O'Connell v Police
[2025] NZHC 952
•17 April 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND PALMERSTON NORTH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE PAPAIOEA ROHE
CRI-2025-454-004
[2025] NZHC 952
BETWEEN COLIN GEORGE O’CONNELL
Appellant
AND
NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 26 March 2025 Appearances:
P J Knowsley for Appellant G L Duncan for Respondent
Judgment:
17 April 2025
JUDGMENT OF GRICE J
(Appeal against sentence)
Introduction
[1] Colin O’Connell pleaded guilty to one charge of possession of 372.49 g of cannabis for supply.1 He was sentenced in the Palmerston North District Court to four months’ imprisonment on 29 January 2025.2
[2] Mr O’Connell now appeals against that sentence on the basis that the Judge erred in his decision not to commute the sentence of imprisonment to home detention, and the sentence is manifestly excessive. He contends that his sentence should be one of home detention or community detention. He also seeks to adduce affidavits affirmed by himself and his wife as fresh evidence on appeal.
1 Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, s 6(1)(f) and (2)(c) — maximum penalty eight years’ imprisonment.
2 Police v O’Connell [2025] NZDC 1688 [decision under appeal].
O’CONNELL v POLICE [2025] NZHC 952 [17 April 2025]
[3] The Police oppose the appeal. While they accept that a sentence of imprisonment was not sought at sentencing, they submit that the case is finely balanced, and a holistic view of the relevant factors suggests the sentence of imprisonment was justifiable.
Background
Summary of the offending
[4]Mr O’Connell is 77 years old.
[5] On the morning of 1 November 2023, police executed a search warrant at Mr O’Connell’s home address. Mr O’Connell and his wife were both at home at the time and were detained for that purpose. Police were led to the address through communications intercepted as part of an investigation in relation to a suspected drug operation involving the sale and supply of methamphetamine, cocaine, ecstasy, and cannabis.
[6] A small suitcase containing 346.49 g of packaged cannabis was found in Mr O’Connell’s garage. A further 26 g of cannabis was located on top of his bedroom drawers. The police also seized $8,000 cash in a brown bag located in Mr O’Connell’s bedroom, and $1,500 in $50 denominations located in his wife’s wallet.
[7] When spoken to by police, Mr O’Connell said the cannabis was all for his personal use or shared with his friends.
Pre-sentence report
[8] The pre-sentence report noted that while Mr O’Connell took responsibility for being in possession of the cannabis, he maintained that it was not for the purposes of supply. He demonstrated “low remorse and poor insight into his position” and suggested that he only pleaded guilty to the charge in order to progress matters. Mr O’Connell also disputed the quantity of cannabis he was in possession of and the manner in which it was stored. In addition, he suggested that the $8,000 in cash was the proceeds of a private sale of a motor vehicle, and the $1,500 was his wife’s personal savings. He disputed any involvement with the larger drug operation
referenced in the summary of facts, and suspected he was targeted by police based on pre-conceived opinions about himself and his family.
[9] The report writer observed that this was Mr O’Connell’s eighth time before the court for drug-related offending, which demonstrated “a continued pattern of offending reducing confidence that further punitive or rehabilitative measures will deter the likelihood of further offending of its kind”. It was noted that he “appeared indifferent” towards undertaking the recommended alcohol and drug counselling and had suggested he was more inclined to stop using cannabis on his own merit (despite over fifty years of substance use).
[10] The report recommended a sentence of imprisonment, given Mr O’Connell’s criminal history and low insight into his offending. While home detention was an available option and Mr O’Connell’s home address where he resides with his wife had been assessed as suitable, the report writer warned that a home detention sentence was unlikely to mitigate the risk of further similar offending.
Criminal history
[11] Mr O’Connell has 43 previous convictions. He has 14 relevant convictions relating to the supply or possession of illegal drugs and has been sentenced to imprisonment for cannabis-relating offending on two occasions, in 1979 and 1989. His most recent relevant convictions were in 2016, for possessing and selling cannabis. He was sentenced for that offending in 2017 to three months’ community detention, which he completed without issue.
