asserting Mrs Patel’s entitlement to beneficial ownership of the shares in the company and/or their assets.
[8] On 2 August 2012, Narendra Patel filed an appearance under protest to jurisdiction in respect of the substantive proceeding. A notice of discontinuance of the claims by Mr Praful Patel and the companies in the defamation/declaration proceeding was filed on 14 August 2012. Mrs Patel subsequently filed an application on 12 September 2012 to set aside the appearance on the substantive proceeding.
[9] The jurisdictional issues arising in respect of Mrs Patel’s relationship property claims and Mr Narendra Patel’s protest to the Court’s jurisdiction to hear them were dealt with by a consent order made on 19 October 2012, striking out the first and second causes of action in Mrs Patel’s amended statement of claim. They were the claims asserting this Court’s jurisdiction to make relationship property orders under the AFLA and the PRA. The consent order left on foot equitable causes of action intended to determine the ownership of shares in the New Zealand- registered companies.
[10] Orders were made on 10 September 2012 which, among other things, released a Browns Bay property owned by one of the companies from constraints on its disposition, but on conditions to be applied until the further order of the Court requiring Mr Narendra Patel, Mr Praful Patel and the companies to act transparently and to account to Mrs Patel for their dealings, for the purposes of preserving such interests in the companies as she may be able to establish. An application by Mrs Patel for further interlocutory orders was disposed of in part by consent orders made on 18 December 2012.
[11] The upshot of this activity is that the Court is required to determine three costs applications:
(a) An application by Mrs Patel dated 13 September 2012 for a costs order against Praful Patel and the plaintiff companies in the defamation/declaration proceedings which were discontinued.
(b)An application by Narendra Patel dated 26 November 2012 for a costs order against Mrs Patel in respect of his appearance to protest jurisdiction which was ultimately resolved by the abandonment of two of the causes of action, and his acknowledgement that the application for a declaration as to the ownership of the New Zealand companies was within the jurisdiction of this Court.
(c) An application by Mrs Patel dated 21 February 2013 for a costs order against Praful Patel following the consent orders made on
18 December 2012.
Mrs Patel’s application for costs on discontinued defamation/declaration proceeding
Mrs Patel’s submissions
[12] Mrs Patel seeks full indemnity costs for all steps taken by her up to the date of the discontinuance of the defamation/declaration proceeding. In reliance on r 14.6(4) of the High Court Rules, she argues that the plaintiffs acted vexatiously and improperly in commencing and continuing a proceeding alleging that her claims were defamatory. It is said that the plaintiffs deliberately withheld from disclosure trust documents obtained by Mrs Patel through an independent third party which justified Mrs Patel’s allegations of fraud. It is submitted that the plaintiffs knew that Mrs Patel’s allegations were true and that the claim for aggravated damages for defamation was designed to deter her from pursuing her claims to a share of the companies, in the hope that she would not obtain access to the trust deed which supported her claims.
[13] In making these submissions, counsel for Mrs Patel rely on the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Bradbury v Westpac Banking Corporation.1 In particular, they refer to the plaintiffs’ alleged misconduct in:
(a) issuing the proceedings in the face of documents which they ought to have disclosed and which identified the defendant’s statements as being correct;
(b)bringing and continuing the proceedings with the ulterior motive of dissuading her from pursuing her proper claims;
1 Bradbury v Westpac Banking Corporation [2009] NZCA 234, [2009] 3 NZLR 400.
(c) doing so in wilful disregard of known facts; and
(d) making allegations which ought never to have been made.
[14] As an alternative, if the claim for indemnity costs is not upheld, Mrs Patel seeks scale costs on a category 3B basis with an uplift of 50 percent. Relying on r 14.6(3), it is submitted that increased costs are justified by the making of allegations that lacked merit and by the plaintiffs’ failure to disclose relevant documents which clearly established the truth of the defendant’s allegations.
The plaintiffs’ position
[15] The plaintiffs oppose the application for indemnity and increased costs and say that the factual issues and the merits of Mrs Patel’s allegations of fraud cannot be determined until the hearing of all issues between the parties is complete. Alternatively, they argue that the proceedings were not so complex as to fall within category 3 and that scale 2B costs should be awarded instead.
