Nino's Limited v Maritime New Zealand
[2020] NZHC 1467
•26 June 2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CRI-2020-485-28
[2020] NZHC 1467
BETWEEN NINO’S LIMITED
ANTONIO INNOCENZO BASILE SHANE MICHAEL McCAULEY
AppellantsAND
MARITIME NEW ZEALAND
Respondent
Hearing: 23 June 2020 Counsel:
R Rasch for Appellant
D R La Hood and L R van der Lem for Respondent
Judgment:
26 June 2020
JUDGMENT OF THOMAS J
[1] On 7 June 2017, the Victory II commercial fishing vessel sank on its return journey to Wellington from off the coast of the South Island. The crew, who were forced to abandon the Victory II some five kilometres offshore, were rescued by a local fisherman. The Victory II sank because it was carrying a catch of at least 28 tonnes, whereas its stability requirements allowed a maximum of five tonnes. The Victory II had consistently exceeded the five-tonne limit for the year prior to the sinking.
[2] The owner of the Victory II, Nino’s Limited, its sole director, Antonio Basile, and the skipper, Shane McCauley, all pleaded guilty to representative charges under s 48 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (the Act) of failing to ensure the safety of the crew. Against maximum penalties of a fine of $1.5 million, $300,000 and
$150,000 respectively, Judge Davidson in the Wellington District Court imposed fines
NINO’S LIMITED v MARITIME NEW ZEALAND [2020] NZHC 1467 [26 June 2020]
of $380,000, $47,000 and $17,500 respectively.1 Nino’s was ordered to pay emotional harm reparation to three crew members. Cory Allen and Jonathan Speak were each to receive $25,000 and Jason Maxwell, $10,000. Nino’s also pleaded guilty to two charges under the Maritime Transport Act 1994 (MTA) of failing to pay two crew members normal wages following the loss of the Victory II until each was re-employed. Against a maximum penalty in respect of each charge of a fine of
$30,000, Nino’s was ordered to pay $1,800 in respect of Mr Allen and $3,000 in respect of Mr Speak. A further fine of $2,500 was imposed for a failure of Nino’s to meet its employer obligations under the MTA.
[3] Nino’s, Mr Basile and Mr McCauley each appeal the sentences on the basis they were manifestly excessive. Specifically, they say that the starting point taken by the Judge assessed their culpability too highly and that, in assessing reparation, he gave insufficient credit for mitigating factors.
[4]There is no appeal against the MTA fines.
Facts
Stability requirement
[5] The Victory II was built in 1971. Nino’s purchased it in 2014. Nino’s owned and operated the Victory II under a Maritime Transport Certificate issued on 9 April 2015. At the time of the incident, the Victory II had a current Certificate of Survey.
[6] Between 1995 and 2009, the Victory II operated in Australia. On 5 August 1996, the Marine Board of Victoria approved a vessel stability book for the Victory II. The stability book stated that, in order to comply with stability requirements, the Victory II should set out with restricted amounts of fuel, water and ice. The stability book identified a maximum catch of five tonnes of fish in order for the vessel to comply with its stability requirements.
[7] Neither Mr Basile nor Mr McCauley were aware of the limitation on load capacity, although Mr Basile was aware of the existence of the stability book.
1 Maritime New Zealand v Nino’s Limited [2020] NZDC 2536 [the District Court Decision].
[8] Nino’s did not provide Mr McCauley with any vessel-specific training other than Mr McCauley taking a fishing trip on the Victory II with the previous skipper. The other crew members did not receive an induction.
The incident
[9] Late in the morning of 10 June 2017, the Victory II was fishing off the Kaikoura coast after a two-day fishing trip. On board were Mr McCauley and the three crew members. Sea conditions were good.
[10] Although the Victory II was already substantially loaded with fish well in excess of the five-tonne load stability limit specified in its stability book, a final catch, estimated to be approximately ten tonnes, was hauled aboard. The Victory II had already begun listing portside with obvious signs of water on board. It could not cope with the additional weight. The stern slumped further portside, water was taken on rapidly and the Victory II began to sink. Evacuation procedures into an inflatable life raft began but at least one of the crew was dragged underwater as the life raft remained connected to the sinking vessel.
[11] The crew were rescued about three-quarters of an hour later. None were physically injured.
