Marsh v Attorney-General HC WN CIV 2006-485-000665

Case

[2009] NZHC 2463

9 November 2009

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CIV 2006-485-000665

BETWEEN  GRESHAM KERSTEN LEITH MARSH

Plaintiff

ANDTHE ATTORNEY-GENERAL Defendant

Hearing:         4 November 2009

Counsel:         L M Hansen for Defendant in Support

J M Elliott for Plaintiff to Oppose

Judgment:      9 December 2009

JUDGMENT OF WILD J

Introduction

[1]      The  issue  for  decision  on  this  strike  out  application  by  the  Attorney,  is whether the plaintiff’s remaining two causes of action are tenable.

[2]      In  this  proceeding  Mr  Marsh  seeks  monetary  relief  against  the  Attorney, alleging the Attorney is vicariously liable for physical and sexual abuse the plaintiff claims he was subjected to while in state care between 1972 and 1989.

[3]      At  one  point,  Mr  Marsh’s  statement  of  claim  contained  seven  causes  of action:             negligence  (two  causes);  non-delegable  duty  of  care;  assault  and  battery; breach   of   fiduciary   duty;   false   imprisonment,   and   breach   of   domestic   and international human rights instruments.   Following Mr Marsh’s acceptance that the tortious causes of action are time-barred, his claim is now confined to two causes of

action:

MARSH V THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL HC WN CIV 2006-485-000665  9 December 2009

·         A claim for breach of fiduciary duty; and

·A  claim  for  breach  of   domestic  and  international  human  rights instruments.

As I will explain in [26] and [27], in opposing the Attorney’s strike out application the plaintiff restricted his second cause of action to a claim that the Bill of Rights

1688 (Imp.) – still part of New Zealand law through the Imperial Laws Application

Act 1988 – affords him a remedy.

[4]      The Attorney applies to strike out both these remaining causes of action.  He contends the first is time-barred (the Limitation Act 1950 applying by analogy) and the second simply untenable.

Factual background

[5]      The plaintiff is now aged 37.   Two weeks after his birth on 8 May 1972, he was adopted by Mr and Mrs Marsh.   There were already 11 children in the Marsh family.   The  plaintiff  alleges  that  he  was  physically,  sexually and  psychologically abused while living with the Marsh family until 1982.

[6]      In  August  1985  the  Department  of  Social  Welfare  admitted  the  plaintiff  to Melville Boys Home in  Hamilton.   On 19 November 1985, Mr Marsh  was placed under the guardianship of the Director-General.  In January 1986 Mr Marsh was sent

to  Hokio  Beach  School  for  long-term  training. At  both  Melville  and  Hokio  the plaintiff  alleges  he  was  physically  and  sexually  assaulted  by  unnamed  boys  on unspecified dates, sometimes in the presence of unnamed staff.   He alleges that he witnessed  other  unnamed  boys  being  physically  assaulted  by  unnamed  boys  and unnamed  staff  on  unspecified  dates.  He  makes  allegations  of  abuse  against  two named staff members, one at Melville, the other at Hokio.

Pleading background

[7]      On 6 April 2006 the plaintiff applied for leave to commence this proceeding out  of  time.           His  initial  statement  of  claim  contained  four  causes  of  action: negligence;  negligence  (vicarious  liability);  non-delegable  duty of  care  and  assault and battery (again, vicarious liability).   The plaintiff’s (second) amended statement

of claim, filed on 5 September 2008, contained the same four causes of action.

[8]      Not  until  12  March  2009,  did  the  plaintiff  further  amend  his  statement  of claim to plead the seven causes of action set out in [3] above.  In addition to the four already   mentioned,   causes   of   action   alleging   breach   of   fiduciary   duty,   false imprisonment  and  breach  of  domestic  and  international  human  rights  instruments were introduced.

[9]      The plaintiff’s latest amended statement of claim, filed on 28 October 2009, confines his claim to the two causes of action which are the subject of the present strike out application.

[10]     The Attorney submits this pleading history demonstrates that the remaining two causes of action, neither of which are tortious, were introduced in an attempt to circumvent the Limitation Act, and overcome the limitation difficulties encountered

by plaintiffs pressing similar claims.

Strike out principles

[11]     These  are  well  established  and  there  was  no  disagreement  as  to  their application here.   Assuming the facts alleged by Mr  Marsh  are  established, do his remaining causes of action have a reasonable prospect of succeeding?  If they do not

– if it is clear they cannot succeed – the Attorney should not be put to the expense and trouble of having to defend the claims further.  Between them counsel identified Attorney-General v Body Corporate 200200 [2007] 1 NZLR 95 (CA) and Couch v Attorney-General [2008] 3 NZLR 725 (SC) as the leading authorities.

Breach of fiduciary duty

[12]     The core of the plaintiff’s pleading (and I take this from his 28 October 2009

amended statement of claim) is:

...

55.The plaintiff was in a vulnerable position, having regard to his age, vulnerability  and  dependence  on  the  Director-General  and  those acting with his authority.