Discussion
[16] I accept that it is reasonable to infer that the response by the plaintiffs to Mrs Patel’s allegations of fraud, in claiming aggravated damages for defamation, was intended to deter her from continuing to make such allegations to persons with whom the plaintiffs were dealing. I also accept that the timing of the discontinuance, a short period after the plaintiffs became aware that Mrs Patel had obtained a copy of documents tending to support her allegations and shortly before the plaintiffs would have been required to comply with a discovery order, justifies the inference that the plaintiffs were acting deceptively.
[17] Had the proceeding been confined to defamation allegations, I would have been inclined to award indemnity costs or, at least, increased costs.
[18] But the proceeding included an application for a declaration as to the ownership of the shares. Such an application was properly brought, irrespective of the plaintiffs’ knowledge of the trust deed and their seeming assumption that
Mrs Patel did not know about it. I cannot assume that the existence of the trust deed would not have been disclosed had the proceedings not been discontinued before the plaintiffs were required to make full discovery. Such disclosure, while highly relevant, would not necessarily have resolved the ownership issue. Furthermore, the question of the legal and beneficial ownership of the shares is the core issue in Mrs Patel’s substantive proceedings, issued after the defamation/declaration proceeding. Putting aside the cause of action based on alleged defamation, Mrs Patel would have been obliged, in any event, to file a statement of defence to the application for declaration and to make the same allegations in defence of that cause of action as she made in resisting the defamation claim and in pursuing her own application. The additional or wasted costs related to the defamation claim are not significant.
[19] I do not accept that the defamation/declaration proceedings were so complex as to require counsel to have special skill and experience in the High Court, at least up to the point of the discontinuance.
[20] Accordingly, while I acknowledge that a number of the considerations identified by the Court of Appeal in Bradbury apply to the defamation cause of action, the proceeding as a whole was not rendered unnecessary by those factors; the claim for a declaration, which mirrored the substance of Mrs Patel’s subsequent proceedings, was not inappropriate. In the circumstances, the discontinuance of the declaration claim is explicable, at least in part, by the plaintiffs’ proceedings having been overtaken by Mrs Patel’s subsequent claims against the plaintiffs in the defamation/declaration proceeding and against other companies owned ostensibly by Praful Patel and Narendra Patel.
[21] For these reasons I consider that ordinary costs principles should apply, but with a modest uplift reflecting such additional work as may have been necessary to respond to the defamation claims.
[22] Mrs Patel is entitled to costs, on a category 2B basis with an uplift of 25 percent to reflect the additional and unnecessary costs incurred in taking steps to
defend the defamation cause of action, as follows:
Filing statement of defence $5,880.00 Appearance at callover 21 June 2012
$598.00
List of documents prepared but not filed
$2,058.00
Subtotal
$8,536.00
Uplift (25 percent)
$2,134.00
TOTAL
$10,670.00
Incidence of costs
[23] If Mrs Patel’s claims to ownership of the company are upheld, an award of costs against the company plaintiffs has the potential to penalise her. Praful Patel personally had a greater interest than the companies in the outcome of the proceeding. In the circumstances, I consider that he should meet personally all of the costs awarded.
Order
[24] Praful Patel shall pay Mrs Patel’s costs on the defamation/declaration proceeding in the sum of $10,670.00, together with disbursements as fixed by the Registrar.
Narendra Patel’s claim for costs on his successful protest to jurisdiction
[25] To explain the basis for Narendra Patel’s claim for increased costs under r 14.6(3), it is necessary to describe more fully the procedural steps taken by Mr Patel to protest the jurisdiction of the Court and Mrs Patel’s response.
[26] On 11 May 2012, Mrs Patel’s statement of claim in the substantive
proceeding alleged as a first cause of action that the Court should apply the AFLA in
dividing all of the property owned by herself and Narendra Patel, wherever situated. In other words, in circumstances where neither Narendra Patel nor Mrs Patel were domiciled in New Zealand, it was asserted that this Court had jurisdiction, applying Australian law, to make orders dividing both movable and immovable property held by the parties or one of them in Australia and elsewhere outside New Zealand, notwithstanding that there were already proceedings on foot in the country where the parties are domiciled. The second, third and fourth causes of action alleged respectively constructive trust/reasonable expectation; express and/or constructive trust/unjust enrichment; and knowing receipt. Mrs Patel sought to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court to make orders for the division of all assets allegedly owned by the parties in any country on the basis that the total pool of these assets included shares in New Zealand-registered companies.