[12] Although the crew were assisted back to Wellington, little was done for them afterwards. Neither Mr Allen nor Mr Speak were paid wages following the loss of the Victory II as required under s 23 of the MTA pending finding new employment.
[13]Two of the crew gave victim impact statements. Mr Allen said:
I had a surge of fear that we weren’t going to make it back to shore alive. … We were now floating in the ocean, in the life raft. … then the panic started. We could not find the safety knife to cut the painter rope which was still attached to the, now very fast, sinking boat. We were too late and the vessel pulled our life raft two to three metres under the water. Johnny and I were stuck in the life raft while McCauley and Maxwell had fallen out. As the life raft capsized it felt like it was going to be the place we would die.
The feeling is indescribable. Mind numbing. Suffocation and the fear of being so close to death. It has given me demons I fight every day. Luckily the static release blew and the life raft fired up out of the water. We retrieved McCauley
and Maxwell again. … There was no leadership or safety provided from him as the skipper. … I reached out to Nino seeking some sort of financial compensation towards counselling, in which he replied to me, “if anyone needs counselling it’s me”, referring to himself. Nino refused to give any form of compensation toward the costs of living and the loss of wages.
[14]Mr Speak said:
I was in the hold when the ship started to sink and if Cory hadn’t come to get me I’d be dead, I know it. At the time I didn’t think we were going to make it and that has stayed with me. I remember being incredibly cold in the life raft and not knowing if anyone was going to rescue us. … Since the sinking I experienced what the psychologists call disassociative episodes, my concentration is poor and I feel anxious. I am generally stressed. I’ve had suicidal thoughts but never any suicidal intent.
[15]Both have been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.
[16] The third crew member, Jason Maxwell, did not provide a victim impact statement.
[17] As the Judge noted, Shane McCauley was both a victim of Nino’s and Mr Basile’s failure to ensure his safety but was also charged as the skipper for failing to ensure the safety of the crew.
The charges
[18] The charges under the Act against Nino’s and Mr Basile were that each failed to take reasonably practicable steps to identify the overloading risk, ensure that appropriate systems were in place to prevent overloading, operate the Victory II in a manner that did not exceed its loading capacity and ensure the provision of adequate training and instruction for the crew.
[19] The charge against Mr McCauley was similar, being that he failed to take the reasonably practicable steps of identifying the overloading risk, familiarising himself with the catch load capacity of the Victory II, ensuring that systems were in place to prevent overloading and ensuring that the Victory II did not operate in a manner that exceeded the load capacity.
The District Court decision
[20] After outlining the facts and the victim impact statements, the Judge addressed the defendants’ personal circumstances and prior health and safety record. Nino’s is “a fairly substantial fishing company”, incorporated in March 2007. It operates nine fishing vessels and has a fish processing plant which employs around 50 staff. Nino’s has no relevant insurance.
[21]Mr Basile is the sole director and shareholder. He earns a good salary.
[22] Mr McCauley gained his skipper’s ticket in 1993 and his coastal master’s fishing ticket in 2003. He earns a reasonable salary.
[23] There was no evidence before the Judge of any financial incapability on the part of Nino’s, Mr Basile or Mr McCauley.
[24] The Judge noted the defendants’ assertion that the Victory II was well-capable of carrying a load beyond its limit and that the limit had been set some years earlier when it was operating in Australia. He said that each defendant accepted by their guilty pleas that they knew the limit. He also noted there was no evidence they had attempted to have the Victory II resurveyed with a view to resetting its load capacity.
[25] The Judge observed that, prior to sentencing, Nino’s sought agreement from the prosecution to the imposition of an enforceable undertaking of an offer of $10,000 reparation to both Mr Allen and Mr Speak. That proposition was rejected by the prosecution. No payments were made to the victims prior to sentencing.
[26] The Judge pointed out that the charges under the Act were representative, reflecting the regular overloading of the Victory II for over a year. Each time the Victory II was overloaded, there was the risk of sinking. The Judge referred to the obvious consequences of a sinking occurring at open sea.