District Court decision
[12] Mr O’Connell received a sentencing indication from Judge Krebs on 30 May 2024, which he accepted.3 In that decision, the Judge indicated that sentences of home detention or community detention had not been ruled out.4 There was then a delay in Mr O’Connell’s sentencing because the Police had initially sought to have the
3 Police v O’Connell DC Palmerston North CRI-2023-054-2558, 30 May 2024.
4 At [8].
cash that was found at the property forfeited, but after considering the evidence they withdrew that application.5
[13] In the District Court, the Police sought a sentence of home detention, while Mr O’Connell sought a sentence of community detention. In his sentencing indication, the Judge had determined that the starting point for Mr O’Connell’s offending would be six months’ imprisonment.6 An uplift of one month was applied for previous convictions, the Judge noting that Mr O’Connell had a history of offending which extended back to the 1960s, including a number of dishonesty and drug offences.7 The Judge had also said Mr O’Connell would be entitled to a discount of 20 per cent if he accepted the sentencing indication and pleaded guilty, which he did.8
[14] At sentencing, the Judge considered a further discount was warranted for Mr O’Connell’s age, recognising that any sentence imposed would be harder on him than it might be for a younger person.9 A reduction was also made in recognition of the fact that Mr O’Connell had been on bail for a little over a year.10 The Judge imposed an overall discount of 1.8 months for these factors, to reach an end point of four months’ imprisonment.11
[15] The Judge then considered whether the sentence of imprisonment should be commuted to home detention.12 He noted that the pre-sentence report indicated that Mr O’Connell had disputed aspects of the offence, had low insight into his offending, and that cannabis had become a lifestyle choice for him which in recent times could not be stopped except by way of imprisonment.13 Moreover, the Judge observed that the offending involved a significant commercial amount of cannabis, which was on the fringes of (although not directly connected to) a much wider operation involving
5 Decision under appeal, above n 2, at [1].
6 At [5].
7 At [4].
8 This would amount to a total of 5.8 months’ imprisonment.
9 Decision under appeal, above n 2, at [5].
10 At [5].
11 At [6].
12 At [6].
13 At [7].
sale of drugs. On this basis, the Judge concluded that a sentence of home detention was not appropriate and the end sentence was one of four months’ imprisonment.
[16] The Judge imposed release conditions requiring Mr O’Connell not to possess consume or use alcohol or drugs for six months, and to attend a drug and alcohol course and rehabilitative and maintenance programme. He also ordered the destruction of the cannabis. Mr O’Connell was granted bail pending the present appeal.
Legal principles relating to home detention
[17] A sentence of home detention may be imposed where an offender would otherwise be sentenced to a short-term sentence of imprisonment if the court is satisfied that the purpose for which the sentence is imposed cannot be achieved by any less restrictive sentence or combination of sentences.14
[18] Before imposing a sentence of home detention, the court is required to consider a pre-sentence report prepared by a probation officer, setting out the suitability of the proposed home detention residence and providing confirmation that the offender consents to any relevant conditions.15 The court must be satisfied that the proposed home detention residence is suitable, that any relevant occupants of the residence understand and consent to the conditions of home detention, and that the offender has been made aware of and understands the conditions that will apply during home detention and agrees to comply with them.16
[19] Section 16(1) of the Sentencing Act 2002 provides that when considering whether to impose a sentence of imprisonment, the court must have regard to the desirability of keeping offenders in the community as far as is practicable and consonant with the safety of the community. In particular, a court must not impose a sentence of imprisonment unless it is satisfied that:17
14 Sentencing Act 2002, s 15A(1). A short-term sentence of imprisonment is one of two years or less: see s 4 definition of “short-term sentence”; and Parole Act 2002, s 4(1) definition of “short-term sentence”.
15 Sentencing Act, ss 80A(2A) and 26A(2).
16 Section 80A(2)(a).
17 Section 16(2).
…
(a)a sentence is being imposed for all or any of the purposes in section 7(1)(a) to (c), (e), (f), or (g); and
(b)those purposes cannot be achieved by a sentence other than imprisonment; and
(c)no other sentence would be consistent with the application of the principles in section 8 to the particular case.
