My Virtual Home International Limited (in receivership and liquidation) v Ngati Tami Custodian Trustee Limited
[2012] NZHC 3351
•12 December 2012
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2009-443-548 [2012] NZHC 3351
BETWEEN MY VIRTUAL HOME INTERNATIONAL LIMITED (IN RECEIVERSHIP AND LIQUIDATION)
First Plaintiff
ANDOPEN GROUP LIMITED Second Plaintiff
ANDDAVID WILLIAM PHILLIPS Third Plaintiff
ANDMVH GROUP LIMITED Fourth Plaintiff
ANDNGATI TAMA CUSTODIAN TRUSTEE LIMITED
First Defendant
ANDRODNEY IVAN MARTIN Second Defendant
Hearing: 9 November 2012
Appearances: D Phillips Third Plaintiff in Person
D Hughes and D Durovich for First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Defendants
B McCarthy for the Eleventh and Twenty-First Defendants
S Telford for Seventh and Twenty Third Defendants
Judgment: 12 December 2012
RESERVED JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE SARGISSON (Costs)
This judgment was delivered by me on 12 December 2012 at 2 pm pursuant to
Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date ..........................
MY VIRTUAL HOME INTERNATIONAL LIMITED (IN RECEIVERSHIP AND LIQUIDATION) V NGATI TAMA CUSTODIAN TRUSTEE LIMITED HC AK CIV-2009-443-548 [12 December 2012]
ANDGREGORY LLOYD WHITE Third Defendant
ANDSTEPHEN TAITOKO WHITE Fourth Defendant
ANDPETER TE MAIHENGIA WHITE Fifth Defendant
ANDHOMESOFT GROUP PTY LIMITED Sixth Defendant
ANDCLEARY WEALTH MANAGEMENT LIMITED & ORS
Seventh Defendant
Solicitors:
Kensington Swan Auckland
Lowndes Associates Auckland Morgan Coakle, Auckland Robertsons Auckland McElroys Auckland
DLA Phillips Fox Auckland
S Trafford Auckland
[1] By memorandum filed on 8 November 2012 Mr Phillips advised of the withdrawal of his application for a stay of proceedings listed for a ½ day fixture the following day.
[2] The matter was called on 9 November when Mr Phillips confirmed his position and I heard submissions on remaining issues of costs. The defendants who appeared seek costs to compensate them for the wasted time and expense of opposing the application which they say was wholly meritless. Mr Phillips seeks that costs lie where they fall, or that the court consider reserving costs on the ground that his position has been severely damaged by defendants to the tune of in excess of
$1 million.
[3] The particular applications for costs are as follows:
a) The 7th and 23rd defendants (who were joined as parties without leave)
seek costs on a 2B basis on certain scale steps allowed under Schedule
2 to the High Court Rules which they set out in a memorandum together with the time allowances they seek as follows: preparing and filing a notice of opposition on 23 December 2011 (0.3 days) and preparing and filing submissions on 5 June 2012 for a hearing on a defended basis (0.25 days);
b) The 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th defendants seek an uplift on 2B costs of
100%. They identify by memorandum the steps and time allowance that they seek as follows: appearance at case management conference on 27 March 2012 (0.3 days) and preparing and filing notice of opposition and affidavit in support on 23 December 2011 (0.6 days).
c) The 11th and 21st defendants (also joined without leave) also seek an uplift of 100% on 2B costs. The relevant steps and related time allowances that they identify in their memorandum are: appearance at case management conference on 27 March 2012 (0.3 day), preparing and filing notice of opposition on 21 December 2011 (0.3 days), filing
submissions on 1 June 2012 and preparation for defended hearing
(0.25 days) and appearance at hearing on 9 March 2013 (0.25 days).1
Background
[4] By application filed on 15 November 2011 (comprising some 22 pages) Mr Phillips sought an order for a “voluntary” stay in respect of all claims in the revised statement of claim filed on 1 August 2011. In effect Mr Phillips was seeking that the court order a temporary halt to the proceeding on terms that would enable him to restart the proceeding when he was ready to proceed again. The application states:
This stay for claims numbers One to Ten is applied for on the grounds that the Third Plaintiff seeks at anytime within the Twelve months period starting from date of this application for the stay is approved (or for such time period as is approved by the Court), to file and serve notice that he seeks to move proceedings forward, either as they now are filed or some amended format.
