IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND NAPIER REGISTRY
CIV-2016-441-101 [2017] NZHC 47
BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION
First Plaintiff
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION Second Plaintiff
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PARKVALE PRIMARY SCHOOL Third Plaintiff
AND
TANIA MAY MCCARTNEY First Defendant
CRAIG ROBERT MCCARTNEY Second Defendant
Hearing: 12 December 2016 Counsel:
M McFarlane for Plaintiffs
J F McDowell for Second DefendantJudgment:
31 January 2017
JUDGMENT OF WILLIAMS J
Introduction
[1] The first defendant was, for some years, a school administrator with access to her employer’s bank accounts and credit card. During the course of her employment she stole nearly $170,000 from the school. She was charged and pleaded guilty. She was then convicted and sentenced for her offending.
[2] She and her husband, the second defendant, separated in June 2016, largely as a result, it seems, of the revelations over her offending. The following month they executed a separation and relationship property agreement. The agreement provides
that the only significant asset of the relationship, the family home, is to be
THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION & ORS v MCCARTNEY & ANOR [2017] NZHC 47 [31 January 2017]
transferred to the husband. The home is said, in the agreement, to be valued at
$395,000 though it is subject to a mortgage of $103,000.1
[3] The school and the Ministry of Education now sue the wife and husband seeking to recover the value of that which she took from the school, external investigation costs, interest and costs. The wife is sued in deceit and breach of fiduciary obligation as an employee for the sum lost; and both husband and wife are sued for relief (effectively) by way of declaration seeking to set aside the separation and relationship property agreement. It is argued the agreement is void pursuant to s 47 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA). Since the agreement takes the family home outside of the wife’s part ownership, it will frustrate the claim by the school and Ministry to the wife’s half of the value of the home.
[4] Freezing orders were granted on an ex parte basis by Clifford J on 31 August
2016. These prevented any dealing with the family home until the application could be argued on notice.2
[5] The wife filed a formal admission of claim on 20 September 2016 in relation to the sum stolen – but not in relation to the application under s 47. That application therefore remains to be argued.
[6] The parties have subsequently agreed that the interim orders should remain until further order of this Court, and that in the meantime a preliminary question as to whether the remaining cause of action in relation to the separation agreement can be dealt with in this Court or whether exclusive jurisdiction in that respect belongs to
the Family Court. I turn now to answer that question.
1 The narrative in the agreement suggests that the exchange is fair because, during the course of the marriage, the wife also extracted approximately $340,000…
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- Case
- [2017] NZHC 47
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to deal with the remaining cause of action regarding the separation agreement or whether exclusive jurisdiction belonged to the Family Court. The court had to determine whether the High Court could decide relationship property issues as if the PRA governed the dispute, even if it was not the Family Court. The court also had to consider whether the High Court could make declarations regarding the ownership of property claimed by a third party, not in the relationship.
The court found that the High Court had jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The court held that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court was limited to applications covered by s 25(1) of the PRA. Section 25(3) – covering declaratory remedies – was not exclusive to the Family Court in at least two situations involving the rights of third parties: (a) where the property was vested in a third party; and (b) where the property was claimed by a third party not in the relationship. The court also found that s 4(4) of the PRA provided the authority for the High Court to decide relationship property issues. The court concluded that there was no reason for it to defer to the Family Court in setting aside the separation agreement as it was intended to defeat the creditors of one of the spouses.
The court granted the interim orders, allowing them to remain in place until further order of the court. The court also found that it had jurisdiction to deal with the matter and that the interim orders were properly made.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi