Parker (Bankrupt) v Official Assignee
[2015] NZHC 2871
•26 November 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2015-404-949 [2015] NZHC 2871
BETWEEN PHILIP CHRISTOPHER PARKER
(BANKRUPT) Applicant
AND
OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE IN BANKRUPTCY of the property of PHILIP CHRISTOPHER PARKER Respondent
Hearing: 28 July 2015 and 2 September 2015 Appearances:
Mr Parker applicant in person
Ms K Morrison and Ms Meade for the Official AssigneeJudgment:
26 November 2015
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE J P DOOGUE
This judgment was delivered by me on
26.11.15 at 4.30 pm, pursuant to
Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date……………
PARKER (BANKRUPT) v OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE [2015] NZHC 2871 [26 November 2015]
Background
[1] The background to the making of the present application is as follows.
a) Philip Christopher Parker was adjudicated bankrupt on his own petition on 18 February 2011. Mr Parker’s statement of affairs was received by the Official Assignee (“the Assignee”) on 18 February
2011, and his three year term of bankruptcy therefore began on that date.1 Mr Parker was eligible for an automatic discharge from bankruptcy on 18 February 2014. However on 10 February 2014 the Assignee objected to Mr Parker’s automatic discharge and Mr Parker therefore remains undischarged from bankruptcy.
b)On 7 May 2015, Mr Parker served on the Assignee an application for discharge from bankruptcy dated 5 May 2015. The Assignee issued a summons to Mr Parker to attend a public examination dated 22 May
2015. The public examination took place on 28 July 2015 part heard, and then again on 2 September 2015.
c) The Assignee filed a report dated 21 July 2015 (“Report”) in advance of the public examination, reporting on:2
i) The bankrupt’s affairs;
ii) The causes of the bankruptcy;
iii) The bankrupt’s performance of his or her duties under the
Insolvency Act 2006 (“Act”);
iv) The manner in which the bankrupt has obeyed orders of the
Court;
v) The bankrupt’s conduct before and after adjudication; and
1 Insolvency Act 2006, s 290 [Bundle of authorities (BOA), Tab 1].
2 Insolvency Act 2006, s 296 [BOA, Tab 1].
vi)Other matters relevant in assisting the Court in making a decision as to the bankrupt’s discharge.
First ground for opposing discharge – pre-adjudication conduct
Introduction
[2] The Assignee essentially takes the position that the objectives of the bankruptcy regime will not be met in this case if Mr Parker is discharged from bankruptcy.
[3] It is said that the objectives which will not be met in this case are, first of all, that completion of administration of Mr Parker’s estate will not be assisted if Mr Parker is able to leave the country and not be available to provide information to, and answer the enquiries of, the Assignee. If he is discharged from bankruptcy he will be free to leave the country.
[4] Further, a primary objective of the bankruptcy legislation as applied to this case is to ensure accountability on the part of the bankrupt. The Assignee takes the position that this element of the objectives of bankruptcy will not on its own possibly justify an extension of the three-year period of bankruptcy but in combination with other factors, it is said that this is a contra-indication to the proposed discharge. As well, the Assignee relies upon deterrence as a factor which supports his position. Mr Parker’s case ought to be an example to other persons of the consequences that will follow from transgressions of commercial morality and breaches of a bankrupt’s duty. This element overlaps to some extent with the accountability elements which have just been discussed.
[5] The Assignee says that both pre-adjudication conduct and post adjudication are relevant when assessing these aspects of the case. In this part of my judgment I will deal with the pre-adjudication phase.
The pre-adjudication conduct that the Official Assignee relies upon
[6] The Assignee pointed to the following pre-adjudication conduct as justifying his position:
1.1The manner in which Mr Parker engaged in commercial dealings raise concerns. Mr Parker has not exhibited any assumption of responsibility for the loss caused to his creditors. Rather:
(a) Mr Parker blames economic circumstances, counterparties for failing to settle on property transactions, and a “Maori occupation” that resulted in the loss of his land.3
(b) Mr Parker blames Kim Spencer for misrepresentations regarding Whangape Station,4 and the real estate agent regarding dealings involving the Queenstown properties.5
(c) In legal proceedings commenced by creditors to seek repayment of debts, Mr Parker also raised arguments which the Courts dismissed as being unsupported by evidence and/or meritless (e.g. the proceedings commenced by Barfoot & Thompson6 and Southland Building Society7).
(d) Mr Parker’s actions were also held to be reasonably indicative of an intention to defeat Barfoot & Thompson’s claim, so as to support a pre-judgment charging order.8
1.2Another relevant consideration is Mr Parker’s actions in soliciting funds just days prior to petitioning his bankruptcy.9 While the funds were solicited in the name of a company (Steppeland Agriculture Limited (SAL)), a complaint regarding Mr Parker’s involvement in SAL is the lack of information and clarity regarding how the funds obtained have been applied.10 Mr Parker had held a shareholders meeting in Huntly in November 2010 and had discussed the need to raise more funds to help the business through to April 2011. In December 2010, Mr Parker appeared to be relatively comfortable with the funding that had been raised. However, in February 2011, there was a sudden urgent need for funds. It is submitted that this timing is all too coincidental with the timing of Mr Parker’s bankruptcy. Taking into account the complaints regarding a lack of clarity regarding how the funds solicited have been applied, it is submitted a negative inference can be drawn.
1.3There is also a concern in relation to Mr Parker’s representations regarding the business of SAL to Ms Owen and Mr Ham in soliciting their investment. In particular:
(a) The Kherson farm was represented as being part of SAL’s business.11 However upon their visit to Ukraine, they were advised that this was no longer the case.12
3 Report, para 2.4.
4 Report, para 2.31.
5 Report, para 2.13.
6 Report, paras 2.30 to 2.38.
7 Report, para 2.20.
8 Report, para 1.10(a).
9 Report, paras 3.34 to 3.36.
10 Report, para 3.50.
11 Report, para 3.29(e).
12 Report, para 3.44.
(b) SAL’s role in the business also changed significantly following the incorporation of Steppeland Agri Management Limited (SAM). As at mid 2010, SAL was scheduled to have a “full scale IPO” in 2012/2013.13 By November 2011, Mr Parker was looking to have SAL removed on the basis “it had not been used in any capacity for some time”.14 It is unclear the reason for this change. Again, SAM’s incorporation (which occurred two days prior to his petition for bankruptcy) coincided with Mr Parker’s bankruptcy. In the absence of a legitimate explanation for this, it is submitted that a negative inference can again be drawn.
