Nottingham v Currie

Case [2024] NZSC 167


NOTE: DISTRICT COURT ORDER IN [2018] NZDC 15368 PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESSES, OCCUPATIONS OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF VICTIMS REMAINS IN FORCE.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA

 SC 78/2024
 [2024] NZSC 167
BETWEEN

DERMOT GREGORY NOTTINGHAM
Applicant

AND

ELIZABETH MAY CURRIE
First Respondent

JOHN DOE AND/OR JANE DOE
Second Respondent

Court:

Ellen France, Kós and Miller JJ

Counsel:

Applicant in person
D M Connor and K M Muller for First Respondent

Judgment:

5 December 2024

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A        The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

BThe applicant must pay costs of $2,500 to the first respondent.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

Introduction

  1. Mr Nottingham has filed an application for leave to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal refusing to grant him an extension of time to file his case on appeal under s 43(2) of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005.[1]  The extension of time related to Mr Nottingham’s appeal to the Court of Appeal from a decision of the High Court in which, among other matters, his application to strike out a statement of claim on the basis of a time bar was declined.[2]

Background

[1]Nottingham v Currie [2024] NZCA 269 (Katz, Mander and Osborne JJ) [CA judgment].

[2]Currie v Doe [2022] NZHC 1547 (Hinton J) [HC judgment].

  1. The background is set out in some detail in the Court of Appeal judgment.[3]  We need only note the following.

    [3]CA judgment, above n 1, at [2]–[8].

  2. The High Court judgment which Mr Nottingham was appealing to the Court of Appeal related to defamation proceedings.  The proceedings were brought in the High Court in 2016 by Ms Currie and two co‑plaintiffs in respect of publications on a website, Lauda Finem.[4]  The plaintiffs sought only declarations and costs, not damages.  The identity of the publishers was uncertain.  Mr Nottingham was identified as a person who might have an interest in the proceeding as he was believed to have an involvement in the website.  Although he denied any involvement, Mr Nottingham was successful in his application to be joined to the proceeding as second defendant.

    [4]The co‑plaintiffs have since discontinued the proceedings, so Ms Currie is the sole plaintiff: at [1], n 1.

  3. Since then, Mr Nottingham took various steps in the proceedings, as a result of which matters have become protracted.  His first statement of defence was filed on 10 December 2021.[5]  Ms Currie subsequently applied to strike out Mr Nottingham’s statement of defence, debar him from defending the proceeding and list the claims for formal proof.  Mr Nottingham applied, amongst other matters, to strike out Ms Currie’s amended statement of claim.

    [5]HC judgment, above n 2, at [8].

  4. Ms Currie’s applications were granted by the High Court.  Mr Nottingham was unsuccessful.  It was from the judgment of the High Court on these matters that Mr Nottingham appealed to the Court of Appeal.  Mr Nottingham did not seek a stay of enforcement of the High Court judgment so…

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Nottingham v Currie [2024] NZSC 167
Case
[2024] NZSC 167
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court considered an application for leave to appeal from Mr. Dermot Nottingham against Ms. Elizabeth Currie, concerning an earlier decision by the Court of Appeal. Mr. Nottingham sought leave to appeal the Court of Appeal's refusal to grant him an extension of time to file his case on appeal. The appeal related to a decision from the High Court, where Mr. Nottingham's application to strike out a statement of claim on the basis of a time bar was declined. The legal issues focused on whether the proposed appeal raised a reasonably arguable ground or a question of general or public importance and if the Court of Appeal's assessment of the application was correct.

The Court found that Mr. Nottingham's arguments regarding the application of the Limitation Act 2010 and the multiple publication rule were not sufficiently strong to warrant an appeal. The Court of Appeal had properly applied the criteria established by the Supreme Court in Almond v Read, concluding that the proposed appeal was in the clearly hopeless category. The Court emphasised that the appeal did not raise any reasonably arguable ground and did not address any error in the Court of Appeal's assessment. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and Mr. Nottingham was ordered to pay costs of $2,500 to the first respondent.

In light of the findings, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal's decision. The Court found that the appeal did not meet the criteria for leave to appeal as it did not present a reasonably arguable ground or a matter of general or public importance. The application was deemed hopeless, and the Court of Appeal's assessment of the strengths of the proposed appeal was affirmed. The dismissal of the application and the imposition of costs underscore the Court's view that the appeal lacked merit and did not warrant further consideration.

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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