McLean v Public Trust
[2019] NZHC 819
•15 April 2019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND INVERCARGILL REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WAIHŌPAI ROHE
CIV-2017-425-000120
[2019] NZHC 819
IN THE MATTER of the will of James Alexander McLean BETWEEN
ALLAN DAVID MCLEAN
Plaintiff
AND
PUBLIC TRUST
Defendant
Hearing: On the papers Counsel:
D R Tobin for the Plaintiff
A R Gilchrist for the Defendant
R B Stewart QC and L W Dixon for J M FlausJudgment:
15 April 2019
JUDGMENT OF NATION J
Introduction
[1] In these proceedings, the plaintiff (Allan), who was self represented at the time of the substantive argument, asked the Court to interpret the will of his father (Mr McLean) in a way which he had been advised was untenable. The proceedings were also brought despite a full settlement of the interpretation issue in earlier proceedings. Mr Flaus, as the surviving trustee in the estate of Allan’s mother, Margaret Ruth McLean (Ruth), was a party directed to be served. He and the Public Trust, as trustee of Mr McLean’s estate, through separate counsel, took an active part in the proceedings.
MCLEAN v PUBLIC TRUST [2019] NZHC 819 [15 April 2019]
[2] In my judgment of 12 December 2018, I held the will was to be interpreted in the way that Allan had earlier been advised it would be and in the way contended for by both the Public Trust and Mr Flaus.1 The latter were thus successful.
[3] Allan and the Public Trust have agreed to Allan paying costs to the Public Trust on a 2B basis. Mr Flaus was represented by Mr Stewart QC and Patterson Hopkins. Mr Flaus seeks indemnity costs.
[4] The proceedings appear to have been driven by the way Allan was aggrieved at the way his father, in his will, had been more generous to a son (John) who was to continue farming the family’s Southland farm. Counsel now again acting for Allan is Mr Tobin. In his memorandum as to costs, Mr Tobin says that, by virtue of a specific gift to John, Allan and his sister Lesley were “disproportionately treated” by Mr McLean relative to John as beneficiaries of Mr McLean’s estate. Allan and Lesley were however recognised by Mr McLean in the will. They were entitled to share in the residue of Mr McLean’s estate but subject to a life interest in favour of his widow Ruth. Allan was also appointed as one of three trustees of his father’s will.
[5] Following Mr McLean’s death, John purported to exercise an option that he was given under the will to purchase part of the farm that would otherwise have fallen into the residue of the estate and thus deprived the estate of the potential increase in capital value which Allan, Lesley and John would have been entitled to share in equally as part of the residue.
[6] John died unmarried and without issue before Ruth. On his intestacy, his property passed to Ruth. Ruth has now also died.
Proceedings in breach of settlement
[7] The first ground on which Mr Flaus seeks indemnity costs is that these current proceedings were brought in breach of a settlement reached in earlier proceedings. Those proceedings were brought by Allan and Lesley against Ruth as trustee of Mr McLean’s estate but also in her personal capacity.
1 McLean v Public Trust [2018] NZHC 3268.
[8] In a second amended statement of claim filed in those proceedings, Allan and Lesley alleged that, as a trustee of Mr McLean’s estate, John was in breach of fiduciary duties in the way he had entered into various transactions over the purchase of part of the estate’s farm. They alleged that Ruth and John were in breach of trust in the way they had allowed John to exercise an option given to him in the will. They also alleged that John was in breach of trust in acting in a position of conflict of interest over various transactions. They alleged Ruth and John were in breach of a fiduciary duty in the way they managed assets of the trust without providing for capital growth for the benefit of the residuary beneficiaries. They alleged Ruth, as administrator of John’s estate, was in breach of trust in the way she had dealt with assets in his estate.
[9] Importantly, for present purposes, the first cause of action in the amended statement of claim referred to the gift in clause 5(a) of Mr McLean’s will by which John was to receive, upon Ruth’s death, all farming plant and machinery, 400 ewes and the “home block”. Allan and Lesley sought a declaration as to the meaning of that clause, in particular, a declaration as to whether the gift to John under clause 5(a) failed because John pre-deceased his mother and whether the gift under that clause was conditional on his surviving Ruth.
