McConnor v Auckland Transport

Case [2025] NZHC 1035


IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2023-404-2805

[2025] NZHC 1035

BETWEEN

JAMES JOHN MCCONNOR

Applicant

AND

AUCKLAND TRANSPORT

First respondent

BAYCORP (NZ) LIMITED

Second respondent

Hearing: On the papers

Appearances:

Applicant in person

PMS McNamara and C J Ryan for first respondent

Date of judgment:

2 May 2025


JUDGMENT OF JAGOSE J


This judgment was delivered by me on 2 May 2025 at 3.30pm.

Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

………………………… Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:

Simpson Grierson, Auckland

Copy to:

Applicant

MCCONNOR v AUCKLAND TRANSPORT [2025] NZHC 1035 [2 May 2025]

[1]                 James McConnor seeks leave to appeal from my 15 August 2024 judgment,1 on Auckland Transport’s interlocutory application, relevantly staying his proceeding until he pays $2,500 as security for costs into court.2 By consent, I am to address the application on the papers.

[2]                 Mr McConnor would argue on appeal I erred in law by both deciding without regard to the merits of his case and emphasising his failure to exhaust appeal rights, rendering my decision arbitrary given his pleading and Auckland Transport’s contended “patent lack of defence”.

Approach to applications for leave to appeal

[3]                 Section 56(3) of the Senior Courts Act 2016 prohibits appeals of orders or decisions on interlocutory applications in civil proceedings without this Court’s leave. The object of requiring such leave is:3

… to limit the cases which may go on appeal in the interests of finality of litigation and the workload of the [appellate] Court, while preserving the integrity of the law and the interests of justice.

[4]                 It is “well settled” the approach to leave is as a “filtering mechanism” for which “[t]he threshold is high”:4

… leave to appeal should only be granted where the significance or implications of an arguable error of fact or law, either for the particular case or for the applicant or as a matter of precedent, warrants the further delay which the appeal process would involve.

The question is if there is something justifying intermediate appeal.

Discussion

[5]                 An incorrect grant of security for costs is not readily susceptible to final appeal. If unmet, there may be no judgment for final appeal. To that extent, intermediate


1      McConnor v Auckland Transport [2024] NZHC 2290.

2      My decision also struck out Mr McConnor’s pleading against the second respondent (Baycorp) and struck out Baycorp as a party: at [35]–[36]. The proposed appeal does not engage Baycorp.

3      Sandle v Stewart [1982] 1 NZLR 708 (CA) at 715.

4      Stockman v Health and Disability Commissioner [2022] NZCA 511 at [13], citing Greendrake v District Court of New Zealand [2020] NZCA 122 at [6] (citing Finewood Upholstery Ltd v Vaughan [2017] NZHC 1679 at [13]).

appeal may be justified. But that can only be so if the exercise of judicial discretion in granting security was in some manner impugnable.

[6]                 Mr McConnor would argue on appeal, on the contended merits of his case, I erred in deciding on balance Auckland Transport’s interests in obtaining security outweighed his interests in pursuing judicial review against it as a constitutional right.

[7]                 I fundamentally disagree. I precisely had  regard  for  the  cases  on  which Mr McConnor now primarily relies.5 Having satisfied myself of Mr McConnor’s likely inability to pay costs,6 I assessed his claim had little chance of success by reason of its prospectively abusive nature.7 His resort to alternative and unorthodox challenge to the procedures leading to imposition of a fine caused me to conclude the balance fell in Auckland Transport’s favour,8 maintaining his right to pursue judicial review subject to security. The exercise of my discretion exactly was informed by applicable principle. No other error is asserted. Intermediate appeal remains unjustified.

[8]                 If I am wrong in that assessment, leave is available directly from the Court of Appeal.9

Result

[9]The application for leave to appeal my decision is dismissed.

—Jagose J


5      McConnor v Auckland Transport, above n 1, at [6] and [8].

6 At [18].

7 At [20].

8 At [20].

9      Senior Courts Act, s 56(5).

Details
AGLC
McConnor v Auckland Transport [2025] NZHC 1035
Case
[2025] NZHC 1035
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

James John McConnor has applied for leave to appeal a decision by Jagose J, issued on 15 August 2024, in which the court stayed McConnor’s proceeding against Auckland Transport until he paid $2,500 as security for costs. The application is heard on the papers. McConnor argues the judge erred by deciding without regard to the merits of his case and by emphasising his failure to exhaust appeal rights, rendering the decision arbitrary. Auckland Transport contends the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed. The central issue before the court is whether the grant of security for costs was erroneous and whether the judge exercised his discretion appropriately.

The court applies the principles governing leave to appeal, noting that such leave is restricted and the threshold for granting it is high. The court must consider whether the error of fact or law in question warrants an appeal, either due to its significance for the applicant, the case, or as a matter of precedent. The court emphasises that the grant of security for costs, if incorrect, is not readily susceptible to final appeal. However, intermediate appeal may be justified if the exercise of judicial discretion was impugnable. The court finds that the judge had regard to relevant authorities, assessed the likely inability of McConnor to pay costs, and considered the prospectively abusive nature of the claim. The judge concluded that the balance of interests favoured Auckland Transport, maintaining McConnor’s right to pursue judicial review subject to security. The exercise of discretion was informed by applicable principles, and no other error is asserted.

The court finds that intermediate appeal is unjustified as the exercise of judicial discretion was appropriately informed by relevant principles and authorities. The court dismisses the application for leave to appeal the decision, noting that if the court is mistaken in its assessment, leave is available directly from the Court of Appeal.

The application for leave to appeal the decision of 15 August 2024 is dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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