1.4Prior to bankruptcy, Mr Parker did not ensure the companies under his sole directorship prepared financial accounts. This was a breach of Mr Parker’s obligations as a director under s 194 of the Companies Act 1993. Mr Parker blamed his accountant for this.15
1.5There have also been a number of transfers of property from Mr Parker to his parents,16 or from his company to his parents.17 The reason for these transfers, and whether the purchase price was accounted for, is unknown. One such transfer does not appear to have been considered a sale so as to trigger agent’s commission.18
Mr Parker had himself advanced $350,000 towards the acquisition of one such property and it is unknown if this debt has been repaid.19
1.6On the whole, it is submitted that the above matters indicate Mr Parker is not upfront in his commercial dealings. There should not be a shroud of mystery over Mr Parker’s affairs. Such conduct does not ensure transparency and accountability. Notably, this conduct can be seen to continue post-adjudication.
1.7Additionally, six months prior to bankruptcy (in August 2010), Mr Parker gave a personal guarantee to Southland Building Society.20 There is no evidence Mr Parker had sufficient assets to meet this guaranteed debt. Mr Parker also acknowledged he was aware of his dire financial position at this time.21
1.8In particular, Mr Parker had said that it “became crystal clear throughout the early stages of 2010, there was no hope basically. In fact it was becoming clearly obvious in 2009.”22 Notwithstanding this, and the fact that Mr Parker claims that his only assets at the time were his clothes and his bible (jointly owned with his
13 Report, paras 3.30 and 3.29(a).
14 Report, para 3.18.
15 Report, para 2.7.
16 Report, paras 1.10(a) and (b)
17 Report, para 2.24.
18 Report, paras 2.37 and 2.38.
19 Report, para 3.94.
20 Report, paras 2.15 to 2.22.
21 Report, paras 2.25 and 2.26.
22 Report, para 2.25.
brother),23 he personally guaranteed the judgment debt entered against his parents in the sum of $311,728.44.24
1.9Additionally, Mr Parker’s notified debts in his statement of claim (i.e. on his own reckoning) exceeds $10 million. Mr Parker clearly did not have sufficient assets to meet this debt. Yet, Mr Parker gave a personal guarantee to Southland Building Society.
1.10This is commercially reprehensible behaviour, the seriousness of which is reflected in s 419 of the Act. Section 419(1) states that a bankrupt commits an offence if he did not, when contracting a debt, expect to be able to pay the debt when it fell due for payment as well as pay all his other debts (including future and contingent debts).
1.11It is submitted that the giving of Mr Parker’s guarantee in these circumstances was reckless and was done with complete indifference to his ability to meet the debt. In doing so, Mr Parker was exposing his creditors to serious risk of loss. It is also submitted that the giving of this guarantee essentially enabled his parents (and him) to have more time to organise their affairs prior to petitioning their own bankruptcies in February 2011. Mr Parker acknowledged that he had been considering this for some time.25
Discussion
[7] Quite a lot of attention was focused on various property transactions that Mr Parker was involved in prior to his adjudication. It is clearly the case that while he was in business as a property developer, Mr Parker was litigious and prone to engaging in disputes in many cases. His history demonstrates that he is a difficult and intractable person to deal with in business. I do not however consider that a great deal of assistance is to be found when considering the discharge question from looking at various cases that he was involved in that related to property deals.
[8] I agree that in some aspects of his solicitation of funds for SAM/SAL that there is justice in the criticisms that there was a lack of clarity about funds which Mr Parker had raised following, for example, the shareholders meeting held in Huntly in November 2010. I also agree that the Assignee is correct in drawing attention to the sudden need for additional funding which Mr Parker addressed in February 2011 just prior to his becoming bankrupt. Not only was Mr Parker soliciting funds in circumstances where there had been a previous lack of transparency as to what funds
were being used for, a further unsatisfactory feature of this part of Mr Parker’s
23 Report, para 2.26.
24 Report, para 2.22.
25 Report, para 2.25.
conduct was that none of the persons that he was soliciting funds from was apparently told about his impending insolvency.
[9] I also agree that it is established that Mr Parker was not candid with Ms Owen and Mr Ham when discussing the property that SAL actually owned that in Ukraine. The effect of their discussions with Mr Parker was that they were left with the understanding that the venture owned a dairy farm in the Kherson region. However when they visited in May 2011, and while they were in Ukraine, they were advised that the farm was no longer part of the company due to family issues.
[10] Mr Parker showed a cavalier attitude in his dealings with Ms Owen and Mr Ham to the business and showed scant regard for the need to be transparent and to keep them informed about where the unsecured investments that they were making were going to. The fact that these particular two investors were perhaps excessively trusting, it is not an excuse.
[11] Further, Mr Parker was attempting to solicit further funds for SAL shortly before he was bankrupted on his own application in February 2011. I agree with the Assignee that this timing was not coincidental. Mr Parker may well contend that the funds were not going into his own hands but into the Hong Kong registered company instead. However, Mr Parker’s involvement in the company was central, notwithstanding his attempts to portray himself as being simply a consultant who acted at the direction of the board. As already mentioned, the persons who he directed his fund-solicitation to would have identified Mr Parker has been the central figure in the Ukrainian farm project.
[12] A number of other instances are cited by the Assignee as providing examples of pre-adjudication conduct which the court ought to take into account when assessing the opposition to his statutory discharge. I agree that the circumstances relating to the Southland Building Society loan are relevant. The circumstances of this kind were accurately summarised in the submission which was filed on behalf of the Assignee as involving the giving of the guarantee of a loan to his parents given in
2010, at a time when there is no evidence Mr Parker had sufficient assets to meet this guaranteed debt. Mr Parker also acknowledged he was aware of his dire financial
position at this time.26 In particular, he said that it “became crystal clear throughout
the early stages of 2010, there was no hope basically. In fact it was becoming
clearly obvious in 2009.”27 Notwithstanding the absence of any assets to back up the guarantee, he personally guaranteed the judgment debt entered against his parents in the sum of $311,728.44.28
Post-adjudication conduct
[13] The Assignee has criticised Mr Parker for concealing material facts.
[14] One instance of an absence of candour is connected with the consultancy agreement that Mr Parker entered into with the Harrington trust and SAL the day before he was adjudicated bankrupt.
[15] The Harrington trust had relevance to an agreement that was entered into on
12 February 2011 that is some six days before Mr Parker was bankrupted. At the time of his bankruptcy, Mr Parker was a trustee of the trust and a beneficiary of the trust although he arranged for himself to be removed as a beneficiary on or about the day when he was bankrupted.