[10] In a statement of defence to the amended statement of claim, Ruth denied the gift to John under clause 5(a) of the will failed. She said that John’s interest under clause 5(a) of the will vested in him on Mr McLean’s death subject to Ruth’s life interest. She denied that the gift to John under clause 5(a) of the will was conditional on his surviving Ruth.
[11] That issue was raised again in the current proceedings and was before me with the question that was put to me for determination on a direction from Associate Judge Osborne.
[12] Allan and Lesley were represented in the earlier proceedings by a solicitor Mr D P Robinson and counsel Mr Tobin.
[13] On 13 June 2016, on the eve of a hearing, the parties settled the proceedings without any proof or acceptance of the allegations Allan or Lesley had made against Ruth and John as trustees. Allan, Lesley and Ruth signed a memorandum recording:
(a) the parties had agreed to terms in full and final settlement of the issues in the proceeding; and
(b) the orders sought were in full and final settlement of all claims made in the proceedings and/or arising out of the subject matter of the proceeding.
[14] They repeated the terms of that settlement in a further document signed by all three of them and described as a supplementary settlement agreement, also dated 13 June 2016. In that document, it was recorded that the solicitors who had previously acted for the estate would no longer do so.
[15] Consistent with their agreement, draft orders were submitted to the Court and orders were made accordingly on 17 June 2016. The orders provided for Allan and Ruth to both be removed as trustees of Mr McLean’s estate. Various interests in land and stock which had been transferred out of Mr McLean’s estate went back into it. It was agreed that, on her death, Ruth would pay two-thirds of the actual legal costs and disbursements incurred by Allan and John, plus interest at 3.5 per cent (not compounding) from 13 June 2016.
[16] It is clear from the documents produced and on the Court record in the earlier proceedings that Allan agreed that he would not raise in any future proceedings any issue over the interpretation of clause 5(a) of the will.
[17] In his initial memorandum over costs, Mr Tobin says the earlier proceedings “primarily focused on alleged wrong doing by Ruth as trustee”. He then says “a settlement was reached over this alleged wrong doing that inter alia resulted in certain land being returned to Alex’s estate and a new trustee being appointed”.
[18] In a memorandum of reply, Mr Tobin said that, to Allan’s understanding, the settlement agreement of 13 June 2016 did not in fact resolve the question of how clause 5(a) of the will should be interpreted.
[19] I note there is no suggestion in Mr Tobin’s memoranda that, as counsel for Allan in the earlier proceedings, he was under any misunderstanding as to what had been agreed to on the earlier settlement. There was clearly an issue in the earlier proceedings as to how clause 5(a) was to be interpreted.
[20] In considering costs, I find Allan had no reasonable basis to believe that the issue as to the interpretation of clause 5(a) had not been settled in the earlier proceedings.
[21] Whether or not there was a settlement in which Allan had agreed he would not in any future proceedings raise any issue as to the interpretation of clause 5(a) must be relevant in deciding whether, in terms of r 14.6(4)(a), one party has acted “vexatiously, frivolously, improperly, or unnecessarily in commencing [or] continuing […] a proceeding or a step in a proceeding”.
[22] In considering whether a party has improperly commenced a proceeding, inevitably a Court must consider relevant events that occurred before the proceedings commenced.
[23] Mr Tobin submitted the Court of Appeal’s 2006 decision of Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd was established authority that costs should generally reflect how parties have acted in the course of the litigation, not before it.2 In that case, Chambers J did say the trial Judge had been wrong to take into account the appellant’s conduct from 1999 through to February 2001 in awarding indemnity costs. That determination was made in relation to the particular factual background to that case and what had been in issue at trial. There is nothing in his Honour’s judgment to indicate that he was saying the background to the commencement of a proceedings should be irrelevant in determining an issue as to costs. Such an approach would be inconsistent with r 14.6(4)(a).
[24] I consider r 14.6(4)(a) is directed at precisely the sort of conduct which Mr Flaus relies on in seeking indemnity costs here. When the rules expressly permit a Court to consider whether proceedings were vexatiously, improperly or unnecessarily
2 Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd [2006] 3 NZLR 188 (CA).
commenced, it must be appropriate to consider whether they have been commenced in breach of an agreement by which a plaintiff agreed he would bring no such proceedings.
