O'Neill v Accident Compensation Corporation HC Auckland CIV 2008-404-8482
[2010] NZHC 362
•31 March 2010
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV 2008-404-8482
UNDER The Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation &
Compensation Act 2001
IN THE MATTER OF an appeal pursuant to s 162 of the Act
BETWEEN CHRISTOPHER O'NEILL Appellant
ANDACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION
Respondent
Hearing: 31 March 2010
Counsel: C J O'Neill, Appellant, in person
D Tuiqereqere for Respondent
A Lewis for Intervenor (Professor Windsor) Judgment: 31 March 2010
(ORAL) JUDGMENT (NO. 2) OF HEATH J
Solicitors:
M J Mercier, Legal Services, ACC, PO Box 242, Wellington 6140
Bartlett Partners, PO Box 10-852, The Terrace, Wellington 6143
Counsel:
D Tuiqereqere, PO Box 16-204, Sandringham, Auckland 1351
A Lewis, PO Box 10 242, The Terrace, Wellington 6143
Copy to:C J O’Neill 62 Kimberhall Avenue, Mt Roskill, Auckland
O'NEILL V ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION HC AK CIV 2008-404-8482 31 March 2010
[1] On 29 June 2009, Asher J granted leave for Mr O’Neill to appeal to this
Court against a decision given in the District Court at Auckland by Judge Barber on
an accident compensation appeal. The District Court had dismissed Mr O’Neill’s appeal against the Accident Compensation Corporation’s declinature of cover. Leave was granted under s 162 of the Injury Prevention Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001:
162 Appeal to High Court on question of law
(1) A party to an appeal who is dissatisfied with the decision of a District
Court as being wrong in law may, with the leave of the District Court, appeal
to the High Court.
(2) The leave of the District Court must be sought within 21 days after the
District Court's decision.
(3) If the District Court refuses to grant leave, the High Court may grant special leave to appeal.
(4) The special leave of the High Court must be sought within 21 days after the District Court refused leave.
(5) The High Court Rules and sections 74 to 78 of the District Courts Act
1947, with all necessary modifications, apply to an appeal under this section
as if it were an appeal under section 72 of that Act.
[2] Section 162(1) makes it clear that leave may only be granted on questions of law. After hearing argument at the leave application, Asher J gave leave to appeal
on two questions:
a) Did s 142 of the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001 (the Act) ... permit counsel for Professor Windsor and the Auckland District Health Board to be present and make submissions at the appeal hearing?
b)If not, what are the consequences of this, and, in particular, should the appeal be allowed and the appeal decision modified or quashed? If so, what indications of effect should be given under s 161(2) of the Act?
[3] During argument on the leave application, Mr O’Neill asked Asher J to grant leave on a point relating to what is called a “deemed decision”. A “deemed decision” arises out of s 146 of the Act. Asher J declined to give leave on that point.
[4] It is plain that the Judge did not understand the nature of the issue, from the material before him. That was understandable. Only in the course of my preparation
of an interim judgment did I realise that the “deemed decision” point arose out of an earlier judgment of Judge Beattie which, I concluded, was simply part of the appeal process which gave rise to a decision of Judge Barber, to which the leave application related.
[5] I heard the appeal on 3 November 2009 and gave a reserved judgment on 14
December 2009. Although I found against Mr O’Neill on the two points on which Asher J gave leave, I adjourned the appeal to seek further submissions on whether the scope of the appeal should be extended.
[6] The additional points relate to whether there was a “deemed decision” and questions relating to Judge Barber’s decision on the merits. Initially, I intended to hear submissions on 12 February 2010. Most regrettably, the judgment of 14
December 2009, had not been made available to Mr O’Neill. At the time a Registrar contacted him to ascertain whether he was to file submissions, Mr O’Neill raised that point.
[7] As I have done in Court today, I express my apologies to Mr O’Neill for the failure to provide a copy of the judgment to him in a timely fashion. I am satisfied, from my inquiries that, however regrettable that was, it was inadvertent.
[8] The history of the complete proceeding is unsatisfactory. From the time ACC made its initial decision to decline cover through to the completion of proceedings in the District Court, the series of systemic procedural irregularities that exist do not reflect well on the administration of justice. As I said in my interim decision, it has not been easy to untangle the procedural web in which Mr O’Neill has been caught.
[9] Two review decisions and two hearings of the one appeal by different Judges has led to confusion over the scope of issues on which leave to appeal to this Court could be brought. The hearing today has confirmed my view that the interests of justice require the appeal points to be expanded, in order that all remaining controversies between the Corporation and Mr O’Neill can be properly resolved.
