Matia v Ministry of Social Development
[2015] NZHC 16
•21 January 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CRI-2014-404-000327 [2015] NZHC 16
BETWEEN KORORIA MATIA
Applicant
AND
MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT Respondent
Hearing: 21 January 2015 Counsel:
N W Woods and S G Rhind for the Applicant
R J Y See and J N Burns for the RespondentJudgment:
21 January 2015
JUDGMENT OF VENNING J
This judgment was delivered by Justice Venning on 21 January 2015 at 4.00 pm, pursuant to
r 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date:
Solicitors: Rice Craig, Auckland
Meredith Connell, Auckland
Copy To: Ministry of Social Development, Auckland
MATIA v MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT [2015] NZHC 16 [21 January 2015]
[1] On 6 November 2014, this Court dismissed an appeal by Ms Matia against conviction on:
(a) One charge of obtaining by deception (s 240 of the Crimes Act 1961);
(b)Four charges of fraudulently using a document to obtain a pecuniary advantage (s 229A of the Crimes Act); and
(c) Seven charges of dishonestly and without colour of right, using a document to obtain a pecuniary advantage (s 22(b) of the Crimes Act).1
The period of offending was between 8 February 2000 and August 2012. Ms Matia had claimed that during that period, she was not married or living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage in order to obtain a domestic purposes benefit and other supplementary benefits to which she would not have been entitled if she had declared her relationship with her partner, Mr Monty Poa.
[2] Following her conviction in the District Court, Judge C J Field had sentenced
Ms Matia to imprisonment for two years, nine months.2
[3] Ms Matia now seeks leave of this Court to appeal further to the Court of
Appeal against conviction.
[4] Ms Matia was charged in the District Court in December 2012. The application for leave to appeal is brought under s 144 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957.3 The application for leave to appeal is out of time. It should have been
filed by 27 November 2014. It was not filed until 4 December 2014.
1 Matia v Min of Social Development [2014] NZHC 2759.
2 Ministry of Social Development v Matia CRI 2012-055-3109, 26 September 2014.
3 Reference to s 397 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011.
[5] Mr Woods accepts the application is out of time but has explained the reason for it. Ms Matia had given instructions to seek leave to appeal on 17 November
2014, but counsel was ill between 24 to 26 November 2014 and was not able to see
Ms Matia until 3 December 2014.
[6] If leave is granted, the proposed grounds of appeal are:
(a) The District Court failed to consider the prejudice in ruling that certain evidence was admissible at the hearing;
(b)The District Court Judge erred in ruling that certain evidence was admissible at the hearing;
(c) The District Court Judge did not explain his reasoning for conviction in respect of each charge;
(d)The District Court decision is generally unsafe, as it is reliant entirely on hearsay evidence;
(e) The appellant was prejudiced in the decision in respect of whether to give evidence or not, due to the failure of the District Court Judge to clearly identify his view as to the admissibility and weight to be afforded hearsay evidence;
(f) The District Court Judge failed to demonstrate the prejudice versus probative value balancing test under s 8 of the Evidence Act 1990;
(g) The High Court Judge (erroneously) upheld the decision of the
District Court for the same reasons outlined in (a) to (f) above; and
(h)Further, the High Court erroneously relied on further evidence, contained in the pre-sentence report, without providing the appellant with an opportunity to reply.
[7] The applicant also seeks to adduce further evidence on the appeal to explain the admission recorded in the pre-sentence report and referred to by this Court in its decision.
[8] In his summary of submissions in support of the application, Mr Woods clarified that he relied on two main points. First, he submitted the application identified a concern as to the scope of the admissibility of hearsay evidence pursuant to ss 8, 16 and 18 of the Evidence Act 2006. Second, the applicant wishes to raise whether it was incumbent on the District Court Judge to demonstrate his reasoning in relation to the evidence in support of each individual charge. He submitted both were of public or general importance.
[9] In R v Slater,4 the Court of Appeal confirmed the elements necessary before leave to appeal can be granted:
(i) A question of law;
(ii)The question must be one which by reason of its general and public importance or any other reason ought to be submitted to the Court of Appeal; and
(iii)The Court must be of the opinion that it ought to be so submitted.5
[10] Relevantly for present purposes, the Court of Appeal also observed at 215:
Section 144 was not intended to provide a second tier of appeals from decisions of the District Court in proceedings under the Summary Proceedings Act. Parliament intended such proceedings to be brought to finality with the defendant having an appeal to the High Court other than when the conditions that are specified in subsections 2 and 3 are met and leave to appeal is granted. Neither the determination of what comprises a question of law nor the question whether that point of law raises a question of general or public importance, are to be diluted.