[27] On 2 August 2012, Mr Patel filed an appearance under protest to jurisdiction. That should have come as no surprise to Mrs Patel’s legal advisers. Nevertheless, on
20 August 2012, Mrs Patel filed an amended statement of claim which added to the initial pleading for division of property under the AFLA a claim for interim relief and a freezing order to support the claims in the Australian proceedings, and a claim under s 44 of the PRA. A further amended statement of claim was filed on
4 September 2012. On 10 September 2012, I issued a judgment recording the issues which had arisen between the parties in connection with the four sets of proceedings then on foot and directed the respondent parties in the substantive proceeding to file and serve draft pleadings in response to the amended statement of claim, without prejudice to their jurisdictional arguments.
[28] On 12 September 2012, Mrs Patel filed an interlocutory application to set aside Mr Patel’s appearance under protest to jurisdiction. The application was supported by reference to eight affidavits, including four not previously filed. There was no memorandum of counsel addressing the legal principles applicable to the assertion of this Court’s jurisdiction.
[29] On 28 September 2012, a further amended statement of claim (the fourth iteration of Mrs Patel’s pleadings) was filed. It maintained the first cause of action seeking orders distributing the asset pool in accordance with the AFLA and asserted
six other causes of action, including under s 44 of the PRA; the remedies sought included orders declaring Mrs Patel to be entitled to 50 percent of the entire asset pool.
[30] On 15 October 2012, Mr Patel filed a notice of opposition to the application to set aside the appearance under protest to jurisdiction, together with an affidavit from an Australian solicitor giving expert evidence in respect of applicable Australian law. The notice of opposition included references to arguably relevant statutory provisions and case law.
[31] The hearing of the application to set aside the protest to jurisdiction was set down for 23 October 2012. Mrs Patel’s submissions in support of her application were filed on 18 October 2012. On 19 October 2012, the parties filed a joint memorandum recording that the first and second causes of action in the amended statement of claim dated 28 September 2012 would be struck out and Mrs Patel’s application to set aside the protest to jurisdiction would be withdrawn.
Mr Patel’s costs claim
[32] Increased costs under r 14.6(3) are sought on the basis that the nature of the proceedings was such that the time required by Mr Patel to respond substantially exceeded the time allocated under band C and that Mrs Patel contributed unnecessarily to the time or expense of the proceeding by taking and pursuing two causes of action which lacked any merit.
[33] In support of these claims, Mr Patel relies on the grounds for indemnity costs discussed in Bradbury2 and Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd.3 Reference is also made to Australian Commercial Research & Development Ltd v ANZ McCaughan Merchant Bank Ltd,4 where Browne-Wilkinson V-C held that where a plaintiff seeks to pursue the same defendant in two jurisdictions in relation to the
same subject matter, the proceedings verge on the vexatious, at least as to outcome.
2 Bradbury, above n 1.
3 Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 (FCA).
4 Australian Commercial Research & Development Ltd v ANZ McCaughan Merchant Bank Ltd
[1989] 3 All ER 65 (CA).
The effect of the dual claims was aggravated, in Mr Patel’s submission, by the apparent lack of any arguable jurisdictional basis for orders in this Court distributing foreign-owned assets of parties not domiciled in New Zealand, a claim which was acknowledged by Mrs Patel’s counsel to be without precedent. Moreover, if any New Zealand court had jurisdiction under the PRA it was the Family Court, not this Court.
[34] Mr Patel refers to the failure of Mrs Patel’s advisers to confront the obvious difficulties with the jurisdictional claims, notwithstanding the appearance to protest dated 2 August 2012. He relies also on observations in Minute (No 5) issued in this proceeding on 14 September 2012, in which the jurisdiction of the Court to make orders under the AFLA was described as “vexed” and the claim under the PRA as “highly problematic”, having regard to apparently clear statutory provisions defining the Family Court’s jurisdiction under that Act.
[35] As to the proper categorisation of the proceedings, Mr Patel argues that, at least in respect of the steps taken over jurisdictional issues, category 3 is appropriate, a claim which is said to be supported by the fact that Mrs Patel instructed senior counsel, Mr David Goddard QC, having expertise in conflict of laws and international law jurisprudence.
