McDowell v Police

[2013] NZHC 2365

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CRI-2013-404-150 [2013] NZHC 2365

BETWEEN

ROBERT BRIAN McDOWELL

Appellant

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent

Hearing:	10 September 2013
Counsel:	Appellant in person RE Savage for Respondent
Judgment:	11 September 2013

JUDGMENT OF RODNEY HANSEN J

This judgment was delivered by me on 11 September 2013 at 11.00 a.m., pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Date: ………………………….

Solicitors: Meredith Connell, Auckland

McDOWELL v POLICE [2013] NZHC 2365 [11 September 2013]

[1]      After a defended hearing before Justices of the Peace in the Auckland District Court on 30 April 2013, the appellant, who prefers to be known as Robert Brian of the McDowell family, was convicted of failing to wear a seatbelt, contrary to s 40 of the Land Transport Act 1998, and r 7.10 of the Land Transport (Road User) Rule

2004.  He was fined $150 and ordered to pay Court costs of $132.29.  He appeals against the decision.

[2]      There are five grounds of appeal or points of contention as the appellant described them in oral argument:

(a)       The  Justices  of  the  Peace  refused  to  identify  themselves  at  the hearing.

(b)      The Justices of the Peace were not legally qualified.

(c)       The relevant authorities had failed to acknowledge prior to the hearing that the appellant was who he said he was.

(d)The Justices of the Peace did not have jurisdiction over the appellant under the relevant statute.

(e)       The appellant is not subject to the law requiring an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seatbelt.

[3]      In the District Court and at the hearing of the appeal, the appellant did not dispute that he was not wearing a seatbelt when apprehended.  His grounds of appeal are confined to the matters I have set out as elaborated in written materials filed for the purpose of the hearing.

[4]      It is the case that in the District Court the appellant requested that the Justices of the Peace identify themselves and they declined to do so.  He also maintained in his written submissions that the Justices of the Peace should have reaffirmed their oaths of office at the hearing. There was no obligation on the Justices of the Peace to either identify themselves or swear an oath. This ground of appeal must fail.

[5]      It is the case that the Justices of the Peace would not have been legally qualified.  They are not required to be under the Justice of the Peace Act 1957.  This ground of appeal must also fail.

[6]      The third ground of appeal involved a complaint that the relevant authorities, among whom the appellant identified the police and the Ministry of Justice, failed to acknowledge prior to the hearing that – to use his words – “I was who I said I was”. As I understand it, based on the transcript of the District Court hearing and the documents filed by the appellant in support of the appeal, this ground of appeal arises from a belief system to which the appellant adheres which draws a distinction between the physical human being and their legal personality.   An aspect of that belief system involves his identifying himself as Robert Brian of the McDowell family.   It does not, however, raise any arguable ground of complaint.   There is nothing to indicate that the appellant has not been properly identified at each stage of the legal process and that he was the individual who was not wearing a seatbelt.

[7]      The appellant next argued that the empowering statute [s 9A of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 (applicable at the time of the hearing before the Justices of the Peace, but now repealed)], which allows Justices of the Peace to stand in judgment, does not apply to a human being.   I am bound to reject that submission.   The legislation applies to the appellant as it does to all who are subject to the laws of New Zealand.

[8]      The appellant’s final submission was that the law requiring the occupant of a motor  vehicle  to  wear  a  seatbelt  does  not  apply  to  him.    His  argument,  as  I understand it, is that he cannot be subject to a law without his consent.  He submitted that a contract was required before he could be bound.  In the absence of harm he could not be guilty of having broken the law.  This ground of appeal must also fail. The Land Transport Act 1998 and the rules and regulations made under it apply to all road users.  No issue of consent arises.

[9]      For these reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed.