| NOTE: PURSUANT TO S 169 OF THE FAMILY PROCEEDINGS ACT 1980 AND S 35A OF THE PROPERTY (RELATIONSHIPS) ACT 1976, ANY REPORT OF THIS PROCEEDING MUST COMPLY WITH SS 11B TO 11D OF THE FAMILY COURTS ACT 1980. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, PLEASE SEE |
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND |
| SC 23/2015 [2015] NZSC 84 |
| BETWEEN | MARK ARNOLD CLAYTON MARK ARNOLD CLAYTON AS TRUSTEE OF THE VAUGHAN ROAD PROPERTY TRUST BRYAN WILLIAM CHESHIRE AND MARK ARNOLD CLAYTON AS TRUSTEES OF THE STACEY CLAYTON EDUCATION TRUST AND THE ANNA CLAYTON EDUCATION TRUST MCGLOSKEY NOMINEES LIMITED AS TRUSTEE OF THE DENARAU RESORT TRUST DEBORAH JOAN VAUGHAN AS TRUSTEE OF THE SOPHIA NO 7 TRUST CHELMSFORD HOLDINGS LIMITED AS TRUSTEE OF THE CHELMSFORD TRUST |
| AND | MELANIE ANN CLAYTON |
| SC 38/2015 | |
| BETWEEN | MELANIE ANN CLAYTON |
| AND | MARK ARNOLD CLAYTON MARK ARNOLD CLAYTON AND BRYAN WILLIAM CHESHIRE AS TRUSTEES OF THE CLAYMARK TRUST CHELMSFORD HOLDINGS LIMITED AS TRUSTEE OF THE CHELMSFORD TRUST NEW ZEALAND TRUSTEE SERVICES LIMITED AS TRUSTEE OF THE LIGHTER QUAY 5B TRUST |
| Court: | Elias CJ, William Young and Arnold JJ |
Counsel: | M J McCartney QC for Mark Arnold Clayton |
Judgment: | 18 June 2015 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
AThe applications for leave to appeal are granted in respect of the questions identified in B and C below (Clayton v Clayton [2015] NZCA 30). In all other respects, the applications for leave to appeal are dismissed.
BIn relation to the Vaughan Road Property Trust (VRPT):
(i)Was the Court of Appeal correct to find that there is no distinction between a sham trust and what the Family Court and the High Court described as an illusory trust?
(ii)Was the Court of Appeal correct to find that the VRPT was neither a sham trust nor what the Family Court and the High Court described as an illusory trust?
(iii)If so:
a. Was the bundle of rights and powers held by Mr and/or Mrs Clayton under the VRPT Trust Deed “property” for the purposes of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA)?
b. Was the Court of Appeal correct to find that the power of appointment under clause 7.1 of the VRPT Trust Deed was “relationship property” for the purposes of the PRA?
c. If so, did the Court of Appeal err in its approach to the valuation of the power?
CIn relation to the Claymark Trust, was the Court of appeal correct in its interpretation and application of:
(i)Section 44C of the PRA?
(ii)Section 182 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980?
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
The parties seek leave to appeal on various questions arising out of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Clayton v Clayton.[1] Leave is granted in respect of the questions identified above. These reasons deal with the matters on which leave is not granted.
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- Case
- [2015] NZSC 84
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the Court of Appeal correctly determined the nature of the Vaughan Road Property Trust and the Claymark Trust, and if the Court of Appeal's interpretation and application of specific sections of the Property (Relationships) Act and the Family Proceedings Act 1980 were accurate. The applicants argued that the Court of Appeal had erred in its assessment of the trusts and the valuation of business interests, which they believed would lead to a substantial miscarriage of justice.
The Supreme Court found that the issues raised by the applicants did not present matters of general or public importance. The court determined that the Court of Appeal's application of the law to the facts was sound, and there was no risk of a substantial miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the applications for leave to appeal, affirming the Court of Appeal's decisions. The court held that the findings concerning the trusts and the valuation of business interests did not raise significant legal questions that warranted further review.
As a result, the Supreme Court did not grant leave to appeal on the specified grounds, and the decisions of the Court of Appeal were upheld. The applicants' arguments concerning the trusts and the valuation of business interests were deemed to be issues of fact and application of law to those specific facts, rather than broader legal principles. The Supreme Court's decision thus concluded that the applicants' appeals did not meet the threshold for leave to appeal on the grounds presented.
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