Meenken v Family Court at Masterton
[2017] NZHC 2103
•31 August 2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CIV-2017-485-174 [2017] NZHC 2103
UNDER THE Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016 IN THE MATTER OF
Application for Review
BETWEEN
DIEDERIK MARTEN MEENKEN Applicant
AND
THE FAMILY COURT AT MASTERTON Respondent
Hearing: 8 August 2017 Appearances:
D M Meenken self-represented
M J McKillop for the respondentJudgment:
31 August 2017
JUDGMENT OF CULL J
[1] The Family Court at Masterton (Family Court) has filed an application to strike out Mr Meenken’s proceedings in judicial review. Mr Meenken seeks to judicially review several decisions of the Family Court, which dismissed Mr Meenken’s applications under the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act
1988 (PPPR Act) for property orders to transfer his “estate” to the Crown. Three such applications were dismissed by the Family Court and a fourth was not accepted for filing. The Court dismissed the applications on the basis that Mr Meenken was competent and therefore was not eligible for any orders under the PPPR Act.
[2] Mr Meenken then sought to appeal to the High Court, but this was refused by
Mallon J. There was no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, as the Family Court had not granted special leave to appeal.1 Leave was refused by the Family Court in
1 Minute of Mallon J, 15 December 2016 (in the matter of an application by Dierderik Marten
Meeken).
January 2017.2 Mr Meenken claims the Family Court wrongly failed to exercise its statutory duty to consider the request for leave to appeal.
[3] The Family Court has applied to strike out the proceedings on the grounds that it is an abuse of process, as Mr Meenken has no standing to bring this proceeding, because he is bankrupt. Through these proceedings, the Family Court says, Mr Meenken is further attempting to transfer his “estate” (by which he means his legal personality) to the Crown, in order to avoid his legal obligations.
Factual background
[4] Mr Meenken has been attempting to transfer his estate to the Crown since
2010. He was first made bankrupt in 2012. The succession of proceedings is based on various arguments, including:
(a) there is a distinction between a legal and natural person, in that legal personhood is a form of property created by the Crown by issuing a birth certificate, which is then held on trust by the natural person;
(b)Mr Meenken’s legal personality was “created” by the Kingdom of the Netherlands (by issuing a Dutch birth certificate), which was then “imported” into New Zealand by his parents;
(c) his actions in acquiring property and existing property rights led to him being identified with his legal personality, which he now regrets; and
(d)transferring his legal personality to the Crown will rid him of his debts and obligations.
[5] Mr Meenken has previously sought to avoid his tax obligations. In 2007 the
Commissioner of Inland Revenue (the Commissioner) commenced proceedings against Mr Meenken seeking unpaid income tax for the 2003 and 2004 tax years.
2 Meenken v Meenken FC Masterton FAM-2015-035-080, 24 January 2017 (Minute of Judge
Johnston).
Mr Meenken commenced review proceedings challenging the District Court’s
jurisdiction to hear that claim, which were dismissed by Dobson J.3
[6] On the application of the Commissioner, Mr Meenken was adjudicated bankrupt on 20 February 2012.4 Mr Meenken was again adjudicated bankrupt on
14 December 2016, and has not been discharged from either bankruptcy.
[7] Ms Joanne Basher, the Official Assignee, has not disclaimed the right to bring this proceeding, nor consented to Mr Meenken bringing the proceeding. The Assignee seeks to discontinue any cause of action that vests in her under s 101 of the Insolvency Act 2006.
[8] In November 2014, Mr Meenken filed a claim in the High Court seeking to transfer his entire estate to the Crown. He then discontinued the claim and a costs order was made.5
[9] Following discontinuance, Mr Meenken attempted to bring applications in the Masterton Family Court under the PPPR Act for property orders. His application was based on the competence of bankrupts. In June 2016, Judge Grace held that the medical evidence demonstrated Mr Meenken was competent, and that a full affidavit should be filed setting out what Mr Meenken sought to achieve with the application.6
Mr Meenken did so, setting out that he wanted to appoint either the Public Trustee or
himself as the property manager under the PPPR Act, to transfer his estate to the
Crown.
[10] In August 2015, the Family Court dismissed Mr Meenken’s application on the grounds that he was competent and therefore was not eligible for any orders under the PPPR Act.7 In September 2015, the Family Court rejected Mr Meenken’s second application.8 In October 2015, the Court dismissed a further application for
the same reasons. Judge Moss ordered that such applications where Mr Meenken
3 Meenken v District Court at Masterton (2008) 23 NZTC 21,949 (HC).
4 Re Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ex parte Meenken HC Masterton CIV-2011-435-136, 20
February 2012.