[5] The grounds of application are set out extensively but essentially they are that:
(a) Mr Phillips is finding it difficult to serve his revised statement of claim on all recently joined defendants despite using process servers. He is also endeavouring to secure legal advice and to instruct counsel and to resolve procedural requirements as to joinder.2
(b)He has settled all disputes and claims between himself and the third party, URS. USR has agreed to provide discovery of relevant documents but the discovery process is likely to take some months
and he wishes to see the documents before finalising his claims.
1 The time allowances are based on the former Schedule 3 to the High Court Rules.
2 Joinder is dependent on an order of the court under r 4.56(b). Though the court generally adopts a liberal approach where a plaintiff makes an application, factors such as delay in applying may tell against joinder. Where it is clear the plaintiff could not succeed against the proposed defendant, the court will decline to make an order. See Garmonsway v Raglan Developments Ltd HC Hamilton CIV-
2006-419-1066, 5 May 2009.
(c) There are appeals against a judgment of Venning J that could affect a “minority” of his claims and result in amendment of the second and fourth plaintiffs’ claims.
(d) Some defendants have given notice they will seek security for costs.
Mr Phillips’ property based assets have been revalued and a substantial part of those assets would be available as security for costs but he needs time to turn assets into cash which could avoid the need for and cost of hearing such applications.
(e) The defendants who have filed “notices of opposition” to the third amended statement of claim would not need to provide “detailed defence statements” until an appropriate time period after the voluntary stay is lifted;
(f) Mr Phillips is committed to other proceedings and to business matters overseas and would like time to negotiate a settlement with other parties in this proceeding.
[6] The defendants who are seeking costs were all represented by counsel at telephone conferences before Duffy J on 11 November 2011 and 27 March 2012. Mr Phillips also appeared and was unrepresented. At the first conference Her Honour made directions timetabling the date for the filing and service of the stay application and any notices of opposition. She also noted the stance taken by recently added defendants that they were not properly joined and she stated:
Having noted their stance, I am not at this point prepared to take further steps in regard to them.
[7] The defendants duly filed notices of opposition. Mr Hughes’ clients also
filed a brief affidavit in support.3
3 The affidavit is sworn by a Mr Hiebendaal and it exhibits the Court of Appeal’s 15 December 2011 decision striking out certain appeals brought by Mr Phillips and other appellants in respect of this court’s decision on a “no appeal” agreement and a costs order made by Venning J (appeals CA534/2011 and CA681/201)).
(a) The filing and service of evidence and submissions; and
(b)The allocation of a fixture as soon as available after 4 June 2012 for a defended hearing.4
[9] By memorandum filed on 18 May 2012 Mr Phillips set out submissions in support of his application. Ms Telford’s clients and Ms McCarthy’s clients filed submissions in June.
[10] The Registrar advised the parties that a hearing would likely be in August or September and some defendants sought an extension of time to file submissions. The proceeding was listed for mention on 22 June 2012 when orders were made on an application for the release of funds and directions given for a chambers mention on 10 August 2012.
[11] There was a further conference on 10 August 2012 before Associate Judge
Christiansen. He minuted the following:
4 The full text of the directions is:
[6] This application is opposed and, accordingly, there will need to be a hearing.
Timetable directions are, therefore, required. The following timetable directions are made:
(a) Mr Phillips has until Thursday, 12 April 2012 to file any further evidence in support of the application for a voluntary stay of proceedings.
(b) The parties opposing the application have until Thursday, 26 April 2012 to file any affidavit evidence in opposition.
(c) Mr Phillips is to have until Friday, 4 May 2012 to file any reply evidence.
This is to be strictly by way of reply to whatever evidence the opposing parties have filed.
(d) Mr Phillips has until Friday, 18 May 2012 to file written submissions in support of his application for a stay.
(e) The opposing parties have until Friday, 1 June 2012 to file their submissions.
[7] The Registry is to allocate the earliest available hearing date after Monday, 4 June
2012 for the fixture. The estimated duration of the hearing is one-half day.
[1] This matter was scheduled for call because of issues raised by other parties who have been purportedly joined as defendants by the amended statement of claim filed on 1 August 2012. Another issue concerns the application for stay filed by the third plaintiff D W Phillips.
