IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2021-404-2109
[2022] NZHC 249
UNDER the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016 IN THE MATTER
of an application for judicial review of decisions made pursuant to Section 15L COVID-19 Public Health Response (Isolation and Quarantine) Order 2020
BETWEEN
JESSICA NESBITT
Applicant
AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF MINISTRY OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND
EMPLOYMENT
Respondent
CIV-2021-404-2110 BETWEEN
ANNA CLARK and ADAM JOSEPH CLARK
ApplicantsContinued overleaf
Hearing: On the papers Appearances:
T D Clee for applicants
P H Courtney and S M Perera for respondent
Date of judgment:
23 February 2022
JUDGMENT OF JAGOSE J
[Costs]
This judgment was delivered by me on 23 February 2022 at 11.00am.
Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
………………………… Registrar/Deputy Registrar
NESBITT v CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF MINISTRY OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND EMPLOYMENT –
Costs [2022] NZHC 249 [23 February 2022]
ANDCHIEF EXECUTIVE OF MINISTRY OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND
EMPLOYMENT
Respondent
CIV-2021-404-2121
BETWEENEMMA LOUISE WATERS and JOSEF MOU MOU WATERS
Applicants
ANDCHIEF EXECUTIVE OF MINISTRY OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND
EMPLOYMENT
Respondent
CIV-2021-404-2122
BETWEENMELE FALAHOLA ELONE and SHANE POTTS
Applicants
ANDCHIEF EXECUTIVE OF MINISTRY OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND
EMPLOYMENT
Respondent
CIV-2021-404-2123
BETWEEN IOANNA PETRAKIS
Applicant
ANDCHIEF EXECUTIVE OF MINISTRY OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND
EMPLOYMENT
Respondent
[1] In these five proceedings — for judicial review of the respondent’s decisions refusing the applicants managed isolation allocation,1 all reconsidered to variable ends and agreed moot and dismissed accordingly2 — the applicants each seek 2B costs from
1 COVID-19 Public Health Response (Isolation and Quarantine) Order 2020, cl 15I(2) (now COVID-19 Public Health Response Act 2020, s 32K
2 Nesbitt v MBIE HC Auckland CIV-2021-404-2109, 17 and 24 November, and 1 December, 2021.
the respondent for their step of commencing the proceeding ($7,170) and an “instructing solicitor fee” ($200). The applicants’ counsel, Tudor Clee, is express he acted “pro bono”, without charging the applicants any fee.
[2] The respondent came to no different conclusion on reconsideration of the Nesbitt, Petrakis and Waters’ decisions, each of whom subsequently obtained access to managed isolation through the online allocation system. The respondent’s reconsideration of the Clarks’ and Elone and Potts’ decisions granted them offline allocations, on grounds of their changed circumstances (including more imminent due birth dates) identified for reconsideration. Given those reconsiderations and their consequences, I disregard the applicants’ contentions as to the merits of their claims, especially as primarily articulated by reference to other proceedings.
[3] It should be unnecessary to recount the general principles applying to determination of costs, prime among them being the party who fails with respect to a proceeding should pay costs to the party who succeeds;3 costs are payable according to scale applied by reference to “each step reasonably required in relation to the proceeding”;4 and “so far as possible the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious”.5
[4] On none of the proceedings can the respondent be said to have failed or the applicants be said to have succeeded. I am not prepared to assume the respondent would not have granted the allocations but for the proceedings’ issue. No orthodox ‘letter before proceedings’ is brought to my attention.6 Instead the applicants have occupied scarce Court time and resources to achieve their ends without the Court’s intercession. The issue of proceedings cannot be said “reasonably required”.
[5] While the principle “an award of costs should not exceed the costs incurred by the party claiming costs”7 is subject to my discretion to award costs,8 the fact of
3 High Court Rules 2016, r 14.2(1)(a).
4 Rule 14.2(a)(c).
5 Rule 14.2(1)(g).
6 Matthew Smith NZ Judicial Review Handbook (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2016) at 1.1.
7 High Court Rules, r 14.2(1)(f).
8 Rule 14.1.
counsel acting ‘pro bono’9 may not be a material consideration.10 In any event, I am not satisfied any of the present applications, brought without prior notice to the respondent, may be characterised then brought “for the public good or in the public interest”, but only in each applicants’ private interest.