…
[20] The relevant purposes of sentencing that the court must consider are: holding the offender accountable; promoting a sense of responsibility in the offender for the harm done; providing for the interests of the victim; denunciation; deterrence; and protection of the community.18 The principles of sentencing which must be taken into account include: the gravity of the offending; the seriousness of the type of offence; the general desirability of consistency in sentencing for similar offending; the need to impose the least restrictive outcome that is appropriate in the circumstances; and any particular circumstances of the offender that would make an otherwise appropriate sentence disproportionately severe.19
[21] However, s 17 states that nothing in that part of the Sentencing Act limits the discretion of a court to impose a sentence of imprisonment on an offender if the court is satisfied on reasonable grounds that the offender is unlikely to comply with any other available sentence.
Approach on appeal
[22] Mr O’Connell’s appeal is brought pursuant to s 244 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011.20 This Court must allow the appeal only if it is satisfied that there was an error in the sentence and that a different sentence should be imposed.21 The statutory test has long been interpreted to mean that the court will allow the appeal only if the sentence is manifestly excessive.22 In Tutakangahau v R, the Court of Appeal noted
18 Section 7(1)(a)–(c) and (e)–(g).
19 Section 8(a), (b), (e), (g) and (h).
20 Section 245 confirms that the fact a defendant has received a sentence indication does not affect their right to bring an appeal against sentence. See also Nepia v R [2015] NZHC 1226 at [25].
21 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250(2).
22 Kumar v R [2015] NZCA 460 at [81].
that generally the court “will not intervene where the sentence is within the range that can properly be justified by accepted sentencing principles”.23
[23] In Palmer v R, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the standard of appellate review adopted in Tutakangahau applies to a decision not to commute a sentence of imprisonment to home detention as it does to any other sentence.24 However, in such cases the sentencing judge must exercise their discretion as to whether imprisonment is necessary or if home detention can respond adequately to the seriousness of the offending — a decision which becomes more difficult to articulate “[t]he closer one gets to the dividing line”.25 Furthermore, it requires the weighing of purposes and principles of sentencing, which may pull in opposite directions.26 Therefore, the margin of appreciation extended to sentencing judges on appeal is “usually significant”.27 That said, “the choice must be intelligible”, in that the relevant factors have been identified and weighed.28
Leave to adduce fresh evidence on appeal
[24] Mr O’Connell seeks leave to adduce fresh evidence on appeal. At the hearing, handwritten letters from Mr O’Connell and his wife to the Court were handed up by counsel. They described the impact a sentence of imprisonment would have on them and their whānau. Mr O’Connell has since filed two affidavits affirmed by himself and his wife, which reflect the contents of those letters.
[25] The test for determining whether fresh evidence may be adduced on appeal is well-settled. The court must be satisfied that the evidence is sufficiently fresh (in that it could not with reasonable diligence have been called at sentence), sufficiently credible, and cogent in the sense that it might reasonably have led to a different outcome.29
23 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [36].
24 Palmer v R [2016] NZCA 541 at [18].
25 R v D (CA253/2008) [2008] NZCA 254 at [66].
26 Palmer, above n 24, at [19]; and Doolan v R [2011] NZCA 542.
27 Palmer, above n 24, at [19].
28 Fairbrother v R [2013] NZCA 340 at [31].
29 R v Lundy [2013] UKPC 28, [2014] 2 NZLR 273.
[26] This evidence is relevant to the Judge’s interpretation of the pre-sentence report, which led to his conclusion that a sentence of imprisonment was appropriate in the circumstances. It provides helpful context regarding the position of Mr O’Connell and his wife, which assists in assessing the application of the relevant principles and purposes of sentencing. I accept that it is sufficiently fresh, credible, and cogent, and leave is granted accordingly.
Summary of the parties’ positions
[27] Mr Knowsley, for Mr O’Connell, refers to s 16 of the Sentencing Act, and submits that in this case a sentence of imprisonment is not required to meet the purposes of sentencing under s 7. He contends that an electronically monitored sentence would adequately meet considerations including denunciation, deterrence, and holding the offender accountable. In terms of the principles of sentencing under s 8, Mr Knowsley submits that the gravity of the offending does not warrant a sentence of imprisonment, particularly given Mr O’Connell’s age and his role in caring for his grandchildren part-time. He says a sentence of imprisonment is inconsistent with a modern approach to cannabis sentencing, particularly where the end sentence is as low as this one, and submits that home detention provides a more humane and practical alternative in this context, which better facilitates access to medical care and family support.