[16] The agreement that the Harrington trust entered into was with SAL. The agreement constituted the trust/Mr Parker as a consultant to SAL. A typical description of the obligations under the agreement was described in the following terms:
HT [that is the Harrington trust] and P Parker will work with the company and its advisers to develop a strategic plan and an investment information memorandum that can be successfully presented to prospective investors working in conjunction with Hong Kong professionals and venture capitalists.29
26 Report, paras 2.25 and 2.26.
27 Report, para 2.25.
28 Report, para 2.22.
29 Clause 5(a)
[17] As well the agreement provided:30
By this agreement, [SAL] engages the Harrington trust and P Parker, and HT accepts the engagement to provide services as summarised above
[18] In return for the services provided:
A monthly fee of $5000 will be paid from the 20th of each month starting from February 20, 2011.
[19] Subsequently though:
HT/P Parker’s monthly fee will be increased and fixed at NZ dollars 6000.31
[20] The questionnaire which Mr Parker was required to complete on his bankruptcy he was asked:
43. Are you currently involved with any trust?
[21] He did not respond to the question but wrote in handwriting across the page of the questionnaire the words “all trusts been dissolved”. He did not respond to the question about whether he had been paid any money from the trust.
[22] Mr Parker was asked about the trust and his nondisclosure of it when he was interviewed by the Assignee on 23 September 2014. His answers may be summarised as being to the following effect:
a) the trust was a separate entity and he could not be “consolidated” with
it;
b) he did not earn the money, but the trust did;
c) under Section 104 only beneficially owned property was transferred to the Assignee and not trust property;
30 At paragraph 7(a).
31 At paragraph 6.
d) the money was being sent to the beneficiary of the trust who was the
bankrupt’s wife living in Ukraine;
e) it was also questionable whether the New Zealand Official Assignee had territorial jurisdiction in respect of the agreement entered into between the Harrington trust/the bankrupt and Sal.
[23] The questionnaire response that the bankrupt gave also appeared to contain an untrue statement when it said that all trusts were being dissolved because the Harrington trust continued in operation, with the only change being that the bankrupt was deleted as a beneficiary.
[24] The tenor of the answers which the bankrupt gave during the course of his examination concerning the trust was evasive and argumentative. He also showed a penchant for making comments about the effect of the law and arguing with the officials interviewing him when he had no qualifications for taking such a position. I also note in passing that his comments were, at times, inaccurate, such as his assertion the trust was a “separate entity”.
[25] It was clear that the bankrupt had engaged to make the results of his personal exertions available to SAL and that he/the Harrington trust was to be the recipient of payment for the services so that he provided. It is not suggested that any other person would carry out the obligations under the contract which was a precondition to receiving the payment from SAL.
[26] Overall the impression that was conveyed was that the bankrupt would only answer those questions which he considered the Assignee was legally justified in putting to him but not others. Taken overall, the stance of the bankrupt at his interview and to the process of providing information required from him was poor. He was uncommunicative, argumentative and evasive.
[27] Mr Parker also misled the Assignee by misdescribing the scope of the activities that he intended to undertake in Ukraine, to which place he was going to travel as soon as he could following his adjudication. He told the Assignee that he
would be going there as a missionary with a project for helping children. No mention was made of the large scale and ambitious agrarian project that Mr Parker and his family through their companies were intending to undertake in Ukraine.
[28] Mr Parker also failed to observe his obligations not to travel overseas without the express consent of the Assignee. At one level, this is not a particularly serious complaint that is made against Mr Parker. The gist of what the Assignee says is that in August 2011 Mr Parker sought and was given leave to depart New Zealand on the basis that he stated that he did not intend to return. In fact he did return and left the country again on three or four occasions. He claims that on one of these occasions he called an 0800 number and spoke to an employee of the Assignee who said it would be fine for him to travel. The Assignee has not been able to locate any record of such a discussion taking place.
[29] However, if the Assignee was happy for Mr Parker to leave indefinitely, it would appear that the substance of this complaint is not so much that Mr Parker entered and left the country but that he did not obtain the consent that he ought to have. The Assignee apparently accepts that had he left the country and not returned when he received permission in October 2011, there would have been no infraction of the Assignee’s requirements. However, I agree that Mr Parker’s conduct in this regard illustrates a disregard for the authority of the Assignee and a belief on the part of Mr Parker that it was not important for him to cooperate.
[30] The Assignee has also expressed concern at the pattern of Mr Parker describing himself as “Phillipe” Parker, in contradistinction to the proper spelling of his name, “Philip”. He is also said to have used the middle name of “Charles” instead of his given name of “Christopher”. While I accept that this likely did occur, I do not consider that it is a matter of any particular moment.
[31] A further breach of obligation which the Assignee alleges is that Mr Parker has also failed to comply with his obligation as a bankrupt to disclose all information
regarding his property to the Assignee.32 All of Mr Parker’s property, that he had upon adjudication or acquired post-adjudication, vests in the Assignee.33
[32] As Ms Morrison noted, Sections 101 and 102 of the Act expressly state that all such property, whether within or outside New Zealand, vests in the Assignee. It is imperative that all property, wherever situated, be fully disclosed to enable the Assignee to duly administer the estate.
[33] In his statement of affairs, Mr Parker’s only assets were stated as his clothes
and his bible, which he jointly owned with his brother.
[34] The Assignee has been critical of the failure on the part of the bankrupt to disclose what bank account/s he had and how he met his expenses including that of travelling to and from Ukraine. I agree that these criticisms are valid and that they are matters of substance because they go to the heart of the administration of the bankrupt’s estate. It is essential that the Assignee be in a position of being able to scrutinise the bankrupt’s affairs in their entirety. Unless that step is taken, there can be no confidence that the Assignee has been able to distribute all the assets of the bankrupt amongst his creditors.
The Ukrainian Project
[35] A central issue in the bankruptcy of Mr Parker was concerned with what can be termed, for convenience, the “Ukrainian Project”. The chronology of events straddles the pre-adjudication period and the post-adjudication period.
[36] The brief background to this matter is as follows.
[37] Sometime prior to 2008 the bankrupt’s brother, Mr M Parker, apparently began investigating the feasibility of establishing large scale dairy farms in Ukraine. The supposed advantages of such an initiative would be that land would be cheaper than it would be for comparable properties in New Zealand. The land was said to be
suitable for agriculture. It was thought that if their New Zealand agricultural know-
32 Insolvency Act 2006, ss 138, 139 and 143.
33 Insolvency Act 2006, ss 101 and 102.
how could be applied to the land holdings then successful projects could be developed. The bankrupt became involved in this enterprise. An “Agricultural Land and Production Company Investment Offering 2010” was produced by “Steppeland Agriculture” apparently for circulation to potential investors which stated that the offer was to open on 15 July 2010. The directors of the company included Mr M Parker and as well the bankrupt. The bankrupt was described as “an executive director” of one of the companies in the company’s structure. The umbrella company was Steppeland Agriculture Limited (“SAL”). The registered office of the company was in Hong Kong. The offer document advised that SAL would acquire shares in an existing company which, it is inferred, was the owner of the Ukrainian farm which “has been operating for more than five years”. The loan offer document sought US $30 million to fund the project. The document said that “Steppeland”
was currently producing crops from around 3,500 hectares in the Kherson Oblast.34
Elsewhere in the document it was stated that:
Steppeland now farms 3,500 hectares rising to 5,000 hectares in production (20,000 ha overall) by the end of 2010, in the Kherson Oblast.
