Mason v Wellington Standards Committee (no.1)
[2025] NZCA 395
•8 August 2025 at 11.30 am
| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA |
| CA479/2025 |
| BETWEEN | JANET MASON |
| AND | WELLINGTON STANDARDS COMMITTEE (NO 1) |
| Court: | Cooke and Campbell JJ |
Counsel: | T Mijatov for Applicant |
Judgment: | 8 August 2025 at 11.30 am |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A The application for leave to appeal is declined.
B The application for a stay is declined.
CThe applicant must pay the respondent costs for a standard application for leave to appeal on a band A basis together with usual disbursements.
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REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Cooke J)
By application dated 30 July 2025, the applicant seeks leave to appeal from a decision of the High Court dated 18 July 2025 which largely dismissed her appeal from a decision of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal (the Tribunal) suspending her from practice as a lawyer, but reducing the period of suspension from three months to one month.[1] She also seeks a stay of the suspension until the appeal is heard and determined. The applications are opposed.
[1]Mason v Wellington Standards Committee (No 1) [2025] NZHC 1978 [High Court judgment].
By judgment dated 30 July 2025, the High Court declined the applicant’s application for leave to appeal and for a stay in that Court.[2] The relevant one-month extension period commenced on 1 August 2025.
[2]Mason v Wellington Standards Committee (No 1) [2025] NZHC 2106 [leave judgment].
On 1 August 2025 Katz J gave directions for the filing of submissions for the determination of these applications on the papers, to be determined at the first available date.
Background
On 29 October 2020, Churchman J issued a minute requesting that the respondent (the Standards Committee) consider opening an investigation into Ms Mason as a consequence of her conduct during proceedings before the High Court.[3] The Standards Committee duly did so and subsequently found Ms Mason’s conduct to be unsatisfactory, in breach of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 (the Rules) and s 12 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (the Act). In addition to a fine and a costs award, the Committee ordered Ms Mason to undertake the Introduction to Civil Litigation Skills training course. The decision required Ms Mason to complete the course within six months of the period of time for lodging any review of the Committee’s decision.
[3]We adopt the facts as set out in the High Court judgment, above n 1, at [3]–[40].
Ms Mason was notified of this and the orders on 1 February 2023. Ms Mason subsequently lodged an application for review of the decision by the Legal Complaints Review Officer, but this was declined as being out of time.
Ms Mason subsequently engaged in correspondence with the New Zealand Law Society asking it to stay its orders, or that they agree that she attend an alternative training course from that decided upon, but the determination of the Committee was not changed.
Ms Mason did not comply with the order that she attend the course notwithstanding the course was run in May, October and November 2023.
On 4 October 2023 the Committee formed the view that Ms Mason’s non-compliance was in breach of its earlier order and it opened a further investigation. After hearing from her again, the Committee decided on 6 December to refer the matter to the Tribunal.
The hearing before the Tribunal took place on 14 October 2024. After the hearing but before the Tribunal delivered its decision, Ms Mason completed the required course on 29–30 October 2024. In its decision on 27 November 2024 the Tribunal decided that Ms Mason’s earlier non-compliance with the order was deliberate and constituted a wilful breach of the Rules.[4] In its subsequent decision the Tribunal suspended Ms Mason from practice for three months from 11 April 2025 pursuant to ss 242(1)(e) and 244 of the Act.[5]
[4]Wellington Standards Committee (No 1) v Mason [2024] NZLCDT 40 [liability decision] at [36].
[5]Wellington Standards Committee (No 1) v Mason [2025] NZLCDT 19 at [37].
Ms Mason then pursued her rights of appeal to the High Court. On 3 April 2025, Radich J stayed the three months’ suspension pending determination of the appeals.[6] By judgment dated 18 July 2025 Venning J largely dismissed the appeals, although the period of suspension was reduced from three months to one month.[7]
[6]Mason v Wellington Standards Committee (No 1) [2025] NZHC 774.
[7]High Court judgment, above n 1, at [143]–[147].
Ms Mason then sought leave to appeal to this Court under s 254 of the Act, and an order staying the one-month suspension pending the outcome of the appeal. By judgment dated 30 July 2025 both applications were declined in the High Court.[8]
[8]Leave judgment, above n 2, at [37]–[38].
She now seeks leave to appeal from this Court under s 254(1) of the Act, and a stay of the suspension under r 12 of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005.
Argument
Mr Mijatov identifies three questions of law that Ms Mason wishes to argue on appeal:
(a)Is a penalty of suspension a necessary disciplinary response for a legal practitioner’s failure to comply with a Standards Committee training order as prescribed?
(b)Is a penalty of censure a sufficient disciplinary response in light of the purposes and principles of disciplinary penalties for lawyers and of the policy rationale for censure?
(c)Accordingly, are the decisions of the High Court including Hong v Auckland Standards Committee No 3 correctly decided?[9]
[9]Hong v Auckland Standards Committee No 3 [2014] NZHC 2871.
Mr Mijatov argues that each question involves the question of the correctness of imposing a suspension at the level of principle, including matters of interpretation and case law applicability. The fact that the argument before the High Court had a greater focus on the facts of the case arose because of existing High Court authority, which is now more readily challenged on appeal to this Court. The questions raised are capable of serious argument. The suspension of a practitioner is a serious matter meriting further consideration in this Court. The present case potentially involved undue penalisation compared with other cases. For the same reasons it would be appropriate to order a stay before the appeal is heard.
