McArthur Ridge Trustee Limited v FM Custodians Limited

Case

[2015] NZHC 496

17 March 2015

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND DUNEDIN REGISTRY

CIV-2014-412-000116 [2015] NZHC 496

IN THE MATTER of the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908

BETWEEN

MCARTHUR RIDGE TRUSTEE LIMITED

Plaintiff

AND

FM CUSTODIANS LIMITED First Defendant

DOMINION FINANCE GROUP LIMITED (In Receivership and In Liquidation)

Second Defendant

Hearing: 13 March 2015

Appearances:

F B Barton and A M Cunninghame for Plaintiff (Respondent) J E Bayley for First Defendant (Applicant)

Judgment:

17 March 2015

JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE MATTHEWS

[1]      FM  Custodians  Limited  (FMC)  applies  for  an  order  consolidating  this proceeding with proceeding CIV-2010-409-1100.  I refer to the present proceeding as  the  declaratory  proceeding,  and  to  the  1100  proceeding  as  the  Alemann proceeding.

[2]      The Alemann proceeding was commenced in 2010.  Alemann Estate Limited is the first-named of 14 plaintiffs.  Each owns a block of land in the McArthur Ridge development near Alexandra.  All were bought from Central Otago Pinot Noir Estate Limited (COPNEL).   All have plantings of grapevines which are operated as one

large vineyard.

MCARTHUR RIDGE TRUSTEE LTD v FM CUSTODIANS LTD [2015] NZHC 496 [17 March 2015]

[3]      As a result all the separately owned parts of the vineyard are dependent upon having access to a communal water supply, and other services essential to the operation  of  a  vineyard.    There  are  three  nearby lots,  adjacent  to  some  of  the plaintiff’s blocks, on which there are reservoirs.  From those water sources there are pipes to the separate allotments.   The contractual obligation of COPNEL to each purchaser was to hold the lots on which the reservoirs and other infrastructure items are located on trust, and then convey those allotments to the owners of the individual lots, unencumbered, at a later point.  This has not occurred, and this proceeding has resulted.  There are issues over whether this obligation subsists.

[4]      Events which have occurred in the period ranging between seven and 12 years since the sale and purchase agreements were signed have added layers of complexity to the situation facing Alemann and the other plaintiffs.   Various endeavours to work through these difficulties and conclude an acceptable outcome have not, so far, met with complete success.

[5]      Last year McArthur Ridge Trustee Limited (MRT) brought the declaratory proceeding.   MRT is a company formed by all the plaintiffs in the Alemann proceeding together with COPNEL, as to the balance of land it holds, and another company which purchased a sizeable holding with a view to undertaking a further development.

[6]      In the declaratory proceeding MRT seeks three declarations:

(a)     A  declaration  that  all  the  provisions  of  the  Deed  of  Covenant  in Schedule 1 to Encumbrance 5836440.5 form part of the terms and conditions of Encumbrance 5836440.5 for the purposes of section 62 of the Land Transfer Act 1952;

(b)     A declaration that the water reservoirs on Lot 50 DP 344847, Lot 61

DP 325098 and Lot 101 DP 333976, (Otago Registry), together with all related headworks, pipeworks, generators, pumps, screens, filters, meters and associated plant and equipment located on any Lot against the title to which Encumbrance 5836440.5 is registered, form part of the easement facility for the purposes of the provisions of the Land Transfer  Regulations  2002  incorporated  by  reference  into Encumbrance 5836440.5;

(c)     A declaration that the obligations under the Deed of Covenant of “the Owner” as defined in the Deed are enforceable by “the Manager” as defined in the Deed against any registered proprietor for the time

being of any Lot against the title to which Encumbrance 5836440.5 is registered, including any such person who becomes a registered proprietor through the exercise of the mortgagee’s power of sale of any such Lot, and against any mortgagee in possession of any such Lot or any other person.

