IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2012-404-7205 [2014] NZHC 2090
BETWEEN JAMES MESSENGER AND JUNE
MARY MESSENGER Plaintiffs
AND
STANAWAY REAL ESTATE LIMITED Defendant
GARY MESSENGER First Third Party
REALTY NZ LIMITED Second Third Party
SIMPSON WESTERN (AS A FIRM) Third Third Party
Hearing: 1 September 2014 Counsel:
RM Cederwell for Plaintiffs
KM Buckhart for Defendants
V Wethey for Third Third PartyJudgment:
1 September 2014
ORAL JUDGMENT OF FOGARTY J
Solicitors: Lowndes Jordan, Auckland
Kennedys, Auckland
Jones Fee, Auckland
MESSENGER v STANAWAY REAL ESTATE LTD [2014] NZHC 2090 [1 September 2014]
[1] This is a dispute which centres upon an agreement for sale and purchase of a luxury property. The terms of the purchase included that the purchase price was
$5,995,000. The agreement was entered into on or about 30 November or
1 December 2006. The terms of the agreement also included the possession date would be on 18 December 2006. There was no settlement date specified.
[2] On 18 December, the purchasers were to be paid $2,750,000, with the balance payable by quarterly instalments – 8 x $61,875 followed by a balloon payment of $2,750,000 on 18 December 2008. The agreement also provided the vendors could lodge a caveat over the property prepared by the vendors at the purchasers’ expense.
[3] There has been already quite a bit of litigation arising from this contract. The original parties to the agreement have litigated this issue to the Court of Appeal. The contract, it turns out, was essentially not performed at all and the property was resold at a loss.
[4] In these proceedings now before the Court and a fixture is scheduled for 15
September, the plaintiffs are the original vendors. The defendants are a real estate agency, Stanaway Real Estate Limited. The son of the plaintiffs, Gary Messenger, was then joined as a first third party, together with the company he was working for, Realty NZ Limited. Stanaway also joined Simpson Western,(a law firm) who had been acting for the vendors, as third third party.
[5] The defendant’s claim against the third third party currently pleads, firstly, that they were the solicitors who owed a duty of care, which I assume is not disputed. The essential pleading is that Simpson Western breached its duty to the plaintiffs in exercising reasonable skill and care by failing to advise the plaintiffs that the settlement and possession date was 18 December 2006; that they failed to advise the plaintiffs to issue a settlement notice in January 2007, after the purchasers failed to make payment on 18 December 2006; and that if the terms of the settlement notice were not complied with, to cancel the agreement. The claim pleads that Simpson Western advised the Messengers to pursue a costly claim in the High Court against the purchasers on the basis that the settlement date was 18 December 2008, rather
than advising them to cancel the agreement at any stage following 18 December
2006.
[6] The case is set down…
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- Case
- [2014] NZHC 2090
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issues before the court included whether the settlement date was indeed 18 December 2006, as the defendant claimed, and whether Simpson Western breached its duty by not advising the plaintiffs to cancel the agreement or issue a settlement notice when the purchasers failed to make the payment on 18 December 2006. The court had to determine whether the advice given by Simpson Western was negligent and if this negligence led to significant financial losses for the plaintiffs. The court also had to consider the procedural aspect of whether allowing the defendant to amend its statement of defence constituted a new theory of the case or if it was an extension of the existing issues.
The court's reasoning focused on the importance of ensuring a just trial by allowing all relevant arguments to be presented. Fogarty J held that the new particulars did not introduce a fundamentally new theory but rather addressed issues already in contention. The court emphasized the need to allow all available arguments to be heard, referencing the principle that parties should have every opportunity to ensure the real controversy is presented at trial. The judge also stressed the importance of preparing for the trial by having expert witnesses meet early to identify areas of agreement and disagreement. Ultimately, the court granted leave for the defendant to amend its statement of defence and set new deadlines for the exchange of expert briefs, emphasizing the need for a focused trial that addresses the core issues efficiently. The court reserved the decision on costs for the trial judge to determine at the hearing.
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