[38] In addition to the bankrupt being a director his brother was to be the chairman of directors and a Mr Graeme Austin was another director. Again Mr Austin was a New Zealander.
[39] The Assignee notes that, significantly, in his view, the offer was to close in
September 2010 and the allotment of shares would issue in October.
[40] As 2010 progressed the financial outlook became bleak for the bankrupt and he later said in an interview with the Assignee that by October 2010 there was no hope that his New Zealand based investment activities could survive the financial problems that he was experiencing.
[41] In the meantime the bankrupt had been attempting to solicit funds in New
Zealand for the Steppeland project. Included amongst these persons was a Ms Owen from Hamilton. The bankrupt objected to the evidence which Ms Owen gave and
34 BD 587.
also the evidence of another person who provided information to the Assignee, Mr Adam. I shall briefly deviate from the narrative to consider the issues that arise in that area.
Objection to the evidence of Ms Owen and Mr Adam
[42] Mr Parker served the Assignee with two notices dated 22 July 2015, issued under High Court Rule 9.74 to cross examine William John Adam and Megan Elizabeth Owen.
[43] The Assignee declined to make the two persons concerned available for cross-examination. The position which the Assignee took was that the rule which Mr Parker invoked, rule 9.74(1) HCR had no application in the present circumstances.
[44] Rule 9.74(1) provides:
A party desiring to cross-examine a person who has sworn or affirmed an affidavit on behalf of an opposite party may serve on that opposite party a notice in writing (which may be by letter addressed to the opposite party's solicitor) requiring the production of that person for cross-examination before the court at the trial.
[45] The submission was made for the Assignee that Mr Adam and Ms Owen had not sworn or affirmed an affidavit on behalf of the Assignee in this proceeding and therefore the rule was irrelevant. Ms Morrison submitted that while Mr Adam and Ms Owen have each sworn an affidavit outlining their dealings with Mr Parker, the sworn affidavits were provided to the Assignee as part of his administration of the estate. The Assignee has in turn used the affidavits as part of his report filed under s 296 of the Insolvency Act 2006. The affidavits form part of the report and are contained in the bundles accompanying the report (starting at v2, p570 and v4, p1033).
[46] I heard the objection on the part of Mr Parker at the beginning of the hearing and ruled that there was no requirement for the two deponents to be produced for cross-examination. I shall now give my brief reasons for that decision.
[47] Mr Parker, as I have indicated, based his objection on the assumption that r 9.74 of the High Court Rules applied in this circumstance. I agree that it does not. However, that is not to say that they were not other grounds to support the position which Mr Parker took. If the matter is approached as one involving the principles of natural justice, it might be assumed that he should be able to confront in court, and question, those who have made damaging allegations against him. Whether or not such an approach is applicable depends upon examining the statutory enactments which give recognition to the Assignee’s report and justify the Assignee putting evidence forward in the form of such a report and the court taking into account such a report.
[48] Ms Morrison submitted that the procedure provided by the Act for the filing of the Assignee’s report prior to a public examination is different from the usual rules of evidence provided by the High Court Rules. The rules itself contemplate such alternative procedures. In particular, r 1.4(3)(c) states that the rules are subject to “any statute prescribing the practice and procedure of the court in a proceeding…”.
[49] She further submitted that s 296 of the Act provides for the procedure by which the Assignee is to put relevant matters before the Court in advance of a public examination of a bankrupt concerning his or her discharge. Section 296(1) provides that the Assignee must prepare and file a report on the matters referred to in s 296(2). The report is therefore the document by which the Assignee must put forward the relevant matters for the Court’s consideration in assessing a bankrupt’s discharge. The Assignee is not required to provide affidavit evidence as the High Court Rules contemplate, given the mechanism for adducing his evidence is prescribed by the Act and that procedure has primacy.
[50] Reference was also made to decisions of this court on the question of the use
of the Assignee’s report for the purposes of an examination of a bankrupt.
[51] In order to determine this issue it is necessary to make brief reference to the nature of the examination of a bankrupt under the insolvency legislation. The most recent and most comprehensive review of the cases on that subject is to be found in
the judgment of Associate Judge Osborne in Havenleigh Global Services Limited v
FM Custodians Ltd.35
[52] What is made clear in the above judgment is that the process of examination of a bankrupt is inquisitorial in nature. It is different from conventional civil litigation in which two adversarial parties place evidence before the court for the judge to make findings of fact upon. An examination under s 295 of the Act is in examination by the court itself, although the actual practice adopted is for questions to be put to the bankrupt by counsel representing the Assignee. In advance of the examination the Assignee provides a report covering the matters identified in s 296(2) of the Act. This sets out the subjects and the specific facts and transactions upon which the bankrupt is intended to be examined at his examination. The report is ancillary to the examination. In his judgment in Henderson Osborne A.J. referred to in article by Professor Andrew Keay on the nature of the inquisitorial process and referred to a passage from it with approval. Part of the passage in question reads as follows:
Thus, questions are not put in order to make out will strengthen the party’s case. The traditional rules of evidence will not be allowed, necessarily, to limit the examination of the examinee. There is no such thing as examination in chief or cross examination36...
[53] The article also reinforced the conventional understanding that:
The reason for this is that the object of the examination is not to take testimony, but to obtain discovery.
[54] The status of the Official Assignee’s report was also considered in Re Peters, Ex parte Marac Finance Limited.37 Objection was made to the court having regard to the report in that case. The Judge concluded:38
In my opinion the issue with the present case is not whether the reporters admissible, but rather what waiters to be attached to it on the important matters of Mr Peters conduct and his involvement in business entities post adjudication, given the direct evidence provided by Mr Peters’witness. Given that it was prepared as part of the Assignee’s statutory function and for the purposes of informing
35 Havenleigh Global Services Limited v FM Custodians Limited [2015] NZHC 1762.
36 Re Grey’s Brewery Co (1883) 25 ChD 400 at 404.
37 Re Peters, Ex parte Marac Finance Limited [2014] NZHC 1755, [2015] NZCCLR 2
38 At [86].
the court, I consider that it is admissible as sufficient evidence of undisputed matters, or even if matters where the underlying documentary evidence establishes the point clearly.