4 R v Slater [1997] 1 NZLR 211.
5 [1997] 1 NZLR 211 (CA).
[11] After some discussion, Mr Woods conceded that he did not rely on any point arising from the admission Ms Matia made in the pre-sentence report referred to in this Court’s decision. He was right to make that concession. The admission and her application to adduce further evidence can be put to one side. In the decision delivered on 6 November 2014, at [33] the Court recorded “for the above reasons the appeal must be dismissed”.
[12] The Court then went on to discuss a further feature of the appeal, noting that:
[34] … Even if the appeal had succeeded on the technical ground raised it would have been remitted for a retrial given the further evidence now available to the Ministry.
[13] The Court then went on to record that in the course of the pre-sentence report, Ms Matia had made certain concessions relating to her relationship with Mr Poa, before concluding:
[36] On any retrial that further evidence of the appellant’s admissions
could be led. It is inevitable that a further finding of guilt would follow.
[14] It is apparent from the decision that the discussion of the admissions in the pre-sentence report was entirely obiter. It was unnecessary for the Court to rely on those admissions to dispose of the appeal. The reference to the admissions in the pre-sentence report were at most an attempt by the Court to have Ms Matia realise the futile nature of the appeal. No issue of further evidence nor any point on appeal can arise out of it.
[15] Returning to the other grounds, I accept the Crown’s submission that the applicant seeks to pursue the same grounds of appeal that she raised before this Court on the appeal from the District Court. She is attempting to pursue a second- tier appeal, but the point is not seriously arguable. The issues of illegitimate prejudice to Ms Matia by the admissibility of the hearsay statements, and the suggestions of ill-will and unreliability of the witnesses’ evidence were raised in the course of the voir dire in the District Court.
[16] The point is not of such general public importance so as to warrant any such second appeal. It does not warrant the attention of the Court of Appeal. The law relating to the admission of hearsay evidence is provided by the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act. The application of the hearsay provisions and of s 8 of the Evidence Act is a matter for determination on the facts in each particular case as is evidenced from the discussion of the authorities in the substantive decision on the
appeal.6 The outcome in this case was fact dependent.
[17] As to the second point, the law is settled. The Court has an obligation to give reasons. The issue Mr Woods seeks to raise was dealt with by this Court at [31] to [33] of the decision as follows:
[31] Mr Woods next generally criticised the Judge as not identifying each of the individual charges and discussing the evidence relating to each one. However, the Judge did consider the charges separately:
[5] I remind myself of the burden and standard of proof applicable in all criminal trials. The informant is required to satisfy me beyond reasonable doubt that all of the elements of a particular charge have been made out. It is also important that I consider each information separately and not adopt a global approach, although it is the informant’s position that at all material times the defendant was in a relationship in the nature of a marriage with Mr Poa. Each information, of course, refers to the date upon which the defendant declared her relationship status.
[32] Later the Judge concluded the evidence disclosed that Mr Poa and the appellant did indeed have a relationship in the nature of marriage at least from February 2000 to August 2012, the period covered by the informations. He confirmed he was satisfied that on each occasion she signed the Income Support Review forms or the Work and Income Review forms she was in a relationship in the nature of marriage and was fully aware of this. He then went on to identify the four categories of offending, finding in each case in relation to each one of the offences the offending was made out before concluding:
[38] I have not listed each information under its relevant CRN number but for the purpose of this decision, I record that I have, in fact, considered each individual document and the evidence relating to it.
[33] For the above reasons the appeal must be dismissed.
[18] Again no seriously arguable question of law arises.
6 Clasen v Police HC Auckland CRI 2011-404-108, 7 July 2007; Bishop v Police HC Gisborne
CRI 2008-416-3, 28 February 2008; Kaye v R [2014] NZCA 393.
Result
[19] While leave is granted to bring the application for leave to appeal out of time, the substantive application for leave to appeal is itself dismissed.
Venning J