Minister of Immigration v Q

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE

CIV-2017-409-000848

[2019] NZHC 1559

BETWEEN

MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION

Applicant

AND

Q

Respondent

Hearing: 2 July 2019

Appearances:

I C Carter for Applicant

A M Toohey – Contradictor – Counsel to assist the Court

Judgment:

4 July 2019


JUDGMENT OF GENDALL J


Introduction

[1]    The applicant, the Minister of Immigration, applies to this Court for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against a judgment I gave in this matter on 4 December 2018 (the judgment).1 The judgment dealt with an appeal from a decision of the Immigration and Protection Tribunal in CW (China) v Minister of Immigration.2

[2]    Leave to appeal the judgment is required. Here the applicant applies for that leave to appeal under s 56 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 and s 246 of the Immigration Act 2009 (the Act).

[3]    In the judgment I had determined that absence of fault could be taken into account as a factor when determining a humanitarian appeal against a deportation


1      Minister of Immigration v Q [2018] NZHC 3173.

2      CW (China) v Minister of Immigration [2017] NZIPT 600408.

MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION v Q [2019] NZHC 1559 [4 July 2019]

liability under the Act. In an earlier decision in this Court, Dunningham J had granted leave to the applicant to appeal to the High Court the earlier decision of the Immigration and Protection Tribunal on the grounds that this matter was one of public importance. In noting the question whether the Tribunal in this case had made humanitarian exceptions to liability for deportation correctly and according to law, Dunningham J held (at [40]):

... I consider that the Tribunal would be assisted if there was a clear statement of law on exactly how absence of fault is to be taken into account under s 207.

[4]The question of law on which the grant of leave to appeal is sought is therefore:

Did the Tribunal err in law by considering the respondent’s absence of fault as a factor relevant to its assessment of “exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature” in s 207(1)(a) of the Act?

[5]In the judgment I answered this question in the negative.

Background facts

[6]    The background facts in this matter are summarised at paragraphs [3] – [10] inclusive of the judgment. Briefly, the respondent became liable for deportation from New Zealand pursuant to s 158(1)(b)(ii) of the Act because it was discovered that false evidence had been provided in support of her residence application in August 2012. Prior to their marriage, her husband had committed passport and immigration fraud, of which the respondent Q had no knowledge. Thus, she appealed her deportation liability to the Tribunal on humanitarian grounds.

Principles for grant of leave to appeal

[7]    Section 246(2) of the Act which addresses the issue of when leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal ought to be granted states:

(2) In determining whether to grant…

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Details
Case
[2019] NZHC 1559
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involves the Minister of Immigration, who is the applicant, seeking leave to appeal against a judgment given by Gendall J on 4 December 2018, in which the Minister had appealed against a decision of the Immigration and Protection Tribunal. The respondent in the original appeal was Q, who had become liable for deportation due to providing false evidence in support of her residence application. Q appealed this deportation liability to the Tribunal on humanitarian grounds, and the Tribunal had allowed her appeal. The Minister then appealed the Tribunal’s decision to the High Court, but the appeal was dismissed. The Minister now seeks leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The central legal issue in this case is whether the Immigration and Protection Tribunal erred in law by considering the respondent’s absence of fault as a factor relevant to its assessment of “exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature” in s 207(1)(a) of the Immigration Act 2009. Gendall J had previously answered this question in the negative, finding that the Tribunal did not err in law by taking into account the respondent’s absence of fault in assessing the humanitarian appeal. The Minister argues that this interpretation of the Act is incorrect and that the absence of fault should not be considered as a relevant factor in the humanitarian appeal. The Court of Appeal will need to determine whether the Tribunal’s approach was legally sound and whether the absence of fault should be taken into account when assessing humanitarian appeals under the Act.

Gendall J granted the Minister’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, finding that the question of law involved in the appeal is one that by reason of its general or public importance ought to be submitted to the Court of Appeal for its decision. Gendall J noted that there is conflicting authority on the issue of whether absence of fault should be considered in humanitarian appeals and that clarification from the Court of Appeal is necessary to provide future guidance to the Immigration and Protection Tribunal and for parties to humanitarian appeals under s 207. Gendall J concluded that the application for leave to appeal should be granted as it involves a question of general or public importance that needs to be clarified.

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