[28] The Police accept that the Judge did not provide explicit reasoning balancing imprisonment against other possible sentences. However, Ms Duncan submits that the relevant factors were implicitly considered within the decision, and therefore the Judge did not err. She contends that while this was a narrow case, the option of a short sentence of imprisonment was available.
Should the sentence have been commuted to home detention?
Family circumstances
[29] Mr O’Connell’s wife acknowledged in her letter that Mr O’Connell is a long-term cannabis user, but mainly uses it for sleep and to help relieve general aches and pains. However, she says she was not aware that “all that cannabis was in the
garage”. She notes that these proceedings have caused them both considerable stress. She accepts that Mr O’Connell is to blame for what happened, and says she “thought his offending days were over”. However, she asks that he be able to serve his sentence by way of home detention.
[30] Mr O’Connell’s wife is 73 years old and is unable to drive. She therefore relies on Mr O’Connell to drive her everywhere, both within the semi-rural small town where they live and for longer trips. In addition, Mr O’Connell takes care of the garden and home maintenance. They cannot afford to pay someone to drive Mr O’Connell’s wife around, nor to attend to the other tasks that he regularly takes care of.
[31] Furthermore, their son is in prison, which means Mr O’Connell and his wife have part-time care of their three grandchildren, who are aged six, nine, and 11 years old. They both suggest Mr O’Connell’s wife will have difficulty coping if he goes to prison.
[32] I accept that the impact on Mr O’Connell’s wife and whānau are relevant factors to be taken into account which go towards a sentence of home detention, particularly given his role in caring for his grandchildren. As noted by the Supreme Court in Philip v R, the impact of a sentence of imprisonment on children within the family is an important consideration in assessing the offender’s personal circumstances in sentencing under s 8(h) and (i).30
Weighing of rehabilitation versus deterrence and denunciation
[33] Mr Knowsley submits that there was no justification for the recommendation of a sentence of imprisonment in the pre-sentence report which the Judge relied upon. He contends that the law acknowledges the limited utility of imprisonment for rehabilitative purposes by treating it as a last resort.
[34] Ms Duncan contends that the Judge gave proper weight to Mr O’Connell’s comments in the pre-sentence report. She submits that in the circumstances,
30 Philip v R [2022] NZSC 149, [2022] 1 NZLR 571.
deterrence and denunciation had greater emphasis than rehabilitation or the need to keep offenders in the community. She says that given Mr O’Connell’s indifferent attitude to treatment and his lack of acceptance that he has done anything wrong, he is unlikely to be assisted in his rehabilitation through a community sentence. Furthermore, if the Court is to accept Mr O’Connell’s expression of remorse in his affidavit as genuine, it has nevertheless come at a very late stage. Ms Duncan notes that in Terewi, the Court said “a short prison term may be merited” where offending is persistent, even for category one offending, which is less serious than Mr O’Connell’s offending. She submits that Mr O’Connell appears set in his ways, continues to deny important parts of his offending, and community-based sentences have not been successful in preventing further offending thus far.
[35] In his affidavit, Mr O’Connell refers to the remorse expressed in his letter to the Court. He notes that at 77 years of age, he finds it increasingly difficult to express himself, his hearing has deteriorated, and he is “generally not as quick-witted” as he used to be. He also reports being “more easily stressed out by some situations”. Mr O’Connell believes this contributed to how he came across at his interview with the pre-sentence report writer. He explains that while he told the pre-sentence report writer that the cannabis was for his personal use, he also accepted that some of it was to be supplied to others, which was why he pleaded guilty to the charge. He reiterates his apology and his willingness to take responsibility, and promises to never come before the court again.
[36] In his submissions in reply, Mr Knowsley referred to Manikpersadh v R.31 As it had not been cited in written submissions, leave was given for the respondent to file further submissions in relation to that decision. The case concerned an appeal against a sentence of six months’ imprisonment, reduced to four months’ imprisonment by the High Court on appeal, for two charges of driving with excess breath alcohol causing injury.32 The Court of Appeal held that the District Court Judge had erred in focussing solely on deterrence when considering whether to impose a sentence of home detention rather than imprisonment.33 Furthermore, it found the High Court Judge was