5 Meenken v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 412.
6 Minute of Judge Grace, 16 June 2015.
7 Minute of Judge Moss, 11 August 2015.
8 Minute of Judge Johnston, 14 September 2015.
was the applicant and the subject person, were not to be accepted for filing in the future.9 A fourth application was not accepted for filing in June 2016.
[11] In August 2016, Williams J rejected a further application from Mr Meenken for filing.10 The Judge concluded that this was another application to transfer his “estate” to the Crown and was barred under r 15.24 of the High Court Rules 2016, as it substantively replicated his 2014 application to the Court.
[12] Mr Meenken claims that a fifth application under the PPPR Act was refused for filing and returned to him in November 2016. He sought to appeal this to the High Court, but Mallon J refused his appeal on the grounds that jurisdiction did not exist as the Family Court had not granted special leave to appeal.11 The Family Court refused to grant leave to appeal, relying on Mallon J’s minute.12
[13] Mr Meenken commenced the current judicial review proceedings in March
2017. In his statement of claim for the current judicial review proceedings, Mr Meenken claims the Family Court wrongly failed to exercise its statutory duty to consider the request for leave to appeal. He also challenges Mallon J’s ruling that leave to appeal is required.
Respondent’s application
[14] The Family Court submits Mr Meenken has no standing to bring this proceeding due to his bankruptcy. The core proceeding in the Family Court relates entirely to Mr Meenken’s property, as he is seeking to make an application in the Court for property orders under the PPPR Act in relation to his own property or “estate”. However, this property is vested in the Official Assignee, who is the only person that can bring proceedings relating to the administration of Mr Meenken’s property. The Assignee has not given permission to bring this proceeding and does not wish to continue it. Accordingly, Mr Meenken has no standing to bring this
application for judicial review and it should be dismissed.
9 Minute of Judge Moss, 20 October 2015.
10 Meenken v Attorney-General [2016] NZHC 2039.
11 Mallon J, above n 1.
12 Judge Johnston, above n 2.
[15] Further, the Family Court submits that if Mr Meenken seeks to challenge the appointment of the Official Assignee and her decisions, he may apply to the High Court for review of the Assignee’s decisions under s 226(1) of the Insolvency Act. He can also seek to discharge the bankruptcy by applying to the Court under s 294 of the Insolvency Act. None of his concerns about the validity of his bankruptcy are sensibly addressed in collateral proceedings.
[16] Finally, the Family Court submits that this proceeding is an abuse of process and should be struck out. In his five applications to the Family Court under the PPPR Act, as well as his two High Court applications, Mr Meenken has advanced a “double/split person” concept that his physical or natural person is distinct from a “corporate entity” created by the state. All of these applications have been dismissed, discontinued or not accepted for filing. Mr Meenken admits that the recent application dismissed by Williams J was effectively a resurrection of an earlier application.
[17] Mr Meenken’s purpose in bringing these proceedings is to transfer his legal personality to the Crown, which the Family Court says is impossible and his “double/split person” concept has no legal effect. The Court submits this type of argument is an abusive tactic adopted by litigants seeking to avoid legal obligations and it is an abuse of process for Mr Meenken to continue to litigate this issue. The Family Court seeks that the proceedings should be struck out as Mr Meenken is continuing to litigate a matter already determined by this Court and the Family Court.
[18] The Family Court also seeks a limited order restricting Mr Meenken from commencing any further proceedings concerning this “double/split person” concept under s 166 of the Senior Courts Act 2016, because Mr Meenken has commenced at least two or more proceedings about the same matter, over the past three years. They were without merit.
Mr Meenken’s opposition
[19] Mr Meenken opposes the respondent’s strike-out application. Mr Meenken says that the Family Court has not replied to his affidavit denying the existence of
any valid act of bankruptcy, establishing the appointment of a lawful Official Assignee. He says there is no evidence that the appointment of the Assignee or his bankruptcy was lawful.
[20] Mr Meenken submits that the strike-out application is not the proper forum to litigate the issues of his bankruptcy or his right to be heard. Mr Meenken relies on r 7.26 of the High Court Rules, submitting that the Family Court should file an affidavit in reply to his interlocutory application.13 He denies his claim is an abuse of this Court’s process.