[25] In Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd, Chambers J said the remedy for the sort of past conduct which the costs applicant relied on there was damages.3 In line with that comment, Mr Tobin suggested that the remedy for a party who has successfully resisted proceedings that should never have been brought is to make a claim in contract under the Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017. I reject that submission. To limit the application of r 14.6(4) on that basis would be to deny a deserving party the benefit of an award of costs on a basis which the High Court Rules expressly provide for.
[26] Ultimately, the award of costs is at the discretion of the Court. In exercising that discretion, it is appropriate for a Judge to recognise the value of settlements reached with proper advice and the way in which parties to a settlement benefit from the compromises and concessions which are usually involved in a settlement. That is particularly so in the context of acrimonious family disputes such as arose here. In awarding costs, there is no reason why a Judge should show some indulgence to a self- represented party who has brought proceedings in denial of a settlement which he had earlier entered in to.
Res judicata/strike out
[27] Mr Tobin submitted for Allan that, if the interpretation question had been settled in the earlier proceedings, the defendant or Mr Flaus should have sought to resolve the proceedings through a summary judgment or strike out application on the grounds of res judicata/issue estoppel. He submits that, on either course of action, if successful, the proceedings would have been resolved at “less than one sixth of the costs for which Mr Flaus now seeks reimbursement, and more expeditiously so”.
[28] In his statement of claim of 8 November 2017, Allan sought a declaration that clauses 5(a) and (b) did not vest in interest or possession until the death of Allan’s
3 Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd, above n 2, at [160].
mother. In their statement of defence of 15 March 2018, Mr Flaus, along with John Young, as trustees of Ruth’s estate, then referred to the settlement memorandum filed in the earlier proceedings and the orders that had been made by consent in terms of that memorandum. They pleaded that the matter at issue in the current proceedings had been determined and was res judicata.
[29] On 6 April 2018, Allan filed an affidavit. It referred to complaints as to the way John, Ruth and solicitors acting for Mr McLean’s estate had acted in the administration of the estate, matters which had been the subject of the earlier proceedings and settled. He argued as to why the interpretation of his father’s will which he contended for was correct.
[30] On 23 July 2018, Allan McLean filed a third amended statement of claim. In those pleadings, he disputed there was an issue in the proceedings covered by res judicata. He sought an order that the Public Trust not be able to use the firm of Preston Russell to act in the administration of Ruth’s estate. In a reply of 14 August 2018 to an amended statement of defence, he denied the issue as to the interpretation of clause 5(b) of the will had been settled through the earlier proceedings. He claimed that Mr Flaus was precluded from making a statement of defence as a trustee of Ruth’s estate and, in doing so, alleged Mr Flaus and his firm were “profiting from a conflict of interest situation, breaching legal responsibilities and legal ethics”.
[31] In an affidavit of 16 August 2018, Allan produced, amongst other documents, the opinions he had received as to the interpretation of the will which I refer to later.
[32] With Allan pleading his case that way, it was reasonable for the Public Trust and Mr Flaus to decide that the most efficient and cost effective way of determining what was really at issue in the proceedings was to have the Court determine the question as to interpretation before trial. Consistent with that, Associate Judge Osborne, as he then was, noted in a minute dated 21 August 2018:
The separate question proposed is by its nature a matter which turns on the construction of the testator’s will according to its terms. The proposed separate question of will construction is eminently suitable material for a separate question. There is no suggestion raised other than that the will is to be construed according to its terms. Other matters raised by Mr McLean in
his pleadings are not matters which can inform the correct construction of the gifts under the will. Mr McLean fears that it will produce an injustice if he cannot in the one trial refer to all his pleaded allegations. But there can be no injustice if the will is construed according to its terms. The potential time savings both to trial and at trial are significant. That also means that there would be significant consequential costs savings (both in terms of solicitor/client costs and party/party costs) if the preliminary question determines the outcome of the proceeding as a whole.
Lack of respect for legal advice
[33] Mr Flaus seeks indemnity costs also on the basis Allan McLean commenced these proceedings and continued with them despite legal advice from four lawyers that the interpretation he was arguing for was essentially untenable, that clause 5 of the will would be interpreted to require that the gifts to John in Mr McLean’s will, vested on Mr McLean’s death, and the phrase “upon the death of my said wife”, was not a condition precedent but simply marked out when the gifts fell into possession.
