IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND INVERCARGILL REGISTRY
CRI 2014-425-50 [2015] NZHC 460
BETWEEN TERESA BRONWYN MITCHELL
Appellant
AND
THE CROWN Respondent
Hearing: 3 March 2015 Counsel:
S Claver for Appellant
S N McKenzie for RespondentJudgment:
16 March 2015
JUDGMENT OF BROWN J
[1] Sprocket, a blue bull mastiff dog (owned by the appellant), is classified under s 33A of the Dog Control Act 1996 (the DCA) as a “menacing dog”. On
29 March 2013 the six year old complainant was playing in the appellant’s property with her three children which was a regular occurrence. Sprocket came into contact with the complainant, apparently at the back door to the appellant’s house, and bit her leaving five puncture wounds on her chest, around her breast and armpit.
[2] The appellant was charged with an offence against s 33EC and s 33E(1)(a) of the DCA that:1
The defendant Teresa Bronwyn Mitchell the owner of Sprocket a blue male neopolitan mastiff classified as a menacing dog pursuant to section 33 by the Invercargill City Council on 30 January 2013 did not have Sprocket muzzled in a private way.
1 Another charge under s 58 was dismissed for the reason that the complainant had not suffered a serious injury.
[3] The appellant appeals against her conviction on the grounds that:
[T]he Honourable District court judge has misdirected himself as to the meaning of “Private way” resulting in His Honour mistakenly finding the dog was unmuzzled in a “private way” when in fact it was unmuzzled while confined to an enclosed area as required by the Dog Control Act 1996.
[4] Section 33E(1)(a) provides:
33E Effect of classification as menacing dog
(1) If a dog is classified as a menacing dog under section 33A or section 33C, the owner of the dog—
(a) must not allow the dog to be at large or in any public place or in any private way, except when confined completely within a vehicle or cage, without being muzzled in such a manner as to prevent the dog from biting but to allow it to breathe and drink without obstruction; …
[5] The appeal raises two issues:
(a) What is the meaning of “private way” in s 33E(1)(a)?
(b) Was Sprocket in a private way when he bit the complainant?
The judgment under appeal
[6] The part of the judgment addressing s 33E first notes that “private way” in the DCA has the meaning given to it by s 315(1) of the Local Government Act 1974 (LGA) which states:
Private way means any way or passage whatsoever over private land within a district, the right to use which is confined or intended to be confined to certain persons or classes of persons, and which is not thrown open or intended to be open to the use of the public generally; and includes any such way or passage as aforesaid which at the commencement of this Part of this Act exists within any district:
[7] The Judge then noted…
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- Case
- [2015] NZHC 460
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