[27] The Judge described the offending as “a gross departure from plain, simple maritime safety and fishing industry standards”.2 He said the risks were obvious and high, and there were a number of reasonably practicable steps available to each defendant to meet that risk but those steps were not taken. To his mind, this carried with it the flavour of “maximising catch return for profit”.3
[28] The defendants were entitled to a discount for their prior good health and safety record and lack of previous convictions, tempered by the ongoing nature of the offending. The Judge was mindful of the need for a discount for cooperation with the investigating authorities, some “fairly tentative” offers of compensation and the fact that the maritime rescue plan worked. They were also entitled to a full credit for their pleas of guilty.
[29] While recognising reparation as a mitigating feature, the Judge dealt with it as part of the overall construction of sentencing.
Reparation
[30] The Judge rejected Ms Rasch’s submissions on behalf of the defendants to the effect that, as the crew had not suffered actual physical injury, emotional harm reparation was problematic. He considered the case of WorkSafe New Zealand v Department of Corrections4 as referred to by the prosecution, who sought a reparation order against Nino’s only. The Judge reasoned that reparation should not be as high as $45,000 (which had been imposed in WorkSafe New Zealand v Department of Corrections when a death was witnessed) but considered each victim suffered “what can only be described as a near death experience” (emphasis added). He imposed
$25,000 in respect of the emotional harm suffered by Mr Allen and Mr Speak. He imposed $10,000 in respect of Mr Maxwell, given the lack of any specific victim impact information.
2 The District Court Decision, above n 1, at [31].
3 At [32].
4 WorkSafe New Zealand v Department of Corrections [2017] NZDC 819.
Level of fine
[31] The Judge referred to the guideline bands from the Stumpmaster v WorkSafe New Zealand decision.5 He agreed with the prosecution’s submission that it was logical to adjust downwards the range of penalties for Mr Basile as an officer of Nino’s (with Nino’s being the person conducting a business or undertaking (PCBU)) and Mr McCauley as a worker. The adjustment was to reflect the available lower maximum fine in each case. This was on the basis of this being an orthodox sentencing approach often used in criminal sentencing in adjusting tariff or sentencing bands downwards to reflect lower maximum penalties in similar types of charges.
[32] Ms Rasch had submitted that the level of culpability for each defendant should be placed at the lower end of the range, advocating a starting point for Nino’s of a fine of $125,000. There was some suggestion Mr Basile and Mr McCauley should be discharged without conviction, although there was no formal application in that regard. Ms Rasch had submitted there was good evidence that, because the load capacity had been exceeded on earlier occasions without difficulty, the capacity was indeed inadequate.
[33] The Judge referred to the cases relied on by the prosecution.6 He categorised the offending as approaching or at the top of the medium culpability band, emphasising the regular overloading of the Victory II and the associated risk. He viewed the failures as a substantial departure from fishing industry standards. He noted the reasonably practicable steps which could have been taken. He then said that what occurred on 10 June 2017 was even worse. There was already 18-28 tonnes of fish in the hold (well in excess of the limit) but a further 10 tonnes was hauled and attempted to be loaded.
[34] Given the maximum available penalty for Nino’s of $1.5 million, the Judge noted that an upper level medium culpability fine of around $600,000 was only 40 per cent of the available maximum. He set the starting point for fines at $600,000
5 Stumpmaster v WorkSafe New Zealand [2018] NZHC 2020, [2018] 3 NZLR 881.
6 Stumpmaster v WorkSafe New Zealand, above n 5; Department of Labour v Hannan and Philp Contractors Ltd [2008] 6 NZELR 79 (HC); WorkSafe New Zealand v Agility Building Solutions Ltd [2018] NZDC 24165; and WorkSafe New Zealand v The Sunday Hive Ltd [2018] NZDC 20796.
for Nino’s, $120,000 for Mr Basile and $40,000 for Mr McCauley. Taking Nino’s fine, the Judge deducted $60,000 (10 per cent) for the prior good record, $30,000 (five per cent) for the offer of amends through an enforceable undertaking and 25 per cent for the guilty plea, resulting in a rounded fine of $380,000.
[35] The Judge concluded that the total penalty against Nino’s (fine of $380,000 and emotional harm reparation of $60,000, totalling $440,000) was not excessive or oppressive.7
[36] The Judge noted that Nino’s and Mr Basile, while distinct legal entities, were clearly interwoven. He pointed out, however, Mr Basile’s individual personal culpability, which he fixed at the top of the medium range. To avoid any double punishment, he made a significant discount, reducing the starting point from $120,000 to $75,000, which, with similar discounts to those of Nino’s, resulted in a fine of $47,000.
