Morrison v Financial Markets Authority
[2023] NZHC 3215
•15 November 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CIV-2021-485-433
[2023] NZHC 3215
BETWEEN LANCE DAVID MORRISON
First Plaintiff
RICHARD TIMOTHY BLACKWOOD
Second PlaintiffAND
FINANCIAL MARKETS AUTHORITY
First Defendant
ATTORNEY-GENERAL
Second Defendant
Hearing: On the Papers Counsel:
J P Cartwright for Plaintiffs
T C Stephens and J B Orpin-Dowell for First Defendant A M Powell for Second Defendant
Judgment:
15 November 2023
JUDGMENT OF McQUEEN J
[Costs]
[1] In a judgment dated 30 June 2023, I found for the plaintiffs on their third cause of action (against the Attorney-General) and granted declaratory relief and damages pursuant to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the NZBORA).1 I dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims in their first and second causes of action (against the FMA and the Attorney-General respectively).
1 Morrison v Financial Markets Authority [2023] NZHC 1654.
MORRISON v FINANCIAL MARKETS AUTHORITY [2023] NZHC 3215 [15 November 2023]
[2] At the conclusion of my judgment, I directed that if the parties were unable to agree to costs, counsel were to file memoranda on costs within fifteen working days, with a further five working days for replies.2 Memoranda were filed by counsel on 21 July 2023, 24 July 2023, and 26 July 2023. Regrettably, owing to an administrative oversight, those memoranda were not referred to me until recently.
The plaintiffs’ position
[3] The plaintiffs jointly seek indemnity costs or increased costs against the Attorney-General. Counsel for the plaintiffs, Mr Cartwright, relies on Attorney- General v Udompun, in which the majority of a full bench of the Court of Appeal noted:3
In our view, the Judge was not wrong in principle to award indemnity costs, even though not all of Mrs Udompun’s claims succeeded before him. In this area it may not always be appropriate to allow costs to follow the event. It is important to remember that Baigent damages are awarded only where other remedies are not sufficient and awards are, in any event, modest. Applying the normal costs rules in such circumstances may discourage litigants from bringing BORA claims. This would clearly have the result of weakening BORA protections. Indemnity costs could also, in suitable cases, be seen as necessary for a proper vindication of the right. This does not mean, however, that indemnity costs are to be awarded as a matter of course in BORA cases.
[4] Hammond J, dissenting from the majority on the issue of whether costs should be remitted back to the High Court, but agreeing that indemnity costs were appropriate, discussed generally the costs involved in bringing proceedings for damages pursuant to the NZBORA, and took the view that “when a citizen – or for that matter a non- citizen – establishes (as here) a distinct and serious breach of BORA by a relevant agency of the state, that agency should be expected to stand fully behind the claim, in costs”.4
[5] Mr Cartwright submits that the Attorney-General should pay the plaintiffs indemnity costs given:
(i)The close factual link between the various causes of action which were all relevant (either directly) as in the BORA breaches or
2 Above n 1, at [213].
3 Attorney-General v Upompun [2005] 3 NZLR 204, (2005) 7 HRNZ 811 at [186] per McGrath, Glazebrook, William Young, and O’Regan JJ.
4 At [222] per Hammond J.
indirectly, in failing to ensure compliance with legislation that practically worked to protect the plaintiffs’ fair trial rights.
(ii)For the plaintiffs not to recover their actual costs will undermine the modest baigent [sic] damages awards made so that the Baigent damages recovered do not “vindicate” the rights concerned.
(iii)The Attorney-General as an agent of the state ought to take full responsibility for breaching fundamental BORA rights.
(iv)To not grant a full recovery of the plaintiffs’ costs is to stifle future BORA litigation.
(v)The reasonable conduct of the plaintiffs’ proceedings.
(vi)The public interest in such proceedings.
(vii)The plaintiffs’ moral victory (having made out the BORA cause of action).
[6] Mr Cartwright submits also that the proceedings were properly brought, and that all causes of action posed legitimate and relevant public interest questions. He says that the plaintiffs ought not to be punished for putting such matters in issue. He submits that costs should not be awarded against the plaintiffs as a result. Mr Cartwright notes that the plaintiffs sought damages against the FMA as a result of unprecedented and admitted disclosure failures, and to compensate them for loss, not for their own personal gain, and that they acted reasonably in the conduct of the proceeding.