[55] The Judge went on to conclude that the question of what weight might be given to hearsay and other elements of the report was for the court to determine.
Conclusion on objection point
[56] Section 296 of the Act requires the Assignee to provide a report on the matters that are set out in that section. These include the question of the bankrupt’s conduct before and after adjudication. There is no requirement that any part of the report itself or the factual assertions made by third parties which the Assignee chooses to include in the report is to be sworn as an affidavit.
[57] It has been recognised in a leading judgment in this area39 that the Assignee is not precluded from incorporating into the report under s 295 material obtained by means of a private examination which the Assignee conducted. In the course of concluding that there was no objection to his doing so, the Judge in that case gave as one of the grounds the fact that if the report is to cover all the matters which the Official Assignee is required to report upon:
It must necessarily be in part at least hearsay.40
[58] The same considerations apply in the circumstances of this case. My conclusion therefore is that the weight of authority establishes that the power of examination is a special inquisitorial procedure. The requirement that the Assignee provide a report under s 296 is obligatory where there is to be an examination. There is no restriction on the matters that are able to be included in the report and, specifically, there is no requirement that where the report, as it very likely to, includes hearsay material, the Assignee is to produce the person who is the source of that information to the court so that he or she can be cross-examined by the debtor. Further, the fact that the Assignee as part of the internal practices observed in his office obtain some or all of the evidence concerning a bankrupt’s case in the form of
an affidavit, does not mean that when that material is reproduced in the statutory
39 Re Baird (A Bankrupt) [1994] 2 NZLR 463 (HC)
40 Re Baird (debtor) Master Kennedy-Grant, HC New Plymouth B39/90, 8 March 1994.
report, the rules of the High Court governing cross examination of deponents have application.
[59] Therefore, I conclude that the notices which the bankrupt in this case served on the Assignee seeking that Ms Owen and Mr Adam should be produced for cross- examination are of no effect. Notwithstanding non-conformity with those notices, the Assignee is entitled to reproduce factual assertions made by those persons in statements made to him as part of the statutory report.
[60] I should also add for the sake of completeness, that I agree with the view expressed in Re Peters, Ex parte Marac Finance Limited41 that it is still necessary for the Court to consider what weight should be attached to assertions contained in the report.
The evidence of Ms Owen
[61] Ms Owen and her husband at relevant times were dairy farmers. She met the
bankrupt to whom she was introduced as “Phillipe Parker” between June and July
2010. Another person involved with Steppeland sent material about the company to her and her husband. That person, Mr Lee, sent to her the investment offer which I have just described. Ms Owen noted that returns were projected to be 20%,42 that there would be cash dividends and capital returns of over 25% per annum.
[62] Ms Owen was also supplied with an information memorandum which seems to have been a draft but which further described the offer for shares in the company which was going to acquire the assets for the carrying on of the project. Seventy six million shares were to be issued. This document omitted the bankrupt as one of the directors of the company and it stated that Mr Austin was now the chairman. The memorandum stated that the company intended to have 2,489 hectares of various crops planted “in 2010”. The document also spoke of the company’s intentions to establish a pilot dairy farm with the intention of expanding into dairy farming on proof of the business model. Elaborate company structure diagrams were included.
The company it was stated would “obtain corporative (sic) leasing rights to
41 Re Peters, Ex parte Marac Finance Limited, above n 37.
42 Presumably per annum.
approximately 290,000 hectares by the year 2019”. While there were references to the position of the CEO in the company structure, the share registry of the company was stated to be at Asialink Limited.
[63] Mr Lee followed up the initial contact on 15 July 2010 recording that Ms Owen and her husband had not got back to them about the chance to invest “as angel investors. It’s a chance to nearly triple you (sic) money in the space of a week (on paper)”.
[64] Upon Mr Owen/Ms Ham indicating they wished to proceed, arrangements were made for the bankrupt to come and meet with them.43 The bankrupt made the arrangements to meet them around 30 July 2010. After Mr and Mrs Owen agreed to provide EU $50,000 arrangements were made for payment to be sent to the company. The bankrupt provided the account where Steppeland funds were to be sent to. He told the Owens/Hams, that “once again I would like to thank you both for your vision in investing with Steppeland”. Subsequently the bankrupt on 5
August 2010 advised that transfer should be in US$ and that NZ$100,000 would entitle Mr Ham and Ms Owen to 0.25% of the share capital which would have an estimated “post completion” value of NZ $240,000. The email also referred to the fact that that shareholdings estimated value after a contemplated IPO in 2013 would be NZ$680,000 to $700,000.
[65] On 19 August the company secretary, AsiaLink, queried whether the money was a loan or for capital subscription and the understanding which Ms Owen/Mr Ham reported in their reply email was that it was to be share capital in Steppeland Agriculture Limited. The arrangement that was made by Mr Parker was that the money was to be sent on to the Steppeland company for the bankrupt or his brother. What actually happened was that the bankrupt on 27 October invited Ms Owen and Mr Ham to send the money to the “following account to our Cherkassy economist who will issue share note on your party’s behalf”. In summary, it was the bankrupt who followed up on the initial introduction of Ms Owen and Mr Ham and who made
arrangements for the funds to be paid to a bank account other than the nominated
43 BD 789.
bank account of Asialink which was providing company secretarial registry services according to the initial disclosure memoranda.
[66] There were apparently delays in the funds arriving and the bankrupt followed up on 31 August while he understood the pressures that Mr Ham and Ms Owen were under, “this is a priority”. Shortly after arrangements were being made for the Hams/Owens to visit Ukraine, again, with all contact being with the bankrupt.
[67] When no shares arrived Mr Ham and Ms Owen began asking when they might be expected. In September the bankrupt advised them that “I will check progress in Hong Kong regarding shareholding”.
[68] A meeting was held of shareholders in Huntly on 27 November 2010 with the notice for the same being issued by the bankrupt. Subsequent emails indicate that the meeting proceeded. By December the outlines of the proposal had changed and the investment was now going to involve a new company being inserted into the structure and it was in this company that Mr Ham and Ms Owen had been told they would be shareholders. There were also indications at the end of December of cash pressures on the company and the bankrupt was asking for additional funds to fund operations. This had apparently been mentioned at the November shareholders meetings.
[69] Mr Ham and Ms Owen made some additional advances in 2011 again in conjunction with the bankrupt. An amount of $26,000 had been advanced which was repayable around August 2011. The bankrupt was by then also discussing with Mr Ham and Ms Owen converting their debt into additional stock in the company.