[37] The Judge then assessed the total overall financial penalty for Nino’s and Mr Basile combined of $487,000 and was satisfied it was appropriate.
[38] The Judge considered Mr McCauley as skipper carried personal responsibility, although he was to some extent reliant on the health and safety processes of his employer. From the starting point of $40,000, the Judge discounted an emotional harm reparation payment which he would have fixed at $12,500, to arrive at a final fine of $17,500.
[39] Finally, there was no dispute as to the reparation for unpaid wages due to Mr Allen ($1,800) and Mr Speak ($3,000). Although the prosecution had submitted a fine of $7,000 would not be excessive, the Judge imposed a fine on each charge of $2,500.
7 The District Court Decision, above n 1, at [70].
The appeal
[40] The Judge followed the sentencing approach and methodology as suggested in the guideline judgment, Stumpmaster v WorkSafe NZ.8 That is, assessing reparation, assessing the appropriate level of fine by reference to the degree of culpability, an adjustment to recognise aggravating or mitigating features, determining whether further orders under ss 152–158 of the Act are required, followed by an overall assessment of penalty, adjusting it if necessary for the financial circumstances of the individual defendant. There is no criticism of his approach.
Reparation
[41] While recognising that the quantification of emotional harm is a difficult task, in Ms Rasch’s submission, the Judge erred in his approach. She contended that it was illogical to arrive at different reparation figures, the assessment should have been made by reference to the Accident Compensation legislation, and she described it as “provocative” of the Judge to label the experiences of the victims, Messrs Speak and Allen, as a “near death experience”.
[42] Ms Rasch acknowledged that Messrs Speak and Allen suffer from post- traumatic stress disorder but, in her submission, positive growth could come out of that – resilience and “coping ugly”. She noted that Nino’s had sought to address this in its offer of an enforceable undertaking by providing for cognitive behaviour counselling to be made available to the crew.
[43] Ms Rasch criticised the Judge’s characterisation of the victims’ experience as a “near death one”, saying that expression applies when a person “appears to be clinically “dead” for a short period – when their heart stops beating, their brain registers no sign of activity and other vital signs indicate death”. These submissions can be described as novel.
[44] The Judge, in contrast, followed an entirely orthodox approach, starting with his quote from the Sentencing Act provisions as to a sentence of reparation.
8 Stumpmaster v WorkSafe New Zealand, above n 5, at [35].
Reparation may be imposed where an offender “caused a person to suffer … emotional harm”.9 There is no indication that Parliament intended judges to undertake some sort of critical analysis of the harm claimed to have been suffered by a victim.10 This is further emphasised by the purposes of sentencing, which require the Court to provide for the interests of the victim and reparation for harm done, and the principles of sentencing which require the Court to take into account any information concerning the effect of the offending on the victim.11
[45] Ms Rasch provides no authority for her definition of a “near death experience”. The crew were in a sinking vessel, five kilometres offshore, not wearing life jackets and pulled underwater while in a life raft. They described the fear and panic that they would not make it to shore alive, feelings of suffocation and the fear of being so close to death. Both victims still suffer from that fear. The Judge had a compelling evidential foundation for his conclusions.
[46] Ms Rasch did not pursue her submissions regarding the appropriate approach under the Accident Compensation Act 2001 and I take that suggestion no further.
[47] Ms Rasch pointed out that both Mr Speak and Mr Allen obtained employment within a relatively short time after the incident. That, however, does not preclude them from continuing to suffer emotional harm. The victim impact statements also speak to the significant implications the incident has had on both men’s career aspirations. Both wanted to continue with a career at sea. They are no longer able to do so because of the emotional harm caused by the incident.
[48] As to whether each victim should have received the same award, the Judge was right to differentiate between them, given the evidence he had from the two victims who provided victim impact statements. He was entitled to conclude that the third victim would have suffered a similar experience but he did not have the same quality
9 Sentencing Act 2002, s 32(1)(b).
10 Of course, victim impact statements need to be considered as against the facts of the offending and there might be cases where the claimed emotional harm could be considered disproportionate to the offending. That would not have the effect of reducing the emotional harm but might affect the weight the Court gives to it.
11 Sentencing Act 2002, s 7(1)(c) and (d); s 8(f).
of information, in particular it was not known whether or not the third victim also suffers post-traumatic stress disorder.