56.The   Director-General   (through   his   staff,   social   workers   and/or agents) held a position of power over the plaintiff and was able to take  all  steps  to  place  the  plaintiff,  and  continue  to  place  the plaintiff,  in  an  environment  that  complied  with  all  statutory  and regulatory guidelines and was also free from harm.

57.The  plaintiff  had  trust  and  confidence  in  the  Director-General  and his staff, social workers and/or agents.

58.      Having regard to paragraphs 55-57 above, the Director-General was

at all material times under a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff.

59.The fiduciary duty required the Director-General at all times: (a)    To act in the plaintiff’s best interests;

(b)      To act with the utmost good faith towards the plaintiff;

(c)      To  take  all  reasonable  steps  to  protect  the  plaintiff  from harm;

(d)To act in accordance with the trust and confidence placed in him  and/or  his  staff,  social  workers  and/or  agents  by  the plaintiff.

...

[13]     The plaintiff accepts this cause of  action is founded upon the same alleged conduct as were his abandoned tortious causes of action.  But he says he is entitled to pursue a claim for breach of fiduciary duty even if he cannot pursue causes of action alleging  breach  of  a  duty  of  care.   He  relies  on  Donselaar  v  Donselaar  [1982]  1

NZLR 97 in which Richardson J, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, said at 110:

As a matter of principle it is difficult to see why a plaintiff who has a cause

of  action  should  not  be  entitled  to  select  his  remedy  and  to  pursue  a

particular  remedy  notwithstanding  that  another  remedy  is  not  available,  at least where the two remedies serve quite different purposes.

[14]     It  is  Mr  Marsh’s  submission  that  the  elements  of  his  vulnerability  and dependence on the Director-General, and the Director-General’s power over him, are the  essentials  of  a  fiduciary  relationship.  He  relies  on  Wilson  J’s  dissenting judgment in the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Frame v Smith [1987] 2 SCR

99.  In Frame, following a marriage breakup, a non-custodial father sued a custodial mother   for   damages   for   emotional   and   psychological   distress   caused   by   her deliberate  interference  in  the  father’s  access  to  the  three  children  of  the  former marriage.  The majority of the Supreme Court held the situation did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship on which a cause of action could be grounded.   The majority took the same view in relation to a duty of care.

[15]     Wilson J considered it arguable there was a fiduciary obligation.  She said (at

99) that such an obligation possessed these three general characteristics:

...

(1)      The fiduciary has scope for exercise of some discretion or power.

(2)      The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as

to affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests.

(3)      The  beneficiary  is  peculiarly  vulnerable  to  or  at  the  mercy  of  the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.

[16]     As ‘home grown’ distillations of the elements of a fiduciary obligation exist,

I  am  unsure  why  the  plaintiff  resorts  to  a  dissenting  judgment  in  a  Canadian decision,  albeit  one  of  the  Canadian  Supreme  Court.          For  example,  there  is  an excellent  summary  of  fiduciary obligations  in  the  judgment  of  Fisher  J  in  Cook  v Evatt (No 2) [1992] 1 NZLR 676 at 685. Blanchard and Tipping JJ also commented

on the type of relationship that will give rise to fiduciary duties at [72] and following

in  their  judgment  in  the  Supreme  Court  in  Chirnside  v  Fay  [2007] 1 NZLR 433. However, determining what are the elements of a fiduciary obligation, and whether they existed here, matters not, because the Attorney was content to assume the Director-General owed fiduciary obligations to Mr Marsh. The Attorney’s point is that not all breaches of duty by a fiduciary are breaches of fiduciary duty. The

Attorney submits that what is really alleged here is a failure by the Director-General

to exercise reasonable care and skill, and to act in the plaintiff’s best interests.

[17]     I  accept  that.   One  example  of  the  plaintiff’s  pleading  is  that  the  Director- General was careless in relation to the adoption of the plaintiff:

...

The  Director-General,  by  his  staff,  social  workers  and/or  agents  knew  or should have known that he was allowing the plaintiff to be adopted into an environment where the plaintiff could be abused, and should not have placed the plaintiff with the Marsh family.

...

[18]     A second example is the plaintiff’s allegations in relation to his treatment at

Melville Boys Home in Hamilton:

...

The plaintiff was repeatedly exposed to violence at Melville.  The Director- General and his staff, social  workers and/or agents, caused  and/or allowed the plaintiff to be exposed to violence at Melville by:

(a)       allowing the use of physical assaults;

(b)omitting to take appropriate action to prevent physical assaults, or to adequately punish offenders, or educate offenders about the negative effects of violence;

(c)omitting to take appropriate action when boys reported incidents of physical assaults;

(d)failing to provide adequate measures to protect boys from physical assaults  or  to  separate  the  victims  of  physical  assaults  from  their offenders; and

(e)       omitting to provide adequate help to victims of physical assaults.