[70] February 2011 was a crucial period having regard to the fact that that was when Mr Parker was bankrupted. The narrative contained in the report by the Assignee on this matter states what occurred during this period in the following terms:
3.38.In February 2011 Mr Parker circulated an introductory memorandum regarding the business.44 The memorandum introduced SAM.
44 Refer Owen affidavit, para 2.32 and exhibit S, at BOD, [575, 850].
Mr Parker was recorded as SAM’s CEO, and as having spent most of his life in “practical farming” and had been living permanently in Cherkassy, Ukraine for the last 5 years (p10).
3.39.As to the relationship between SAL and SAM, the memorandum stated (at p2) that SAL was set up as a vehicle to invest in agriculture in Ukraine and has farmed some 3,500 hectares in Southern Ukraine. The intention was now to raise investment through a special purpose vehicle incorporated in Hong Kong (The Ukraine Farms Investment Company Limited or UFI) for the purchase of up to 4 more operating farms. SAM will manage and operate these farm business, which will be acquired with existing land leases on agriculture land, farm buildings and equipment.
3.40It is further stated (at p10) that SAM will earn a fee and share of profits, UFI will meet the costs, and SAL will have an option in 3 years to acquire UFI’s farm business at market value.
3.41Later that month a further newsletter from SAL/SAM was circulated.45 The newsletter referred to the shareholders meeting in Huntly in November 2010 (p1). The newsletter stated that the new parent company was to become SAM (p4). However, SAL remained and would be allocated the existing farming operation in Kherson. Existing shareholders remained part of this company (p4).
3.42Notably, SAL/SAM still maintained a strong focus on New Zealand investors. At the end of the newsletter (at p5), it was stated that the company was scheduling a dinner presentation in New Zealand in April for its shareholders. This was to showcase the proposed farms operated by Steppeland and to provide a general company update. As at 19 February 2011, Mr Parker also continued to provide Ms Owen with information regarding expected returns on the shares.46
[71] In May 2011 Mr Ham and Ms Owen visited Ukraine. To their concern, they found that there were no assets that the company owed outright. They were told that the dairy farm in the Kherson area which they regarded as the backbone of the project that they invested into was not owned by the company. The explanation was given that there had been some inter-family dealing involving the Parker family which had changed over the ownership of it. It would seem that they developed real concerns about the soundness of their investment from this point forward. Subsequently when they attempted to obtain repayment of the loan of 26,200 US dollars they were fobbed off by Mr Parker. Ms Owen and Mr Ham finally received NZ$25,860 in November 2011 which was less than the amount that they had
advanced.
45 Refer Owen affidavit, para 2.35 and exhibit U, at BOD, [575, 864].
46 Refer Owen affidavit, exhibit V, at BOD, [869].
[72] The chronology set out to this point indicates that the period described straddles the point at which Mr Parker became bankrupt (February 2011). At no point had Mr Parker informed Ms Owen and Mr Ham of his status as a bankrupt.
[73] Ms Owens and Mr Ham lost the rest of the money that they put into the venture.
The Adams investment
[74] A similar story was told by another New Zealand investor, Mr Adam. He met the bankrupt in New Zealand in July 2011. At this meeting the bankrupt provided information about the Steppeland Investments. He also spoke of the humanitarian needs of particularly orphans in Ukraine. Mr Adams and his wife and the other persons at the meeting were, I gather, Christians who had an interest in the latter subject. The bankrupt provided promotional material at that meeting which is along the lines of what Mr Ham and Ms Own had received. The difference was that the investment now was to be in SAM (rather than SAL). The documentation provided described the bankrupt as “Chief Executive Officer”. Eventually the Adams following other meetings decided to invest an amount of $80,000 to buy shares in SAM with a deposit of $8,000 to be paid 20 October 2011 with the balance due later.
[75] In 2012, Mr Adam and his wife travelled to Ukraine. As well as inspecting the operations there I gather they had also been invited to attend the bankrupt’s impending wedding. However before they left they were unable to meet the obligation to buy the shares because of a change in their financial circumstances and the bankrupt on 17 June suggested that they not come to Ukraine after all. During this period they received at least one communication from the bankrupt which was signed by him as “Philippe”, the CEO of SAM.
[76] In any event the Adams did travel to Ukraine. What they found there was different from their expectations.. They found for example that the “operational dairy farm at Sagunikivka” had not actually been purchased and such property as had been leased comprised unimproved extensive grazing land with few buildings.
[77] During the period from August to December 2012 Mr Adams attempted to recover his deposit of $8,000. Amongst other grounds for resisting doing that that the bankrupt put forward was that the money which had been paid out of the Adam’s private company, Black Pearl Holdings Limited, was not theirs and would not be returned to them.
[78] The bankrupt also told the Adams that the company would take steps to enforce the contract for purchase of the shares unless a satisfactory solution was arrived at. He said that he would instruct SAM’s lawyers to that end. In 2013 the Adam’s discovered for the first time that the bankrupt had in fact been adjudicated. They had not been aware that he was a bankrupt until that point. The Adams did not recover the $8,000.
[79] Mr Adam made enquiries amongst other people about the total funds obtained by the bankrupt within New Zealand and he assessed that the sum was approximately NZ $2,000,000.
The response of the Bankrupt to the Owen/Adam Allegations
[80] In his synopsis of submissions, the bankrupt put forward the following arguments in relation to the evidence about his conduct which is referred to in the Assignee’s report which reproduces statements that Ms Owen and Mr Adam made in this proceeding.
[81] He said that:47
The bankrupt does not own any assets in Ukraine;
The bankrupt does not have any interest in any company;
The bankrupt is not a founder of any entities during his bankruptcy term
[82] The bankrupt said that he has,
[4.3] ..undertaken no management of companies rather has been a contractor and missionary..
47 At paragraph [2.5].
[4.4] .. Is not subject to any breach or contravention of any company codes or securities laws in any country.
[4.5] The Applicant’s bankruptcy estate was only reopened upon the complaints by Mr Adam and Ms Owen. The conduct evidence used by the Defendant is inadmissible pursuant to the Evidence Act s
15,16 and 17. Of note, the Applicant has begun defamation proceedings against Ms Owen.
Assessment of assertions in Official Assignee’s report concerning Ms Owen and
Mr Adam.
[83] The first question I shall address is what if any weight should be attached to the statements of Ms Owen and Mr Adam. I consider that the statements ought to be treated as veracious accounts of what occurred. The reasons for that conclusion are these.
[84] The bankrupt did not suggest that the evidence was a fabrication. It would have been difficult to make such a submission given that substantially similar complaints were made by two people who are apparently independent of each other.