[7]      FMT applies to consolidate this proceeding with the Alemann proceeding. FMT has a first mortgage over Lot 50, and a second mortgage over Lot 101.  The principal infrastructure assets, apart from piping under the ground, are on Lots 50 and 61, and those parts of Lot 101 as are intended to eventually be held in proposed Lots 13 and 14 when Lot 101 is subdivided.   The finer details of this are of no present moment.  I refer to these properties as the infrastructure lots.

[8]      Rule 10.12 of the High Court Rules provides:

Application of rule 10.12

Rule 10.12 applies even though –

(a)     the relief claimed in the proceedings is not the same; or

(b)     1 or more of the proceedings –

(i)     is  pending  in  the  court  in  the  exercise  of  its  admiralty jurisdiction; or

(ii)     is brought under the provisions of an Act conferring special jurisdiction on the court.

[9]      The discretion to make an order is broad, and a range of possible orders is open to the Court.   For example, it may consolidate the two proceedings on such terms as it thinks just, order them to be tried at the same time but without consolidation, order them to be tried consecutively but without consolidation, and order one of the proceedings to be stayed until after the determination of the other.1

[10]     The easements in favour of the plaintiffs in the Alemann proceeding, and the parties whose relevant interests are held by MRT, were created by deed of covenant. The deed of covenant is attached to a memorandum of encumbrance, and the latter document is registered on the relevant titles.  The parties to the deed of covenant are

the original owner of all the land, COPNEL and a company then named Central

1      Regan v Gill CA438/2011, 2 December 2011 at [9] and [10] per Chambers J.

Otago   Pinot   Noir   Management   Limited   but   now   named   McArthur   Ridge

Management Limited (MRM).

[11]     The first declaration sought is that all the provisions of the deed of covenant attached to the encumbrance form part of the terms and conditions of the encumbrance for the purposes of s 62 of the Land Transfer Act 1952.

[12]     Debate on whether this is the case or not is centred on the sole operative clause of the memorandum of encumbrance:

NOW THIS MEMORANDUM WITNESSES that the Owner encumbers the Property with the annual rent charge and on the terms and conditions described in Schedule 2 to better secure to the Manager performance by the Owner of the Owner’s duties and obligations under the Deed.

[13]     Schedule 2 contains “Terms and Conditions of Encumbrance”, six in number. Schedule 1 contains the deed of covenant.  There is no reference to Schedule 1 in the operative clause of the encumbrance.

[14]     In the fifth cause of action on the Alemann proceeding (1100) this aspect of the encumbrance is called into question.  The Alemann plaintiffs seek an order that the encumbrance be rectified to make it clear that the properties are encumbered with the annual rent charge on the terms and conditions described in both Schedules 1 and

2 of the deed of covenant.

[15]     Broadly speaking, the difference between the first declaration sought in the declaratory proceeding, and the relief sought in the fifth cause of action in the Alemann proceeding, is that in the former proceeding the declaration relates to the interpretation of the encumbrance, but in the latter rectification is sought.

[16]     Mr Bayley says that there are common issues between both proceedings in this respect.  Plainly he is right.  However, Mr Barton says that the complexities of the proceeding are such that an early answer on the meaning and ambit of the encumbrance will assist in resolving other issues raised in the Alemann proceeding.

[17]     If this were the only declaration sought I would not order consolidation, because although similar issues are raised, in this respect, in both proceedings, and there are other factors which favour consolidation, I consider that the interpretation of the encumbrance is a point of considerable importance to the case as a whole which should be decided as soon as practicable.   The issue is discrete and readily capable of determination on a declaration proceeding.  The proceeding has a one day fixture shortly.

[18]     I am also mindful that it may be open to argument that construction of the document, or rectification of it, can be dealt with as one issue.

[19]     I will return to the first declaration later in this judgment.

[20]     The second declaration raises questions over whether the reservoirs and other stipulated   infrastructure   and   equipment   form   part   of   the   easement   facility. Mr Bayley has two arguments.

[21]     First, clause 7(e) of the deed of covenant provides that a proportional share of the infrastructure lots will be transferred by MRM to each purchaser of a lot containing plantable areas, which are those parts of the properties which are suitable for the growing of premium pinot noir grapes.

