Parata v The King
[2025] NZHC 1437
•5 June 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CRI-2025-404-000102
[2025] NZHC 1437
BETWEEN LANCE PARATA
Appellant
AND
THE KING
Respondent
Hearing: 26 May 2025 Counsel:
KE Tuialii for Appellant
BN Kirkpatrick for Respondent
Judgment:
5 June 2025
JUDGMENT OF DOWNS J
This judgment was delivered by me on Thursday, 5 June 2025 at 10 am.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors/Counsel:
Crown Solicitor, Auckland. KE Tuialii, Auckland.
PARATA v R [2025] NZHC 1437 [5 June 2025]
The appeal
[1] Sentencing for fraud turns on many things, including the nature of the offending; its scale and sophistication; the amount involved; the number of victims; and the extent of harm.1 Mitigating features are also relevant.
[2] Between 25 November 2019 and 9 May 2022, Lance Parata defrauded his employer of $57,469.15. Mr Parata was sentenced to a term of 24 months’ imprisonment.2 He appeals that sentence.
[3] Mr Parata’s appeal must be allowed if there is an error in the sentence and a different sentence should be imposed.3 The overarching concern is whether the sentence is manifestly excessive rather than how it was determined.4
Background
[4] Mr Parata was employed by NPD Maintenance Ltd, a small company which operates a commercial vehicle and machinery workshop. Mr Parata began at the company in May 2018. He was responsible for buying parts, taking bookings, producing invoices, and sending invoices to clients. Consequently, Mr Parata had access to the company’s invoicing system. His offending is captured by the agreed summary of facts:
Circumstances
….
Over the period of his employment, the defendant produced 34 preliminary or “proforma” invoices for work undertaken by NPD Maintenance using the company’s computer system “SAM”.
SAM is a computer management system for automotive workshops. These proforma invoices were linked to a job in SAM.
Once the jobs had been completed and were at the invoice processing stage, the defendant altered the proforma invoices he had previously created.
1 Varjan v R CA97/03, 26 June 2003.
2 R v Parata [2025] NZDC 3042.
3 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250(2).
4 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482.
He deleted the complainant’s company bank account number on the invoices and replaced the company’s bank account number with his own Westpac bank account number, [redacted].
The defendant emailed the modified invoices to the customers from his own work email address, [redacted].
The defendant deleted the 34 jobs off the system so that there was no record of the job.
Obtains by deception (over $1,000) (as a representative charge)
Between 22 November 2019 and 2 May 2022, the defendant created 20 proforma invoices for jobs completed by NPD Maintenance that had a value over $1,000.
He then altered the 21 invoices, replacing the complainant’s company bank on the invoice with account with his own Westpac bank account number, [redacted].
The defendant received a total of $50,109.27 into his personal bank account.
Obtains by deception ($500 - $1,000) (as a representative charge)
Between 20 January 2020 and 9 May 2022, the defendant created 10 proforma invoices for jobs completed by NPD Maintenance that had a value between
$500 - $1,000.
He then altered the 10 invoices, replacing the complainant’s company bank on the invoice with account with his own Westpac bank account number, [redacted].
The defendant received a total of $6,568.32 into his personal bank account.
Obtains by deception (under $500) (as a representative charge)
Between 13 December 2019 and 21 December 2020, the defendant created three proforma invoices for jobs completed by NPD Maintenance that had a value between under $500.
He then altered the three invoices, replacing the complainant’s company bank on the invoice with account with his own Westpac bank account number, [redacted].
The defendant received a total of $791.56 into his personal bank account.
Conclusion
Between 25 November 2019 and 9 May 2022, the defendant received a total of $57,469.15 worth of fraudulent invoice payments into his personal Westpac Bank Account.
Refer Schedule attached.
Defendant comments
The defendant declined to comment.
The defendant is a 34-year-old male who has previously appeared before the Court.
Reparation
Police seek reparation of $57,469.15 for the loss caused.