[85] The bankrupt has not made a forthright statement identifying in what way the statements that the two persons have made are false. In each case, there is support for the assertions that the two witnesses48 make to be found in contemporaneous documents. Again, the bankrupt does not suggest that the documents are fabrications or that statements attributed to him in the documents, such as that he is the CEO of SAM are untrue. The documentary evidence includes verification that funds were actually transferred to Asialink, the company functioning as the secretary of the Parker incorporations.49 A further example is an email from Mr Parker dated
5 September 2011 discussing with Ms Owen the possibility of conversion of the loan that she and Mr Ham made into company stock.50
[86] The documents show that the companies which the bankrupt was involved in were engaged in broadly the type of activities that the witnesses describe, namely,
48 Ms Owen and Mr Adam are described as “witnesses” for reasons of convenience even though they are not strictly speaking witnesses who gave evidence in the proceeding.
49 Documentation includes Kiwibank remittance forms dated 6th October 2010.
50 BD 919.
aggregating contributions from investors to apply to the acquisition of farmland in
Ukraine through the medium of companies to be incorporated in Hong Kong.
[87] In the absence of any detailed or focused attack on the credibility of the witnesses, it is difficult to judge in what respect the evidence is said to be untrue or incorrect. Reference in his submissions to the fact that the bankrupt has commenced defamation proceedings against the makers of the statements does not advance matters in that regard.
[88] My judgment is that overall the evidence of the two witnesses provides mutual reinforcement of broadly the same narrative from two independent sources and is supported by contemporaneous documents. The evidence does not appear to be inherently far-fetched or implausible. It is consistent with what is not disputed about some aspects of the surrounding circumstances and that is the trips that both witnesses independently made to Ukraine. It seems inherently unlikely that two witnesses in the position of those in this case would make a journey to a place such as Ukraine unless there was some particular reason that they had an interest in that country. The fact that they had invested in or made advances to a farming project in that country would explain why they travelled there.
[89] My conclusion overall is that the evidence of these two witnesses ought to be accepted at face value.
Significance of the Ukrainian project
[90] The documents which originated from Mr Parker concerning the Ukrainian venture envisage a large-scale, if not vast, farming undertaking to which New Zealand citizens were being invited to subscribe. The prospectus issued in 2010 was in some respects quite a polished document. It is in that document that the bankrupt is described as being a director, Executive Director and executive of the Steppeland group. The prospectus referred to the objective of raising USD 30 million for the purpose of purchasing a property and business from the European company.
[91] The flavour of what the promoters had in mind is captured by the following statements:
Steppeland plans to have 30,020 ha in Ukraine freehold land holding in Russia to have diversified into key resources and infrastructure and have assets valued at around [USD 80.7M] by 2012.
….
Steppeland is currently producing crops from around 3500 ha in the Kherson Oblast… The land holding will increase to 20,000 ha by the end of 2010.
[92] The prospectus was replete with other optimistic claims including that Ukrainian agriculture land was expected to increase by 28% each year after a 50% increase in 2009 and that crop yields from farming were forecast to more than double. Revenues were expected to be around $3.2 million from crops (the date by which this was to occur and the denomination of the monetary estimate not being provided). The raising of the USD 30 million would by 2013 lead to revenues of “around US$55.8 million”. Investors were also told that Steppeland intended to make an initial public offering on the Hong Kong market in early 2012.
[93] The gap between these grandiose projections and the actual financial position of the bankrupt would not have been more stark in 2010. I appreciate that the prospectus did not envisage that it was the capital of the bankrupt which would fund the execution of these plans. But knowledge on the part of the proposed investors that their principal architect and the person who was selling the concept in New Zealand was nearly, if not actually, insolvent in 2010 and had actually been adjudicated bankrupt in February 2011 would have injected a sobering note of realism into the marketing of the proposal had potential investors known about these additional facts.
Reasons for decision on discharge
[94] The approach that I intend to take is to broadly apply the principles enunciated in the Court of Appeal judgment in ASB Bank v Hogg.51 One of the primary issues is whether the continuation of the bankruptcy of the bankrupt in this case beyond three years is in the public interest. I accept that the onus is on the
Assignee to satisfy the court that it is in the public interest that the bankruptcy should
51 ASB Bank v Hogg [1993] 3 NZLR 156 (CA).
continue for a further period.52 That issue will be approached on the basis that whether it is or not depends upon analysis of the facts in this case. As well matters such as the causes of bankruptcy, the manner in which the bankrupt has performed the duties imposed on him under the Act. The conduct of the bankrupt both before and after the bankruptcy together with any other fact matter or circumstance that would assist the court in making its decision. It will be necessary for the court to give consideration to the legitimate interests of the bankrupt, the creditors and wider public concerns. Finally, the court is to pay regard to the overall purposes of bankruptcy law when assessing whether to exercise the discretion to extend the
bankruptcy.53 Those purposes include holding the bankrupt accountable for his
insolvency, protecting the community from the bankrupt and allowing the bankrupt to take up commercial activity again freed from his liability.
Relevance of the Ukrainian venture
[95] In this judgment I have emphasised the importance of the part which the bankrupt played in the Steppeland fundraising initiatives. I do not discount other elements of the Assignee’s case. For example, the fact that the bankrupt gave a guarantee of his parents’ liability to SBS at a time when he knew that he was close to insolvency is a telling factor when it comes to assessing the sense of responsibility or otherwise that the bankrupt brought to his commercial dealings.
[96] However, the circumstances relating to Mr Parker’s involvement in the Steppeland companies as the Assignee alleges, would amount to the most significant series of transactions that throw light upon the question of whether the appropriate decision in this case, viewed overall, is that the bankruptcy should now come to an end.
Bankrupt’s involvement in Steppeland
[97] During the course of the examination of Mr Parker, he proved to be an unsatisfactory witness. He was evasive and belligerent, focusing on technical points
about the significance of his conduct, rather than dealing with the substance of the
52 Re Whitelaw HC Hamilton CIV-2004- 419- 1647, 10 September 2010.
53 Darby v OA [2013] NZHC, 22 at 14.
allegations put to him. A case in point concerns his involvement in raising the Owen/Ham funding. When it was put to him that he undertook these activities as CEO, Mr Parker repeatedly declined to give a direct answer to the questions. After one exchange between counsel in which Mr Parker was referred to the fact that the Steppeland prospectus described him as a CEO, and following Mr Parker’s unwillingness to accept that he was acting in that capacity the following question and answer occurred:
Q. Mr Parker let me just stop. If you ask an investor in New Zealand what the person in the role of CEO is responsible for, what do you think the expectation is going to be?
