Melanie Ann Clayton v Mark Arnold Clayton

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NOTE: PURSUANT TO S 169 OF THE FAMILY PROCEEDINGS ACT 1980 AND S 35A OF THE PROPERTY (RELATIONSHIPS) ACT 1976, ANY REPORT OF THIS PROCEEDING MUST COMPLY WITH SS 11B TO 11D OF THE FAMILY COURTS ACT 1980.  FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, PLEASE SEE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 23/2015
[2015] NZSC 84
BETWEEN

MARK ARNOLD CLAYTON
First Applicant

MARK ARNOLD CLAYTON AS TRUSTEE OF THE VAUGHAN ROAD PROPERTY TRUST
Second Applicant

BRYAN WILLIAM CHESHIRE AND MARK ARNOLD CLAYTON AS TRUSTEES OF THE STACEY CLAYTON EDUCATION TRUST AND THE ANNA CLAYTON EDUCATION TRUST
Third Applicant

MCGLOSKEY NOMINEES LIMITED AS TRUSTEE OF THE DENARAU RESORT TRUST
Fourth Applicant

DEBORAH JOAN VAUGHAN AS TRUSTEE OF THE SOPHIA NO 7 TRUST
Fifth Applicant

CHELMSFORD HOLDINGS LIMITED AS TRUSTEE OF THE CHELMSFORD TRUST
Sixth Applicant

AND

MELANIE ANN CLAYTON
Respondent

SC 38/2015 

BETWEEN

MELANIE ANN CLAYTON
Applicant

AND

MARK ARNOLD CLAYTON
First Respondent

MARK ARNOLD CLAYTON AND BRYAN WILLIAM CHESHIRE AS TRUSTEES OF THE CLAYMARK TRUST
Second Respondent

CHELMSFORD HOLDINGS LIMITED AS TRUSTEE OF THE CHELMSFORD TRUST
Third Respondent

NEW ZEALAND TRUSTEE SERVICES LIMITED AS TRUSTEE OF THE LIGHTER QUAY 5B TRUST
Fourth Respondent

Court:

Elias CJ, William Young and Arnold JJ

Counsel:

M J McCartney QC for Mark Arnold Clayton
C R Carruthers QC for the Trustees
D A T Chambers QC for Melanie Ann Clayton

Judgment:

18 June 2015

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe applications for leave to appeal are granted in respect of the questions identified in B and C below (Clayton v Clayton [2015] NZCA 30). In all other respects, the applications for leave to appeal are dismissed.

BIn relation to the Vaughan Road Property Trust (VRPT):

(i)Was the Court of Appeal correct to find that there is no distinction between a sham trust and what the Family Court and the High Court described as an illusory trust?

(ii)Was the Court of Appeal correct to find that the VRPT was neither a sham trust nor what the Family Court and the High Court described as an illusory trust?

(iii)If so:

a.   Was the bundle of rights and powers held by Mr and/or Mrs Clayton under the VRPT Trust Deed “property” for the purposes of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA)?

b.   Was the Court of Appeal correct to find that the power of appointment under clause 7.1 of the VRPT Trust Deed was “relationship property” for the purposes of the PRA?

c.   If so, did the Court of Appeal err in its approach to the valuation of the power?

CIn relation to the Claymark Trust, was the Court of appeal correct in its interpretation and application of:

(i)Section 44C of the PRA?

(ii)Section 182 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980?

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

  1. The parties  seek leave to appeal on various questions arising out of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Clayton v Clayton.[1]  Leave is granted in respect of the questions identified above.  These reasons deal with the matters on which leave is not granted.

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Details
Case
[2015] NZSC 84
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Clayton v Clayton, the Supreme Court of New Zealand heard an appeal concerning property distribution between Mark Arnold Clayton and Melanie Ann Clayton. The case involved multiple trusts and business interests, leading to complex questions about the classification and valuation of assets. The applicants sought leave to appeal several findings of the Court of Appeal, particularly concerning the characterisation of certain trusts as sham or illusory, the classification of assets as property under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, and the valuation of business interests.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the Court of Appeal correctly determined the nature of the Vaughan Road Property Trust and the Claymark Trust, and if the Court of Appeal's interpretation and application of specific sections of the Property (Relationships) Act and the Family Proceedings Act 1980 were accurate. The applicants argued that the Court of Appeal had erred in its assessment of the trusts and the valuation of business interests, which they believed would lead to a substantial miscarriage of justice.

The Supreme Court found that the issues raised by the applicants did not present matters of general or public importance. The court determined that the Court of Appeal's application of the law to the facts was sound, and there was no risk of a substantial miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the applications for leave to appeal, affirming the Court of Appeal's decisions. The court held that the findings concerning the trusts and the valuation of business interests did not raise significant legal questions that warranted further review.

As a result, the Supreme Court did not grant leave to appeal on the specified grounds, and the decisions of the Court of Appeal were upheld. The applicants' arguments concerning the trusts and the valuation of business interests were deemed to be issues of fact and application of law to those specific facts, rather than broader legal principles. The Supreme Court's decision thus concluded that the applicants' appeals did not meet the threshold for leave to appeal on the grounds presented.

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