Schedule
Date Amount Invoice number 25/11/2019 $1,282.18 82296-1 3/12/2019 $2,200.00 82314-1 18/12/2019 $1,130.44 82088-1 19/12/2019 $169.56 82088-1 16/01/2020 $300.00 82663-1 21/01/2020 $850.00 82728-1 17/03/2020 $1,021.43 82936-1 8/04/2020 $4,353.99 82062-1 3/07/2020 $1,681.32 83539-1 13/07/2020 $2,903.75 83772-1 16/07/2020 $1,093.05 83611-1 14/09/2020 $575.00 84431-1 30/09/2020 $3,644.76 84180-1 12/12/2020 $322.00 85101- 13/01/2021 $546.66 85050-1 13/01/2021 $1,165.96 84401-3 27/01/2021 $1,445.83 85289-1 4/02/2021 $4,000.00 85323-1 10/03/2021 $602.01 85596-1 13/05/2021 $548.07 85862-1 13/05/2021 $622.45 86068-1 13/05/2021 $695.75 86041-1 13/05/2021 $4,002.23 85363-1 13/07/2021 $5,000.00 86245-1 28/07/2021 $543.74 86481-1 28/07/2021 $3,661.64 86385-1 20/09/2021 $5,310.79 86245-1
24/12/2021 $1,651.71 87199-1 8/02/2022 $1,061.48 87401-1 21/03/2022 $2,040.38 87479-1 2/05/2022 $566.64 87806-1 2/05/2022 $1,458.33 87825-1 9/05/2022 $1,000.00 86010-1
[5] Judge M-E Sharp adopted a starting point of 36 months’ imprisonment. The Judge deducted 15 percent for Mr Parata’s guilty pleas and three months “for the possible causal nexus between his substance disorder and his offending”.5 The Judge also deducted one month for reparation. The Judge added two months for Mr Parata’s criminal history: in 2017, he committed theft in a special relationship; and in 2013, he obtained property by deception (in relation to property worth more than $1,000).6
[6] The Judge imposed a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment. As will be apparent, that sentence is four months shorter than the stated arithmetic.
Grounds of appeal
[7] Mr Parata advances no fewer than seven grounds of appeal, including challenges to the starting point and discounts for mitigating features. Several can be dealt with together.
Starting point
[8] On behalf of Mr Parata, Ms Tuialii contended the three-year starting point was excessive. Ms Tuialii said it should have been 28–30 months’ imprisonment, a submission based on the decisions below.
[9] In Richards v Police,7 the defendant was employed by a company that made furniture. He commissioned furniture, sold it for himself, and created paperwork to conceal what he had done. The offence period was 14 months. Approximately
5 R v Parata, above n 2, at [24].
6 Neither offence resulted in imprisonment.
7 Richards v Police [2018] NZHC 2288.
$50,000 was involved. A starting point of 20 months’ imprisonment went unchallenged on appeal.
[10] Farina v R8 involved an accounts clerk at a radiology practice who transferred money into her own bank account 20 times within two months. She took a little over
$21,000. A 23-month starting point was upheld but “at the top of the available range”.9
[11] In Luoni v Police,10 the defendant was an office administrator. She misappropriated a little over $41,000, used business fuel cards for her own benefit to the value of $1,300, and wrote two company cheques to her creditors totalling $730.
A starting point of three years’ imprisonment was upheld as “stern”.11
[12] In Kerwin v Police,12 the defendant stole more than $90,000 from his employer through manipulation of the company’s computer system. The offence period was two years. A three-year-and-three-month starting point was reduced to three years on appeal.
[13] In Williams v Police,13 the defendant stole more than $179,000: he was employed as a security guard and had access to an ATM, from which he took the money. All of it was recovered. A starting point of three years and four months’ imprisonment was upheld on appeal, in part because of the “gross breach of trust”.14
[14] As Ms Tuialii observed, the amount taken by Mr Parata is less than that in Kerwin and Williams. However, as Mr Kirkpatrick observed on behalf of the respondent, Mr Parata’s offending involved a significant breach of trust given his position and responsibilities within the company. The offending involved 33 discrete transactions, made over two-and-a-half years. The amount taken is significant for a small company, which at the time of the offending, had 11 staff. And, as discussed at [29], the offending placed the company under great financial strain. Overall, the
8 Farina v R [2021] NZHC 811.
9 At [32].
10 Luoni v Police [2016] NZHC 695.
11 At [34].
12 Kerwin v Police [2014] NZHC 2415.
13 Williams v Police [2018] NZHC 732.
14 At [23].
offending is more serious than Luoni, the most similar comparator. The three-year starting point is, therefore, (comfortably) within range.
