IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND TIMARU REGISTRY
CIV 2014-476-69 [2014] NZHC 2449
BETWEEN GABRIELLE PAULETTE MATHIESEN
First Applicant
GORDON WALLACE CAMERON MCNAB and GABRIELLE PAULETTE MATHIESEN, being the Trustees of the Sweet Pea Family Trust
Second Applicants
AND
JAN HENRIK MATHIESEN Respondent
Hearing: On the papers Judgment:
6 October 2014
JUDGMENT OF MACKENZIE J
I direct that the delivery time of this judgment is
4.15 pm on the 6th day of October 2014.
Copies to: G P Mathiesen, First Applicant
G W C McNab, Second Applicant
J H Mathiesen, Respondent
MATHIESEN v MATHIESEN [2014] NZHC 2449 [6 October 2014]
[1] At the hearing of the purported contempt proceedings on 15 September 2014, Mr McNab made reference to an application for habeas corpus. The relevance of that was unclear to me, and the topic was not pursued. Subsequent to the hearing, the plaintiffs filed, on 25 September, a document headed “Application for habeas corpus”. The essence of the application is said to be:
… to determine, whether or not being adjudicated bankrupt under the provisions of Insolvency Act 2006 and its companion-piece the Insolvency (Cross-border) Act 2006 has become a “detention” for the purposes of the law in respect of Habeas Corpus, in the context of the Imperial Laws Application Act 1988 following on the Constitution Act 1986.
[2] This application was referred to me. On 3 October 2014, Mr McNab sent an email to the Registrar, which has also been referred to me. In it he says:
… we have no objection for our application being initially considered on the papers, but, it cannot be disposed of without hearing, by reason of its complexity from both a technical and an evidential perspective …
[3] Section 9(3) of the Habeas Corpus Act 2001 (the Act) requires that the Registrar must allocate a date for hearing of applications under that Act within three working days.
[4] I direct that the Registrar is not to allocate a hearing date. While the application is entitled a habeas corpus application, it does not fall within the scope of the Act. Section 6 of the Act provides the statutory basis for such an application. It must be “an application to challenge the legality of a person’s detention”.
[5] Mrs Mathiesen, to whom the application relates, is not under any form of detention. The proposition sought to be advanced is that the restrictions which are imposed by an adjudication in bankruptcy constitutes a detention. That is not a tenable or arguable proposition. There is no basis upon which I could properly direct that a hearing be held to consider that submission.
[6] A purported application for habeas corpus, based on similar grounds, was dealt with on the papers by Whata J on 22 November 2013.1 In that minute he said:
1 An application for Habeas Corpus by G W C McNab and A S Bird HC Timaru CIV-2013-476-
310, 22 November 2013.
[5] I have endeavoured the best I can to understand the basis for the application for writs of habeas corpus. The allegations are framed in such a way as to be largely difficult to comprehend but in short seem to be claiming that the bankruptcies were not valid and that the consequences of those bankruptcies for them are restraints on their liberty from which they should be freed.
[6] Whatever the validity of the claims made, a writ of habeas corpus must relate to a “detention”. I do not consider that the bankruptcy amounts to the type of “detention” contemplated either at common law or for the purposes of the Habeas Corpus Act 2001. Furthermore, I consider the application to be spurious and fundamentally defective. It is simply a collateral challenge to the adjudications of bankruptcy, and an abuse of process.
[7] On that basis, while I have considered the documents, they are not to be accepted by the Registry.
[7] A further application for habeas corpus was made, again based on Mrs Mathiesen’s status as an undischarged bankrupt. It was also dealt with, also on the papers by Mander J in a minute dated 28 February 2014.2 He refused the
application. He said:3
An application for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus is not the appropriate procedure to consider the legitimacy of the bankruptcy adjudication.
[8] The proposition asserted by this application and the earlier applications, namely that the making of an order for adjudication amounts to a detention, is not arguable. The applicants have been clearly told that on two occasions, and I say it again. This application is not an application to which the Act applies, and the Act has no application to it.
[9] The application is dismissed.
[10] Under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, I direct that no further papers purporting to be an application by or on behalf of Mrs Mathiesen for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting her status as an undischarged bankrupt as a detention, in whatever form that assertion may be made, are to be accepted for filing.
“A D MacKenzie J”
2 McNab v Matthews HC Timaru CIV-2014-476-11, 28 February 2014.
3 At [2].
- AGLC
- Mathiesen v Mathiesen [2014] NZHC 2449
- Case
- [2014] NZHC 2449
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether an adjudication of bankruptcy, which imposes certain restrictions on the bankrupt, could be considered a form of detention under the Habeas Corpus Act 2001. The key issue was whether the legal framework of bankruptcy could be equated with the concept of detention as contemplated by habeas corpus law. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the application, despite its title, was an appropriate use of the habeas corpus process or if it was being employed as a means to challenge the validity of the bankruptcy adjudication indirectly.
The court found that the application did not fall within the scope of the Habeas Corpus Act 2001. Section 6 of the Act requires that habeas corpus applications must challenge the legality of a person's detention. Since Mrs Mathiesen was not under any form of detention, the court held that the proposition that bankruptcy constitutes detention was not tenable or arguable. The court also noted previous instances where similar habeas corpus applications, based on the status of being an undischarged bankrupt, were dismissed as spurious and abusive of process. Therefore, the court dismissed the application and directed that no further papers purporting to be an application for a writ of habeas corpus on the same grounds would be accepted for filing.
The final orders of the court were to dismiss the application for a writ of habeas corpus and to direct that no further papers asserting Mrs Mathiesen's status as an undischarged bankrupt as a form of detention would be accepted for filing. This ruling reinforces the understanding that bankruptcy, while restrictive, does not equate to detention in the legal sense required for a habeas corpus application.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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