[7] Mr Cartwright also disclosed that the plaintiffs’ costs are subject to a conditional fee agreement, whereby to date they have only been invoiced for
$4,996.75, but where their previous counsel (Mr O’Leary) is entitled to all costs from them for the proceedings given their success on the third cause of action. Mr Cartwright says that in accordance with r 14.2(2) of the High Court Rules 2016, the plaintiffs ought not to be disadvantaged by the conditional fee agreement in recovering their actual costs incurred. He submits that for costs to be ‘incurred’ they must only be chargeable, rather than actually charged.5 He says that to do otherwise would have a chilling effect on future conditional fee agreements and undermine access to justice.
5 McGuire v Secretary for Justice [2018] NZSC 116, [2019] 1 NZLR 335 at [71]–[72].
[8]Accordingly, the plaintiffs seek:
(a)an order of indemnity costs against the Attorney-General in the sum of
$83,424.00 (including disbursements); or
(b)an order of 2B scale costs against the Attorney-General in the sum of
$61,217.00 (including disbursements), plus a further increase in costs as deemed appropriate by the Court; or
(c)an order of 2B scale costs against the Attorney-General in the sum of
$61,217.00 (including disbursements); and
(d)that the FMA not be awarded the costs it seeks, or that in the alternative, any costs awarded to the FMA are met by the Attorney-General, by way of a Sanderson or Bullock order, or with a proportion of those costs being met by the Attorney-General;6 and
(e)that the Attorney-General not be awarded any of its costs.
The FMA’s position
[9] The FMA notes that the plaintiffs’ sole cause of action against it was dismissed. It therefore seeks an order that the plaintiffs are jointly liable for costs in the sum of
$43,378.50 and disbursements of $220. Counsel for the FMA, Mr Orpin-Dowell, submits that the plaintiffs should pay costs on a 2B basis for all steps (including an allowance for second counsel) except discovery, for which band C is appropriate.
[10] Mr Orpin-Dowell submits that there is no proper basis on which the Court can exercise its discretion not to award costs to the FMA as a successful defendant, given the fundamental principle that costs follow the event. He submits that:
6 See Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Co [1903] KB 533 (CA); and Bullock v London General Omnibus Co [1907] 1 KB 264 (CA).
(a)the FMA’s conduct in the underlying criminal proceedings is not relevant to the determination of costs in this proceeding;7
(b)the plaintiffs’ success against the Attorney-General cannot bear upon whether costs should be awarded to the FMA as a successful defendant; and
(c)the public interest ground for reducing or refusing to award costs to a successful defendant is not available to the plaintiffs, as their claim against the FMA was not brought reasonably, because it was an attempt to use a tortious claim to cut across the statutory regime for costs in criminal cases.
[11] Mr Orpin-Dowell submits also that an award of costs in favour of the FMA should be paid by the plaintiffs, rather than the Attorney-General pursuant to a Sanderson or Bullock order. He says that either of those orders may be appropriate where a plaintiff is in genuine doubt as to which of multiple defendants are responsible for an injury and it is therefore reasonable to bring proceedings against both, rather than where a plaintiff brings proceedings against multiple defendants on different causes of action based on different facts.8
[12] Mr Orpin-Dowell submits that the unsuccessful cause of action against the FMA was independent and factually distinct from the cause of action against the Attorney-General on which the plaintiffs succeeded. He relies on Irvine v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis where the claimant succeeded against the first defendant for breach of statutory duty but failed in claims in negligence against the second and third defendants, and the English Court of Appeal held that it was inappropriate to make a Bullock or Sanderson order.9
7 Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd [2006] 3 NZLR 188 (CA) at [160]; Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd [2007] NZSC 26, [2007] 3 NZLR 169 at [41]; and Thames-Coromandel District Council v Coromandel Heritage Protection Society Inc [2009] NZCA 204, (2009) 19 PRNZ 365 at [13].
8 Mulready v JH & W Bell Ltd [1953] 2 All ER 215 (CA) at 219; as cited in Irvine v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2005] EWCA Civ 129; and McDermott v InHealth Ltd [2018] EWHC 1835 (QB).
