Paltridge v Paltridge

[2025] NZHC 2675

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2025-404-421

[2025] NZHC 2675

UNDER

the Administration Act 1969 and the Trusts Act 2019 and the Court’s inherent

jurisdiction

IN THE MATTER

of the Estate of Ronald James Arthur Paltridge

BETWEEN

KERRY JAMES PALTRIDGE and DANIEL JASON PALTRIDGE

Applicants

AND

ANNE MAREE PALTRIDGE

Respondent

Hearing:	17 July 2025
Appearances:	A W Johnson for the Applicants M Lloyd for the Respondent
Judgment:	15 September 2025

JUDGMENT OF ROBINSON J

This judgment was delivered by me on 15 September 2025 at 3:30 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules

…………………………………………………………………… Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors/Counsel:

Martelli McKegg, Auckland

Paul Gallagher Legal, Auckland | M Lloyd, Auckland

PALTRIDGE v PALTRIDGE [2025] NZHC 2675 [15 September 2025]

Introduction

[1]                  Ronald James Arthur Paltridge died on 17 April 2023, 13 days after he executed his most recent will on 4 April 2023. In that will Mr Paltridge appointed his wife, Anne Maree Paltridge, to be the sole executor of his estate. Probate of the will was granted on 3 October 2023 and Mrs Paltridge was appointed sole administrator.

[2]                  The applicants are Mr Paltridge’s sons from an earlier marriage. They apply for an order that an independent executor and trustee be appointed to administer his estate in place of their stepmother, Mrs Paltridge. They propose the Public Trust.

[3]                  After some initial resistance, Mrs Paltridge does not oppose the appointment of an independent executor. But she opposes the appointment of the Public Trust. She proposes the appointment of Mr Andrew Walter, solicitor, or an independent executor to be put forward by the Court.

Background

[4]                  Mr and Mrs Paltridge began their relationship in 1981, after Mr Paltridge and the applicants’ mother had separated. The applicants then were approximately eight and six years old. Mr Paltridge also had two sons with Mrs Paltridge after they married in 1987.

[5]                  In his will Mr Paltridge left $10,000 to each of his four sons, $2,000 to each of his five grandchildren, and the residue of his estate to Mrs Paltridge. However, when he made these bequests, the bulk of Mr Paltridge’s estate comprised his share of two properties he owned jointly with Mrs Paltridge. His interest in these properties has passed to Mrs Paltridge by operation of the doctrine of survivorship.

[6]                  On 26 August 2024 the applicants’ solicitors advised Mrs Paltridge’s solicitors that they intended to file proceedings against  their  father’s  estate  under  the  Family Protection Act 1955. The applicants considered that the doctrine of survivorship had caused serious injustice to  the  estate.  They  enquired  whether Mrs Paltridge in her capacity as executor of the estate would seek leave under s 88(2)

of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA) to apply for an order under s 25(1)(a) of the PRA for a division of Mr and Mrs Paltridge’s relationship property.

[7]                  On 30 August 2024 counsel for Mrs Paltridge advised the applicants’ solicitors that it is not worth making a claim against Mr Paltridge’s estate because it consists of a bank deposit of about $2,000. He confirmed that Mrs Paltridge will not be applying for a division of property pursuant to s 88(2) of the PRA. Counsel confirmed he was authorised to accept service.1

[8]                  Further correspondence followed. It is unnecessary and potentially unhelpful to set it all out here. It reveals an unfortunate degree of antipathy and distrust between the parties, which may be the genesis of the current dispute but ultimately does not help resolve it. The upshot is that Mrs Paltridge, in my view quite rightly, now accepts it is appropriate to appoint an independent executor, but for reasons set out below she opposes the appointment of the Public Trust.

Applicants’ correspondence with the Public Trust

[9]                  On 7 March 2025, shortly after the applicants filed their application for appointment of an independent solicitor, their solicitors forwarded the application to the Public Trust stating: “Our hope is that [Public Trust] can take on this role”. They advised that due to the doctrine of survivorship there are no assets in the estate but that:

Our clients have however indicated they are willing to fund PT for carrying out its role as executor, including the bringing of a relationship property claim (including application [sic] for leave to do so).

[10]              On 14 March 2025 Public Trust asked whether the applicants would fund its legal team to undertake a review of the documentation to “see if this is something Public Trust would look to take on?”. On 20 March 2025 Public Trust indicated a

$1,000 retainer would be required, with funds returnable if the review took less time than  estimated.  The  applicants  confirmed  that  the  retainer  had  been  paid  on  26 March 2025.

1      The applicants have subsequently issued Family Protection Act 1955 proceedings in the Family Court.

[11]On 28 March 2025 Public Trust wrote to the applicant’s solicitors as follows:

I confirm Public Trust has reviewed the information provided to us regarding the wish for your client to have Public Trust involved in the Paltridge estate administration.