31 Manikpersadh v R [2011] NZCA 452
32 Land Transport Act 1998, s 61(1)(b) — maximum penalty five years’ imprisonment or $2,000 fine.
33 Manikpersadh, above n 31, at [8].
in error in failing to recognise the District Court’s narrow focus as an error requiring correction on appeal. The Court also indicated that a shorter sentence, such as a term of four months’ imprisonment, favoured granting home detention.34
[37] Mr Knowsley notes that in Manikpersadh, the Court of Appeal cited comments made in the dissenting judgment of William Young P in R v Vhavha:35
[45] … I do not see the requirements of holding the appellant to account, denunciation or deterrence as logically controlling the decision whether to commute the otherwise appropriate sentence of imprisonment to home detention. That being so, and the appellant being in all respects a good candidate for home detention, I see the least restrictive outcome principle (see s 8(g)) as the primary consideration, with the result that I would allow the appeal and sentence the appellant to nine months home detention.
[38] Mr Knowsley submits that the same rationale applies here. He says the respondent conceded that the Judge’s sole focus was on deterrence, denunciation, and accountability, and notes that even those purposes were not expressly referred to by the Judge. Ms Duncan submits that the circumstances of Manikpersadh can be distinguished from the present circumstances, as in that case the appellant was 19 years old and had no previous convictions. In that context, the purpose of assisting rehabilitation and reintegration under s 7(h) of the Sentencing Act was of greater importance, and a sentence of home detention would adequately address the purpose of community protection. She says the same cannot be said for Mr O’Connell.
[39] The appropriate sentence must be assessed by weighing the relevant purposes and principles of sentencing and determining whether, in the circumstances, a sentence of home detention is an adequate response to the offending.
[40] I accept that Mr O’Connell’s evidence offers some explanation for his manner of presentation to the pre-sentence report writer. In his affidavit, Mr O’Connell accepts that he is “old enough to know better”. While his rehabilitation prospects may be lower than those of a younger person without his history of offending, they still remain a relevant consideration. It would be incorrect to place sole emphasis on the purposes of deterrence and denunciation, and disregard rehabilitation as a factor.
34 Manikpersadh, above n 31, at [22].
35 R v Vhavha [2009] NZCA 588.
Mr O’Connell has expressed a commitment to not put himself in a position where he is before the court for cannabis offending again, and will be motivated to follow through on that promise by the impact that a sentence of imprisonment would have on his wife and whānau. It is likely that a sentence of home detention would overall be more effective in supporting Mr O’Connell’s rehabilitation than one of imprisonment.
Community protection
[41] Mr Knowsley further submits that Mr O’Connell does not pose any risk to the community, as the offending does not involve violence or a “socially destructive” drug. He suggests there has effectively been a declaration by the government that cannabis is not a risk to public health given that the legalisation of cannabis was put to a public referendum. He notes that cannabis is readily available by medical prescription.
[42] Ms Duncan says the submission that there is no social harm from cannabis supply whatsoever is inconsistent with recent authorities. She cites Anderson v R, where the Court of Appeal briefly noted the harmful effects of cannabis with high levels of THC (as opposed to medicinal-grade cannabis), including intoxication, paranoia, memory impairment, increased risk of psychotic illness, and addiction.36
[43] As Ms Duncan notes, the decriminalisation of cannabis is clearly a matter for Parliament, and the Court is not entitled to sentence on the basis that cannabis ought not to be illegal. I do not accept Mr Knowsley’s contention that the government has effectively made a “declaration” that cannabis is not a public health risk through the 2020 referendum. Nevertheless, the fact that it is less pernicious than many drugs is reflected in its status as a Class C drug and the guidance in the tariff case R v Terewi.37
Age
[44] Mr Knowsley also contends that Mr O’Connell’s advanced age points towards an electronically monitored sentence. He says it is well-settled that home detention
36 Anderson v R [2022] NZCA 472 at [22].
37 R v Terewi [1999] 3 NZLR 62 (CA).
can serve the same punitive and rehabilitative purposes as imprisonment, and is particularly suitable for an elderly offender like Mr O’Connell.
[45] Ms Duncan submits that while this factor may weigh in favour of a community-based sentence, it cannot be determinative. She says the factor was given appropriate weight, the Judge having applied a discount to the duration of the sentence in recognition of Mr O’Connell’s age. Ms Duncan suggests that starting points of much higher than six months’ imprisonment can be justified under the guideline case for cannabis offending.38 She also contends that Mr O’Connell appears in good health, has been sentenced to imprisonment before, and will not be spending a lengthy period in prison.
