Martin v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections
[2019] NZHC 1251
•5 June 2019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGAREI REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHANGĀREI-TERENGA-PARĀOA ROHE
CIV-2019-488-000044
[2019] NZHC 1251
BETWEEN ROBIN DION LESLIE MARTIN
Applicant
AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Respondent
Hearing: 5 June 2019 Appearances:
Applicant in person (via AVL) MB Smith for Respondent
Judgment:
5 June 2019
JUDGMENT OF DOWNS J
This judgment was delivered by me on Wednesday, 5 June 2019 at 3 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Whangarei. Copy to: Applicant
MARTIN v CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS [2019] NZHC 1251 [5 June 2019]
[1] Habeas corpus can be an important check on Executive power. But, the procedure can also be misused.
[2] In October 2016, Mr Martin argued he was unlawfully detained on burglary charges because the charging document omitted one of his middle names. Muir J concluded there was “no reasonable argument” detention was unlawful.1 In November the same year, Mr Martin sought habeas corpus on the basis his birth certificate was a fraud. Toogood J said there was “absolutely no merit in this application” and it was “a gross abuse of the Court’s procedure”.2 In December 2017, Mr Martin again sought habeas corpus. By then, Mr Martin had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for burglary. Mr Martin argued he had “withdrawn his consent to being governed, and … the laws of New Zealand no longer apply to him”. Wylie J dismissed the application, noting it was “without merit”.3 Which brings me to today.
[3] Mr Martin seeks habeas corpus. He has now served his sentence but faces another burglary charge. On 26 April 2019, Judge N J Sainsbury declined him bail. Mr Martin’s next appearance is on 25 June. Mr Martin accepts all this but contends the warrant of commitment—produced by the Crown—does not comply with r 11.11 of the District Court Rules 2014. This is unsurprising, because it does not have to. Rule 11.11 is concerned with sealing judgments, and r 1.5(1) of the same rules makes clear these are directed at civil cases, not criminal matters.
[4] Warrants of commitment are instead governed by s 168(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 and r 3.5 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2012. The former requires the warrant identify the period of adjournment. The latter provides:
3.5 Warrant to detain defendant
A warrant for the detention of a defendant in a prison must include—
(a) the section of the enactment under which the warrant is issued; and
(b) the court issuing the warrant; and
(c) the particulars of the person who is directed to detain the defendant; and
1 Martin v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2016] NZHC 2500 at [13].
2 Martin v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2016] NZHC 2811 at [19].
3 Martin v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2017] NZHC 3294 at [5].
(d) the particulars of the defendant; and
(e) the offence; and
(f) a direction that the defendant be detained in a prison; and
(g) the duration of the detention; and
(h) a direction that the defendant be brought before the court when notified by the court to do so; and
(i) the name and title of the person issuing the warrant; and
(j) the date of issue of the warrant.
[5] The warrant in relation to Mr Martin complies with these requirements. It is unnecessary to consider the savings provision.4
[6] Mr Martin also argues his detention is unlawful because he does not consent.5 This argument is unsustainable for obvious reasons.
[7]The application is dismissed: Mr Martin’s detention is lawful.
[8] The Crown did not seek costs. Had it done so, I would have ordered them despite the usual reluctance of Courts to do so. As I said earlier, this procedure can be misused. Mr Martin has again misused it.
……………………………..
Downs J
4 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 379.
5 This is a terse summary of Mr Martin’s oral argument, which was difficult to follow.
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