[21] Mr Meenken states that even if the bankruptcy or vesting of his property in the Official Assignee was lawful, this would not remove his standing to bring the judicial review claim.
[22] In support of his opposition, Mr Meenken has also filed a memorandum “regarding applicant’s bankruptcy” which largely canvasses arguments already made in previous applications. In this memorandum Mr Meenken submits:
(a) as a bankrupt person he is incompetent at law, relying on the
Philippine High Court Rules;
(b) although there are two bankruptcies on the insolvency register (in
2012 and 2016), Mr Meenken’s estate is not in fact under the statutory
administration of the Official Assignee or anyone else; and
(c) even if it is determined that the estate is lawfully under administration, then Mr Meenken would be required to co-administer it, which he is not competent to do, and therefore he is entitled to
statutory relief under the PPPR Act.
13 Rule 7.26 relates to the filing of an affidavit in reply in interlocutory applications. As this is a strike-out proceeding, this rule is not relevant.
Relevant law
Strike out principles
[23] Rule 15.1 of the High Court Rules provides:
(1) The court may strike out all or part of a pleading if it—
(a) discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action, defence, or case appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or
(b) is likely to cause prejudice or delay; or
(c) is frivolous or vexatious; or
(d) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
(2) If the court strikes out a statement of claim or a counterclaim under subclause (1), it may by the same or a subsequent order dismiss the proceeding or the counterclaim.
(3) Instead of striking out all or part of a pleading under subclause (1), the court may stay all or part of the proceeding on such conditions as are considered just.
(4) This rule does not affect the court's inherent jurisdiction.
[24] The well-settled principles that apply on a strike out application were summarised by Kós J with application to judicial review proceedings, in Siemer v Judicial Conduct Commissioner:14
The jurisdiction is exercised sparingly. Causes of action may be struck out only if so untenable that they cannot succeed. Facts pleaded are treated as true unless self-evidently speculative or false. These principles apply to judicial review as much as to general proceedings.
[25] An abuse of process can take various forms. Lord Diplock in Hunter v Chief
Constable of the West Midlands Police, referred to the power to strike out as:15
… the inherent power which any court of justice must possess to prevent misuse of its procedure in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its procedural rules, would nevertheless be manifestly
14 Siemer v Judicial Conduct Commissioner [2013] NZHC 1853 at [13]. See also Attorney- General v Prince [1988] 1 NZLR 262 (CA) and Couch v Attorney-General [2008] NZSC 45, [2008] 3 NZLR 725.
15 Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529 at 541, [1981] 3 All ER
727 (HL) at 729 and relied on by Brown J in Rabson v Judicial Conduct Commissioner [2015] NZHC 714, [2015] NZAR 831 at [11].
unfair to a party to litigation before it, or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people.
[26] An abuse of process includes a proceeding brought for an improper purpose,16 a proceeding that attempts to relitigate matters that are already determined,17 and a proceeding brought where it is inevitable that a remedy will be refused even if one or more grounds of review are made out.18
Restriction on commencing or continuing proceedings
[27] Under the Senior Courts Act 2016, a Judge of the High Court has the power to restrict a litigant from commencing further proceedings. The following provisions contain the types of order that can be made and the grounds for doing so.
166 Judge may make order restricting commencement or continuation of proceeding
(1) A Judge of the High Court may make an order restricting a person from commencing or continuing a civil proceeding.
(2) The order may have—
(a) a limited effect (a limited order); or
(b) an extended effect (an extended order); or
(c) a general effect (a general order).
(3) A limited order restrains a party from commencing or continuing civil proceedings on a particular matter in a senior court, another court, or a tribunal.
(4) An extended order restrains a party from commencing or continuing civil proceedings on a particular or related matter in a senior court, another court, or a tribunal.
(5) A general order restrains a party from commencing or continuing civil proceedings in a senior court, another court, or a tribunal.
(6) Nothing in this section limits the court’s inherent power to control its
own proceedings.
16 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd [2013] NZCA 53 at [89].
17 Hunter, above n 15, at 733; Colman v Attorney-General [2013] NZCA 92; Rabson, above n 15, at [14].
18 Maddever v Umawera School Board of Trustees [1993] 2 NZLR 478 (HC) at 502.
167 Grounds for making section 166 order
(1) A Judge may make a limited order under section 166 if, in civil proceedings about the same matter in any court or tribunal, the Judge considers that at least 2 or more of the proceedings are or were totally without merit.