[36] Except for the time commitment involved in preparing memoranda and appearing in Court, it is argued that band C is appropriate having regard to the complexity of the jurisdictional points and the amount of time required to obtain expert evidence from Australia.
[37] Against total actual costs of $144,939.03 including GST, plus the fees of the Australian expert witness, Mr Patel seeks scale costs calculated on a category 3C basis with an uplift of 70 percent, amounting in total to $53,363.00. Alternatively, costs are sought on a category 3C basis of $31,390.00. Disbursements and experts’ fees are also sought.
Mrs Patel’s arguments
[38] In response to these arguments, Mrs Patel argues that the decision not to pursue the abandoned causes of action was pragmatic and not based on any concern about the merits of her argument; she supports this argument by reference to the comprehensive submissions in favour of jurisdiction filed by Mr Goddard QC. She also asserts that Mr Patel failed to comply with timetable orders and respond promptly to offers by Mrs Patel to resolve the matter, thereby causing unnecessary costs. Mrs Patel also disputes the time band and the justification for a 70 percent uplift to scale costs.
[39] It is also argued that Mr Patel has funded all or at least part of the litigation costs from the companies in which Mrs Patel claims a 50 percent interest, with the result that an order requiring her to pay costs would result in her contributing both personally and through the assets of which she claims at least partial ownership. Mrs Patel also submits that the Court will not be able to assess the true position until the completion of the substantive proceeding.
Discussion
[40] Bearing in mind the submissions filed on behalf of both parties, including Mr Patel’s reply submissions of 28 February 2013, I approach the determination of costs on this application in light of the following considerations:
(a) Costs should follow the event.5
(b)There is a presumption in favour of awarding costs against a party which has discontinued a proceeding.
(c) While, as a general rule, the courts will not consider the merits of the competing contentions in a discontinued proceeding, the costs issue
may be influenced where the merits are obvious.6
5 High Court Rules, r 14.2(a), Manukau Golf Club Inc v Shoye Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 109, [2013] 1 NZLR 305 at [8].
6 North Shore City Council v Local Government Commission (1995) 9 PRNZ 182 (HC).
(d)The jurisdictional barriers to the claims in respect of all assets, other than the shares in the New Zealand-registered companies, were insurmountable. It may be arguable that a New Zealand court might apply Australian family law principles in a relationship property dispute where one of the parties is domiciled in New Zealand, or the parties have submitted to the jurisdiction of a New Zealand Court. But it is difficult to discern any arguable basis upon which a New Zealand court might assume jurisdiction to make orders affecting assets outside New Zealand, whether movable or immovable, in a dispute which is before a foreign court, between parties who are not domiciled here, merely because there are some assets in New Zealand which are also in dispute.
As Mrs Patel’s pleadings now assert in their current iteration, and as Narendra Patel appears to acknowledge, this Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to determine the claims based on the application of equitable principles in respect of determining the ownership of New Zealand-based assets. That is a very different proposition, however, from asserting this Court’s jurisdiction to make orders in respect of assets outside New Zealand where proceedings are on foot within the jurisdiction of the courts where the parties are domiciled.
(e) The suggestion that the PRA could apply to the shares in the New Zealand-registered companies flies in the face of the plain wording of the Act. Because Mr and Mrs Patel are not domiciled in New Zealand, the PRA applies only to immovable property.7 The shares in the companies are movables which fall outside the ambit of the PRA. The real property owned by the New Zealand-registered companies is
immovable property, but the establishment of an equitable interest in the assets of the companies, rather than the shares, would require the lifting of the corporate veil, something not sought in Mrs Patel’s
pleadings.
7 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 7(1) and 7(2).
(f) Whatever the difficulties posed by the jurisdictional limitations of the PRA, the Family Court has jurisdiction to determine all proceedings under the Act unless it makes an order transferring the proceedings to this Court; no such order has been made.
(g)Without a full consideration of the evidence and legal submissions to be given on the substantive claims, it is not possible for the Court to determine the extent to which Mr Patel has relied upon the assets of the companies which are the subject of Mrs Patel’s claims, or dividends from his shareholding in those companies, to fund his involvement in the litigation. In any event, if it should be held in the substantive proceeding that Mrs Patel is entitled to ownership of the shares or part of them, and there has been impropriety in the payment of Mr Patel’s personal expenses by or on behalf of the companies, appropriate adjustments can be made.