[2] It is clear that none of the parties named as seventh – thirty first defendants in the newly filed amended statement of claim, have been formally joined. Some of those newly joined defendants have filed a response to those claims against them. Others have taken no steps because they believe they are not required to do so.
[3] I direct that none of the recently added parties identified by the amended statement of claim filed on 1 August 2012 is required to take any further steps in this proceeding until formally joined by order of this Court.
[4] I direct the outstanding stay application be scheduled for hearing on
9 November 2012 beginning at 10:00am. A half day is required. The Court notes that pre hearing obligations have previously been fixed.
[12] In accordance with Judge Christiansen’s direction that recently added parties are not required to take further steps until formally joined, the 7th and 23rd defendants have taken no further steps save for the appearance that Ms Telford made on 9
November 2012 for the purpose of seeking costs.
[13] The 1st and 3rd to 6th defendants, who are not excused from taking steps, have had their counsel Mr Hughes prepare for the 9 November hearing and engage in discussions with Mr Phillips in order to establish whether or not Mr Phillips would be proceeding with or withdrawing the stay application. These defendants did not get to the point of filing submissions.
[14] The 11th and 21st defendants (though excused by Judge Christiansen’s
directions) instructed their counsel to prepare for the hearing allocated for 9
November and to engage in discussions with Mr Phillips with a view to clarifying whether or not he intended to proceed with his application. With one exception, the costs that these defendants claim for were incurred prior to Judge Christiansen’s 10
August directions. The exception is that they also claim for appearance at the 9
November hearing.
[15] The grounds that the defendants rely on in support of their applications for costs have a common theme (as do their grounds of opposition to the application for a voluntary stay). It is that the application was clearly misconceived and doomed to fail as:
(a) The defendants are entitled to a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the proceeding in accordance with the provisions of Part 7 of the High Court Rules which is designed to promote the expeditious dispatch of the Court’s business.
(b)The third plaintiff is obliged to prosecute the claim against them in an appropriate and timely manner consistent with Part 7 and he cannot suspend that obligation.
(c) If the third plaintiff is unable to proceed in a timely way it would be more appropriate for him to seek leave to discontinue in terms of r
15.20.
[16] Mrs Telford also argues that there is no good reason why the party who withdraws should not meet the costs of an opposing party.
[17] Mr Hughes and Ms McCarthy rely on the same argument. They also submit that an uplift of 100% of 2B scale costs is justified on the grounds that:
(a) The application for a voluntary stay plainly had no prospect of success and unnecessarily contributed to the time and cost of the proceeding. The defendants should not have had to file documents in opposition or incur costs on submissions and otherwise preparing for hearing.
(b)The application has not been straight forward to deal with due to the “nature of this plaintiff”. Mr Phillips advised the defendants that he was not pursuing the application very belatedly.5
(c) It would have been unwise to have delayed preparation in anticipation of Mr Phillips’ withdrawing his application. By the time Mr Phillips was clear that he was withdrawing the application, considerable cost had been incurred in preparing for hearing and conferring with Mr Phillips with a view to clarifying his position.
[18] Mr Hughes also submits that increased costs are warranted because Mr Phillips’ amended statement of claim which purported to add twenty five defendants made it quite unclear who the plaintiffs’ claims are really against. He also submits little progress has been made since the stay application was filed and that the proceedings have sat in abeyance while Mr Phillips has been overseas.
Decision
Mr Phillips’ claim that costs should be reserved
[19] I first note that I see no merit in Mr Phillips’ suggestion that costs ought to be reserved should I be disinclined to accept his submission that costs will lie where they fall. The statutory costs regime presumes as a matter of principle that the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious. Mr Phillips’ allegations of loss have yet to be determined (they are matters for trial) and they are not reason to depart from the presumption. There is no reason in principle not to apply that presumption.
[20] I therefore turn to consider the applications for costs.
5 As at the end of the week before the hearing he was equivocal. He sent an email on 1 November saying he would be proceeding but then inferred the contrary when he sent considerable related material on 8 November about the Judge to be allocated.