A. There’s no evidence of me ever been chief executive formerly in
terms of a resolution. This was just placed into the documentation.
[98] Mr Parker also insisted that he was acting at all times under the direction of the directors of the company and that any involvement he had was as “a consultant”. He also claimed that he never had an employment agreement as CEO. He apparently took the position alternatively that describing him as CEO was done for convenience because in Hong Kong the description “consultant” has not looked upon with any favour.54
[99] The case for the Assignee, if proved, establishes that the bankrupt was in breach of s 149 of the Act because he took part in the management or control of a business.
[100] I consider that the case has been established. On the facts, Mr Parker was the person who had responsibility for dealing with persons from whom capital or loans were being solicited within New Zealand. He met with these people and exchanged emails with them. He has not produced any evidence that on each occasion he did so in accordance with the directions of the board. Even if that were true, I do not consider it would absolve them. The responsibility to comply with the law is his and not the board of directors of the Hong Kong company or companies. Nor is his position in immune because he was allegedly acting as a consultant. Mr Parker appears to be saying that if he was an independent contractor of the company he
could not have the same time be involved in the direct or indirect carrying on
54 Notes of evidence page 88.
business or management or control of any business. I know of no authority which supports such a position. It is a relevant whether in taking part in the control and management of business or carrying on business the bankrupt did so as an employee acting in accordance with an employment agreement or whether in doing so he was acting pursuant to an obligation to the company – whether direct or indirect – to provide services pursuant to a contract for services.
[101] Nor does it matter that he may have entered into any contractual arrangement as a trustee. It would not seem to be relevant to the objectives of the Insolvency Act to differentiate between a bankrupt acting under a contract in which he had a beneficial interest or, on the other hand, as a trustee. Both situations bring with them the potential for harm.
[102] Any attempt to argue that Mr Parker escapes liability on the basis that the trust is a separate entity will inevitably fail because, unlike a company and its director, a trust is not a legal person distinct from its trustee.55
[103] Mr Parker appears to also put forward the view that any conduct on his part which occurred outside New Zealand could not be a breach of New Zealand’s insolvency laws because they do not have extraterritorial effect. It is not very clear what he says about this matter but in any event, I consider that his meetings with the New Zealanders and communications with persons in New Zealand by email and other means are capable of amounting to carrying on business in New Zealand.
[104] The submission is further made that Mr Parker was at the relevant times not in business but was a missionary. It does not matter if Mr Parker had the additional status of a missionary, that does not take his commercial activities by way of involvement in the Steppeland business outside the scope of s 149 of the Act.
Assessment of the overall position
[105] In ASB v Hogg56 it was stated that “wider public concerns” need to be
weighed. These would include the necessity for accountability. Such accountability
55 NZHB Holdings Limited v Bartells HC Auckland, CIV-2000-404-1385, 10 June 2004 at [46], per
Baragwanath J.
is called for in this case, in my view. The bankrupt had engaged in a risky enterprise in the form of the Steppeland/Ukrainian venture and was attempting to solicit funds at a time when he was insolvent. There does not seem to have been any assurance that if the necessary subscription levels were not met in relation to the enterprise, that money would be able to be refunded to subscribers. Indeed, there are indications in the evidence that any funds subscribed were being immediately consumed. Attempting to launch the venture in those circumstances made what would in any circumstances be a speculative venture, even more likely to fail. Yet the bankrupt persisted and did so in a way that contravened the law and which he must have known did so.
[106] On the other hand I accept that the amounts of money actually proved to have been involved, while important to the individual investors, was not at the upper end of the amounts of financial loss caused to the public through the failure of insolvent schemes.57
[107] I am, however, in no doubt that because of his past track record and in particular his involvement in the Steppeland venture, Mr Parker appears to be a person who because of lack of judgement, business prudence or integrity – or indeed all of those elements – represents a commercial risk to the community.
[108] He said in his synopsis of submissions that he is remorseful but I am afraid that that was entirely contrary to the position which he took when examined in the witness box, which was to the effect that everything he did was entirely defensible and did not contravene any legal obligation that he was under. He claims to have reflected on his position but I am concerned that his statements are self-serving and designed to assist his contention that he should now be discharged from bankruptcy. Had he been genuinely remorseful, the court might have been able to conclude that the chances of repetition of doubtful commercial practices were low. That not being the case, it has to be recognised that Mr Parker continues to present a risk stemming
from the fact that he has a poor track record as a businessman. That is paired with
56 ASB v Hogg, above n 51 at 66.
57 For instance in the case of Bryers.
vaulting ambitions of the kind that led him into the Steppeland venture. These two elements in conjunction mean that he constitutes a genuine commercial hazard.
[109] He has not been cooperative with the Assignee. He described his property as amounting to his personal effects and a Bible. He made no mention of his shares in companies associated with Steppeland. He did not disclose the existence of the Harrington trust. Instead he recorded “all trusts being dissolved”, which was an untruth.
[110] So far as the interests of Mr Parker are concerned, he says that he has two objectives, the first being to qualify for his doctorate as a doctor of philosophy and also to involve himself in further commercial activity. So far as the matter is concerned, he has stated his belief to be that given the stigma of bankruptcy, it could be some seven years before he can realistically expect to involve himself in business. In the face of those contentions, I consider that while there is no doubt that Mr Parker will be adversely affected by the stigma of bankruptcy, this is not a case where any particular hardship will result to him if a discharge from bankruptcy is deferred for the time being. This is not a case where the prohibition on re-entering business is likely to have a real and immediate adverse financial effect on the bankrupt.
[111] I consider that applying the usual approach which is that bankruptcy should not be extended unless there are good reasons for that course being taken, that there are in fact such reasons present in this case and that it is a serious issue whether Mr Parker ought to be discharged at this point.
[112] For these reasons I intend to uphold the objection which the OA has made to the bankrupt being discharged.
[113] Counsel for the Assignee submitted that it is proper to decline Mr Parker’s discharge from bankruptcy, and to specify the earliest date at which Mr Parker may apply again for discharge as being 18 February 2017. It will then be a matter for Mr Parker to make an application to Court if and when he seeks a discharge, and for him to satisfy the Court that such a discharge is appropriate.
[114] I agree that an extension of Mr Parker’s bankruptcy until 18 February 2017 is appropriate. Any extension less than that would be unlikely to be appropriate when measured against the various factors that the court is required to take into account when considering whether an extension is required, such as protection of the public interest, the need to demonstrate accountability and the other relevant factors. There will be an order accordingly.
[115] The parties should file submissions not exceeding six pages on each side concerning the question of costs are not less than 15 working days from the date of
this judgment.
J.P. Doogue
Associate Judge
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