For the Committee, Mr Bain and Ms Cann argue the grounds of appeal advanced by Ms Mason are not seriously arguable, involve issues of fact, and are not of sufficient importance to justify prolonging an already protracted case, and neither the application for leave nor the application for a stay should be granted.
Analysis
An appeal to this Court is governed by the Act in the following terms:
254 Appeal to Court of Appeal on question of law
(1)Any party to an appeal under section 253(1) who is dissatisfied with any determination of the High Court in the proceedings as being erroneous in point of law may, with the leave of that court, or, if the High Court refuses leave, with the leave of the Court of Appeal, appeal to the Court of Appeal against the determination; and section 56 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 applies to any such appeal.
(2)In determining whether to grant leave to appeal under this section, the Court of Appeal must have regard to whether the question of law involved in the appeal is one that, by reason of its general or public importance or for any other reason, ought to be submitted to the Court of Appeal for its decision.
…
The approach to the grant of leave was summarised by this Court in Reid v New Zealand Law Society in the following way:[10]
(a)Leave to appeal may be granted only where the appeal raises one or more questions of law capable of bona fide and serious argument and the case involves some interest, public or private, of sufficient importance to outweigh the costs and delay of a further appeal. Ultimately the question is whether a grant of leave is in the interests of justice.
(b)The applicant must be able to demonstrate that the alleged error or errors of law are sufficiently important to justify a second appeal.
[10]Reid v New Zealand Law Society [2024] NZCA 399 at [31] (footnotes omitted) citing Reid v New Zealand Law Society [2024] NZHC 411 at [5].
We accept that Ms Mason’s proposed appeal can be said to involve a question of law that might have wider significance, and accordingly wider importance. That is so to the extent that it invites this Court to consider when suspension is appropriately imposed as a matter of principle, and whether the appropriate approach has been applied in earlier High Court decisions, including Hong v Auckland Standards Committee No 3. But although the proposed appeal can be said to potentially involve such questions, we are not satisfied that leave to appeal should be granted. That is so for three closely related reasons.
First, although the proposed appeal has some potential to involve wider questions, we agree with the High Court that Ms Mason’s appeal is centred on the facts and circumstances of her own case more than questions of law of general or public importance. As the High Court said in declining leave, the suggested points of principle were not squarely raised before the High Court.[11] That is not surprising given that penalty decisions will invariably depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Whilst that does not eliminate the possibility that a point of wider importance may be involved, it is significant that has not been articulated on this basis in the case to date.
[11]Leave judgment, above n 2, at [18].
Secondly, we do not consider Ms Mason’s arguments in relation to the facts and circumstances of her case are strong. The Tribunal found that she had intentionally not complied with the sanction that had earlier been imposed, and we do not consider a challenge to that factual finding is reasonably open. Once that point is reached, and given the significance attached to conduct involving an intentional failure to comply with a sanction imposed by the Tribunal, we consider that Ms Mason’s argument that the penalty then imposed was wrong as a matter of principle faces considerable difficulties, particularly given that the period of suspension has now been reduced to one month. There is force in the Tribunal’s conclusions that:[12]
[38] The orders … stood, and it was not for Ms Mason to disregard them, to unilaterally presume that different courses than those she was directed to undertake would meet her obligations, or presume some entitlement to “negotiate” her compliance with the orders in circumstances where Ms Mason’s obligations were crystal clear.
[39] We consider that members of the public would be dismayed if the failure of lawyers to comply with sanctions imposed upon them were to be tolerated.
[12]Liability decision, above n 4, as endorsed by the High Court in the High Court judgment, above n 1, at [120].
Thirdly, we consider that the grant of leave and an associated stay could be seen as a continuation of this aspect of the proceedings. There has been significant delay. The original unsatisfactory conduct took place in 2020, with the sanction notified in February 2023. Since that time Ms Mason has engaged in argument about the sanction, and she has exercised her appeal rights. It was not until after the further Tribunal hearing in October 2024 that she undertook the required course. There is a public interest in decisions of bodies such as the Tribunal being effective and implemented in a timely way. As we say, the period of suspension has been reduced and now may be close to the minimum suspension period realistically available. We consider it appropriate that the suspension now be served. The case is not of sufficient importance to outweigh the costs and delay of a further appeal.
In reaching these views we take into account that Ms Mason provides legal services meeting a particular need in the community, and that she has strong support from a client group. But it is also important that this client group be served by lawyers who comply with the relevant standards. Otherwise, the clear need for legal services is not being met appropriately, to the ultimate disadvantage of that group. That is not in the interests of justice.
For these reasons we decline the application for leave to appeal.
Given that conclusion, the application for a stay is also declined.
Result
The application for leave to appeal is declined.
The application for a stay is declined.
The applicant must pay the respondent costs for a standard application for leave to appeal on a band A basis together with usual disbursements.
Solicitors:
Papageorgiou Law Office, Wellington for Applicant
Luke Cunningham Clere, Wellington for Respondent
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