[21] In response to Mrs Telford’s submissions, Mr Phillips submits that there was no need for her and the 7th and 23rd defendants to be involved according to Associate Judge Christiansen’s 10 August 2012 minute. While that may be true for costs incurred after 10 August, the steps claimed for were taken before that date and it was not unreasonable for these defendants to take steps in compliance with Duffy J’s directions. Mr Phillips chose to name the 7th and 23rd defendants in his 1 August
2012 amended statement of claim and he had to expect that they would take steps. For so long as they remained named as defendants (whether properly or improperly joined) the prolonging of the determination of the proceeding would not be in their interests. Mr Phillips cannot be surprised that they took the precaution of filing a notice of opposition and submissions and must expect that there will be costs implications upon the late withdrawal of his application. It is true that these defendants’ submissions were filed several days late, but it would be harsh to withhold costs for that reason alone. There is nothing to indicate that any prejudice occurred.
[22] I accept Mrs Telford’s submission that there is no reason in principle not to award the 7th and 23rd defendants 2B costs on the steps they claim for. I am satisfied that, in the absence of good reason to the contrary, the relevant statutory presumption is that a party that withdraws should meet the costs of the opposing party, absent good reason. The presumption, set out in r 15.236, is expressly applicable to the withdrawal of a proceeding, but I find that it is equally apposite here.7 These defendants are also entitled to 2B costs on the appearance at the hearing on 9
November 2012.
6 Rule 15.23 provides:
Unless the defendant otherwise agrees or the court otherwise orders, a plaintiff who discontinues a proceeding against a defendant must pay costs to the defendant of and incidental to the proceeding up to and including the discontinuance.
7 Rule 1.6(1) relevantly provides:
If any case arises for which no form of procedure is prescribed by any Act or rules or regulations or by these rules, the court must dispose of the case as nearly as may be practicable in accordance with the provisions of these rules affecting any similar case.
1st and the 3rd to 6th defendants’ claims
[23] I turn next to the 1st and the 3rd to 6th defendants’ costs claims. Mr Phillips submits there are a number of reasons why there should be no award at all and costs refused. He points first to Judge Christiansen’s ruling that some parties were improperly joined. However these defendants were not among those noted in Judge Christiansen’s ruling and the ruling does not assist Mr Phillips’ attempt to show that they took unnecessary steps. These defendants can no more be criticised for taking steps to prepare for the hearing allocated for 9 November 2012 than they can for taking steps in accordance with the directions Duffy J made in November 2011.
[24] Mr Phillips also relies on a number of other arguments. The arguments are essentially these:
(a) The defendants did not take issue with the directions made in November 2011 for the purpose of timetabling his proposed stay application. Therefore, it is the joint position both sides took on matters of timetabling that “gets us here today”.
(b)Some of his objectives for making the stay application have been achieved.8 To that extent the application should be viewed as successful or meritorious.
(c) It was not unreasonable for him to take the position shortly before the hearing that he would withdraw “save as to costs” and to depart from his earlier advice that he would agree to withdraw but only if there was agreement that there would be no costs. The reason was that he wished to get legal advice;
(d)The application required little by way of response and counsel is inflating the costs claim by confusing costs on the stay application
with costs on the overall proceeding. That is illustrated in Mr
8 Mr Phillips says he has realised funds from assets in Russia, he has obtained discovery from URS
and he has made conscientious efforts to effect joinder of various defendants.
Hughes’ submissions on costs which refer to much more than the stay application.
(e) It was not by reason of anything that he had done that twelve months have passed between his filing the application and its disposal.
[25] Mr Phillips also submits by way of an alternative submission that he reached agreement with Mr Hughes that there would no order for costs.
[26] I accept that the twelve month delay does not appear to be of Mr Phillips’ making. Nonetheless, I am satisfied that there are significant problems with others of Mr Phillips’ arguments and that they do not establish good reason to depart from the statutory presumption as to costs on the withdrawal of an application. With a possible exception9, I see no substance in them. I deal first with his alternative submission. In support of that submission he relies on a brief period of correspondence between himself and Mr Hughes before the hearing for the stay application was scheduled to take place.
[27] As both sides agreed at the hearing, I have been provided with the relevant email correspondence for review. There is nothing in it that supports Mr Phillips’ contention and I am satisfied that the correspondence shows unequivocally that no agreement was reached on costs. The correspondence does show that both sides discussed whether or not Mr Phillips was withdrawing his application and attempted to reach agreement on the issue of costs. It is unnecessary to go into the detail. It is sufficient to note that Mr Phillips indicated by email that he would withdraw the stay application if these defendants agreed there would be no costs claim against him. When that proposal was not accepted, he elected to withdraw the application save as to costs.
