Meyer v Commissioner of Police
[2025] NZHC 3158
•22 October 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2025-404-2884
[2025] NZHC 3158
UNDER the Habeas Corpus Act 2001 IN THE MATTER OF
an application for a writ of Habeas Corpus
BETWEEN
REECE GARETT MEYER
Applicant
AND
THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
First Respondent
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Second RespondentContinued over
Hearing: 20 October 2025 Appearances:
Applicant in person
L Dittrich for the defendants
Judgment:
22 October 2025
JUDGMENT OF MACGILLIVRAY J
[Habeas Corpus]
This judgment was delivered by me on 22 October 2025 at 4.00 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
………………
Solicitors:
Meredith Connell, Auckland
MEYER v THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2025] NZHC 3158 [22 October 2025]
LEGAL AID SERVICES
Third Respondent
CHIEF EXECUTIVE, MINSTRY OF JUSTICE
Fourth Respondent
CHIEF OMBUDSMAN
Fifth Respondent
INDEPENDENT POLICE CONDUCT AUTHORITY
Sixth Respondent
NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY
Seventh Respondent
COMMUNITY LAW CENTRES NEW ZEALAND
Eighth Respondent
CHEF EXECUTIVE, MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Ninth Respondent
WAIKATO DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD
Tenth Respondent
ATTORNEY-GENERAL
Eleventh Respondent
Introduction
[1]On 17 October 2025, Mr Meyer filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus.
[2] The application had its first call before me in the Duty Judge list on 20 October 2025. During that hearing, I directed counsel for the defendants to file a memorandum providing me with further information relating to decisions made concerning Mr Meyer in the District Court.
[3] I explained to Mr Meyer that after receiving this further information, I would then determine whether his application should be dismissed on the papers, on the basis that an application for a writ of habeas corpus was not the appropriate procedure for the allegations he makes.
[4] Counsel for the defendant has now filed a memorandum providing me with details of the orders made concerning Mr Meyer in the District Court. I address whether this application should be dismissed on the papers.
Background
[5] In mid-2024, Mr Meyer was arrested and charged with a number of offences. On 23 July 2024, was released on EM bail by Judge D P Dravitzki and he remains on EM bail while awaiting trial.
[6] On October 2024, Mr Meyer was sentenced on earlier charges by District Court Judge D C Ruth to 12 months’ supervision. Therefore, Mr Meyer is presently on EM bail and under supervision, although the period of supervision comes to an end later this month.
Legal principles
[7] A person can challenge the legality of their detention by making an application under the Habeas Corpus Act 2001 (the Act) by way of originating application.1 The
1 Habeas Corpus Act 2001, ss 6 and 7(2).
issue to be determined on an application for a writ of Habeas Corpus is whether detention of the detained person is lawful.2
[8] Detention includes every form of restraint of liberty of the person.3 “Close custody” is required before a writ of habeas corpus can be entertained.4 Parole on conditions limiting a person’s movements does not meet the required threshold.5
[9] I consider that the limits imposed on a person by a sentence of supervision do not amount to detention under the Act. The issue of whether EM bail restrictions amount to detention justifying an application is undecided.6 What is clear is that I am not entitled to call into question a ruling as to bail by a court of competent jurisdiction.7
[10] An application for a writ of habeas corpus is given precedence over all other matters before the High Court. The Registrar must allocate a date for the hearing of an application no later than three working days after it is filed.8 However, the Court may dismiss a habeas corpus application on the papers without holding a hearing if the Court is satisfied that the issue of a writ is not the appropriate procedure for considering the allegations made by the applicant.9
[11] Habeas corpus procedures will rarely permit a court to inquire into administrative law grounds seeking to challenge decisions which lie upstream of apparently regular warrants or rulings.10 The issue is whether the challenge to detention is properly susceptible to fair and sensible summary determination.11 A habeas corpus application is not the appropriate procedure for challenging underlying processes and decisions that led to an apparently lawful detention. Nor is it an appropriate procedure for pursuing a review or appeal against a decision of a court of competent jurisdiction.
2 Habeas Corpus Act, s 14.
3 Section 3.
4 Drever v Auckland South Corrections Facility [2019] NZCA 346, [2019] NZAR 1519 at [25].
5 At [27].
6 See Clark v Police [2024] NZHC 2644; and Clark v Police [2024] NZSC 106.
7 Habeas Corpus Act, s 14(2)(b).
8 Section 9.
9 Section 14(1A)(b).
10 Manuel v Superintendent, Hawkes Bay Regional Prison [2005] 1 NZLR 161 (CA) at [49].
11 At [49].
Analysis
[12] I do not need to resolve whether EM bail restrictions amount to “close custody” or detention under the Act for two reasons. First, Mr Meyer was remanded on EM bail by order of the District Court, a court of competent jurisdiction. That order undoubtedly provides a lawful basis for the EM bail restrictions imposed on him. I cannot call that ruling into question on an application for a writ of habeas corpus.12
[13] If Mr Meyer wishes to challenge the EM bail conditions imposed on him, the correct course for him to follow is to apply for a variation of his EM bail conditions or bail simpliciter.
[14] Second, I am satisfied that the arguments advanced by Mr Meyer in his application are not matters that can appropriately be pursued under the Court’s habeas corpus jurisdiction.
[15] The grounds set out in Mr Meyer’s application are very wide-ranging. The unifying theme is that he has been subjected to a coordinated attempt by the Police and other parts of the justice system to entrap and bring charges against him. He alleges that these charges are based on fabricated and planted evidence, and the exploitation of a vulnerable complainant. He also alleges that he has been the victim of a conspiracy to deny him effective legal representation.
[16] All of the matters raised in the application seek to reopen or challenge actions, decisions or processes upstream from the court’s ruling to release Mr Meyer on EM bail. The matters he raises are not properly susceptible to fair and sensible summary determination and fall outside the proper scope of the habeas corpus jurisdiction. They are matters more appropriately raised either in judicial review proceedings, or as part of his defence to the charges against him.
[17] The only specific allegation that seeks to challenge the lawful basis of judicial decisions is an allegation that Judge Ruth was invalidly appointed at the time he presided over Mr Meyer’s trial and sentencing in October 2024. As this relates to the
12 Section 14(2)(b).
sentence of supervision, it is irrelevant to the issue of whether he is lawfully subject to EM bail restrictions. In any event, I am satisfied that there is no merit to the allegation. Counsel for the defendants has provided me with a copy of Judge Ruth’s appointment as an Acting District Court Judge able to exercise the Court’s criminal jurisdiction for a term of one year from 27 March 2024. Mr Meyer’s assertion that 72 years old is the absolute maximum age for judicial service is incorrect.13
Result
[18] For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that an application for a writ of habeas corpus is not the appropriate procedure for considering the allegations made by the applicant. No proper purpose would be served by holding a further hearing. Mr Meyer’s continued remand on EM bail is plainly lawful.
[19]I dismiss Mr Meyer’s application pursuant to s 14(1A)(b) of the Act.
MacGillivray J
13 District Court Act 2016, ss 31 and 32.
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