(2) A Judge may make an extended order under section 166 if, in at least
2 proceedings about any matter in any court or tribunal, the Judge considers that the proceedings are or were totally without merit.
(3) A Judge may make a general order if, in at least 2 proceedings about any matter in any court or tribunal, the Judge considers that the proceedings are or were totally without merit.
(4) In determining whether proceedings are or were totally without merit, the Judge may take into account the nature of any interlocutory applications, appeals, or criminal prosecutions involving the party to be restrained, but is not limited to those considerations.
(5) The proceedings concerned must be proceedings commenced or continued by the party to be restrained, whether against the same person or different persons.
(6) For the purpose of this section and sections 168 and 169, an appeal in a civil proceeding must be treated as part of that proceeding and not as a distinct proceeding.
[28] The standard of “totally without merit” is not defined in the Act. The cases establish that the question of whether a litigant has commenced proceedings that are totally without merit is to be determined objectively, in relation to its nature and substance, and should not be considered in relation to the litigant’s own beliefs or motives.19 In its Departmental Report to the Justice and Electoral Committee, the Ministry of Justice identified the following factors as relevant to determining whether a proceeding is totally without merit:20
(a) There are no prospects whatever for success.
(b)Exposure of defendants to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to the gain a plaintiff is likely to receive.
19 Andrew Beck and others McGechan on Procedure (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at
[SC167.03].
20 Judicature Modernisation Bill: Report of the Ministry of Justice to the Justice and Electoral Committee (Ministry of Justice, Departmental Report CRT-09-04-07, April 2014) at [292] – [293].
(c) Actions are brought “at the drop of a hat” despite the lack of merit. (d) No regard is paid to merit, proportionality or cost by a litigant.
(e) The statement of claim or defence discloses no reasonable grounds of bringing or defending the claim.
(f) The statement of claim is an abuse of the court’s process or is
otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceeding.
(g)There has been failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order.
[29] The Court may make an order without an application from a party.21 Further, an order may be made for up to three years, or up to five years in exceptional circumstances.22 If such an order is granted, a party is prevented from commencing or continuing any proceeding of the type specified in the order without first obtaining leave of the High Court.23
Property rights on bankruptcy
[30] Mr Meenken is an undischarged bankrupt. His property, and any powers he could have exercised in respect of any property for his own benefit, have vested in the Official Assignee pursuant to s 101 of the Insolvency Act. Section 101 provides:
101 Status of bankrupt’s property on adjudication
(1) On adjudication,—
(a) all property (whether in or outside New Zealand) belonging to the bankrupt or vested in the bankrupt vests in the Assignee without the Assignee having to intervene or take any other step in relation to the property, and any rights of the bankrupt in the property are extinguished; and
(b) the powers that the bankrupt could have exercised in, over, or in respect of any property (whether in or outside New Zealand) for the bankrupt’s own benefit vest in the Assignee.
21 Senior Courts Act 2016, s 169(3).
22 Section 168(2).
23 Section 168(1).
(2) This section is subject to section 104.24
[31] Section 3 of the Insolvency Act provides a definition of “property”:
property means property of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, real or personal, corporeal or incorporeal, and includes rights, interests, and claims of every kind in relation to property however they arise.
[32] These sections provide the Official Assignee with the exclusive right to
commence proceedings relating to Mr Meenken’s property.
Discussion
[33] I consider that this proceeding should be struck out for the following reasons:
(1)Mr Meenken is an undischarged bankrupt and has no standing to bring this proceeding.
(2) Mr Meenken’s property has vested in the Official Assignee. There is no
“estate” to be made the subject of a PPPR Act application.
(3) The “double/split person” underpinning Mr Meenken’s attempt to
transfer his legal personality to the Crown has no legal basis.
No standing
[34] Mr Meenken was adjudicated bankrupt on 20 February 2012 and is yet to be discharged from that bankruptcy. He was adjudicated bankrupt again on
14 September 2016 and remains an undischarged bankrupt under that bankruptcy as well. The Official Assignee has sworn an affidavit confirming Mr Meenken’s respective bankruptcies and has disposed that she gave no consent to Mr Meenken bringing this proceeding. Nor has the Assignee disclaimed the right to bring this proceeding under s 117 of the Insolvency Act.
