Nepia-Rangi v The King

[2025] NZHC 3311

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CRI-2025-404-000438

[2025] NZHC 3311

BETWEEN

KEISHA ELAINE NEPIA-RANGI

Appellant

AND

THE KING

Respondent

Hearing:	3 November 2025
Counsel:	JWL Webby on instruction from CS Fredric for Appellant NC Vaughan for Respondent
Judgment:	3 November 2025

ORAL JUDGMENT OF DOWNS J

Solicitors/Counsel:

Crown Solicitor, Manukau. CS Fredric, Auckland.

JWL Webby, Auckland.

NEPIA-RANGI v R [2025] NZHC 3311 [3 November 2025]

The appeal

[1]                  Keisha Nepia-Rangi received a sentence of 22 and a half months’ imprisonment for arson.1 Ms Nepia-Rangi appeals that sentence. The issue is narrow: whether the Judge should have imposed home detention, or more particularly, granted leave to apply for home detention if a suitable residence became available.2

[2]                  The appeal must be allowed if there is an error in the sentence and a different sentence should be imposed.3

Background

[3]                  This is best explained by including the entirety of Judge G A Andrée Wiltens’ sentencing remarks, which are concise:

[1]        Ms Nepia-Rangi you are here for sentence in relation to an arson charge to which you pleaded guilty in May.

[2]        What happened is on the night of 10 February 2025 you seemed to have an argument with your partner about something, and one of you then smashed windows in an adjoining house to where you were staying; and then you went into that house and set fire to a number of places.

[3]        First of all, there was a mat hanging on a wall and it was found burning in a number of places itself. So, you tried to set fire to this mat again and again.

[4]Secondly, the middle of the curtains on another wall.

[5]        Then there is a curtain on yet another wall which has fallen to the ground and burnt away.

[6]        Fortunately, there was not too much damage done but there was clear intent on your part to set fire to the house and even if the number of attempts to light the fire do not indicate that you were walking away from there singing, “burn, burn, burn” – that is fairly indicative of what you were intending for some reason or another. It is unclear why.

[7]        I have submissions from both the prosecution and the defence as to what is the appropriate start point in terms of this offending. And there is a quite a difference between them.

[8]        I am satisfied that the appropriate start point for this arson is two and a half years’ imprisonment.

1      R v Nepia-Rangi [2025] NZDC 19532.

2      Sentencing Act 2002, s 80I.

3      Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250(2).

[9]        I take into account the fact that you pleaded at an early stage, so there is a 25 per cent discount that is available for that. There is a further 10 per cent discount that is available for your personal background and the factors that have been mentioned in the reports that I have and also in oral submissions today and fact of the loss of your mother. So, there is 10 per cent further for that.

[10]      You have some previous convictions, and there are a number of them. They occupy seven pages of recorded convictions with any number of things. So, there has to be an uplift for that and also for the fact that this offending occurred while you were on bail. The uplift for the previous convictions has been agreed between the counsel as two months, and I think that is right. And then for offending while on bail, a further month.

[11]      The end sentence that I get to is 22 and a half months’ imprisonment. That is less than two years’ imprisonment which means that a community- based sentence can be considered.

[12]      The problem that I have with that is that you have as I say a vast number of previous convictions. They deal not only with violence and dishonesty, but significantly with breaches of earlier Court sentences. So, I have no confidence that were I to sentence you to a sentence within the community that you would comply with the conditions that accompany such sentence.

[13]      I am not prepared to give you leave to apply for home detention in those circumstances. It seems to me that would be setting you up to fail.

[14]      So, the end sentence is 22 and a half months’ imprisonment, and there is no leave to apply for home detention. I need to set release conditions which I do as per the pre-sentence report - it will be the four conditions that are set out there.

[15]There is no reparation sought so there are no further orders required.

The case for Ms Nepia-Rangi on appeal

[4]                  On behalf of Ms Nepia-Rangi, Mr Webby contends the Judge erred to decline leave for home detention because Ms Nepia-Rangi complied with the conditions of compassionate bail granted 7 April 2025. Ms Nepia-Rangi was bailed that day to attend her mother’s funeral. She was required to return to prison by 7.30 that evening. She did so, despite her car apparently breaking down.

[5]                  Mr Webby contends this episode provided a basis for the Judge to conclude Ms Nepia-Rangi had turned a corner and was likely to comply with a sentence of home detention. He notes a suitable address may have become available. (I say “may” because it is not entirely clear an address is available.)

[6]                  Mr Webby also reports two other matters. As noted, Ms Nepia-Rangi’s mother died in April 2025. Ms Nepia-Rangi has litigation in the Family Court in relation to her children. Mr Webby contends a home detention sentence may be of assistance in relation to that. He also raises one other matter. Ms Nepia-Rangi’s partner is apparently in a coma. He said Ms Nepia-Rangi does not have the means to pay for escorts, hence compassionate bail is unavailable.

[7]                  Mr Webby could not add anything to these humanitarian grounds because the information came to him from Mr Fredric, who was originally to argue this case, and Mr Fredric has nothing in writing either.

Analysis

[8]                  Section 80I of the Sentencing Act 2002 requires a Court to grant leave for home detention if it has sentenced an offender to a short-term sentence of imprisonment — meaning less than 24 months — and at the time of sentencing, “the Court would have sentenced the offender to a sentence of home detention if a suitable residence had been available”. It follows the issue is whether the Judge should have sentenced Ms Nepia-Rangi to home detention but for the absence of an available address.

[9]In Palmer v R, the Court of Appeal commented on this decision: 4

… [T]here is nothing in the Sentencing Act 2002 to suggest a presumption for or against commutation, either general or for particular types of offence. The decision calls for the case by case exercise of judgment against the statutory principles and purposes of sentencing. Those principles and purposes sometimes point, as here, in opposing directions, meaning that the sentencing judge is called upon to assess whether home detention can respond adequately to   the   seriousness   of   the   offending.    As   the   Court   explained   in   R v D(CA253/2008), it can be very difficult in a marginal case to articulate reasons for preferring one approach to another. In consequence, the margin of appreciation extended to sentencing judges is usually significant.

[10]I make these points.

[11]First, the offending was serious.

4      Palmer v R [2016] NZCA 541 at [19] (emphasis added).

[12]              Second, Ms Nepia-Rangi has an extensive criminal history. It includes recent failures to answer District Court bail (2025, 2023 (x 2), and 2022),5 relatively recent breaches of release conditions and supervision (2024, 2023, 2019 (x 3)),6 and other forms of offending that connote difficulty in compliance with court orders and sentences.

[13]              Third, the pre-sentence report recommended imprisonment, noting “community based and custodial sanctions … do not appear to have reduced her offending”.

[14]              Fourth, that Ms Nepia-Rangi was able to comply with compassionate bail for a single day does not really alter this mix. More particularly, it cannot be said this factor means it was wrong for the Judge to decline home detention but for the absence of an address.

[15]              Fifth, the humanitarian matters identified by Mr Webby are of concern, albeit unsupported by evidence. Assuming they are correct, which I do not really doubt, the unfortunate position is that Ms Nepia-Rangi’s history, including her failures to comply with sentences and bail, mean it could not be said the Judge erred in declining home detention or leave to apply for home detention.

Result

[16]The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

……………………………..

Downs J

5      Ms Nepia-Rangi has historical offending of the same nature.

6      Ms Nepia-Rangi also has historical convictions for breaching community detention and community work.