9 Irvine, above n 8, at [22]–[51].
[13] As to quantum, Mr Orpin-Dowell notes that the plaintiffs have raised no issues with the quantum of costs sought by the FMA. He seeks costs on a 2B basis, and as noted, costs for discovery on a 2C basis, because extensive searches had to be carried out by the FMA to comply with its discovery obligations, including the individual review of 11,703 documents.
The Attorney-General’s position
[14] Counsel for the Attorney-General, Mr Powell, agrees that costs should follow the event, and for the most part, adopts the submissions for the FMA. He submits that:
3.The first event is that the plaintiffs failed on the only cause of action pursued against the Financial Markets Authority, and it failed because the cause of action did not sound in law. The Financial Markets Authority should be entitled to costs against the plaintiff.
4.The second event is that the plaintiffs succeeded on the third cause of action against the Attorney-General, but failed on the other two, again because those causes of action were not sound in law. The plaintiffs should be entitled to costs against the Attorney-General, but costs according to scale and reduced to reflect that its success was accompanied by failure on two causes of action.
5.The only other issue to address is the suggestion from the plaintiffs in correspondence that it is the Attorney-General who should meet the costs of the Financial Markets Authority, by way of a Bullock or Sanderson costs order. The Attorney-General agrees with the Financial Markets Authority that there is no principled basis for such an order in these circumstances.
[15] Mr Powell submits that the plaintiffs should not be awarded indemnity costs, noting that the Court of Appeal has returned to the issue of whether courts should depart from the scale in cases asserting a breach of human rights, endorsing the approach in Udompun, and stating:10
As set out above, costs in NZBORA cases are awarded in light of the totality of the remedy appropriate, to be assessed in each case. It is contrary to this principle to award indemnity costs (or full costs) automatically to a claimant merely because the claim raises a NZBORA issue. While we acknowledge the need to balance the incentives involved, so as not to discourage claims seeking compensation for NZBORA violations, this is not necessarily achieved by making extensive costs awards as a matter of course.
Rule 14.6 of the High Court Rules sets out factors a Judge must consider when awarding increased or indemnity costs. One such factor is acting unnecessarily
10 Attorney General v Van Essen [2015] NZCA 22, (2015) 10 HRNZ 155 at [158]–[159].
in pursuing or continuing a proceeding. It is relevant that, despite a declaration being available, Mr Patterson nonetheless pursued and lost a number of additional claims in the High Court against all parties.
[16] Mr Powell submits that a case for indemnity costs would be strong in circumstances where a plaintiff brings a discrete claim against the Attorney-General solely for a remedy pursuant to the NZBORA, and advances that claim responsibly. He says, however, that the plaintiffs did not adopt that approach in the present case, instead, they brought a larger and more complex proceeding with another defendant and alternative causes of action in tort, which failed. Mr Powell notes that the entirety of the plaintiffs’ costs cannot be attributed to the cause of action on which they were successful, and that the totality of the plaintiffs’ conduct of the proceedings and the outcome is relevant to the question of costs and should be considered in the balance. He submits this should be done on the basis of scale but does not specify what the appropriate reduction to the amount of costs should be in recognition of this.
[17] Like counsel for the FMA, Mr Powell submits also that Sanderson and Bullock orders are not appropriate, as the third cause of action was distinct from the first two, and could and should have been advanced without them. He says that to immunise the plaintiffs from the responsibility of costs would not serve any legitimate principle or purpose, but rather reward them for bringing a party to Court on a cause of action that was not sound in law.
[18] Finally, Mr Powell, in reply, takes issue with the manner in which the plaintiffs have claimed costs for the filing of their amended statements of claim. He submits that sch 3 of the High Court Rules does not make an allowance for the filing of an amended pleading. Rather, this is something a party may do as of right, but it is a cost that should be absorbed by the party. Mr Powell says that even if an allowance is made for it on the basis it is a matter not specifically allowed for (item 36) the allowance of three days for commencement of proceedings allows for the process of taking initial instructions and item 36 is not apt for a change of approach after the proceedings are commenced.