(h)The settlement offers made by Mrs Patel were made at a late stage, after Mr Patel had taken all relevant steps in the proceeding and only a week before the hearing date for consideration of the jurisdiction issue.
[41] What remains of the proceeding is founded on conventional equitable principles, the ultimate determination of which will be based principally upon findings of fact. In such circumstances, it would be inappropriate to categorise the proceeding as coming within category 3, but the steps in the proceeding related to the jurisdictional argument, now abandoned by Mrs Patel, have taken more time than an application of the scale would allow. In such circumstances, it is appropriate to allocate different time bands to each step.
[42] The draft statement of defence filed under the Court’s direction on a basis which was without prejudice to the claim to lack of jurisdiction was required to inform the Court’s consideration of the arguments as to jurisdiction, but it is more properly regarded as being referable to the substantive proceeding. The incidence of the defendants’ costs incurred in preparing the statement of defence can be
determined once the substantive claims are decided. The complexity of the jurisdictional arguments in respect of the first two causes of action can be accommodated by reference to the time taken to prepare the notice of appearance under protest, rather than the statement of defence.
[43] The considerations justifying an uplift to scale costs are more readily applicable to the steps which Mr Patel was required to take in opposing Mrs Patel’s application to set aside the protest to jurisdiction, after the Court’s views about the merits of Mrs Patel’s claims to jurisdiction were drawn to the attention of the parties in the Minute of 14 September 2012.
[44] Applying these principles, I assess the costs properly payable by Mrs Patel in respect of the protest to jurisdiction and her discontinuance of the challenged causes of action on the basis that the substantive proceeding falls within category 2, at least up to the time the first two causes of action were struck out.
[45] Costs should be paid on a category 2B basis in respect of the following steps taken by Mr Patel:
Filing of memorandum dated 2 August 2012 $796.00
Filing memorandum in response to plaintiff’s
memorandum seeking urgent telephone conference
$796.00
Appearance at mentions hearing on 14 September
2012
$398.00
TOTAL $1990.00
[46] Costs on the notice of appearance under protest to jurisdiction should be paid on a 2C basis - $3,980.00. Costs on the opposition to interlocutory application for order setting aside protest to jurisdiction should be paid on a 2C basis, uplifted by 50 percent - $3,980.00 x 150% = $5,970.00.
[47] Mr Patel is also entitled to recovery of the witness expenses of NZ$12,472.34 related to the affidavit containing the expert opinion on the application of Australian law, and other disbursements as fixed by the Registrar.
Order
[48] Mrs Patel shall pay Narendra Patel’s costs on the steps in the proceeding related to the protest to jurisdiction in the sum of $11,940.00, calculated as above, together with witness expenses of $12,472.34 and other disbursements as fixed by the Registrar.
Mrs Patel’s application of 21 February 2013 for costs against Praful Patel
[49] On 26 November 2012, Mrs Patel sought interlocutory orders in relation to the property dealings of the defendant company, the accountability of the companies for certain payments, and an order restraining the companies from paying legal costs and dividends in favour of Praful Patel and Narendra Patel. On 18 December 2012, consent orders were made and costs were reserved. By memorandum dated
21 February 2013, Mrs Patel sought costs against the second defendant, Praful Patel, totalling $19,042.50. There is no record on the Court file of Praful Patel having responded to that application.
[50] Praful Patel shall have until 17 July 2014 to file a memorandum in response to the application. Unless the Court otherwise directs, the costs will then be determined on the papers.
Summary of orders
[51] The orders are summarised as follows:
(a) Praful Patel shall pay Mrs Patel’s costs on the defamation/declaration proceeding in the sum of $10,670.00, together with disbursements as fixed by the Registrar.
(b) Mrs Patel shall pay Narendra Patel’s costs on the steps in the
proceeding related to the protest to jurisdiction in the sum of
$11,940.00, together with witnesses’ expenses of $12,472.34 and other disbursements as fixed by the Registrar;
(c) Praful Patel shall have until 17 July 2014 to file a memorandum in response to Mrs Patel’s application dated 21 February 2013 seeking costs in respect of interlocutory orders made by consent on
18 December 2012.
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Toogood J
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