[19]     The  plaintiff’s  pleading  (it  is  paragraph  39)  in  relation  to  his  subsequent treatment at Hokio Beach School is identical.

[20]     I consider the plaintiff faces the same insuperable difficulties that confronted the plaintiff in S v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 450. Delivering the judgment

of the Court of Appeal, Blanchard J said:

[77]     We are content to proceed on the basis that the superintendent was a fiduciary for a child placed in foster care.  The difficulty for the appellant is, however, the absence of proof that any breach of a duty which can properly

be  characterised  as  fiduciary  was  committed.    The  breaches  put  to  us  as failures  by  the  department  to  act  in  BS’s  best  interests  (acting  informally

rather than strictly in accordance with statutory requirements, failing to seek

a committal order or to arrange an adoption), were in reality no more than alleged breaches of the duty of care.   As Ronald Young J said, the pleaded

matters  were  effectively  charges  of  negligence.       Negligent  conduct  by  a

fiduciary will render the fiduciary liable in negligence but is not a breach qua fiduciary, notwithstanding that the fulfilment of the role of a fiduciary is the setting for the negligent act or omission.  Nothing in the evidence in this case suggests  that  the  department  was  attempting  to  act  other  than  in  what  it believed to be the best interests of BS, for example, in deciding not to apply for a committal order.  It was not in any way disloyal to BS nor did it act in bad faith or dishonestly.  And, of course, the allegations of negligence on the part of the officers of the department have failed.

[21]     The point that not all breaches of duty by fiduciaries are breaches of fiduciary duty had earlier been made by the Court of Appeal in Bank of New Zealand v NZ Guardian Trust Co Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 664 at 681 and 687-688.

[22]     Where,  as  here,  the  alleged  breaches  of  the  (assumed)  fiduciary  duty  are actually breaches of  a duty of care, the limitation position is the same as it would have  been  had  the  plaintiff  sued  in  tort.  The  time  bar,  which  the  plaintiff  has accepted was fatal to his tortious causes of action, is equally fatal to this cause of action.  This was clearly stated by the Court of Appeal in Stratford v Phillips Shayle- George (2001) 15 PRNZ 573 at 578:

[17]     A cause of action accrues for limitation purposes when all the facts necessary to establish the claim are in existence.   The relevant facts for the tort   of   negligence   are   those   necessary   to   establish   duty,   breach   and consequent  loss.    If  the  tortfeasor  is  a  fiduciary  the  position  is  the  same unless  there  is  also  a  breach  of  fiduciary  duty  (ie  a  breach  of  a  duty  of fidelity  or  loyalty).   Thus,  if  the  breach  established  against  a  fiduciary  is simply  a  breach  of  a  duty  of  care  by  a  person  who  happens  to  stand  in  a fiduciary relationship with the  plaintiff, the claim is in  reality tortious  and limitation issues are dealt with on that basis rather than in equity.

[23]     Mr  Elliott  sought  to  circumvent  this  by  relying  on  “the  evidence  of  the plaintiff that he was unable to make any link between the breach of fiduciary duty of the defendant and damages suffered by him, because of the damage inflicted upon him during this period”.   Mr Elliott submitted it would be inequitable and unjust if the Director-General was permitted to benefit from his own breach of fiduciary duty,

by alleging the delay caused (by the damage allegedly inflicted on the plaintiff) is reason to have the plaintiff’s claim barred by analogy.

[24]     There  is  no  merit  in  this  point.   If  the  alleged  breaches  by  the  Director- General  are  essentially  tortious,  time  does  not  stop  running  because  they  were committed by an (assumed) fiduciary.  That is because the Director-General was not

in breach qua fiduciary.   That is the point made in the passage I have cited in [20]

above from S v Attorney-General.  Equitable principles do not engage.

[25]     The  result  of  this  is  that  the  plaintiff’s  cause  of  action  alleging  breach  of fiduciary duty must be treated as time barred.  As the Attorney invokes that time bar, the cause of action cannot succeed.  I strike it out.

Bill of Rights 1688 giving the plaintiff a remedy

[26]     At  the  outset  of  his  submissions  opposing  the  striking  out  of  this  second cause of action, Mr Elliott made this concession.

33.It  is  accepted  that  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights (“UDHR”),  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights (“ICCPR”),  and  International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and Cultural    Rights  (“ICESR”)              (collectively              “the              international obligations”)  do  not  provide  the  plaintiff  causes  of  action  in  or  of themselves.   The   plaintiff   does   not   assert   that   a   right   to compensation exists as a result of customary international law at this time.

[27]     As now framed, this cause of action relies solely on article 10 of the Bill of Rights  Act  1688,  as  giving  rise  to  a  cause  of  action  for  public  law  compensation. Complete with the titles and recitals necessary to give it context, article 10 provides:

Bill of Rights 1688

1 Will and Mar, Sess 2, c 2

AN ACT delareing the rights and liberties of the subject and setleing the succession of the Crowne.