[46] I acknowledge that Mr O’Connell’s age was one of the factors to be considered by the Judge. However, I do not accept the submission for the Police that consideration of age in relation to whether or not the sentence was commuted to home detention was not appropriate as the Judge had already taken it into account under s 8(h) by way of a discount for personal factors. The principles of sentencing under s 8 are central to the consideration of whether a sentence should be commuted to one of home detention. That is a separate assessment to be made once it has been determined that a short-term sentence of imprisonment will otherwise be imposed.
Connection to more serious drug dealing offending
[47] The Judge appeared to take into account that Mr O’Connell was indirectly “connected to a wider operation involving sale of drugs”, which Mr Knowsley disputes. He says Mr O’Connell is better described as a “little fish caught in a wider net”. In addition, he contends that using the quantity of cannabis as a justification for imprisonment was a flawed approach, when that has already been properly taken into account in setting the starting point. Mr O’Connell maintains in his affidavit that he had “nothing to do with any other drug dealing despite what the police think”.
[48] I also note that the Police did not confiscate the cash which was found on the premises, a factor which Mr Knowsley suggests indicates they were satisfied that the
38 R v Terewi, above n 37.
money was the proceeds of drug dealing. As Ms Duncan submits, Mr O’Connell’s contention that there was no connection whatsoever between this more serious drug trafficking and his own offending is at odds with the accepted summary of facts to which he pleaded guilty. However, beyond that there was no evidence connecting his offending to any wider operation.
Previous convictions
[49] Mr O’Connell’s last conviction for similar offending was in 2016, almost a decade ago. As Mr O’Connell has historically served three sentences of imprisonment for cannabis dealing, Mr Knowsley suggests that imprisonment has not been effective, albeit it is quite some time since Mr O’Connell’s last drug offence. Mr O’Connell served his last sentence of community detention successfully, and committed no further offending for eight years thereafter. Mr O’Connell’s previous convictions, which are spread over 10 years (in 1989 and 1979) do not demonstrate incessant and determined offending of such gravity that a sentence of imprisonment is warranted.
Overall assessment
[50] The court is required to impose the least restrictive outcome appropriate in the circumstances. As Ms Duncan correctly notes, there is no presumption in favour of home detention. However, in these circumstances I consider that the relevant factors indicate that a sentence of home detention is appropriate. I note in particular Mr O’Connell’s age and the impact that a sentence of imprisonment would have on his wife and grandchildren. The interests of those children must be considered as a factor. A sentence of home detention will best support his rehabilitation, whilst adequately supporting the purposes of denunciation and deterrence. These factors are not outweighed by the need to protect the community, nor the peripheral connection between Mr O’Connell’s offending and a wider drug offending operation, both of which carry limited weight in the circumstances.
[51] I conclude that the Judge erred in determining that a sentence of imprisonment was the least restrictive available outcome in the circumstances, and the end sentence of four months’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
[52] Mr O’Connell’s home address has been assessed as technically suitable for electronic monitoring. A sentence of two months’ home detention at that address is appropriate.39
Result
[53]The appeal is allowed.
[54] The sentence of four months’ imprisonment is substituted for one of two months’ home detention, to be served at the address specified in the report. The following special conditions recommended in the pre-sentence report apply:
(a)Not to possess, consume, or use any alcohol or drugs.
(b)To attend and complete an appropriate Alcohol and Other Drug programme as directed by a probation officer.
(c)To attend an assessment for a departmental rehabilitative programme as directed by a probation officer. To attend and complete any counselling, treatment, or programme as recommended by the assessment as directed by a probation officer.
(d)To attend and complete an appropriate departmental maintenance programme as directed by a probation officer.
[55] The post-detention condition imposed by the District Court not to possess, consume, or use alcohol or drugs for six months remains in place.
Grice J
39 The period for which the sentence is imposed is halved to reflect the fact that Mr O’Connell would otherwise have been required to serve half of his sentence of imprisonment: see Parole Act, s 86(1).
Solicitors:
BVA The Practice, Palmerston North for Respondent
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