[6] Last, nothing in costs’ principle or practice warrants an award of an “instructing solicitor fee”: scale costs are a contribution to, not indemnity of, a successful party’s legal expenses. The statutory threshold for indemnity costs11 requires “distinctly bad behaviour”,12 of “flagrant” or “very unreasonable” misconduct.13 Nothing of that nature is established here. And no instructing solicitor is identified on the filed documents.
[7]It is predictable and expeditious no costs be payable in such circumstances.
[8]The applicants’ applications for costs are dismissed. Costs lie where they fell.
—Jagose J
Counsel/Solicitors:
T D Clee, Barrister, Auckland Crown Law, Wellington
9 Peter Spiller New Zealand Law Dictionary (9th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2019): definition of “pro bono publico”:
(Latin, for the public good) Legal work performed free or at a reduced fee, for the public good or in the public interest. Work is often performed pro bono on issues of broad community concern or with significant impact on disadvantaged or marginalised groups. See Re Fidow (a debtor) [1989] 2 NZLR 431, 444–5 (“the role of protectors of the public interest”).
10 Environmental Defence Society Inc v New Zealand King Salmon Co Ltd [2014] NZSC 167, (2014) 25 PRNZ 637 at [22]. Compare Marino v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2017] NZCA 2 at [3].
11 High Court Rules, r 14.6(4).
12 Bradbury v Westpac Banking Corp [2009] NZCA 234, [2009] 3 NZLR 400 at [26].
13 Prebble v Huata (No 2) [2005] NZSC 18, [2005] 2 NZLR 467 at [6]; and Flujo Holdings Pty Ltd v Merisant Co Inc [2018] NZCA 226 at [34].
- AGLC
- Nesbitt v Chief Executive of Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2022] NZHC 249
- Case
- [2022] NZHC 249
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the applicants were entitled to costs under the High Court Rules and whether the respondent had failed in the proceedings. The court considered the general principles of costs, which include the party who fails in a proceeding should pay costs to the party who succeeds, costs are payable according to scale applied by reference to "each step reasonably required in relation to the proceeding", and "so far as possible the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious". The court also considered whether the applicants' counsel acting 'pro bono' was a material consideration and whether the applications were brought for the public good or in the public interest.
The court held that the respondent had not failed in the proceedings, and the applicants had not succeeded. The court was not prepared to assume that the respondent would not have granted the allocations but for the proceedings' issue. The court found that the applicants had occupied scarce Court time and resources to achieve their ends without the Court’s intercession, and the issue of proceedings could not be said "reasonably required". The court also held that the principle "an award of costs should not exceed the costs incurred by the party claiming costs" was subject to the court's discretion to award costs. However, the court was not satisfied that any of the present applications, brought without prior notice to the respondent, could be characterised as brought "for the public good or in the public interest", but only in each applicant's private interest. Finally, the court held that nothing in costs' principle or practice warranted an award of an instructing solicitor fee, as scale costs are a contribution to, not indemnity of, a successful party’s legal expenses. The statutory threshold for indemnity costs required "distinctly bad behaviour", of "flagrant" or "very unreasonable" misconduct, which was not established in this case.
The court dismissed the applicants' applications for costs and held that costs lie where they fell. The court found that it was predictable and expeditious that no costs be payable in such circumstances. The court emphasised that the applicants had occupied scarce Court time and resources to achieve their ends without the Court’s intercession, and the issue of proceedings could not be said "reasonably required". The court also held that the applicants' counsel acting 'pro bono' may not be a material consideration, and the applications were brought only in each applicant's private interest, not for the public good or in the public interest. Lastly, the court held that nothing in costs' principle or practice warranted an award of an instructing solicitor fee, as scale costs are a contribution to, not indemnity of, a successful party’s legal expenses.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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