Analysis
Relevant principles
[19] All matters of costs are at the discretion of the court.11 The general principles which apply to the determination of costs include that costs follow the event, and that the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious.12 This means that the party who is unsuccessful pays costs to the party who is successful. Further, an award of costs should not exceed the costs incurred by the party claiming costs.13 However, costs may still be awarded to a party who has received legal services provided under a conditional fee agreement.14
The application of ordinary costs principles
[20] In considering costs in this proceeding, it is necessary to set out briefly the extent of each party’s success. This is necessary because there was mixed success as between the parties, and also because the plaintiffs do not appear to have accounted for their mixed success in their claim for costs.
[21] The plaintiffs brought three causes of action. The first alleged a breach of a statutory duty as against the FMA. The second alleged a breach of a statutory duty as against the Attorney-General on behalf of the Crown Solicitor at Auckland. The third alleged breaches of the NZBORA as against the Attorney-General on behalf of the Crown Solicitor at Auckland. The first and second causes of action were therefore to a certain extent, related. The third cause of action was distinct.
[22] The plaintiffs were unsuccessful on the first and second causes of action, but successful on the third cause of action. Accordingly, applying ordinary costs principles, the outcome of costs would be as follows:
11 High Court Rules 2016, r 14.1.
12 Rules 14.2(1)(a) and 14.2(1)(g).
13 High Court Rules 2016, r 14.2(1)(f).
14 Rule 14.2(2). A conditional fee agreement is defined in r 14.2(3) as an agreement under which a party to a proceeding and a person who provides legal professional services agree that the party to the proceeding is liable for payment of some or all of the person’s fees and expenses depending on the outcome of the proceeding.
(a)the FMA is entitled to scale costs for the entirety of its costs, being that it was successful on the only cause of action pleaded against it, and those costs should be paid by the plaintiffs;
(b)the Attorney-General is entitled to costs from the plaintiffs on the second cause of action, and liable for costs to the plaintiffs on the third cause of action; and
(c)the plaintiffs are liable for costs to the FMA on the first cause of action, liable to the Attorney-General on the second cause of action, and entitled to costs on the third cause of action, which should be paid by the Attorney-General.
[23]The issues in the present case are:
(a)whether there is any reason to depart from the outcome required by ordinary costs principles; and
(b)the quantum of the costs awards.
Departure from scale costs
[24] The plaintiffs seek indemnity costs or increased costs against the Attorney- General. They rely on rr 14.6(3)(d) and 14.6(4)(f), which provide that the court may order a party to pay increased or indemnity costs if some other reason exists which justifies the court making such an order despite the principle that the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious. The plaintiffs say that, relying on Udompun, indemnity costs are justified because their successful claim for damages pursuant to the NZBORA was in the public interest, brought reasonably, and that if indemnity costs are not awarded, other litigants may be discouraged from bringing such cases.
[25] The Court of Appeal was clear in both Udompun and Van Essen that indemnity costs where a plaintiff has successfully established a breach of the NZBORA do not follow as a matter of course. It appears only that costs are a consideration that is
relevant to the question of whether a right has been sufficiently vindicated, and that “costs in NZBORA cases are awarded in light of the totality of the remedy appropriate, to be assessed in each case”, in all the circumstances, and that “it is contrary to this principle to award indemnity costs (or full costs) automatically to a claimant merely because the claim raises a NZBORA issue”.15
[26] In the present case, as in Van Essen, it is relevant that the plaintiffs pursued two other causes of action which were both unsuccessful. It is also relevant as to the vindication of the plaintiffs’ rights that the plaintiffs have been awarded declaratory relief and damages pursuant to the NZBORA. I accept that the FMA and Attorney- General’s conduct in the underlying criminal proceedings is irrelevant.16 In these circumstances, I am satisfied that an award of increased or indemnity costs against the Attorney-General is not necessary, and that a proper assessment of costs at scale between the parties according to their mixed success is a better method of achieving a just outcome as to costs.
[27] I am also satisfied that refusing the plaintiffs’ application for increased or indemnity costs will not have a chilling effect on potential future claims for relief pursuant to the NZBORA. While that is indeed a relevant consideration, I do not consider that this is such a case where the interests of potential future litigants require an award of increased or indemnity costs to be made.