13 February 1688

WHEREAS  the  Lords  Spirituall  and  Temporall  and  Comons  assembled  at

Westminster  lawfully  fully  and  freely  representing  all  the  estates  of  the

people of this Realme did upon the thirteenth day of February in the yeare of our Lord one thousand six hundred eighty eight present unto their Majesties then called and known by the names and stile of William and Mary Prince and  Princesse  of  Orange  being  present  in  their  proper  persons  a  certain declaration  in  writeing  made  by  the  said  Lords  and  Comons  in  the  words following viz

The Heads of Declaration of Lords and Commons, recited.

WHEREAS the late King James the Second by the assistance of diverse evill Councellors Judges and Ministers imployed by him did endeavour to subvert and  extirpate  the  Protestant  religion  and  the  laws  and  liberties  of  this Kingdome.

...

Excessive Bail

And excessive baile hath beene required of persons committed in criminall cases to elude the benefit of the lawes made for the liberty of the subjects.

Fines.

And excessive fines have beene imposed.

Punishments.

And illegall and cruell punishments inflicted.

...

Recital that the late King James II had abdicated the Government, and that the Throne was vacant, and that the Prince of Orange had written letters to the Lords and Commons for the choosing representatives in Parliament.

And  whereas  the  said  late  King  James  the  Second  haveing  abdicated  the

Government and the Throne being thereby vacant his Highnesse the Prince

of  Orange  (whome  it  hath  pleased  Almighty  God  to  make  the  glorious instrument  of  delivering  this  Kingdome  from  Popery  and  arbitrary  power)

did  (by  the  advice  of  the  Lords  Spirituall  and  Temporall  and  diverse

principall persons of the Commons) cause letters to be written to teh Lords

Spirituall  and  Temporall  being  Protestants  and  other  letters  to  the  severall countyes cityes universities burroughs and cinque ports for the choosing of such persons to represent them as were of right to be sent to Parlyament to meete and sitt at Westminster upon the two and twentieth day of January in this  yeare  one  thousand  six  hundred  eighty  and  eight  in  order  to  such  an establishment as that their religion lawes and liberties might not againe be in danger  of  being  subverted,  upon  which  letters  elections  haveing  beene accordingly made.

The Subject’s Rights

And  thereupon  the  said  Lords  Spirituall  and  Temporall  and  Commons pursuant to their respective letters and elections being now assembled in a full  and  free  representative  of  this  nation  takeing  into  their  most  serious

consideration the best meanes for attaining the ends aforesaid doe in the first place (as their auncestors in like case have usually done) for the vindicating and asserting their auntient rights and liberties, declare

1        ...

Excessive bail – That excessive baile ought not to be required nor excessive   fines   imposed   nor   cruell   and   unusuall   punishments inflicted.

...

[28]     The Attorney accepts the 1688 Bill of Rights is still part of New Zealand law.

It was, famously, the basis for the declaration made against the then Prime Minister

by Wild CJ in Fitzgerald v Muldoon [1976] 2 NZLR 615 at 621-622.

[29]     As the Bill of Rights 1688 remains part of New Zealand law, I accept that it should be interpreted consistently with the indigenous New  Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the BORA), passed three centuries later.  That is consistent with the view taken  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  Crown  Health  Financing  Agency  v  P  [2009]  2

NZLR 149 (CA), where the issue was whether leave provisions in the mental health legislation  of  1935  and  1969  had  survived  the  coming  into  force  of  the  Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992.

[30]     In  order  for  this  second  cause  of  action  to  be  tenable,  the  plaintiff  must establish three successive propositions.  I take each of these in turn.

“Punishments”

[31]     First,  the  plaintiff  must  establish  that  the  ill  treatment  he  alleges  he  was subjected to was “punishment” within the meaning of article 10.

[32]     The two cases in point are squarely against the plaintiff.  The first case is R v Shand  (1976)  70  DLR  (3d)  395,  a  decision  of  the  Ontario  Court  of  Appeal.   The issue was whether the minimum sentence of 7 years imprisonment for importing a narcotic  was  a  “cruel  and  unusual”  punishment  within  the  meaning  of  s  2(b) Canadian Bill of Rights RSC 1970 App III.  After noting that article 10 of the 1688

Bill of Rights was the genesis of s 2(b), the Court at 402 remarked:

The Bill was directed at the Courts, not at Parliament ...

[33]     That article 10 was directed at judicially imposed penalties emerges also from American case law.  There is a substantial body of it, since the Eighth Amendment to the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  of  America  adopted  the  precise  language  of article 10.  The case fastened upon by counsel is  Ingraham v Wright (1977) 430 US

651, a decision of the United States Supreme Court.   In issue was whether corporal punishment in a junior high school in Florida violated the students’ rights under the Eighth  Amendment.   The  students  had  been  “paddled”  –  spanked  on  the  buttocks with  a  wooden  paddle.  Delivering  the  opinion  for  the  majority  of  five  Judges, Powell J said this at 664:

The Eighth Amendment provides:  “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”.  Bail, fines,  and  punishment  traditionally  have  been  associated  with  the  criminal process,  and  by  subjecting  the  three  to  parallel  limitations  the  text  of  the Amendment suggests an intention to limit the power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function of government.   An examination of the history of the Amendment and the decisions of this Court construing the proscription against  cruel  and  unusual  punishment  confirms  that  it  was  designed  to protect   those   convicted   of   crimes.  We   adhere   to   this   long-standing limitation  and  hold  that  the  Eighth  Amendment  does  not  apply  to  the paddling of children as a means of maintaining discipline in public schools.

[34]     The minority of four Judges considered the Eighth Amendment encompassed the school corporal punishment in question, but they nevertheless limited the scope

of the amendment to punishment.  The judgment of White J for the minority contains this passage at 686:

...  The Court would have us believe from this fact that there is a recognised distinction between criminal and noncriminal punishment for purposes of the Eighth  Amendment.        This  is  plainly  wrong.       “Even  a  clear  legislative classification  of  a  statute  as  ‘non-penal’  would  not  alter  the  fundamental nature  of  a  plainly  penal  statute”.   Trop  v  Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95 (1958) (plurality opinion). The relevant inquiry is not whether the offense for which a punishment is inflicted has been labelled as criminal, but whether the purpose of the deprivation is among those ordinarily associated with punishment, such as retribution, rehabilitation, or deterrence. Id., at 96.  Cf. Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).

If  this  purposive  approach  were  followed  in  the  present  case,  it  would  be clear  that  spanking  in  the  Florida  public  schools  is  punishment  within  the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.  The District Court found that “corporal punishment is one of a variety of measures employed in the school system for the correction of pupil behaviour and the preservation of order”.   App.

146.  Behaviour correction and preservation of order are purposes ordinarily associated with punishment.

[35]     Mr  Elliott  referred  also  to  the  decision  of  the  Canadian  Supreme  Court  in Rodriguez  v  British  Columbia  (Attorney-General)  [1993] 3 SCR 519. The issue there was whether the provision in Canada’s Criminal Code prohibiting assistance to commit suicide was unconstitutional. Ms Rodriguez contended it breached, amongst other provisions, s 12 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms:

12.Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.

[36]     Ms  Rodriguez  was  dying  of  amyotrophic  lateral  schlerosis.   She  wanted  a physician to set up a technological means whereby she could end her own life when she  ceased  to  have  any  further  capacity  to  enjoy  it.   She  argued  that  s  12  of  the Charter gave her that right.  Section 12 (mirrored in s 9 of the BORA) provides:

12.      Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.

[37]     The passage Mr Elliott focused on is this one in the judgment of Sopinka J at

611:

For  the  purposes  of  the  present  analysis,  I  am  prepared  to  assume  that “treatment”  within  the  meaning  of  s  12  may  include  that  imposed  by  the state in contexts other than that of a penal or quasi-penal nature. ...

[38]     I  do  not  see  the  relevance  of  this;  the  present  case  concerns   alleged punishment, not treatment.

[39]     I respectfully align myself with the two cases I have referred to which hold that article 10 is directed at judicially imposed punishments.   The historical context

of the 1688 Bill of Rights reinforces this.  It is explained at 664-665 in the majority’s judgment in Ingraham v Wright thus:

The history of the Eighth Amendment is well known.   The text was taken, almost verbatim, from a provision of the Virginia Declaration of Rights of

1776, which in turn derived from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.   The

English  version,  adopted  after  the  accession  of  William  and  Mary,  was intended to curb the excesses of English judges under the reign of James II.

Historians  have  viewed  the  English  provision  as  a  reaction  either  to  the

“Bloody  Assize,”  the  treason  trials  conducted  by  Chief  Justice  Jeffreys  in

1685 after the abortive rebellion of the Duke of Monmouth, or to the perjury prosecution  of Titus  Oates in  the  same  year.   In  either  case,  the  exclusive concern of the English version was the conduct of judges in enforcing the criminal law.  ...

[40]     Should I hold that the 1688 Bill of Rights applies only to judicially imposed penalties Mr Elliott contended it nevertheless encompassed the plaintiff because:

a)        He was placed under the guardianship of the Director-General of the

Department of Social Welfare by a judicial order.

b)The  living  conditions  and  residences  ‘enjoyed’  by  the  plaintiff  at Melville and at Hokio so closely resembled a prison as to be akin to a penal  sentence  or  quasi-penal  in  nature:  the  resident  compulsorily resided  in  these  institutions,  including  being  required  to  live  in  the secure unit on occasion.

[41]     I reject this submission.  Guardianship is not a “punishment”.  Even if tough living  conditions  at  Melville  and/or  Hokio  could  be  termed  a  “punishment”,  they were not judicially imposed.

[42]     I  hold  the  ill-treatment  alleged  by  the  plaintiff  was  not  a  “punishment”  in terms of article 10 Bill of Rights 1688.