[35] The Assignee has reviewed Mr Meenken’s statement of claim and to the
extent that the claim seeks to vest “property” in the Assignee under s 101 of the
24 Section 104 specifies that all property held by the bankrupt in trust for another person does not vest in the Assignee.
Insolvency Act, she states clearly that she does not intend to proceed with that course of action and would seek to discontinue it.
[36] Applications for lack of standing due to bankruptcy have previously been dismissed in this Court.25 Without the Official Assignee’s consent to commence these proceedings, Mr Meenken has no standing to bring them.
[37] I record for completeness that Mr Meenken has raised in his affidavit and in this hearing a number of issues contesting whether he was validly made bankrupt. He also challenged Ms Basher’s appointment as an Official Assignee and contended that no lawful decisions have been made by her as an Official Assignee. I accept the Crown’s submission that if Mr Meenken seeks to challenge the Assignee’s decisions, he has a remedy in reviewing the Assignee’s decisions under s 226(1) of the Insolvency Act. He could also apply to this Court to discharge his bankruptcy. However, the validity of his bankruptcy cannot be addressed in these proceedings, which are collateral to those challenges. It was inevitable that this proceeding would fail, for lack of Mr Meenken’s standing to bring it.
Mr Meenken’s “estate”
[38] Mr Meenken’s application to the Family Court seeks the appointment of a property manager for all of his “property” under the PPPR Act. Although Mr Meenken’s property has already vested in the Assignee through bankruptcy, his application seeks to dispose of the remaining item of Mr Meenken’s property, which he calls his “estate”, consisting of his legal personality. As this Court has already observed, Mr Meenken has been attempting to transfer his estate to the Crown since
2010.26 His lengthy campaign to transfer his estate appears to be an attempt to avoid
his debts.27
[39] Mr Meenken’s applications have been unsuccessful, because the Family
Court decisions have found him to be competent. Without the threshold requirement under s 24 PPPR Act of lack of competence, the Family Court has held there is no
25 Cooley v Prestidge HC New Plymouth CIV-2011-443-436, 7 December 2011; De Alwis v Luvit
Foods International HC Auckland CIV-2002-404-1944, 24 March 2010.
26 Meenken, above n 10.
27 At [2].
jurisdiction to consider his application. Judge Moss records that the applicant and the reporting medical practitioner agree that Mr Meenken understands the nature and foresees the consequences of his decisions.28 In those applications, Mr Meenken, as the applicant, concedes he is the same person as the proposed subject.29 His various applications were accordingly dismissed.
[40] Mr Meenken’s claim that he has property in his legal personality or “de son tort” which is available to everyone is not recognised in law. Mr Meenken’s property has been vested in the Official Assignee and under the definition of “property”, any right of action relating to it vests in the Official Assignee.30 There is nothing for a property manager to manage under the PPPR Act, even if Mr Meenken was able to satisfy the jurisdictional test of being incompetent.
[41] I record again for completeness that Mr Meenken sought a ruling on the PPPR Act definitions of “competence” for property applications and lack of “capacity” for personal ones. There have already been determinations that there is no real distinction between “competence” and “capacity” under the Act and it is not appropriate in this case, where the concepts are not in issue, to deliberate or review other decisions.
[42] Again, Mr Meenken’s underlying application to appoint a property manager under the PPPR Act is so untenable that it cannot succeed. Mr Meenken is competent and there is no property to transfer.
Double/split person concept
[43] Mr Meenken’s applications in the Family Court, seeking the appointment of a property manager for his own property, arises from the distinction he makes between the legal person and a natural person. The legal person is a form of property created by the Crown by issuing a birth certificate, which is then held on trust by the natural person. This has been set out in [4] above. On the basis of his “split person”
concept, Mr Meenken filed his applications in the Family Court with Mr Meenken
28 Minute of Judge Moss, 11 August 2015; Minute of Judge Moss, 20 October 2015; and Minute of
Judge Johnston, 14 September 2015.