[34]Preston Russell provided an opinion to that effect.
[35] David Robinson, then a partner of Gallaway Cook Allan, who was solicitor for Allan in those earlier proceedings, sent an email dated 5 June 2015, saying:
Est McLean
Allan, I have considered the position of the home block further. I am fortified in my view that it must pass to John’s estate by the New Zealand case Tanner v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd [1992] 1 NZLR 57.
I think it is beyond argument that the home block has to pass to John’s estate.
[36] Mr Patterson, a partner of Patterson Hopkins, provided an opinion to Mr Robinson of 1 June 2016. I accept that Mr Patterson would have been recognised by solicitors such as Mr Robinson as being a lawyer with expertise in the drafting and interpretation of documents such as wills. In a careful and reasoned opinion, he explained why it was that the meaning of clauses 5(a) and (b) were quite clear, why John obtained a vested interest on his father’s death and why, on John’s intestacy, that interest passed to his mother.
[37] Amongst the material Allan provided to the Court were also letters to him and his sister of 26 and 31 July 2017 confirming that the legal opinion within the Public
Trust was that the gift to John vested in him when Mr McLean died and only possession was delayed until Ruth died.
[38] Greg Kelly of Greg Kelly Law provided similar detailed opinions for Allan. They were addressed to Allan and his then solicitor, Michael de Buyzer of Berry & Co. Allan prepared a written argument disagreeing with the advice he had received from Mr Kelly. In a further letter to Mr de Buyzer of 17 August 2017, Mr Kelly said:
We have reviewed the terms of the will dated 1 September 1986, our previous letter of advice dated 16 July 2015 and the arguments put forward by Mr McLean.
Having reviewed all these points, we remain of the opinion that the gift in clause 5(a) of the will vested in the son John McLean as at the death of the will maker James Alexander McLean.
[39]Mr Kelly went on further to explain his reasons for this opinion.
[40] In his submissions for Allan, Mr Tobin does not suggest it was reasonable of Allan to ignore the opinions he had received as to how his father’s will would be interpreted.
[41] Mr Tobin submits only that Allan’s proceeding was initiated in good faith. He submits “rightly or wrongly, the plaintiff assessed that an error of law [as to the interpretation of the will] had been committed by the Public Trust in the context of administration of his father’s will and estate”. He says it would not promote a policy of access to justice were all unrepresented litigants to face a prospect of significant legal costs on an indemnity basis purely for being brave enough to assert their perceived rights within the relevant forum.
[42] Mr Tobin misrepresents the basis on which indemnity costs are being sought. Indemnity costs are being sought because Allan ignored the legal advice he had received in issuing proceedings on an issue of how the will should be interpreted. As a self-represented litigant, Allan demonstrated that he had considerable confidence in his ability to both understand and prepare documents. He was able to access, and presumably afford, legal advice from a number of lawyers. He had the benefit of advice from lawyers who were eminently qualified to give him the advice he sought.
He chose to ignore it and pursued Court proceedings on an issue where he has not been successful. In such circumstances, a party should not be denied costs to which they would otherwise be entitled just because the person who would have to pay those additional costs was unrepresented.
The involvement of Mr Flaus as a party
[43] In his memorandum as to costs, Mr Tobin says Mr Flaus did not need to be involved in the proceedings and to allow Mr Flaus costs through his involvement in the proceedings would be to punish Allan inordinately by “requiring him to carry the substantial expenses of a party that never needed to join the proceeding in the first place”. He also submitted that to allow Mr Flaus costs when costs as between Allan and the Public Trust had been agreed to “would amount to double jeopardy”. There is no merit in those submissions.
[44] Mr Tobin referred to r 18.5(2) High Court Rules which provides that, in claims involving a deceased’s estate, the only defendant that may be named in the statement of claim is the personal representative of the trustee. That is a rule as to form of the intituling, not a rule as to who may be a party in the proceedings. Mr Flaus, as a trustee in Ruth’s estate, was a party the Court directed to be served. The Court directed that the trustees in Ruth’s estate be served so that they could be heard in the proceedings. It was appropriate for the trustees of her estate to take an active part in the proceedings. Through the claims Allan was making in the new proceedings, he was seeking to claw back out of Ruth’s estate assets which it had retained with the settlement of the earlier proceedings.