The issues faced by your clients are becoming increasingly common. We are usually prepared to assist so long as we are covered for our costs and any other litigation risks which may arise from the proceedings. Public Trust does not receive any funding in relation to these requests. Any litigation risk regarding costs, including those that may be awarded in the event of an unsuccessful claim, must be borne by your client. Experience has shown that claimants are often convinced of the righteousness of their claim at the beginning of proceedings but may lapse into unco-operative [sic] silence when faced by a robust defence and mounting costs. Public Trust is prepared to lend its name to the PRA proceeding filed by your client subject to the following conditions:

1.Your firm will be responsible for the conduct of the entire PRA proceeding and will be the solicitor on the record.

2.You will supply to Public Trust a copy of all documents filed and served in the proceedings as if Public Trust was a party directed to be served.

3.You and your barrister will recover your own costs and the barrister’s costs directly from your client.

4.You undertake on behalf of your client to meet Public Trust’s reasonable costs either as nominal plaintiff or arising from any related activity. Notwithstanding this undertaking those costs will be a first charge on any assets belonging to or recovered from the estate.

(emphasis added)

[12]              There appears to have been further discussion between the applicants’ solicitors and Public Trust. On 24 April 2025 Public Trust indicated its solicitors “do not necessarily agree” that the applicants’ solicitors would have a conflict of interest when acting for the applicants as well as the independent trustee. Other firms apparently do so. But Public Trust asked the applicants solicitors to nominate other firms if they did not wish to act for both.

[13]              On 5 May 2025 the applicants’ solicitors advised the Public Trust that Morgan Coakle would be able to assist. At the same time they proposed terms of a Deed of Indemnity for when third party lawyers are engaged by the Public Trust as executor.

[14]              Daniel Monaghan, a specialist trustee, has sworn an affidavit on behalf of Public Trust dated 29 May 2025.2 He confirms that Public Trust consents to being appointed administrator/executor/trustee of Mr Paltridge’s estate. He  confirms Public Trust is independent of all parties to these proceedings and is regularly appointed to the role of independent administrator/trustee of estates which face similar issues to those arising in this case. He confirms Public Trust’s awareness that, if appointed, it will be required, amongst other things, to:

1.obtain information about assets which the deceased had an interest in prior to his death as either joint owner or pursuant to the PRA;

2.consider whether in all the  circumstances  it  is  appropriate  for Public Trust to apply to the Family Court under s 88(2) of the PRA for leave to file a claim as the deceased’s personal representative under    s 25(1) of the PRA; and

3.become the respondent to a claim filed by the deceased’s sons under the Family Protection Act 1955.

[15]              Mr Monaghan also confirms that, if appointed, Public Trust will instruct independent counsel to provide advice and, if necessary, represent it in any proceedings. He has provided a copy of the indemnity Public Trust has received from the applicants in respect of its costs. Mr Monaghan confirms that although these financial arrangements have been put in place to protect Public Trust for its costs, it will meet its obligations to exercise its powers and duties for the benefit of the estate as a whole, not for the benefit of any particular beneficiary.

Mrs Paltridge’s opposition

[16]              Mrs Paltridge responsibly accepts that the Court is empowered by s 21(1) of the Administration Act 1969 to replace her as executor of Mr Paltridge’s estate on the basis that it is expedient to do so given her conflict of interest. However, she says it would be inappropriate to appoint Public Trust because its independence has been

2      Mr Monaghan is not the author of the Public Trust correspondence referred to above.

tainted by its previous dealings with the applicants. Instead she proposes the appointment of Andrew Walter, solicitor, who is experienced in estate work and not known to any of the parties.

[17]              Mr Lloyd for Mrs Paltridge submits that the applicants’ sole purpose in replacing Mrs Paltridge is to persuade an independent executor to apply under the PRA to “claw back” Mr Paltridge’s half share of the jointly owned property, so their Family Protection Act claim has “something to bite into”. He says the applicants are relatively young and financially independent, while the respondent is a recently widowed pensioner planning shortly to retire. Mr Lloyd says Mrs Paltridge is anxious, vulnerable, and justifiably suspicious of the applicants’ motives. She has never previously been involved in litigation. Mr Lloyd is highly critical of the applicants’ litigation strategy in these circumstances.

[18]              Mr Lloyd is critical of the applicants for having approached Public Trust, without consulting the respondent, the day after she had suggested (through counsel) that they jointly appoint and pay  for  an  independent  executor.  He  suggests  Public Trust have only been told the applicants’ side of the story, and they have offered to pay for Public Trust’s services alone.

[19]              Mr Lloyd submits that an executor deciding whether to apply for leave under s 88(2) should follow a quasi-judicial decision-making process. He says the correspondence between the applicants and Public Trust gives the impression of unconscious bias and/or pre-determination by Public Trust. He says Public Trust’s letter of 28 March 2025 advising that it would “lend its name to the PRA proceedings filed by your client” shows a lack of transparency and independence which cannot be rectified by the assurances set out in Mr Monaghan’s subsequent affidavit.  From  Mrs Paltridge’s point of view the appointment of Public Trust is irreparably tainted.