Remedy for public law compensation

[43]     The plaintiff must establish that article 10 gives rise to a cause of action for public law compensation.

[44]     The  plaintiff  developed  this  part  of  his  argument  in  three  ways.   First,  by arguing that the 1688 Bill of Rights is to be given an interpretation consistent with the BORA, and that the latter (excepting s 26(1)) can have retroactive effect.   The plaintiff sought support for the latter contention in Wilson v First County Trust (No

2) [2004] 1 AC 816 (HL). Lord Hope, referring to the United Kingdom equivalent

of s 6 BORA said at [99]:

[t]he Court should take a more relaxed approach to a potentially retroactive element in legislation where its intended purpose was ... to protect children.

I would apply the same reasoning to section 3 of the 1998 Act.  Its purpose is

to ensure that legislation is read and given effect in a way that is compatible with  Convention  rights,  so  far  as  it  is  possible  to  do  so,  whenever  the

legislation   is   enacted. To   restrict   the   application   of   the   interpretive

obligation,  without  exception,  to  ‘events’  that  happened  or  transactions entered  into  or  after  2  October  2000  would  be  to  introduce  a  restriction

which  is  not  stated  expressly  anywhere  in  the  1998  Act.   A  restriction  in

such  absolute  and  all-embracing  terms  would  seem  to  be  contrary  to  the intention of the legislation and incapable of being read into it by necessary implication.

[45]     I  interpret  this  submission  as  inviting  the  Court  to  give  the  Bill  of  Rights

1688 the sort of “rights based interpretation” (i.e. the right to a remedy for a breach)

which   the   Court   of   Appeal   gave   the   BORA   in   Simpson   v   Attorney-General

[Baigent’s  Case]  [1994] 3 NZLR 667, affirmed in Taunoa  v  Attorney-General

[2008] NZLR 429.

[46]     Secondly,  in  Baigent’s  Case  and  also  in  Taunoa,  the  BORA  was  “not  the source of the damages” awarded, “indeed the Act is completely silent on the issue of monetary  relief  for  a  breach  of  its  provisions”.  Rather,  it  was  “the  inherent  and fundamental nature of the right breached, New  Zealand’s international obligations, and the need to give practicable effect to those rights and obligations”.  The plaintiff submitted:

...  that  damages  are  an  available  remedy  if  a  breach  of  the  1688  Act  is established.   Public law  damages  are not limited to cases of breaches of a provision of the 1990 Act.

[47]     Thirdly, the plaintiff pointed to the reliance placed by the Court in Baigent’s Case  on  article  2(3)  of  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights (ICCPR),  which  New  Zealand  signed  in  1968  and  ratified  on  28  December  1978. Article 2(3) provides:

3.        Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:

(a)To  ensure  that  any  person  whose  rights  or  freedoms  as herein   recognised   are   violated   shall   have   an   effective remedy,    notwithstanding   that    the    violation   has   been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;

...

[48]     The  plaintiff  relied  particularly  on  this  passage  in  Casey  J’s  judgment  in

Baigent’s Case:

I  do  not  regard  the  absence  of  a  remedies  provision  in  the  Act  as  an impediment  to  the  Court’s  ability  to  “develop  the  possibilities  of  judicial remedy:  as  envisaged  in  art  3(b).    The  rights  and  freedoms  affirmed  are fundamental   to   a   civilised   society   and   justify   a   liberal   purposive interpretation  of  the  Act,  even  though  it  has  not  been  constitutionally entrenched and has the same status as ordinary legislation.  Its purpose being the  affirmation  of  New  Zealand’s  commitment  to  the  Covenant  (including art 3(b)), it would be wrong to conclude that Parliament did not intend there

to be any remedy for those whose rights have been infringed.  ...

[49]     The plaintiff referred also to this passage at 700  in the judgment of Hardie

Boys J (a passage cited with approval by Elias CJ in Taunoa at [106]):

...

Citizens of New Zealand ought not to have to resort to international tribunals

to obtain adequate remedy for infringement of Covenant rights this country has affirmed by statute.   I consider that the Courts are obligated to provide

those remedies by domestic law ...

[50]     Mr Elliott submitted Baigent’s case and Taunoa make it clear that damages were  awarded,  not  for  breach  of  the  BORA,  but  “because,  given  the  nature  of  the breaches and the fundamental rights concerned, declaratory relief would not provide

an effective remedy for those plaintiffs”.

[51]     Contrary  to  the  submissions  of  Ms  Hansen  for  the  Attorney,  Mr  Elliott contended  the  1688  Bill  of  Rights  provides  an  applicable  statutory  basis  for  the plaintiff’s claim, when interpreted according to s 6 of the BORA and, through that section, the international obligations.