Guilty plea discount
[15] Mr Parata was charged 14 September 2023. He pleaded guilty 15 August 2024. The plea reflected an arrangement by which the charges were amalgamated to three representative charges and quantum reduced from $78,194.06 to $57,469.15. The ultimate summary of facts was otherwise the same.
[16] Ms Tuialii contended the guilty plea discount should have been at least 20 percent, not 15 percent. Ms Tuialii emphasised the reduction in quantum. She said had Mr Parata pleaded guilty earlier, “he would have been accepting a level of culpability that was not justified”.
[17] The Supreme Court decision of Hessell v R holds the level of guilty plea discount must reflect the totality of circumstances, including timing of the plea.15
[18] The guilty pleas came after 11 months and multiple court appearances. Yet the discount was meaningful. The most material change throughout the litigation concerned quantum. Mr Parata could have pleaded guilty earlier and still disputed quantum, which answers Ms Tuialii’s submission. I am unpersuaded of error for these reasons, particularly as the Judge enjoyed a measure of discretion in this context.
Misuse of drugs: a causal nexus?
[19] The Judge received a drug and alcohol report in relation to Mr Parata. It said he had a history of severe substance use disorder involving cocaine and MDMA; that Mr Parata began using both drugs socially from the age of 27; and he reported “subsidising” his drug use through the offending. Ms Tuialii argued the Judge’s associated three-month discount was inadequate.
15 Hessell v R [2010] NZSC 135, [2011] 1 NZLR 607. Ms Tuialii cited Rikihana v Police [2013] NZHC 711, a High Court decision of Kós J, as supportive of the submission. However, Hessell is the governing authority.
[20] Doubt attaches to whether the offending is connected causatively to Mr Parata’s drug difficulties. Mr Parata did not make a statement to Police or testify at sentencing, so a connection is ultimately reliant on what he said to the author(s) of the report. Mr Parata’s explanation to the probation officer who prepared his pre-sentence report was more wide-ranging. Mr Parata said the offending reflected “cashies” by clients who wanted an invoice, which Mr Parata then “doctored”. Mr Parata said he was giving the clients a “better deal”. Mr Parata also told the probation officer he used the money for “drugs, food, alcohol, tools and equipment”. On this account, offence proceeds were spent on various things, drugs being but one.16
[21] Assuming (without deciding) a causative connection existed, the number of transactions (33); offence period (at least 25 months) and deliberate nature of the offending told against a greater discount, as the combination implies a high level of culpability. In any event, Ms Tuialii’s proposed deduction of four months is only one month longer than that afforded. No error is established.
Victim impact statements
[22]The Judge said this about victim impact:
[8] I make it clear that whilst the proven amount that Mr Parata defrauded the company of was low in the scheme of such cases, I reiterate and stress the damage to his victims. As far as I am concerned, he significantly abused a position of trust and Ms McQuoid today, has made clear to me just how he was able to do so. That is because he inveigled himself into the affections of people that worked at the company and of the officers of the company. Everybody placed great trust in him; trust which was terribly, terribly abused. But it would appear that he did not just abuse their trust. It would appear, from the victim impact statement, that, in fact, he went so far as to turn other members of the staff against their employer and the officers of the employer and to effectively, ruin the name of NPD and Mr Warren [Dobbe] in the marketplace. It would appear, from what I read, that he did so knowingly and manipulatively. His level of premeditation I find to be high. I find that those aggravating features are very significant.
[23] Ms Tuialii argued the two victim impact statements before the Judge contained improper material on which the Judge relied. More background is thus necessary.
16 Mr Parata told the probation officer he would use about $1,000 of cocaine at each dance party he attended with friends.
[24] Warren Dobbe is the owner and general manager of the company. Janine McQuoid, his wife, worked for the company.17 Both made victim impact statements, which they read aloud at sentencing. Redactions to the victim impact statements were made either before or during sentencing. This is apparent from the sentencing transcript, as the Judge interrupted Ms McQuoid’s reading of her statement, noting she appeared to be reading the unredacted version.