29 Re “Tony” (1990) 5 NZFLR 609 (FC).
30 See, for example, Insolvency Act 2006, s 3.
being both the applicant and the subject person. As the Court noted, where an applicant and subject person are the same person, the application is not in proper form because the PPPR Act requires a successful applicant to be competent and a subject person cannot be.31
[44] The type of argument advanced by Mr Meenken as a “double/split person” has been described by the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench as the Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments (OPCA).32 In Meads v Meads, the Court undertook an exhaustive examination of the arguments and strategies adopted by OPCA litigants, whom were described by the Court as a “category of vexatious litigant”.33
[45] The Alberta Court described the double/split person concept as a duality of a “physical person”, which is distinct from a “corporate entity” or a “legal fiction” created by the State. The Court said:
[417] A strange but common OPCA concept is that an individual can somehow exist in two separate but related states. This confusing concept is expressed in many different ways. The ‘physical person’ is one aspect of the duality, the other is a non-corporeal aspect that has many names, such as a “strawman”, a “corporation”, a “corporate entity”, a “corporate fiction”, a “dead corporation” … an “estate”, a “legal person”, a “legal fiction” … or a “juristic person”.
[46] The Court observed that many OPCA litigants refer to this duality by using lower case for the physical person and upper case for the corporate entity. The duality is used to avoid various legal obligations, with a common underlying theme, that the OPCA litigant is not the person before the Court, or is not subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. If a person therefore wishes to add a legal “‘layer’ to themselves” then adopting a corporation and protesting the Court’s authority or jurisdiction over the person, is the method employed to disclaim any liability or
responsibility.34
31 Minute of Judge Moss, 20 October 2015.
32 Meads v Meads [2012] ABQB 571.
33 At [1].
34 At [445] – [446].
[47] In New Zealand, in the recent case of Martin v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, a remand prisoner sought habeas corpus, because he was not subject to New Zealand’s laws.35 He described himself as the representative of an “infant deceased estate” and filed a copy of his birth certificate along with his application.36 Mr Martin described himself as a “freeman of the land” not subject to any act of Parliament.37 Toogood J dismissed Mr Martin’s application reinforcing that “[i]ncomprehensible statements about birthright and being a natural person not susceptible to the laws of this country are regularly and properly rejected by the Courts”.38
[48] Equally here, such “double/split personality” concepts and arguments cannot prevail. Mr Meenken has made five such unsuccessful applications, with the fifth application not being accepted for filing in the Family Court. The applications were unsuccessful and Mr Meenken’s persistence in continuing to file them and review the dismissals of his arguments, is both an abuse of process and is vexatious. The dual personality concept has no prospect of success. For the reasons set out above, Mr Meenken’s judicial review is dismissed.
A restriction order
[49] Mr Meenken has filed five applications in the Family Court, and two in the High Court, all of which have been unsuccessful. They have been respectively dismissed, discontinued (in one instance) or not accepted for filing.
[50] The Family Court has issued several minutes explaining to Mr Meenken the reason his applications cannot be successful, on competence grounds under the PPPR Act. The High Court declined to overturn the Registrar’s decision to reject Mr Meenken’s fourth Family Court application for filing. Williams J held that Mr Meenken’s application should not be accepted if the following conditions were
met:39
35 Martin v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2016] NZHC 2811, at [1] and [5].
36 At [2] and [4].
37 At [5].
38 At [20].
39 Meenken, above n 10, at [4].
(a) it arises out of the same or substantially the same facts; (b) it is against the same defendant; and
(c) the applicant has not paid any costs in respect of the discontinuation.
[51] Mr Meenken continued in his attempt to file his fifth Family Court application, unsuccessfully appealing from that decision. He then sought leave to appeal from the Family Court, also unsuccessfully, before issuing these proceedings.
[52] Under the Senior Courts Act, a High Court Judge may make an order restricting a person from commencing or continuing a civil proceeding about the same matter, where two or more of the proceedings are, or were, totally without merit.40
[53] Mr Meenken’s applications have engaged the resources of the Family Court, the High Court and more recently, at my direction, the Crown Law Office.
[54] I consider the time has been reached that a limited order restricting Mr Meenken from commencing any further proceedings concerning his “double/split person” concept should be made. The criteria under s 167(1) have been met, namely there are more than two proceedings, that are or were totally without merit.
[55] Mr Meenken will be restricted from commencing or continuing a proceeding, which engages the “double/split person” concept or seeks to transfer Mr Meenken’s “estate” to the Crown for three years.
Result
[56] The Family Court’s application to strike out is granted. Mr Meenken’s
statement of claim and judicial review proceedings are dismissed.
40 Senior Courts Act 2016, ss 166(1) and 167(1).
[57] Under s 166(1) and (2) of the Senior Courts Act, I make a limited order restricting Mr Meenken from commencing or continuing a proceeding, which engages the “double/split person” concept or seeks to transfer Mr Meenken’s “estate” to the Crown. This order will remain in force for three years.
Cull J
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