[52]     I  do  not  accept  the  last  of  these  submissions.       From  the  judgments  in

Baigent’s Case emerge three core justifications for providing damages as a remedy for breach of the BORA:

a)        The long title of the Act required the Court to “protect and promote” the rights contained within the Act, and in turn required the potential for damages.

b)The ICCPR, to which the Act (in its long title) gives effect, requires the development of such a remedy under the Act.

c)        The  remedy  of  a  “toothless”  declaration  was  inappropriate,  lest  the

Court pay lip service to the Act, necessitating a stronger remedy such

as damages or a mandatory injunction.

[53]     I draw these justifications particularly from the judgment of Cooke P at 676.

[54]     On the other hand, article 10 of the 1688 Bill of Rights was a bald prohibition

on the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments:

Excessive bail – That excessive baile ought not to be required nor excessive fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall punishments inflicted.

[55]     Most  of  the  other  articles  in  the  Bill  were  equally  blunt  requirements  or prohibitions.  For example:

·Preventing the dispensing or suspension of laws without Parliament’s consent (articles 1 and 2).

·Preventing the raising of armies in peacetime and the levying of taxes without Parliament’s consent (articles 4 and 6).

·Requiring  that  Parliament  should  be  frequently  summoned  and  that there should be free elections (articles 8 and 13).

·Preventing  the  impugning  of  Members  of  Parliament  for  statements made in the Houses of Parliament (article 9).

[56]     All these things were direct responses to what had been, and was, happening

in England at the time.  The immediate trigger was the Glorious Revolution of 1688, when  James  II  was  deposed  by William  of  Orange  and  Mary.   More  broadly,  the

1688 Bill of Rights was symptomatic of the respective rise and decline of Parliament and the Monarchy respectively, which had been occurring since the Magna Carta of

1215, and with accelerated pace in the 17th  Century.

[57]     James  II  acceded  to  the  throne  after  the  death  of  his  brother  Charles  II  in

1685.  James II was a Roman Catholic who attempted to relax or suspend the Penal Laws, which upheld Anglicanism to the detriment of Catholicism.   In addition, he sought  heavy  taxation  for  his  standing  army,  proroguing  Parliament  without  its consent when it appeared they would dissent.  It was this unbridled use of the Royal Prerogative  that  raised  the  ire  of  many  Members  of  Parliament.  When  James  II fathered a son late in 1688, thereby seemingly securing the Catholic dynasty, there was consensus that  he should be deposed  as King.   Noblemen wrote to  the Dutch Protestant,  William  of  Orange,  who  was  married  to  James  II’s  daughter  Anne, inviting his intervention.

[58]     William landed in England in November 1688.  Facing widespread defection

by his allies, James II attempted to flee to France on 11 December 1688, throwing the  Great  Seal  into  the  River  Thames  on  the  way  (thereby  preventing  the  legal summoning of Parliament), but was captured.  Eventually, he was allowed to depart

for France, and on 26 December 1688 William was asked to take command.  As he was not yet the king, he summoned a Convention Parliament, which first met on 21

January 1688 (the Julian Calendar, which had the year commence in March, had not yet been replaced).  On 12 February 1688 a declaration was drawn up affirming the rights and liberties of the people and  conferring the Crown on William and Mary. Once the declaration had been accepted by William and Mary, it was published as a proclamation.  The declaration was subsequently enacted with some additions in the form  of  the  Bill  of  Rights  1688,  and  the  Acts  of  the  Convention  Parliament  were subsequently ratified and confirmed by the Crown and Parliament Recognition Act

1689, which also recognised the new King and Queen.

[59]     The 1688 Bill of Rights is similar to modern rights instruments, in that it is declaratory  legislation  –  it  affirmed  existing  rights  and  obligations  of  citizenry, Parliament and the King.  It is dissimilar to modern rights instruments in that it does not  define  and  guarantee  the  basic  human  rights  of  individual  citizens.  The  13 articles  in  the  1688  Bill  of  Rights  provided,  in part,  the  genesis  for  modern  rights instruments.  As I have pointed out, article 10 was adopted by the Americans in their Bill  of  Rights,  as  an  amendment  to  their  Constitution.  And  it  has  a  modern equivalent in s 9 of the BORA.   But, for the most part, the 1688 Bill of Rights was

simply intended to “extirpate the abuses of the Stuart kings” (per Wild CJ at 622 in Fitzgerald v Muldoon).  The 1688 Bill of Rights represented Parliament exerting its control over the King to prevent a recurrence of the actions of James II.

[60]     What  emerges  from  all  this  is  that  the  justifications  for  the  creation  of

‘Baigent’  damages  under  the  BORA  are  absent  from  the  1688  Bill  of  Rights. Whereas  international  instruments,  and  the  text  of  the  BORA,  necessitated  the introduction of a remedy for such damages, the 1688 Bill of Rights was not based on the ICCPR, and did not have the same purpose as is expressed in the long title to the BORA.  The 1688 Bill of Rights was not concerned to protect the rights of citizens;

its aim was to curb the power of the King.  Although the 1688 Bill of Rights has an important place in the constitution of this country, that does not mean that it has the same purpose or content as the BORA.