Sanderson and Bullock orders
[28] A Sanderson order involves an order that an unsuccessful defendant (in this case the Attorney-General) pay the costs of a successful defendant (here the FMA).17 A Bullock order involves ordering a plaintiff to pay costs to a successful defendant (here the FMA), but allowing the plaintiff full or partial recovery of those costs from an unsuccessful defendant (here the Attorney-General).18 Whether it was a reasonable and proper course for a plaintiff to join the successful defendant will be a relevant
15 Van Essen, above n 10, at [158].
16 And in any event, in the underlying criminal proceedings, costs pursuant to both the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967 and the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 were awarded in favour of the plaintiffs.
17 Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Co, above n 6; and Brown v Heathcote County Council (No 2) [1982] 2 NZLR 618.
18 Bullock, above n 6; and Ronaldson v Rankin [1948] NZLR 850 (SC).
consideration in determining that it is appropriate for an unsuccessful defendant to pay the costs of a successful defendant.19 As Tipping J stated:20
While it may have been reasonable for the plaintiff to join both defendants, that of itself does not entitle the plaintiff to an order that the unsuccessful defendant should pay the successful defendant's costs, either directly (as a Sanderson order) or indirectly (as a Bullock order). The reasonableness of the original joinder is certainly a relevant factor. If such joinder was unreasonable the plaintiff cannot seek to pass costs payable by it to the successful defendant over to the unsuccessful defendant. Even if the joinder is reasonable at the outset, the position must also be looked at from the point of view of the unsuccessful defendant. If that party has done nothing to cause or contribute to the joinder of the successful defendant, that will be a point in its favour. The converse also applies. How the proceeding develops may well be relevant. Another factor which may be of moment comes into play if an unsuccessful defendant is found liable for significantly less than the claim made against both itself and the successful defendant. Such a situation will be relevant to the ultimate discretion because the costs payable in that event by the plaintiff to the successful defendant (based on the amount claimed) will be more than the costs payable by the unsuccessful defendant to the plaintiff (based on the amount recovered).
[29] Instead, the discretion must be exercised according to the overall justice of the matter as between the parties.21 Further, a relevant factor in the overall exercise is, as submitted by the FMA, whether the causes of action relied on against the defendants are connected with each other. For example:22
A Bullock order is appropriate where a plaintiff is in doubt as to which of two persons is responsible for the act or acts of negligence which caused his injury, the most common instance being, of course, where a third person is injured in a collision between two vehicles and where the accident is, therefore, caused by the negligence of one or the other, or both. It does not appear to us that it is an appropriate order to make where a plaintiff is alleging perfectly independent causes of action against two defendants where the breaches of duty alleged are in no way connected the one with the other.
[30] The plaintiffs’ claim against the FMA was a novel claim in tort. This was essentially repeated against the Attorney-General in the second cause of action. On the other hand, the claim against the Attorney-General in the third cause of action was a relatively standard claim for breach of the NZBORA. While the factual circumstances which informed the two claims were related, the plaintiffs were not in doubt as to
19 Lane Group Ltd v D I & L Paterson Ltd [2000] 1 NZLR 129, (1999) 13 PRNZ 509 at [80]–[84] per Tipping J.
20 At [84] per Tipping J.
21 Lane Group Ltd, above n 19, at [91] per Tipping J.
22 Mulready, above n 8, at 219 per Lord Goddard; cited in Irvine, above n 8, at [27].
which of two persons were responsible for the act or acts which they claimed caused them injury—because the plaintiffs claimed in respect of two different injuries.23 The first injury was represented by the tortious damages sought by the plaintiffs to recover for economic and emotional harm. The second injury was rights-based, seeking to compensate the plaintiffs for breach of their fair trial rights.
[31] Accordingly, I do not consider that this is an appropriate case in which to order the Attorney-General to pay, whether directly or indirectly, costs incurred by the FMA in successfully defending the plaintiffs’ claim in tort.
Quantum of costs
[32] It follows that I have concluded that there is no reason to depart from ordinary costs principles. The FMA is entitled to the costs it has claimed. The plaintiffs are entitled to costs paid by the Attorney-General for the portion of their costs incurred in bringing their successful cause of action (although they have made no submission as to what portion of their costs this is). The Attorney-General does not seek costs in relation to his successful defence of the second cause of action, rather he suggests that the extent to which he was successful can be taken into account in assessing the quantum of the award of costs for the plaintiffs.
