Mata v The King

[2025] NZHC 3197

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CRI-2025-404-377

[2025] NZHC 3197

BETWEEN

RIO PATRICK MATA

Appellant

AND

THE KING

Respondent

Hearing:

20 October 2025

Appearances:

L Smith for the Appellant

N Narayanan for the Respondent

Judgment:

24 October 2025

JUDGMENT OF ANDREW J

This judgment was delivered by me on 24 October 2025 at 3 pm

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:

MATA v R [2025] NZHC 3197 [24 October 2025]

Introduction

[1]This is an appeal against sentence.

[2]        Rio Mata was sentenced in the Auckland District Court on 4 July 2025 to two years and two months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to the following charges:

(a)unlawfully getting into motor vehicle;1

(b)burglary;2

(c)theft;3

(d)receiving (under $500);4

(e)receiving (over $1,000);5

(f)unlicensed driver failing to comply with prohibition;6 and

(g)possession of utensils used for the consumption of methamphetamine.7

[3]        Mr Mata is a recidivist offender with a significant criminal history. The current offending took place while he was on bail for other charges.

[4]        Mr Mata appeals on the sole ground that no discount was allowed for his willingness to participate in restorative justice and his application for restorative justice was not advanced. He submits that there was a breach of the mandatory terms of s 24A of the Sentencing Act 2002 (adjournment for restorative justice). This, he says, is significant as a discount for restorative justice may have reduced his sentence

1      Crimes Act 1961, s 226(2). Maximum penalty two years’ imprisonment.

2      Section 231(1)(a). Maximum penalty 10 years’ imprisonment.

3      Sections 219 and 223(c). Maximum penalty one year’s imprisonment

4      Sections 246 and 247(c). Maximum penalty three months’ imprisonment.

5      Sections 246 and 247(1). Maximum penalty seven years’ imprisonment.

6      Land Transport Act 1998, s 52(1)(c). Maximum penalty $10,000 fine.

7      Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, s 13(1)(a) and (3). Maximum penalty one year’s imprisonment.

to 24 months or less, meaning he would have been eligible for automatic release instead of having to go before the Parole Board.

[5]        The Crown opposes the appeal on the basis that restorative justice was directed at arraignment and, even if the restorative justice referral had been properly processed, it is speculative to suggest that a conference would have taken place. Further, the Crown submits a discount sufficient to reduce the sentence to 24 months would have been generous in the circumstances and, in any event, the overall sentence was not manifestly excessive.

The offending

[6]I address Mr Mata’s offending briefly.

[7]        Between 18 and 19 January 2024, Mr Mata stole a Honda Accord in Onehunga. He was arrested on 20 January 2024 and told Police he had “purchased” the vehicle two days before for half an ounce of marijuana.

[8]        On the evening of 25 May 2024, Mr  Mata  entered  an  address  on  Crummer Road through a bedroom window. He did not have permission to be there. He made his way through the house and stole jewellery, car keys, a laptop, and a Westpac bank card. The items stolen were valued at over $5,000.

[9]        On the afternoon of 14 July 2024, Mr Mata stole clothing from Rebel Sport valued at a total of $844.91.

[10]      On 26 September 2024, Mr Mata burgled a property in Three Kings, Auckland and stole items worth a total of $7,200. The same day, Mr Mata took a parcel valued at $116 from outside a property on the same street in Three Kings.

[11]      On 17 November 2022, Mr Mata was driving without a licence (it expired in July 2022) and was stopped by Police. He was forbidden from driving until he obtained an appropriate  licence.  In September  2024, Police were informed that   Mr Mata had been involved in a road rage incident (allegedly involving firearms) while he was driving. Police arrested him at the Avondale Motor Inn and carried out

a warrantless search of the vehicle he had been driving. They located the items stolen on 26 September 2024. They also located two glass pipes used for the consumption of methamphetamine.

Procedural background

[12]      Mr Mata was arraigned on the charges set out above at [2] on 8 May 2025. Judge Sellars KC set down sentencing for 4 July 2025 and directed a restorative justice referral. Both Crown and defence completed the referral form and it was provided to the Registry on 12 May 2025. The referral was sent to the restorative justice provider, but due to an “administrative error”, the referral was not processed.

[13]      Mr Mata was sentenced by Judge Ryan on 4 July 2025 and his sentence was constructed as follows:

(a)global starting point of two years and six months’ imprisonment;

(b)uplift of six months’ imprisonment for previous, similar offending;

(c)20 per cent (six month) discount for guilty pleas;

(d)five per cent (two month) discount for cultural report; and

(e)five per cent (two month) discount for rehabilitation in prison.

[14]The end sentence was 26 months’ imprisonment.

[15]In relation to restorative justice, Judge Ryan stated:

[19] A restorative justice conference was directed. There is no restorative justice report on the file. Mr Mata is for sentence today so therefore a restorative justice conference is not able to take place prior to sentencing. No restorative justice form is on the file. It is not clear whether the parties completed one.