[45] In the earlier proceedings, Allan had said Ruth was sued in her personal capacity in respect of matters concerning Mr McLean’s estate, and as administrator of John’s estate. She was a party to the settlement agreement.
[46] The trustees of Ruth’s estate argued that the issue which Allan wished to pursue through new proceedings had been settled in the earlier proceedings so res judicata applied. Mr Stewart had appeared as counsel for Ruth in the earlier proceedings.
[47] He and lawyers in the firm of Preston Russell, including Mr Flaus’ co-trustee Mr Young, must have been fully acquainted with the issues that had been dealt with in the earlier proceedings, and all that was involved in settling those proceedings. It was appropriate and proper for the trustees of Ruth’s estate to be heard separately in the proceedings in the interests of all the beneficiaries of her estate. Through that separate representation, Mr Stewart was able to take the lead role in advancing the case for both the Public Trust and Mr Flaus. Through assuming that role, it must also have been easier for the Public Trust, as the administrator in Mr McLean’s estate, to distance itself somewhat from the intense hostility Allan had demonstrated towards his mother and brother over what had happened in the administration of Mr McLean and John’s estates.
[48] In a reply memorandum over costs, Mr Tobin suggested that trustees in Ruth’s estate had acted unreasonably in actively opposing Allan’s claims in the new proceedings because they had not obtained the consent of all beneficiaries in her estate in pursuing that role. There was evidence that they had sought and obtained approval from some of the beneficiaries for what they were doing. They may not have received it from all beneficiaries. They did not have to obtain the approval of all beneficiaries to decide what steps they would take in the proceeding. It was understandable, given the sort of allegations Allan had made about Preston Russell’s conduct in the administration of Mr McLean’s estate, that the trustees from Preston Russell endeavoured to protect themselves against the likelihood of further complaints. They were nevertheless entitled to take an active part in the proceedings if they considered this was necessary for the benefit of all beneficiaries. The decision the trustees made in this regard was reasonable.
Quantum
[49] I have considered first what an appropriate award of costs would be with the proceedings appropriately categorised under r 14.3. In his first case management minute, Associate Judge Osborne categorised the proceedings as category 2. The interpretation issue in the proceedings was neither novel nor difficult. As the Associate Judge later anticipated, determination of the proceedings should have been achievable with an answer on the interpretation issue. Allan’s claim did however raise further
matters. With the defence of res judicata, there was potential for resolution to be more difficult. Resolution of the proceedings and the legal costs incurred by other parties in achieving this was however made more difficult and costly through the way in which Allan pursued the proceedings, the content of various affidavits he filed and his refusal to accept the settlement reached in the earlier proceedings.
[50] Through a memorandum dated 30 January 2019, the Public Trust and Allan, by a solicitor, advised the Court that costs as between them had been agreed in the sum of $22,523 with disbursements at $892.70.
[51] I have considered the way in which time has been allocated for each step in the proceeding on a 2B basis in the schedule accompanying that memorandum. Counsel for Mr Flaus, in their memoranda over costs, have not advised me of what they consider their costs entitlement would have been on a 2B basis. Given the lead role which Mr Stewart took in the proceedings, it may be the time allocation for various steps could have been more for Mr Flaus and his legal representatives. Nevertheless, the schedule agreed to by other parties is an appropriate starting point for the assessment I have to make.
[52] It would be appropriate to award increased costs on the basis Allan contributed unnecessarily to the time and expense of the proceeding through failing, without reasonable justification, to accept a legal argument and by reason of the matters which Mr Flaus has relied on in seeking indemnity costs.4 Were I to award costs on an increased basis, with a 50 per cent increase, Mr Flaus would be entitled to $33,784.50 plus disbursements.
[53] Mr Flaus seeks indemnity costs of $96,600, $23,200 for Mr Flaus’ solicitors Patterson Hopkins, and $63,500 for Mr Stewart QC. Those sums are exclusive of GST and disbursements.
[54] Mr Tobin described the costs incurred by Mr Flaus as “outrageous”. He submitted the involvement of solicitors, senior counsel and junior counsel was unnecessary. He said:
4 High Court Rules, rr 14.6(3)(b)(ii), (iii) and (d).
On the Plaintiff’s submission, the inference to be drawn is that Mr Flaus by his counsel is seeking to mop up unnecessary expenditure by pinning these costs to the Plaintiff for having the temerity to stand up and be counted as a family member.