[33] Thus, I turn to consider what portion of the plaintiffs’ claimed costs can properly be said to have been directed to the third cause of action and to what extent those costs should be reduced to take account of the Attorney-General’s successful defence of the second cause of action.
[34] One approach would be to award the plaintiffs one third of the costs claimed on the basis that they brought three causes of action. All three causes of action relied on the same underlying factual circumstances relating to the earlier criminal proceedings brought against the plaintiffs. In terms of the legal arguments, I consider that the third cause of action raised more complex legal issues than the second cause of action although I recognise that, to address the second cause of action, the Attorney- General was required to advance his case on the basis that there was no private right
23 Irvine, above n 8, at [36]–[37].
of action for breach of statutory duty (thus dealing with matters also considered under the first cause of action against the FMA). However, the reality is that the plaintiffs pursued their claim on two bases, a claim in tort and a claim under the NZBORA.
[35] Accordingly, in the circumstances, I am satisfied that the plaintiffs should be awarded 50 per cent of their claimed costs on a 2B basis, as representative of the extent to which they were successful against the Attorney-General. I also consider that there should then be a reduction of costs in the sum of $5,000 to take account of the Attorney-General’s success on the second cause of action. I appreciate that this, combined with my conclusion that the FMA is entitled to costs on the usual principles, leaves the plaintiffs in a situation where the costs they receive are less than they are required to pay to the FMA. This is unfortunately inevitable, the plaintiffs having brought claims in tort against both the FMA and the Attorney-General, which were ultimately unsuccessful. I note that even if I had awarded costs to the plaintiffs on an indemnity basis, the quantum of the award of costs against the Attorney-General calculated on the approach I have outlined would still have been less than the award made against them in favour of the FMA.
[36]The three remaining issues as to quantum are:
(a)have the plaintiffs incorrectly claimed costs for the filing of amended statements of claim;
(b)should the FMA be entitled to claim costs for discovery on a 2C basis; and
(c)should the FMA be entitled to claim for second counsel.
[37] As to the first issue, Mr Powell is correct that sch 3 of the High Court Rules does not provide a time allocation for costs incurred in filing amended pleadings, but only for “pleading in response to [an] amended pleading”. In my view, the fact that an allocation is provided for a pleading in response to an amended pleading but not for the preparation of an amended pleading indicates that such actions are not to be included within a claim for costs. In addition, I agree with Mr Powell that the use of
item 36 in sch 3 of the High Court Rules is not apt in relation to a change of approach after the proceedings are commenced. Accordingly, the claims made by the plaintiffs for the filing of two amended statements of claim must be removed from their calculation of costs.
[38] As to the second issue, I am satisfied that the FMA has properly claimed for its discovery costs on a 2C basis, given the amount of documentation involved, and the extent of information relevant to this proceeding, stretching back over a period of more than ten years.
[39] As to the third issue, the FMA has claimed for second counsel, but has not identified the basis on which this is sought or addressed this point in its submissions.24 An award of costs for second counsel is only made if allowed by the court. The High Court Rules provide no guidance as to when an allowance for second counsel will be made, and the norm is that only one counsel will be allowed.25 Whether the court will depart from that norm is influenced by the complexity of the proceedings including the issues involved, the range of the evidence, the number of witnesses, and the volume of evidence involved.26 While the claim against the FMA involved a novel legal issue it was not factually complex and proceeded on affidavit evidence. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that it would be appropriate to require the plaintiffs to meet the cost of second counsel for the FMA.
Result
[40]Accordingly, I order that:
(a)the Attorney-General pay costs to the plaintiffs on a 2B basis in the sum of $13,881, plus disbursements of $9,115; and
24 The plaintiffs did not expressly challenge this aspect of the FMA’s claim for costs but I do not consider that this prevents my assessment of it.
25 Northwest Developments Ltd v Zhang [2019] NZHC 2146 at [23] citing Brady v Presbyterian Church of Aotearoa New Zealand [2013] NZHC 2300 at [2].
26 Brady, above n 25, at [2].
(b)the plaintiffs are jointly liable to pay costs to the FMA on a 2B basis in the sum of $41,586 plus disbursements of $220.
McQueen J
Solicitors:
Henderson Reeves, Whangarei for Plaintiffs Margot Gatland, Auckland for First Defendant
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Second Defendant
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