Morland (Easton) v Wellington City Council
[2025] NZHC 1270
•22 May 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CIV-2024-485-344
[2025] NZHC 1270
UNDER the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016 BETWEEN
BENJAMIN MORLAND [EASTON]
Applicant
AND
WELLINGTON CITY COUNCIL
First Respondent
ATTORNEY-GENERAL
Second Respondent
Hearing: On the papers Appearances:
Applicant in person
No appearance for First Respondent
S B McCusker and G P Fitzgerald for Second RespondentJudgment:
22 May 2025
JUDGMENT OF McHERRON J
(Costs)
[1] In my judgment of 21 March 2025, I struck out the applicant’s claim in its entirety. In summary, I concluded that the applicant’s claim:
(a)attempted to relitigate issues already decided in earlier cases and was thus an abuse of process;
(b)involved matters not suitable for judicial review, such as parliamentary processes and legislative decisions;
MORLAND v WELLINGTON CITY COUNCIL [2025] NZHC 1270 [22 May 2025]
(c)was founded on incoherent pleadings which lacked structure and failed to identify specific decisions or legal grounds for review;
(d)involved the applicant attempting to bring claims on behalf of those in respect of whom he lacked standing; and
(e)sought relief that was not legally available.
[2]I provided a process for filing submissions if the respondents sought costs.
[3] The first respondent does not seek costs. However, the second respondent filed a memorandum on 3 April 2025 seeking to recover costs on a 1A basis ($4,213.50) plus disbursements of $1,386.09.
Applicant’s submissions on costs
[4] The applicant filed a memorandum dated 17 April 2025, entitled “Interlocutory cross-judgment on Judge’s initiative”. As with his pleadings and submissions in the substantive proceeding, I found it difficult to follow the applicant’s memorandum. It employs legalise, and refers to numerous High Court Rules and other legislative provisions without understanding their meaning, relevance or applicability.
[5]However, as best as I can discern, the applicant:
(a)opposes an order of costs being made against him; and
(b)instead, seeks costs and damages against the respondents.
[6] The applicant’s grounds for these orders are, again, somewhat opaque and difficult to discern but they seem to be based on various alleged errors in my 21 March 2025 judgment which, the applicant alleges amounts to a miscarriage of justice.
[7] In addition, the applicant alleges the respondents failed to disclose the outcome of criminal proceedings which he says had some bearing on his claim, although the precise relevance of this material remains unclear to me.
[8] In addition, the applicant submits that because his proceeding engages “matters of constitutional abuse” it requires an interlocutory hearing on costs and damages. He thus seeks “an interlocutory hearing to navigate cross-judgments”.
My assessment
[9] The applicant has not identified any legitimate basis for opposing a costs order in favour of the second respondent. His submissions concerning errors in my judgment do not amount to a proper basis for opposing an award of costs. For the purposes of considering costs, I assume the judgment is correct unless and until it is overturned on appeal. The applicant’s arguments therefore only have relevance in an appeal context. Neither is there anything else of relevance to the second respondent’s costs application in the applicant’s submissions in response.
[10] Moreover, it is usual for costs to be considered on the papers. Nothing the applicant has raised justifies, in my view, a further hearing.
[11] As the second respondent’s submissions correctly identify, costs are at the discretion of the Court.1 However, costs will ordinarily follow the event unless there are exceptional reasons.2 The “event” in the present case is the respondents’ successful strike out of the applicant’s entire proceeding.
[12] No issue has been taken with the schedule of costs set out at the end of the second respondent’s submissions, or with the schedule of disbursements.
[13] Accordingly, in accordance with the second respondent’s submissions, I order the applicant to pay the second respondent a total of $5,599.59, comprising $4,213.50 costs and $1,386.09 disbursements (the filing fee for the application to strike out the pleading and costs of photocopying and printing the bundle of authorities and bundle of documents).
McHerron J
1 High Court Rules 2016, r 14.1(1).
2 Rule 14.7.
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