[25] Redactions to the victim impact statements clearly address some of Ms Tuialii’s concerns; she did not then act for Mr Parata.18 For example, that Mr Parata was considered “a professional criminal” was redacted. However, Mr Dobbe should not have been permitted to describe Mr Parata as a “degenerate”, or to express an opinion about the adequacy of the charges. Ms McQuoid should not have been permitted to say Mr Parata was now working for “known patched Head Hunter members”, nor comment on Mr Parata’s alleged “poaching” of the company’s clients either, as this appears unrelated to the offending. These observations went beyond what Parliament has said should be captured by a victim impact statement. They too should have been redacted.
[26] However, there is no real risk these observations influenced the Judge. I did not understand Ms Tuialii to contend otherwise in oral argument. But what about the Judge’s observation Mr Parata (actively) turned staff against the victims? This contention appears to be based on Ms McQuoid’s victim impact statement, which records (as read at sentencing):
…
The emotional damage that has [not] been discussed or raised through this journey is horrendous. The fact that it created animosity on [Mr Dobbe] and I from staff in the office (inaudible), words that were directed at the both of us, how useless [Mr Dobbe] is, and that they wanted us to fail. Staff purposely being defiant and not complying with managerial direction which in turn was another loss of money. The dynamics that were all (inaudible) circus for [Mr Parata] to watch, as everyone loved [Mr Parata].
Whilst [Mr Parata] is paying himself beyond an $80,000 salary, petrol cards, a phone and a vehicle supplied, [Mr Parata] shouted boxes of alcohol and would have an attitude towards customers and suppliers about how useless [Mr Dobbe] was. [Mr Parata] has also laughed it off with other staff
17 The Judge wrongly referred to Ms McQuoid, as did counsel, as Warren Dobbe’s daughter-in-law.
18 Mr Parata was represented at sentencing by counsel from the Public Defence Service.
colleagues that we never police checked him. I do have a witness can further support the above statement.
…
Not only has he stolen from us, he has jeopardised our reputation with the negative conversations he has had about [Mr Dobbe] and our staff and our business. The time it has taken to get here with [Mr Parata], [Mr Dobbe] has been perceived as a liar amongst the community, with some suppliers as it has been over two years, and [Mr Parata] just buying his time out in the hope that minimises the consequences, because we have just become another case amongst many that needed closing.
…
[27] No objection to these passages appears have been taken by Mr Parata’s counsel at sentencing. That may reflect a view the passages concerned “any … emotional harm suffered by the victim through, or by means of, the offence”,19 or perhaps that they concerned “the victim’s views about the offending”,20 each a category of information that should be addressed in a victim impact statement.21
[28] But even if the passages should have been redacted for being beyond the scope of a victim impact statement, which, frankly, is difficult to determine given the state of the information before me, no causative error arises. This because the starting point was open to the Judge irrespective of the passages in question; a point evident from the discussion at [14].
[29] This leaves one aspect. Ms Tuialii argued the Judge was wrong to conclude the offending placed the company under great financial strain. I am unable to accept that submission. Fifty-seven thousand dollars is a significant amount of money for a small enterprise, particularly given: (a) the offending occurred during the height of the Covid-19 pandemic and (b) the financial burdens on the company identified by the victim impact statements. That it is still trading likely speaks to resilience.
19 Victims’ Rights Act 2002, s 17(2)(a).
20 Section 17AB(b).
21 Section 17AA.
Other matters
[30] Ms Tuialii also contended the Judge should have made further deductions for remorse and restrictive bail conditions. I respectfully disagree given the absence of tangible evidence of remorse beyond the pleas of guilty, Mr Parata’s apparent minimisation of his offending to the probation officer, and the modest interference with Mr Parata’s liberty by virtue of his conditions of bail: a residential condition, and a non-association condition in connection with the company and its employees.
[31]A contention Mr Parata has made rehabilitative progress in relation to drugs
— which I am inclined to accept — is addressed by the earlier discussion in connection with the alleged contribution of drug use to the offending.
[32] Ms Tuialii did not pursue, at least forcefully, a contention that the sentence should have been home detention. No more need be said about that then, particularly as the Judge’s arithmetic suggested a sentence of 28 months’ imprisonment rather than the 24-month term imposed.
Summary
[33] The three-year starting point was within range. The 15 percent guilty plea discount was available, as was the three-month discount in connection with drug use. No causative error arises in relation to any matter (save for the arithmetical error favourable to Mr Parata). All of which is to affirm the sentence is not manifestly excessive.
Result
[34]The appeal is dismissed.
……………………………..
Downs J
0
8
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