[61]     The  fact  that  a  large  part  of  the  1688  Bill  of  Rights  refers  to  James  II  as having vacated the throne, indicates that the focus was on preventing the abuses of the Monarch from recurring.   Its enactment thus differs sharply from the context of the  United  States’  Bill  of  Rights,  enacted  in  1791,  shortly  after  the  birth  of  the American nation.   Similarly, it differs from the BORA, enacted after a White Paper

on the issue, and to further New Zealand’s ratification and adoption of the ICCPR.

If one of the key reasons for providing the remedy of ‘Baigent’ damages under the BORA was legislative context, then the legislative context of the 1688 Bill of Rights does not provide the same impetus.

[62]     For those reasons, I accept the Attorney’s argument that the plaintiff cannot graft a remedy providing public law compensation onto the 1688 Bill of Rights.

Limitation

[63]     Thirdly,  the  plaintiff  must  establish  that  a  cause  of  action  for  public  law compensation based on the 1688 Bill of Rights is not subject to a limitation period, either directly or by analogy.

[64]     In PF Sugrue Ltd v Attorney-General [2004] 1 NZLR 207 (CA) the Court of

Appeal confirmed that a claim for ‘Baigent’ damages is not barred by any provision

in the Limitation Act.  But the Court stated:

[70]     ...   The Court must have a degree of flexibility in determining how long a delay is too much.   All the circumstances, including those in which the cause of action arose, whether the alleged breach of the plaintiff’s rights may have had an effect which excuses the delay and whether the delay has prejudiced the defence of the claim, should be considered.  Appropriate and significant weight should obviously be given to the fact that the claim is one for breach of a fundamental human right guaranteed by the Bill  of Rights. But it can be expected that the Court will still be guided to an extent by the periods  set  for  the  bringing  of  common  law  and  statutory  claims  by  the Limitation Act, just as it is when there has been a delay in commencing a claim in equity:  see generally Matai Industries Ltd v Jensen [1989] 1 NZLR

525.

[65]     At [73] the Court rejected the suggestion that treating such a claim as time- barred  would  deny  the  plaintiff  an  effective  remedy  and  place  New  Zealand  in breach  of  the  ICCPR.           It  said  that  a  declaration  might  well  remain  appropriate, despite delay, to vindicate the plaintiff’s right.

[66]     In Pearson v R [2006] FC 931, a decision of the Canadian Federal Court, Y

de Montigny J reached the same conclusion, in a case where the plaintiff was suing the Crown for compensatory damages for breaches of his rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (essentially, being unjustly sent to jail).  At para 54 the Judge said:

54.      ...  The purposes of limitation periods are as valid in the context of a

Charter claim as they are for any other type of claims; a claimant should not

be  entitled  to  sue  the  Crown  indefinitely  just  because  the  basis  of  his complaint   is   the   violation   of   a   constitutional   right.           As   long   as   the government is not trying to do indirectly what it could not do directly, I see

no reason not to apply a limitation period.

[67]     Similarly,  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  in  Stubbings  v  United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 213 at [51] upheld limitation periods as consistent with human rights protections because they:

...  serve  several  important  purposes,  namely  to  ensure  legal  certainty  and finality,  protect  potential  defendants  from  stale  claims  which  might  be difficult to counter and prevent the injustice which might arise if courts were required to decide upon events which took place in the distant past on the

basis  of  evidence  which  might  have  become  unreliable  and  incomplete because of the passage of time ...

[68]     Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim for ‘Baigent’ damages is, by analogy, time- barred.   No persuasive reason for permitting it to be brought out of time has been advanced.   The reasoning in Stubbings is particularly apt here.   It suggests that the plaintiff’s claim should not now be permitted.

Summary

[69]     I have held that the plaintiff cannot establish that the ill treatment he alleges

he was subjected to was “punishment” within article 10 of the 1688 Bill of Rights.  It was not judicially imposed.

[70]     Further, I have held the plaintiff has failed to show that article 10 gives rise to

a cause of action for public law compensation.

[71]     Each of these points is fatal to the plaintiff’s second cause of action.

[72]     A  further  insuperable  difficulty faced  by the  plaintiff  is  that  the  Limitation Act  applies  by analogy to  his  claim,  which  is  out  of  time.   For  those  reasons,  the plaintiff’s second cause of action cannot succeed and I strike it out.

Result

[73]     I have struck out each of the plaintiff’s two remaining causes of action.  The result is to bring his proceeding to an end.

[74]     The timetable orders of Gendall J, set out in [10] of his minute of 12 March

2009, are vacated, as is the fixture for trial of this proceeding commencing 19 July

2010, five weeks allocated.

Costs

[75]     My understanding  is  that  the  plaintiff  is  legally  aided.   Costs  are  reserved. Any party seeking an order has leave to apply.

Solicitors:

Cooper Legal, Wellington for the Plaintiff

Crown Law Office, Wellington for the Defendant

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