Legal Research
Cases
Marong v R

Marong v R

Case [2020] NZCA 179 22 May 2020

Sentencing

Breach of Contract

Unconscionable Conduct

Type to search within this case.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA

CA758/2018
[2020] NZCA 179

BETWEEN	SAINEY MARONG Appellant
AND	THE QUEEN Respondent

Hearing:	22 April 2020
Court:	Brown, Gilbert and Dobson JJ
Counsel:	C M Ruane for Appellant P A Currie and S J Mallett for Respondent
Judgment:	22 May 2020 at 12.30 pm

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A The application for leave to appeal out of time is granted.
BThe appeal is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Dobson J)

On 23 February 2018, after a trial in the High Court at Christchurch, the appellant (Mr Marong) was found guilty of the murder of a Christchurch sex worker, Renee Duckmanton. On 20 April 2018, the trial Judge, Mander J, sentenced Mr Marong to life imprisonment and imposed a minimum period of imprisonment (MPI) of 18 years.[1]
[1]R v Marong [2018] NZHC 748.
Initially, Mr Marong pursued an appeal against his conviction. He represented himself in that appeal, which was dismissed on 28 November 2018.[2]
[2]Marong v R [2018] NZCA 531.
The present appeal against sentence was filed on 10 December 2018, almost seven months out of time. Mr Marong has deposed in an affidavit that he was confused about the procedure that applied to such appeals, and was having difficulty obtaining legal representation.
Leave to bring the sentence appeal out of time is not opposed by the Crown. Given some of the points raised in criticism of the sentencing Judge’s application of s 104 of the Sentencing Act 2002 (the Act), we consider it is in the interests of justice to grant leave for the appeal to be brought out of time, and accordingly so order.

The circumstances of the offending

On the evening of 14 May 2016, CCTV footage shows Mr Marong picking up Ms Duckmanton from a central Christchurch street where she was working as a sex worker. He drove her to the outskirts of Christchurch. Over an hour after he had picked her up, Ms Duckmanton’s mobile phone was disconnected from the telecommunications network. The Judge’s analysis of the facts reflected a belief that, around that time, Mr Marong murdered Ms Duckmanton in the back of his car by strangling her.
Mr Marong left Ms Duckmanton’s body in the boot of his car until the following day, when he disposed of her semi-naked body on the side of a rural Canterbury road. He doused the body with petrol and set her on fire. A post-mortem established that intercourse had occurred. There was an issue as to whether intercourse occurred before or after the victim died, but in the absence of proof on the point, the Judge put it to one side.
Police investigations into internet searches undertaken by Mr Marong over a substantial period prior to the murder revealed various enquiries about matters such as how to kill a person with bare hands, the use of chloroform to stupefy a victim, disposal of bodies by fire,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Marong v R

Details

AGLC: Marong v R [2020] NZCA 179
Case: [2020] NZCA 179
Decision Date: 22 May 2020 at 12.30 pm

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Sainey Marong appealed against the sentence imposed on him by the High Court, arguing that the trial Judge had erred in finding any of the features specified in s 104 of the Sentencing Act 2002 to be present. The appeal was brought seven months out of time and leave to bring it out of time was granted. The appeal was dismissed. The Court of Appeal found that the Judge’s comments on exceptional circumstances in sentencing were in error, as the threshold for the imposition of a minimum period of imprisonment (MPI) of 17 years or more should not be met by cumulatively assessing individual features of an offender’s conduct that do not independently make out the presence of one of the features specified in s 104(1). The consequences of the s 104 threshold being met are grave and the level to which such features are present must be measured individually. However, the Court found that the Judge was justified in finding that s 104 applied in this case. The Court was also concerned that the Judge had not provided explicit reasoning as to whether an MPI of more than 17 years was required. Although not essential, it is an exercise likely to be better informed by reference to the circumstances of other similar sentencings. The assessment of the appropriate MPI requires consideration of all the individual circumstances, including the extent to which s 104(1) features were present. The Court was satisfied that the extent to which Mr Marong undertook planning for the murder, the callousness of the way he went about it including his conduct after the killing, and the particular vulnerability of his small and defenceless victim, justified an additional year beyond the 17 year MPI set by s 104.

Orders