Decision

[20]              It is abundantly clear that Mrs Paltridge would have a conflict of interest in determining as executor whether to apply under s 88(2) of the PRA for leave to seek a division of their relationship property. She no longer disputes that she needs to be replaced.

[21]              For the reasons set out below I do not accept Mr Lloyd’s submission that an appearance of unconscious bias or pre-determination arises out of the applicants’ prior dealings with Public Trust that should preclude its appointment as an administrator and executor of Mr Paltridge’s estate. Nor do I consider those previous dealings give rise to a conflict of interest or any other legal impediment to Public Trust’s appointment.

[22]              In terms of relevant legal principles, I do not accept Mr Lloyd’s submission that it is a quasi-judicial decision for an executor whether to apply for leave under     s 88(2) of the PRA, to facilitate an application for a division of property under s 25.

[23]              The duties incidental to the office of an administrator under the Administration Act are taken to be express trusts for the purposes of the Trusts Act 2019,3 which applies to those trusts with any necessary modifications.4 The duty of impartiality or even-handedness applies to executors and administrators.5 However, the duty of impartiality does not preclude a trustee from making a discretionary decision that benefits one beneficiary and disadvantages others.6

[24]              The “apparent bias” test which applies in judicial bias cases does not apply to trustees or administrators. In New Zealand Māori Council v Foulkes, Kós J held:7

Thirdly, the respondent trustees were minded to rely on the apparent bias test applied in judicial bias cases, such as Saxmere Co Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Co Ltd. I disagree. The private and public law tests have much in common. Both require a robust, realistic view to be taken by a notional reasonable person in full possession of the facts. But it would be a mistake to import case law from one stream to resolve issues in the other. One concerns private, fiduciary duties. The other public, ethical duties. Their content is different, because different interests and ultimate objectives are involved. Evaluative outcomes will not necessarily be identical. […] I agree with [counsel’s] submission that there is no need to risk confusion by intermingling the two streams of jurisprudence represented by the rule against bias in administrative law and the rule in respect of conflicts of interest in the law of trusts. The latter is entirely ample to manage conflicts in the context of this Trust, despite its additional public dimension.

3      Administration Act 1969, s 4B(1).

4      Section 4B(2).

5      Trusts Act 2019, s 35. See also Nicola Pear and others Family Property (online looseleaf ed, Thompson Reuters) at TU35.02(4).

6      Section 35(2); Kain v Hutton [2007] NZCA 199, [2007] 3 NZLR 349 at [243].

7      New Zealand Māori Council v Foulkes [2015] NZAR 1441, [2014] NZHC 1777 at [207].

[25]              The terms of Public Trust’s letter to the applicants’ solicitors of 28 March 2025 were unfortunate and perhaps reveal the author’s misunderstanding of its obligations and the role Public Trust was being asked to undertake. If an application for leave under s 88(2) is made, it will be Public Trust’s application; Public Trust will not merely be “lending its name” to the applicants’ application.

[26]              However, it quite clear from Mr Monaghan’s affidavit that any misunderstanding about Public Trust’s role has been clarified. Mr Monaghan confirms that, if appointed, Public Trust will consider whether it is appropriate to apply under s 88(2) for leave to file a claim as Mr Paltridge’s personal representative under s 25(1) of the PRA.8 Public Trust will also become the respondent to the applicants’ Family Protection Act claim. It will, quite appropriately, receive independent legal advice and representation.

[27]              Mr Johnson for the applicants also points out that it is a principal statutory function of the Public Trust to participate in the business of providing comprehensive estate management and administration services.9 This will always be subject to its statutory duties and other obligations.

[28]              There is also no conflict of interest arising out of the applicants having agreed to indemnify Public Trust in respect of the costs. Mrs Paltridge’s advice to the applicants is that the estate presently has assets of $2,000, so it is unsurprising that the Public Trust required an indemnity. It has a statutory obligation to prudently manage its assets and liabilities.10 I also note that Mrs Paltridge’s suggestion through counsel that she and the applicants jointly fund a replacement executor was on the basis that she would cease to contribute if the executor decided to apply for leave under s 88(2).

[29]              I therefore grant the applicants’ application under s 21  of  the  Administration Act to appoint Public Trust as executor  and  trustee  in  place  of  Mrs Paltridge. I make this order in reliance on Mr Monaghan’s affidavit, and on the basis that Public Trust is to receive independent legal advice and representation.

8      For completeness I note that the Court may only grant leave under s 88(2) if it is satisfied that refusing leave would cause a serious injustice.

9      Public Trust Act 2001, s 8(1)(a).

10     Section 9(b).

Result

[30]              Public Trust is appointed as executor and trustee to administer the estate of Mr Paltridge in place of the respondent.

[31]              I strongly encourage the parties to agree costs. If they cannot, they should file submissions of no more than three pages, the respondent 10 working days after the applicants. My initial view is that Mr Lloyd’s email of 6 May 2025 is significant.

Robinson J