Oakes v Police - [2024] NZHC 1930

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2024-404-000202

[2024] NZHC 1930

BETWEEN
JULIET DORA OAKES

Applicant

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE

Respondent

Hearing: On the papers

Counsel:

Applicant self-represented M C M Nash for Respondent

Judgment:

15 July 2024

JUDGMENT OF ANDREW J

This judgment was delivered by Justice Andrew on 15 July 2024 at 3.00 pm
pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016 Registrar / Deputy Registrar
Date…………………………..

OAKES v NZ POLICE [2024] NZHC 1930 [15 July 2024]

Introduction

[1] The applicant, Ms Juliet Oakes, seeks to appeal her conviction for theft. Ms Oakes was convicted on 19 January 1977 and sentenced to pay a fine of $30. She filed her notice of appeal on 13 May 2024. That is 47 years out of time.

[2] Ms Oakes submits that she intends to pursue two grounds of appeal, were the application for an extension of time granted. First, she says that although a guilty plea was entered, she did not agree to that decision, and so the conviction should be overturned. Second, she refers to adverse consequences of the conviction, namely her inability to run a childcare business, and seeks a discharge without conviction, even were that guilty plea properly made.

[3] The respondent, the New Zealand Police, opposes the application for extension of time. The Police say that the 47-year delay is extraordinary and largely unexplained; given the lapse of time, the prosecution is significantly prejudiced in responding to any appeal.

[4] In accordance with my minute of 30 May 2024, the application is being determined on the papers.1

The statutory framework

[5] Ms Oakes’ conviction was entered before the enactment of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. In accordance with s 397(2) of that Act, her appeal must be heard and determined as if the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 was still in force.

[6] Under s 115 of the Summary Proceedings Act, Ms Oakes had a general right of appeal to this Court against her conviction. Section 116 of that Act required that any appeal be lodged within 28 days of sentence. As noted above, Ms Oakes’ appeal is some 47 years out of time.

1 In response to my minute, I received submissions from the parties.

[7] Section 123 of the Summary Proceedings Act allows the Court to extend the time for filing an appeal. In R v Slavic,2 the Court of Appeal held that the key questions are:

(a)Why was the appeal filed late?

(b)What merit does the prospective appeal have?

[8]The Court of Appeal held:3

[13] It is for the appellant to provide sufficient information for the Court to determine whether it is in the interests of justice for leave to be granted… Where the appellant fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay, “the only ground … on which the delay could be overlooked is if the proposed appeal is overwhelming on the merits.”

[14] In the simplest terms,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Oakes v Police

Details

AGLC: Oakes v Police [2024] NZHC 1930
Case: [2024] NZHC 1930
Decision Date: 15 July 2024

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of New Zealand, Juliet Dora Oakes sought to appeal her 1977 conviction for theft, which she filed on 13 May 2024, 47 years after her sentencing. The New Zealand Police opposed the application for an extension of time, arguing that the delay was extraordinary and largely unexplained, significantly prejudicing their ability to respond to any appeal. The court had to determine whether to grant the extension of time for the appeal, considering the reasons for the delay and the merits of the appeal, as well as the prejudice to the respondent and the broader interests of justice.

The court considered the statutory framework applicable to the appeal, noting that it should be treated as if the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 was still in force. The applicant's appeal was filed well beyond the 28-day statutory limit, and the court applied the principles established in R v Slavich, which require the applicant to provide sufficient information for the court to determine whether it is in the interests of justice to grant leave. The court noted that the applicant's reason for the delay – a recent desire to take on childcare responsibilities – did not explain why she did not appeal earlier. The court also found contradictions in the applicant's account of how her guilty plea was entered. Furthermore, the court found that the applicant's proposed appeal lacked merit, as the historical theft conviction was unlikely to be relevant to her current childcare aspirations. The court also highlighted the significant prejudice to the respondent due to the delay, as the police file appeared to have been destroyed, making it impossible to properly assess the merits of the applicant's position.

The court concluded that the delay was extreme, and the prejudice to the respondent insurmountable. The broader interests of society in the finality of decisions also weighed against granting the extension of time. Therefore, the court dismissed the application for an extension of time, and the conviction stood.

Orders