[10] The three points identified in my interim decision, on which I heard argument
in relation to expansion of the grounds of appeal, are:
a) Whether there was a “deemed decision”, for the purposes of s 146 of the Act, resolving issues in favour of Mr O’Neill.
b)Whether Judge Barber had jurisdiction to deal with a substantive appeal, having regard to observations made in (what I termed) the Dunn review. Those comments are set out at para [24] of my interim judgment.
c) If Judge Barber did have jurisdiction, did he err in his approach to the appeal, by considering whether a “personal injury” had been suffered when that point had not been the subject of reliance in either of ACC’s purported decision letters.
[11] Mr Tuiqereqere, for ACC, opposed extending the grounds of appeal. In short
he submitted that the leave issue had been resolved finally by Asher J and the Court was functus officio. If those arguments were not accepted, Mr Tuiqereqere proposed the addition of further points relating to my jurisdiction to extend the matters that Mr O’Neill could argue before the Court.
[12] I decline to reserve expressly issues of jurisdiction to extend the appeal points. As I indicated to Mr Tuiqereqere during argument, those would be rulings in the course of an appeal hearing in this Court. If Mr O’Neill were ultimately successful, it would be open to the Corporation to seek leave to appeal to the Court
of Appeal, if it considered I had erred in doing so. However, just like the position in
the District Court, there is no decision capable of being appealed until the appeal itself is determined.
[13] I formed the view, during the course of the hearing, that I should extend the appeal points. For that reason, I did not hear orally from Mr O’Neill on the issues. I had, however, read his written submissions before the hearing.
[14] I consider that jurisdiction to extend the time to appeal is available, once this Court has become seized of an appeal through the grant of leave under s 162. Section 162 does not refer to specific approved appeal points, though the articulation
of such points usually occurs for reasons of efficiency. Nevertheless, it is common
for approved points to be amended before judgment is given, if they do not satisfactorily record the true controversies with which the court must deal on appeal. An example is the decision of Ronald Young J in Nelson v Accident Compensation Corporation[1].
[1] (2008) 19 PRNZ 108 (HC).
[15] In my view, once leave has been granted it is open to the High Court to extend or to amend grounds of appeal if, on a review of relevant evidence and the record below, such a course is in the interests of justice. The general principle which
is captured in r 1.9 of the High Court Rules, incorporated into Accident
Compensation appeals by s 162(5) of the Act, is to allow all amendments necessary
to determine the real issues between the parties: see Wright Stevenson & Co Ltd v Copland[2]. The modern trend is to allow amendments where there is no demonstrable prejudice: Elders Pastoral Ltd v Marr[3].
[2] [1964] NZLR 673 (SC).
[3] [1987] 2 PRNZ 383 (CA).
[16] The history of this proceeding means that, despite the obvious delay in bringing matters to a conclusion, the interests of justice require the additional points
to be argued. My view on the jurisdiction of the Court is confirmed by the way in which the Supreme Court approached a similar issue in Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd[4]. Although s 13 of the Supreme Court Act 2004 allows
that Court to grant leave to appeal, it is common for the Court to approve grounds of
appeal. In Paper Reclaim Ltd, the Court dealt with an application to extend the grounds of appeal. While the application was unsuccessful, the Court did not comment adversely on any jurisdictional issue.
[4] [2007] NZSC 1
[17] Accordingly, the importance of the additional points to Mr O’Neill, coupled with their seriously arguable nature, lead me to the view that the grounds should be extended. It is necessary to adjourn the appeal for further argument to be advanced on those points.
[18] I considered whether to appoint amicus curiae. Mr O’Neill opposed that, in
his written submissions. Having reflected on the issue, I consider that the factual matters on which I have already been addressed, coupled with the ability to test submissions to be made by Mr Tuiqereqere on the law, means that the need for amicus is not present.
[19] I adjourn the appeal until Thursday 1 July 2010 at 10am, when I will hear argument on the remaining issues. One day is allocated for that hearing.
[20] Written submissions from ACC shall be filed and served on or before 14 May
2010, together with a paginated bundle attaching all documents from the record to which reference will be made. A separate bundle of authorities should also be filed and served.
[21] Submissions, in writing, from Mr O’Neill, together with any additional documents to which he wishes to refer, shall be filed and served on or before 18 June 2010.
[22] Costs reserved.
P R Heath J
0
1
0