[22]     However, COPNEL and MRM also entered a management agreement.  One issue requiring determination in the Alemann proceeding is whether the management agreement was cancelled in September 2009, or for other reasons has ended.  The counterclaim  brought  in  the  Alemann  proceeding  specifically  pleads  that  the plaintiffs have purported to cancel the contract, but without any lawful basis.

[23]     Mr Bayley says that before the issue sought to be determined by the second declaration can be decided, it is necessary first to establish whether the management contract has come to an end.  If it has, so too have the obligations in clause 7 of the deed of covenant, because clause 10 provides that the obligations in clauses 6 and 7 expire  on  the  expiration  or  earlier  termination  of  the  management  agreement.

Mr Bayley  says  that  determining  whether  the  items  described  in  the  second declaration form part of the easement facility is premature until that is decided.

[24]     Secondly, in each agreement for sale and purchase of the small allotments there is a clause to the effect that the property will receive the benefit of easements to store and  take water over each  of the infrastructure lots,  such  easements  to  be registered on completion of the last stage of the subdivision and transfer of the infrastructure lots to the owners as I have set out.  Mr Bayley argues that the fact that these obligations are in the agreements for sale and purchase, in various formats, shows that there was no intention that the deed of covenant would provide easement rights, and this is an issue that needs to be determined at trial of the Alemann proceeding.     It  cannot  be  decided  within  the  parameters  of  the  declaration proceeding.

[25]     Mr Barton’s position is that this, and the third declaration to which I will refer shortly, do not require consideration of wider issues.  I respectfully disagree.  In my opinion the issues which MRT seeks to have determined by the granting of the second  declaration  are  integrally  involved  factually  with  issues  arising  in  the Alemann proceeding, will require the consideration of the evidence that will be led in that proceeding, and must be determined at the same time.

[26]     The third declaration raises a question over who may enforce the deed of covenant.  MRM assigned its interest to MRT in February 2013.  However, it is an issue for determination in the Alemann proceeding whether the management contract was cancelled in September 2009, as I have said, resulting in the assignment having no effect.   That is a factual issue requiring determination before the Court can properly reach a conclusion on the third declaration sought.

[27]     In my opinion it follows that the issues arising in relation to the second and third  declarations  sought  are  such  that  consolidation  should  be  ordered.    This position differs from the conclusion I have reached in relation to the first cause of action.

[28]     There are other factors favouring consolidation, including commonality of parties, the same counsel acting for the plaintiffs and for some of the defendants in both proceedings, and the fact that there is potential for waste of resources of both counsel  and  the  Court  if  two  hearings  were  to  take  place.    However,  counsel indicated that if I concluded that the issues raised in relation to the second and third declarations require the proceedings to be consolidated, but that the issues relating to the first do not, an alternative course would be to stay the declaratory proceeding save only for the claim for the first declaration, with the claims for the second and third declarations being raised by amended pleadings in the Alemann proceeding.

[29]     For the reasons given I have reached this conclusion.   As a consequence I

make the following orders:

(1)     The application for consolidation is dismissed.

(2)The applications for the second and third declarations in the declaratory proceeding are stayed.

(3)     The time for filing of substantive affidavits in opposition to the MRT

proceeding is extended to 23 March.

(4)    Costs are reserved.  Each party has succeeded in part.  My inclination is that costs should lie where they fall.   If either counsel disagrees application  may  be  made  for  costs  by  memorandum  within  five working days and in that event a memorandum in response should be filed and served within a further five working days.  Memoranda must not exceed three pages.

[30]     If counsel are able to resolve, by agreement, the remaining issue on the MRT

proceeding they should advise the Registry immediately.

[31]     The Registry is asked to arrange a telephone case management conference in approximately two months with a view to the Court making orders to close the

pleadings and to take the Alemann proceeding through to trial.

J G Matthews

Associate Judge

Solicitors:

Anderson Lloyd, Dunedin. Rhodes & Co, Christchurch.

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