Legal principles on appeal

[16]      Section 250 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 sets out how a court is to determine a sentence appeal. An appeal must be allowed if the Court is satisfied that there is an error in the sentence imposed, for any reason, and that a different sentence should be imposed.8

[17]      The Court of Appeal in Palmer v R outlined the position with respect to sentence appeals, stating that:9

… the standard of appellate review in sentence appeals … requires that the appellant show a material error was made and satisfy the appellate court that a different sentence ought to be imposed. Sentencing is not a science and an appellate court will not ordinarily interfere unless the end sentence was outside the range available to the sentencing judge. For that reason it is not an error to describe sentencing decisions as discretionary, so long as it is clear that “discretion” means only that the sentencer enjoys an appropriate margin of appreciation.

[18]      In Tutakangahau v R, the Court of Appeal said that the concept of “manifestly excessive” continues to apply to appeals against sentence.10 The Court held that the appellate court’s focus is on the sentence imposed rather than the process by which it was reached.11 A judge on appeal should not intervene where the sentence imposed was within the range that could properly be justified by accepted sentencing principles.12

Analysis and submissions

[19]      I reject the principal submission of Mrs Smith for Mr Mata that Judge Ryan made a material error of law in declining to further adjourn the proceedings for the processing of the restorative justice referral. Mrs Smith contended that the mandatory provisions of s 24A required her Honour to adopt that course.

[20]       I acknowledge that s 24A(2) of the Sentencing Act is expressed in mandatory terms. However, the Court of Appeal has held that exploring restorative justice is not

8      Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250(2).

9      Palmer v R [2016] NZCA 541 at [17] (footnotes omitted).

10     Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279; [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [35].

11 At [36].

12     At [36], citing Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZHC 556 at [10].

a prerequisite to sentencing. If a restorative justice process does not take place, then the question for an appeal court is whether such a process would have been available, and if so, whether it would have made a difference.13

[21]      In Lewis v Police,14 Brewer J applied that test. His Honour assumed that, had an adjournment been granted for restorative justice enquiries to take place, the outcome would have been positive for the parties. The overall question to consider was how this would have affected the characterisation of the overall gravity of the offending (it was a discharge without conviction case).

[22]      I also observe that this  is a different case from those such as  Wessels  v    New Zealand Police,15 where no consideration at all was given to s 24A and the restorative justice process. Here, a restorative justice conference was directed. Having said that, the clear legislative intent is that proper consideration is to be given to restorative justice and court processes need to be adopted to ensure that that occurs.

[23]      The critical issue to address here is whether a restorative justice process would have affected the final sentence to the point where the appeal should be allowed.16

[24]      It is far from clear that a restorative justice process would have been available in this case. Mr Mata was for sentence on a wide variety of offences. It is clear that restorative justice would not have been available to him in respect of the burglary victim. That victim made it clear that she had no desire to participate in restorative justice.

[25]      Mrs Smith also submits that even if none of the victims had wanted to participate in restorative justice, Mr Mata would have been entitled to a discount of five per cent (a further discount) “for trying”. I reject that submission.

[26]      In her decision, Judge Ryan gave little weight to remorse in Mr Mata’s PAC report, noting that his “remorse” has to be weighed against his recidivist offending.

13     Moore v R [2019] NZCA 205 at [11]; see also Lewis v Police [2021] NZHC 3086 at [20].

14     Lewis v Police, above n 13.

15     Wessels v New Zealand Police [2023] NZHC 909 at [25] and [27].

16     Lewis v Police, above n 13.

As the Crown submits, the only other mention of Mr Mata’s remorse is a letter of remorse that had been handed up at Mr Mata’s sentencing. That letter is not before me and neither party appears to have a copy. In the absence of other meaningful expressions of remorse by Mr Mata, I find that it was open to Judge Ryan not to provide a discount for remorse. There is no basis for me to conclude that she was in error in failing to do so.

[27]      I accept that some willingness to attend restorative justice might have provided a further basis for a discrete discount, but certainly not to the extent of 10 per cent that Mr Mata contends for. Mr Mata is a recidivist offender with a significant criminal history and, in the circumstances, a five per cent discount would have been generous.

[28]      Even if a discrete discount for remorse had been available and adopted by Judge Ryan, thereby reducing the sentence to below 24 months, her Honour was not required to convert the sentence to one of home detention. As her Honour commented, “a sentence of less than imprisonment would in any account be inappropriate”. I concur. The PAC  report  recommended  a  sentence  of  imprisonment  and,  given Mr Mata’s criminal history, including offending on bail, home detention would have been entirely unsuitable.

[29]      I find that a restorative justice process (even if available) would not have affected the final sentence to the point where the sentence should be allowed.

[30]      I find that the end sentence imposed by Judge Ryan was well within range and cannot be said to be manifestly excessive.

Result

[31]The appeal against sentence is dismissed.

Andrew J