[28] These are the problems with Mr Phillips’ other arguments:
9 The possible exception is Mr Phillips’ submission that counsel is inflating the costs claim by confusing costs on the stay application with costs on the overall proceeding. I put that argument to one side momentarily and address below it in the context of increased costs.
(a) The fact that a party does not oppose a timetable for the filing of an application and notices in opposition does not disentitle a party to the scale costs that the party would otherwise be entitled to.
(b)Mr Phillips’ point that some of the objectives behind the stay application have been achieved does not show that the application has been partially successful or that it had merit. Though the court is not generally required to speculate on the merits when determining costs on an application that has been withdrawn, this is one of those unusual cases where the merits are clearly against the party that made the application. It is not an appropriate use of the stay procedure to halt the litigation process temporarily to meet the plaintiff’s
convenience.10 Such use would not promote the objective of the High
Court Rules to secure the determination of proceedings that is “just, speedy and inexpensive”.11 The point, when viewed with the absence of any suggestion that other objectives remained unfulfilled, serves only to support Mr Hughes’ submission that the application should have been withdrawn well before the eve of the hearing. When discussions on costs broke down, Mr Phillips did not have a merit
based argument for threatening to proceed with the application (assuming the sake of argument that he ever did have one). Furthermore, by default Mr Phillips had obtained the time he sought in his application. The only live issue remaining was the issue of costs.
(c) The position Mr Phillips took in the negotiations in the days prior to the hearing on 9 November was not reasonable. Plainly, from any perspective there was no ongoing point to the application and Mr
Phillips should not have left the other parties in doubt about what his
10 The High Court Rules do not contemplate using the stay procedure for that purpose (see rr 15.1 and
15.2) and although such use may fall within the Court’s inherent jurisdiction, I do not see that it is
appropriate here.
11 Rule 1.2 states: The objective of these rules is to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of any proceeding or interlocutory application.
intentions were and whether they needed to be ready for a defended hearing.
[29] For these reasons I am satisfied that there is no principled basis for refusing costs for these defendants at least on a 2B basis for steps allowed and claimed under the High Court costs regime. Similarly there is no basis for refusing costs on the appearance at the 9 November hearing. The remaining issue is whether they have established that there is good reason for an uplift on the claimed steps and if so whether the uplift should be as much as 100%.
[30] Applications for increased costs are governed by r 14.6. Relevantly, the rule provides:
14.6 Increased costs
...
(3) The court may order a party to pay increased costs if—
...
(b) the party opposing costs has contributed unnecessarily to the time or expense of the proceeding or step in it by—
...
(ii) taking or pursuing an unnecessary step or an argument that lacks merit;
or
...
(d) some other reason exists which justifies the court making an order for increased costs despite the principle that the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious.
[31] I am satisfied that these defendants are entitled to a measure of compensation over and above scale costs for or the time and expense that they have been put to. I accept counsel for these defendants’ submissions that Mr Phillips contributed unnecessarily to the time and expense of the proceedings by making an application that had no real prospect of success.
[32] There is however, an absence of material before me to demonstrate what time was actually spent on the steps claimed for. I cannot rule out the possibility raised by Mr Phillips that counsel may not have separated out costs on the steps claimed with other costs in the proceeding. Mr Hughes concedes that the schedule he has provided to set out the steps taken for which 2B costs may be claimed “is not a lot”
in respect of the application. Though unable to say at the hearing exactly what time was spent preparing, he submits that the court can be assured that the costs that he is seeking for his clients are more than the actual time. He adds that it is fortuitous that his clients have not spent too much time preparing and that further material could be filed if needed. Given that costs determinations should be expeditious, it is not appropriate to allow these defendants time to file further material. There has been sufficient opportunity for that.
[33] While these defendants are entitled to compensation over and above scale costs, I am not satisfied that there should be an order for increased costs in the order of 100%. No actual figures for time spent were provided to justify an increase at that level and I am not prepared to assume the time spent justified such an increase. Such an increase would far exceed what could be reasonable given that the statutory daily recovery rate is two thirds of the daily rate considered reasonable for the
proceeding.12 All counsel agreed in the course of the hearing, the defendants’
response to the application and the time incurred should be proportionate in all circumstances. Mrs Telford’s more modest approach to the quantum of costs belies any claim that 100% uplift reflects time that is proportionate.