[49] I am satisfied there was no error in the Judge’s approach to and assessment of reparation.
Assessment of culpability
[50] Ms Rasch described the defendants’ culpability as a careless omission. She contended that the defendants had not intended to exceed the stability requirements, despite the offending having taken place over the period of one year, and that it was a combination of factors, including a jammed open scupper,12 which contributed to the sinking of the Victory II. Finally, she noted that, while the overloading of the Victory II was a serious and foreseeable stability hazard, it was a survivable event.
[51] In oral submissions, Ms Rasch emphasised that, although the Victory II was built in New Zealand, the stability limit was imposed in Australia. She referred to the fact that the Victory II had been operating in New Zealand since 2009 but was not purchased by Nino’s until 2014. Nino’s had the Victory II surveyed on purchase and it had all its required certificates. Those certificates did not, however, alter the stability requirements in the vessel stability book. In her submission, the only omission was the failure by Mr Basile to read the stability book, which she accepted remained onboard the Victory II. She then said that, despite the omission, there were checks and balances in place to ensure safety, including a qualified and experienced crew, and emergency procedures and equipment. Furthermore, Nino’s had offered to negotiate an enforceable undertaking but Maritime New Zealand failed to engage. In all the circumstances, in her submission, the defendants’ culpability properly fell into the low band.
[52] The starting point must be the failures which the defendants accepted by their pleas of guilty. These are recorded in the summary of facts as follows:
23.Nino’s Ltd failed to take the following reasonably practicable steps to ensure the health and safety of its workers while at work on the Victory II:
12 The point is that the open scupper should have been above the waterline.
23.1Nino’s Ltd failed to identify the risk of overload the Victory II;
23.2Nino’s Ltd failed to ensure appropriate systems were in place to prevent overloading. For example, testing of the vessel’s loading capacity and setting limits on the weight of fish brought on board;
23.3Nino’s Ltd systematically overloaded the vessel Victory II during its operation at the direction of Antonio Basile; and
23.4Nino’s Ltd failed to ensure the provision of adequate training or instruction to ensure the health and safety of workers while on board the Victory II. For example, training on safe loading limits.
…
26.Antonio Basile failed to exercise due diligence to ensure Nino’s Ltd complied with its duties and obligations under the HSWA to ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, the health and safety of its workers while on board the Victory II, by:
26.1Failing to gain an understanding of the hazards and risks associated with the nature of the commercial fishing operation, in particular by failing to identify the loading capacity of the Victory II;
26.2Failing to ensure the PCBU had appropriate processes to eliminate or minimise risks to health and safety from work carried out in that he did not ensure processes were in place to minimise the risk of overloading and hazards associated with overloading;
26.3Failing to ensure a process was in place for the training of the PCBU’s staff in respect of loading limitations;
26.4Failing to ensure the Victory II was not operated in a manner that exceeded its loading capacity, in that he directed the operation of the vessel without regard to load limits and in a manner that exceeded those limits; and
26.5Failing to ensure the PCBU had processes for complying with its duties and obligations, by failing to ensure it had appropriate systems in place to prevent overloading.
…
29.During that period Shane McCauley, while at work on the Victory II, failed to comply with his duty, so far as reasonably practicable, to take reasonable care that his acts or omissions did not adversely affect the health and safety of others persons by:
29.1Failing to identify the risk of overloading the vessel Victory II;
29.2Failing to familiarise himself with the catch loading capacity of the vessel Victory II;
29.3Failing to ensure there were appropriate systems in place to prevent overloading of the Victory II. For example, by ensure the weight of fish were measured while on board and preventing further fish being brought on board once that limit was reached; and
29.4Operating the vessel Victory II in excess of its loading capacity.
[53] The Judge’s assessment was in line with the guidance in Stumpmaster, which requires:13
(a)the identification of the operative acts or omissions at issue. This will usually involve the clear identification of the “practicable steps” which the Court finds it was reasonable for the offender to have taken in terms of s 22 of the Health and Safety at Work Act;14
(b)an assessment of the nature and seriousness of the risk of harm occurring as well as the realised risk;
(c)the degree of departure from standards prevailing in the relevant industry;
(d)the obviousness of the hazard;
(e)the availability, cost and effectiveness of the means necessary to avoid the hazard;
(f)the current state of knowledge of the risks and of the nature and severity of the harm which could result; and
(g)the current state of knowledge of the means available to avoid the hazard or mitigate the risk of its occurrence.
