Mitchell v The Queen

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND INVERCARGILL REGISTRY

CRI 2014-425-50 [2015] NZHC 460

BETWEEN

TERESA BRONWYN MITCHELL

Appellant

AND

THE CROWN Respondent

Hearing: 3 March 2015

Counsel:

S Claver for Appellant
S N McKenzie for Respondent

Judgment:

16 March 2015

JUDGMENT OF BROWN J

[1]      Sprocket, a blue bull mastiff dog (owned by the appellant), is classified under s 33A  of  the  Dog  Control  Act 1996  (the  DCA)  as  a  “menacing  dog”.     On

29 March 2013 the six year old complainant was playing in the appellant’s property with her three children which was a regular occurrence.  Sprocket came into contact with the complainant, apparently at the back door to the appellant’s house, and bit her leaving five puncture wounds on her chest, around her breast and armpit.

[2]      The appellant was charged with an offence against s 33EC and s 33E(1)(a) of the DCA that:1

The defendant Teresa Bronwyn Mitchell the owner of Sprocket a blue male neopolitan mastiff classified as a menacing dog pursuant to section 33 by the Invercargill City Council on 30 January 2013 did not have Sprocket muzzled in a private way.

1      Another charge under s 58 was dismissed for the reason that the complainant had not suffered a serious injury.

[3]      The appellant appeals against her conviction on the grounds that:

[T]he Honourable District court judge has misdirected himself as to the meaning of “Private way” resulting in His Honour mistakenly finding the dog was unmuzzled in a “private way” when in fact it was unmuzzled while confined to an enclosed area as required by the Dog Control Act 1996.

[4]      Section 33E(1)(a) provides:

33E      Effect of classification as menacing dog

(1)      If  a  dog  is  classified  as  a  menacing  dog  under  section  33A or section 33C, the owner of the dog—

(a)       must not allow the dog to be at large or in any public place or in any private way, except when confined completely within a vehicle or cage, without being muzzled in such a manner as to prevent the dog from biting but to allow it to breathe and drink without obstruction; …

[5]      The appeal raises two issues:

(a)      What is the meaning of “private way” in s 33E(1)(a)?

(b)      Was Sprocket in a private way when he bit the complainant?

The judgment under appeal

[6]      The part of the judgment addressing s 33E first notes that “private way” in the DCA has the meaning given to it by s 315(1) of the Local Government Act 1974 (LGA) which states:

Private way means any way or passage whatsoever over private land within a district, the right to use which is confined or intended to be confined to certain persons or classes of persons, and which is not thrown open or intended to be open to the use of the public generally; and includes any such way or passage as aforesaid which at the commencement of this Part of this Act exists within any district:

[7]      The Judge then noted…

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Details
Case
[2015] NZHC 460
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the appellant Teresa Bronwyn Mitchell was convicted of failing to have her dog muzzled in a private way, contrary to the Dog Control Act 1996. The dog, Sprocket, bit the complainant, a six-year-old child, on the appellant's property. The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing that the dog was not in a private way when the incident occurred. The central legal issues were the interpretation of "private way" in section 33E(1)(a) of the Act and whether Sprocket was in a private way when he bit the complainant. The court reviewed the legislative history of the relevant sections and the definition of "private way" in the Local Government Act 1974, concluding that a private way refers to a recognised thoroughfare over private land intended for the use of certain persons. The court found that the backyard where the incident occurred did not qualify as a private way under this definition, leading to the conclusion that the appellant did not have an obligation to muzzle the dog in that location. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the conviction was quashed. The court reserved leave to file a memorandum on costs.

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