[55] Mr Flaus has sought indemnity costs, not because Allan had the temerity to stand up as a family member but because he has put his father’s estate and the family members who are to benefit from it to considerable expense through pursuing proceedings unreasonably and in defiance of a settlement which he had reached with his mother over his father’s estate. Had he not brought these proceedings, neither the Public Trust as trustee of his father’s estate, nor his mother’s estate would have had to incur any legal costs in responding to his claims.
[56] I am satisfied that, for the reasons referred to above and relied upon by Mr Flaus, this is a case where it might be appropriate to order indemnity costs. The Court of Appeal has recognised that one situation in which indemnity costs can be ordered is where proceedings have been commenced or continued in wilful disregard of known facts or clearly established law. In instituting the current proceedings, Allan did so in denial of the settlement he had reached and with wilful disregard to what he had been told by a number of lawyers was clearly established law.5
[57] Indemnity costs are determined with reference to actual costs but may be less if the Court considers the actual costs are unreasonably high.6 Costs are reasonably incurred if a reasonable observer would expect those costs to be incurred. They are calculated, not from the costs rules, but from a “reasonable allocation of actual costs”, based on the appropriate time taken, the significance and complexity of the work, and a median hourly rate reasonably applicable.7 It is incorrect in law for the Court to assess reasonableness solely by comparison of costs against the sum at stake – the Court must have regard to the kind of analysis in Bradbury in order to satisfy itself that the costs were reasonably incurred.8
5 Bradbury v Westpac Banking Corp [2009] NZCA 234, [2009] 3 NZLR 400 at [29].
6 McGechan on Procedure (online loose-leaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [HR14.6.03(2)].
7 Bradbury v Westpac Banking Corp [2009] 18 PRNZ 859 (HC) at [204] and [209].
8 Edel Metals Group Ltd v Geier Ltd [2018] NZCA 494 at [62].
[58] I consider it was reasonable for the trustees to instruct Mr Stewart as senior counsel in this case, given his familiarity with the background to the proceedings, the importance of the matter to the trustees and the likely value of the “home block”. It was the estate’s entitlement to either the proceeds or the value from this which was at risk with the interpretation arguments which Allan was determined to pursue.
[59] I have not however been given sufficient information to determine whether fees to the extent that were incurred by Patterson Hopkins and Mr Stewart were reasonably incurred on both a time and hourly rate basis.
[60] For that reason, I do not make an award of costs on the indemnity basis sought. I do order Allan to pay costs on a 2B basis with a 50 per cent increase. He is thus ordered to pay costs to Mr Flaus, as a party served and as trustee for Ruth’s estate, in the total sum of $33,784.50
[61] Allan is also to pay disbursements of $2,924.92 as set out in the accounts of Patterson Hopkins and Mr Stewart. Mr Tobin questions whether certain disbursements were reasonably necessary. I find they are properly recoverable as disbursements. It was appropriate for Mr Stewart to appear with junior counsel. It was also appropriate for him to travel to Christchurch the night before the hearing to ensure that the hearing could be sure to proceed as scheduled.
[62] Mr Flaus is also entitled to costs in respect of the dispute over costs. In fixing those costs, I have regard to the extent to which some of the submissions made for Allan were without merit. Mr Flaus has not been successful in obtaining indemnity costs for the amount sought but he has been successful in obtaining costs when the award of any costs was opposed by Allan. The submissions made in support of an application for indemnity costs have also been relevant and accepted in my awarding costs on an increased basis. Allan must pay costs to Mr Flaus on the costs issue of
$3,345. That has been calculated as the amount payable for preparation of submissions on an interlocutory application on a 2B basis. He is also entitled to the disbursement of $50 for the sealing of the order as to costs.
Costs as between the plaintiff and defendant
[63] Having considered the memorandum on behalf of the plaintiff and the defendant, and by consent, I order the plaintiff to pay costs to the defendant in the sum of $22,523 with disbursements in the sum of $892.70.
Solicitors:
A Gilchrist, Southern Cross Chambers, Auckland R B Stewart QC, Shortland Street, Auckland
Wilkinson Rodgers, Dunedin Patterson Hopkins, Auckland.
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