13 Stumpmaster v WorkSafe New Zealand, above n 5, at [36].
14 This will usually involve the clear identification of the “practicable steps” which the Court finds it was reasonable for the offender to have taken in terms of s 22 of the Health and Safety at Work Act.
[54] The Judge was correct when he described the factors contributing to culpability as the ongoing practice of overloading, the obvious risks and consequences of overloading, the substantial departure from industry standards and the reasonably practicable steps available to avoid the risk.
[55] Although the Judge misstated the position somewhat when he said each defendant knew the limit whereas the prosecution accepted neither Mr Basile nor Mr McCauley were aware of the limit, Mr Basile was aware of the existence of the stability book. As Mr La Hood submitted, whether or not a stability book exists, the person conducting a commercial fishing operation, an officer of that organisation and the skipper of a vessel should all know the loading capacity of the vessel.
[56] I agree with Mr La Hood. The point is that the defendants did not take steps to test the loading capacity of the Victory II and set limits on the weight of fish to be brought on board. Even putting aside the stability book, one of the primary obligations of an owner and operator of a commercial fishing vessel must be to establish the loading capacity of the vessel and ensure that its operations do not exceed that loading capacity. The consequences of a failure to do so in an industry where the crew fish in open water are obvious. In simple terms, if a vessel is overloaded, it will sink, meaning those on board will need to abandon the vessel and hope for rescue.
[57]The guideline bands in Stumpmaster are:15
low culpability Up to $250,000 medium culpability
$250,000 to $600,000
high culpability
$600,000 to $1,000,000
very high culpability
$1,000,000 plus
[58] The Judge considered the guidance in [54] of Stumpmaster appropriate in the circumstances:
[54] We are satisfied a figure of $600,000 for the top of the middle band represents a significant deterrent that reflects the statutory purposes. It is a substantial figure, and one which may well be higher depending on the degree of departure and the actual harm caused. For many businesses it will be
15 Stumpmaster v WorkSafe NZ, above n 5, at [53].
onerous, as the legislation intends it to be. For those for whom it is not, the legislation makes clear the obligation of the court to consider uplifts to reflect the relative wealth of the offender.
[59] The Judge’s assessment of the starting points was correct. That is, they fell near or at the top of the medium culpability bands. The culpability inured over a period of 12 months. The offending was even more egregious on 10 June 2017 when the load was already in excess of the limit but a further 10 tonnes was hauled aboard.
[60] The starting points of $600,000 and $120,000 for Nino’s and Mr Basile respectively place them both at the top of the medium band. Mr McCauley’s starting point of $40,000 placed him in the middle of the medium band, correctly reflecting that Nino’s and Mr Basile owed him health and safety obligations on which he was entitled to place reliance.
[61] The Judge made appropriate reductions to reflect mitigating factors – 10 per cent for the prior good record, notwithstanding the representative nature of the charge; five per cent for the offer of amends through an enforceable undertaking, notwithstanding that no payments were made to the victims prior to sentencing; and 25 per cent for the guilty pleas.
[62] Furthermore, the Judge made a significant discount to Mr Basile to avoid “any double punishment”, given Mr Basile’s position as sole director and shareholder of Nino’s. As the Judge correctly observed, they were distinct legal entities. Nino’s was liable as the body conducting the business and Mr Basile was liable as an officer of the company. It was appropriate that Mr Basile received a separate and distinct penalty. To do so appropriately recognises the purpose of the Act and the principle that workers should be given the highest level of protection against harm to their health, safety and welfare from risks arising from work.
[63] Finally, the Judge undertook the overall assessment required and satisfied himself that the sentences were proportionate and appropriate. This included the fact there was no evidence before him of any financial incapacity on the part of any of the defendants.
[64] In short, the Judge approached his assessment in the correct way, arriving at the correct conclusions in a well-reasoned judgment. There was no error and the sentence was not manifestly excessive.
Result
[65]For the reasons given, the appeal is dismissed.
Thomas J
Solicitors:
Rasch Leong, Wellington for Appellants
Crown Solicitor’s Office, Wellington for Respondent
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