| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND |
| SC 68/2016 [2016] NZSC 98 |
| BETWEEN | OLIVIA WAIYEE LEE |
| AND | WHANGAREI DISTRICT COUNCIL |
| Court: | Glazebrook, Arnold and OʼRegan JJ |
Counsel: | Applicant in person |
Judgment: | 3 August 2016 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
AThe application for leave to appeal is granted in part (Olivia Waiyee Lee v Whangarei District Council [2016] NZCA 258).
BThe approved question is whether, in terms of s 37 of the Weathertight Homes Resolution Services Act 2006, the application for an assessor’s report, “stopped the clock” for limitation purposes with regard to the proceedings against the respondent.
CIn all other respects the application is dismissed.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
Background
Ms Lee seeks leave to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal[1] dismissing her appeal against summary judgment granted in the favour of the respondent in the High Court.[2]
[1]Lee v Whangarei District Council [2016] NZCA 258 (Winkelmann, Simon France and Woolford JJ) [Lee (CA)].
[2]Lee v Whangarei District Council [2015] NZHC 2777 (Associate Judge Bell) (Lee (HC)].
The proceeding concerns Ms Lee’s house. During construction, Ms Lee had noticed that the house leaked and drew this to the builder’s attention. In February 2008 Ms Lee engaged an expert consultant, Mr Beattie, to assess the home. This was in an attempt to resolve an ongoing dispute with the builder over workmanship and payment.
The Beattie report, amongst other faults, identified that the exterior cladding “would not meet the requirements of the New Zealand Building Code in either durability, weathertightness or alignment.” A later report in April 2008 repeated this finding, in addition to noting defects in roof draining and balconies.[3] In April 2011, another report was prepared by Mr Gill, a registered building surveyor, who identified defects that had not previously been identified, including that the plywood pre-cladding had not been sealed and joints had not been taped.
[3]These facts are taken from Lee (HC), above n 2, at [15]–[36] and [46].
The Whangarei District Council had carried out a number of inspections during construction of the house. It failed its final inspection on 26 March 2008 and a code compliance certificate was not issued. Ms Lee issued proceedings on 21 May 2014 alleging negligence in the Council’s inspections.
Judgments in the courts below
Associate Judge Bell was satisfied that the proceedings were governed by s 4(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1950 and not by s 393 of the Building Act 2004.[4] He held that the Council had shown “by a strong margin” that Ms Lee had discovered the damage to her house prior to 21 May 2008, Ms Lee knew it had defects that went to the weathertightness of the house and that the house did not comply with the Building Code. Associate Judge Bell granted summary judgement to the Council accordingly.[5]
[4]At [13].
[5]At [70]–[71].
The Court of Appeal dismissed Ms Lee’s appeal. The Court found that the Associate Judge did not err in identifying the…
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- Case
- [2016] NZSC 98
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Supreme Court concluded that the appeal did not meet the criteria for leave to appeal under section 13 of the Supreme Court Act 2003. Ms. Lee's arguments were mostly focused on her particular circumstances and did not raise issues of general or public importance. However, the court found that the question of whether section 37 of the Weathertight Homes Resolution Services Act could halt the limitation period was a matter of public importance, as it was left open in a previous case. Therefore, the court granted leave to appeal in part, specifically to address this issue. In all other respects, the application was dismissed.
The court ruled that the application for leave to appeal is granted in part, with the approved question being whether section 37 of the Weathertight Homes Resolution Services Act 2006 can "stop the clock" for limitation purposes in proceedings against the respondent. In all other respects, the application is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter initially came before the High Court, where Associate Judge Bell granted summary judgment in favour of the Whangarei District Council. Ms Lee appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed her appeal. Ms Lee then sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of New Zealand against the Court of Appeal's decision. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in part, focusing on the question of whether section 37 of the Weathertight Homes Resolution Services Act 2006 "stopped the clock" for limitation purposes concerning the proceedings against the respondent. In all other respects, the application was dismissed.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether, in terms of s 37 of the Weathertight Homes Resolution Services Act 2006, the application for an assessor’s report, "stopped the clock" for limitation purposes with regard to the proceedings against the respondent.
Held
1. The application for leave to appeal is granted in part. The approved question is whether, in terms of s 37 of the Weathertight Homes Resolution Services Act 2006, the application for an assessor’s report, “stopped the clock” for limitation purposes with regard to the proceedings against the respondent.
2. In all other respects the application is dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in part to determine whether the application for an assessor’s report under s 37 of the Weathertight Homes Resolution Services Act 2006 had the effect of "stopping the clock" for limitation purposes in proceedings against the Whangarei District Council. The Court noted that this issue had been left open in Osborne v Auckland Council and was significant enough to warrant further examination. The Court was not persuaded that other issues raised by Ms Lee met the criteria for leave to appeal, as they did not raise questions of general or public importance and did not suggest the lower courts had erred in their application of the limitation period or the Beattie report as the starting point for limitation purposes. The Court dismissed the application in all other respects as these issues did not point to any miscarriage of justice or suggest errors in the lower courts' decisions.
The Court of Appeal had previously found that the limitation period applicable was s 4(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1950, and not s 393 of the Building Act 2004. The Associate Judge had granted summary judgment to the Council, finding that Ms Lee had discovered the defects before the limitation period expired. The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, rejecting Ms Lee’s argument that the relevant defect was the plywood cladding identified in 2011, rather than the defects identified by Mr Beattie in 2008. Additionally, the Court of Appeal held that s 37 of the Weathertight Homes Resolution Services Act did not "stop the clock" for all proceedings relating to the building, a contention Ms Lee sought to challenge further in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's decision to grant leave to appeal on this specific issue highlights the importance of clarifying the scope and effect of s 37 in the context of limitation periods for proceedings against local authorities regarding building inspections.