P v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development

[2015] NZHC 1228

ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAME OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF THE APPELLANT.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CIV-2013-485-10883 [2015] NZHC 1228

IN THE MATTER OF

an appeal by way of case stated from the

determination of the Social Security Appeal Authority at Wellington under s 12Q of the Social Security Act 1964

BETWEEN

P Appellant

AND

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Respondent

On papers
Judgment:	4 June 2015

SUPPLEMENTARY JUDGMENT OF DOBSON J

[1]      My  substantive  judgment  in  this  appeal  issued  on  7 May  2015.     In distributing the judgment to the parties and counsel, the Registry advised, in standard terms, that it would be available on the internet following delivery, and invited the parties to advise the Court immediately if they had any matters of concern regarding the availability of the decision on the internet.

[2]      The judgment was delivered to the appellant by email, at the only address the Registry had for her.  The Registry received no response to the covering email that delivered the judgment to her electronically, and it thereafter became publically available, in the usual way, on the Ministry of Justice website accessible via the

internet.

P v CHIEF EXECUTIVE, MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT [2015] NZHC 1228 [4 June 2015]

[3]      On 28 May 2015, the Registry received an email from the appellant objecting to the judgment being available on the internet, and requesting suppression of her name on the implicit premise that she was entitled to that.

[4]      On 29 May 2015, her beneficiary advocate, Mr Graham Howell, who had helped the appellant with her submissions on the appeal, also made a request for name suppression by email.  He acknowledged that a request for name suppression was omitted accidentally from the case as presented to the Court.  He submitted that the fact of publication was causing distress to the appellant.

[5]      I invited Crown Law that provided counsel for the respondent, to indicate its view in relation to the appellant’s request for name suppression.  I promptly received a memorandum dated 2 June 2015, which indicated the respondent would abide the decision of the Court.   The memorandum helpfully reviewed the considerations governing name suppression in such appeals, including drawing my attention to a recognition that parties are required to accept the inherent risk of embarrassment and

damage to reputation which can follow from involvement in litigation.1

[6]      The memorandum from Crown Law cited the significance of the principle of open justice and the need for compelling reasons to displace it.  Given the lack of specific serious prejudice cited by the appellant and the fact that the decision had been in the public arena for approximately three weeks, the memorandum submitted that it did not seem to be in the interests of justice and fairness to require name suppression.

[7]      I  infer  from  the  appellant’s  communications  since  she  appreciated  the publication of the judgment that she had embarked on the appeal anticipating that her name would be suppressed.   She cites respect for her privacy as having led to decisions on various of her dealings with other State agencies and judicial bodies as leading to decisions being anonymised.

[8]      The appellant’s criticisms of this Court for not having suppressed her name are misplaced.   The Court accommodated her request to deal with her substantive

1      Clark v Attorney-General (2004) 17 PRNZ 161 (HC) at [8] and [13].

appeal on the papers, and it may be that her election to request that the matter proceed in that way contributed to her misapprehension as to publication of the identity of the parties to the appeal, which may have been aired had there been an oral hearing.

[9]      I am prepared to accept that the appellant’s adverse state of health means that publication of her name would, or may be likely to, cause a higher level of on-going stress and discomfort.  As against that, the judgment does not reveal details of her personal situation that would generally be characterised as particularly sensitive.

[10]     In the end, I am prepared to accept that the principle of open justice that normally requires publication of the names of parties in proceedings in this Court is sufficiently  outweighed  by  the  appellant’s  circumstances.     Those  include  her pursuing her own appeal assuming that she would retain name suppression, and having made out an unusual level of distress flowing from publication of her name. This balancing exercise is obviously dependent entirely on the factual circumstances of this appeal, and could not be treated as having any wider application.

[11]     I accordingly grant her application for name suppression and will re-issue my judgment anonymising her involvement.  She will henceforth be referred to as “the appellant” in the body of the judgment, and “P” in the intitulement.

Dobson J

Solicitors:

Crown Law, Wellington for respondent

Copy to:

The appellant