Nicholls v R
[2013] NZSC 39
•19 April 2013
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NOTE
Nicholls v R [on application from Tallentire v R]
Supreme Court of New Zealand SC10/2013; SC11/2013; [2013] NZSC 39
19 April 2013
Chambers and Glazebrook JJ
Criminal law – Theft – By person in special relationship – Elements of crime –
Intention to enter into transactions – Intention to do so in breach of relevant obligations – Whether necessary to prove intention or concealment – Crimes Act 1961, s 220.
[1] Neal Nicholls and Wayne Douglas, as directors of Capital + Merchant
Finance Ltd, were found guilty of three charges under s 220 of the Crimes Act
1961 of theft by a person in a special relationship. They were tried by Wylie J sitting without a jury.1 The Court of Appeal dismissed their appeal against conviction and sentence.2
[2] Messrs Nicholls and Douglas now seek leave to appeal on the basis of what they say was an error in the Crown’s approach at trial with respect to mens
rea under s 220. They assert that leave should be granted because guidance from this Court is required “for future proceedings to correct the approach taken by the Crown at the trial”. We do not accept the premise upon which this submission is based. What we do know is that counsel agreed at trial on what the elements of a s 220 offence are. Wylie J recorded that agreement in the
following terms:3
Prior to counsel making their closing submissions, I circulated a draft setting out what I considered to be the elements of the offence created by the section, and invited counsel to comment on the same. They did so, and it was agreed that the elements of the offence are as follows:
(a) Did the accused have control over property?
(b) Was the property in the control of the accused, in circumstances
that required him to deal with the property, or any proceeds arising from the property, in accordance with the requirements of any other person?
(c) Did the accused know of those circumstances? And,
(d) Did the accused intentionally deal with the property, or any
proceeds of the property, otherwise than in accordance with those requirements?
[3] Elements (c) and (d) are the two so-called mens rea requirements. The
applicants in their submissions paraphrase these elements. They correctly
1 R v Douglas [2012] NZHC 1746.
2 Tallentire v R [2012] NZCA 610, [2013] 1 NZLR 548.
3 At [149].
paraphrase element (c) but do not accurately paraphrase element (d). They then go on to explain why element (d) is incorrect – but it is the paraphrase which is in error. The whole argument advanced by the applicants is built on that false initial premise. The High Court’s approach, with which the Court of Appeal
agreed and we agree, was endorsed by the Crown at trial, as Wylie J recorded, 5 and remains the Crown’s position now.
...
We dismiss the applications for leave. The test applied by Wylie J and the Court of Appeal was agreed and even now is not in truth challenged. Rather
what is put up is the strawman of an alleged Crown approach at trial. 10
Mr Davidson QC disputes that it was the Crown approach at trial, but in any
event it was not the approach adopted by Wylie J or the Court of Appeal. When properly analysed, there is no question of general or public importance. Nor are we satisfied that a substantial miscarriage of justice will occur if the proposed
appeal is not heard. 15
Application dismissed.
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