[34] In the circumstances any increase must necessarily be a modest increase. I
consider an uplift of 15% is reasonable.
11th and 21st defendants’ claim
[35] I come next to the 11th and 21st defendants’ claim for costs. Ms McCarthy submits that her clients’ position is essentially the same as Mr Hughes. Though not formally joined, they elected to take steps and filed a notice of opposition in accordance with Duffy J’s directions. She says it was not until sometime later that Judge Christiansen directed there was no need to do anything unless and until
directions were made for formal joinder and by then formal steps had been taken.
12 See Holdfast NZ Ltd v Selleys Pty Ltd (2005) 17 PRNZ 897 (CA) and McGechan on Procedure
(online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [HR14.6.02].
[36] Ms McCarthy was unable to give a clear indication of the wasted time spent more recently on preparation for the hearing but submits that the attendances involved dealt predominantly with preparing for the hearing of the stay application as opposed to discussion with Mr Phillips about his intention to proceed or withdraw the application.
[37] As is the case with the 7th and 23rd defendants, I accept it was reasonable for these defendants to take steps to comply with Duffy J’s directions. I also do not take Judge Christiansen’s ruling that they have not been formally joined and are not required to take steps as a ruling that disentitles them from claiming for steps that they actually took. Nor does the ruling disentitle them from claiming for their appearance at the hearing on 9 November. The only step in fact claimed for after 10
August is the appearance at the hearing on 9 November.
[38] I do accept however, Mr Phillips’ contention that in the absence of supporting material the court cannot rule out that these defendants are in fact seeking such a large uplift by reason of attendances not strictly related to the stay application. Mr Phillips points by way of example to the case management conference on 1 June
2012. It was a telephone conference for 45 minutes which was not confined to the stay application. He also points out that Mrs McCarthy’s clients filed a statement of defence on 15 November 2011 which has nothing to do with the application for a stay.
[39] Nonetheless, I agree that these defendants are entitled to an uplift on the steps they claim for. A modest uplift of 15% will compensate them for the cost of having to deal with an application of dubious or no merit.
[40] For the purpose of calculating costs, rather than adopting the current statutory time allocations I adopt the time allocations taken from the former Schedule 3 as the latter are proposed in counsel’s memoranda. These are more advantageous to Mr Philips.
Result
[41] I make orders for the costs claimed as follows:
(a) Mrs Telford’s clients are awarded costs in the sum of $1,592.00 calculated in accordance with the schedule, plus disbursements as fixed by the Registrar.
(b)Mr Hughes’ clients are awarded costs in the sum of $2,631.80 calculated in accordance with the schedule, plus disbursements as fixed by the Registrar.
(c) Mrs McCarthy’s clients are awarded costs of $2,517.35 calculated in accordance with the schedule, plus disbursements as fixed by the
Registrar.
Associate Judge Sargisson
Schedule
Mrs Telford’s Clients
Item Description Time
allocation
Amount13
4.13 Filing notice of opposition to interlocutory
application
0.3 days $597.00
4.14 Preparation of written submissions 0.25 $497.50
4.15 Appearances at hearing on 9 November 2012 0.25 $497.50
Total 0.8 $1,592.00
Mr Hughes’ Clients
Item Description Time
allocation
Amount
4.11 Appearances at case management conference
on 27 March
0.3 days $597.00
4.13 Filing notice of opposition to interlocutory
application and affidavit in support
0.6 $1,194.00
4.15 Appearances at hearing on 9 November 2012 0.25 $497.50
Total
Plus 15% uplift of $343.30
1.15 $2,288.50
$2,631.80
13 Time allocation multiplied by daily recovery rate of $1,990.00.
Mrs McCarthy’s Clients
Item Description Time
allocation
Amount
4.11 Appearances at case management conference
on 27 March
0.3 days $597.00
4.13 Filing notice of opposition to interlocutory
application
0.3 $597.00
4.14 Preparation of written submissions 0.25 $497.50
4.15 Appearances at hearing on 9 November 2012 0.25 $497.50
Total
Plus 15% uplift of $417.90
1.1 $2,189.00
$2,517.35
0