Mariteq Fabricators Ltd v Quigley's Technical Services Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 4 min read

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND TAURANGA REGISTRY

CIV 2012-470-533 [2012] NZHC 2516

BETWEEN  MARITEQ FABRICATORS LTD Plaintiff

ANDQUIGLEY'S TECHNICAL SERVICES LTD

Defendant

Hearing:         27 September 2012

Counsel:         T J G Allan for Plaintiff

J A MacGillivray for Defendant

Judgment:      27 September 2012

(ORAL) JUDGMENT OF HEATH J

Solicitors:

Grove Darlow, PO Box 2882, Auckland

Tompkins Wake, PO Box 258, Hamilton

MARITEQ FABRICATORS LTD V QUIGLEY'S TECHNICAL SERVICES LTD HC TAU CIV 2012-470-533 [27 September 2012]

Introduction

[1]      Mariteq Fabricators Ltd (Mariteq) seeks an interim injunction designed to compel Quigley Technical Services Ltd (Quigley’s) to perform a condition of Deed of Settlement (the Deed) dated 5 December 2011.  It also seeks to restrain Quigley’s from asking the Registrar of this Court to set down for hearing two related proceedings brought by Quigley’s: one is an application to put Mariteq into liquidation (the liquidation proceeding) while the other seeks a declaration that a compromise with creditors, into which Mariteq entered under Part XIV of the Companies Act 1993, is not binding on it (the compromise proceeding).

[2]      The application came on for hearing before me today.  From the papers filed, the central  issue  appeared  to  be whether cl 11  of the Deed  operated  to  require Quigley’s to agree to a substitute investigating accountant to determine whether Quigley’s would receive a greater payment under the compromise than it would if Mariteq  were  placed  in  liquidation.     That  issue  arose  because  the  agreed investigating accountants “McDonald Vague (Auckland Office)” had resigned, following assertions of pre-determination on their part.  To counter that, Quigley’s contended that McDonald Vague’s resignation had the effect of frustrating the contract, primarily based on that conclusion having previously been reached in cases

involving the appointment of a specific arbitrator.[1]

[1] Counsel referred to Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Machinenfabrik [1981] 1 All ER 289 (HL).

[3]      Other issues were raised.  For present purposes, it is unnecessary to rehearse them.

Developments during the hearing

[4]      During the course of the hearing, Mr MacGillivray, for Quigley’s, indicated that his client no longer opposed an order restraining it from applying to have the liquidation and compromise proceedings set down for hearing.  He was prepared to

deal with the issue on a final basis, by reference to its “frustration” argument.

[5]      In answer to a question from me, Mr MacGillivray confirmed that, if I were to  hold  that  the  agreement  had  not  been  frustrated,  Quigley’s  would  join  with Mariteq in appointing a replacement investigating accountant to perform obligations conferred by the Deed of Settlement.

[6]      Discussions then took place over procedural issues.  Mr Allan, for Mariteq, was keen to preserve his ability to deal with the application on an interim basis.  He submitted that a restraining order should be made as sought until such time as the substantive issue was resolved.  Subsequently, he made a helpful suggestion that the substantive issue could be determined on an application for summary judgment.  Mr MacGillivray concurred with that suggestion.

[7]      I expressed some concern about making an…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Mariteq Fabricators Ltd v Quigley's Technical Services Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2012] NZHC 2516
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Mariteq Fabricators Ltd brought an application against Quigley's Technical Services Ltd, seeking an interim injunction to enforce a term of a Deed of Settlement. Mariteq sought an order to compel Quigley's to agree to a substitute investigating accountant to determine whether Quigley's would receive a greater payment under a compromise with creditors than if Mariteq were placed into liquidation. Mariteq also sought to restrain Quigley's from asking the Registrar of the Court to set down for hearing two related proceedings: an application to put Mariteq into liquidation and a proceeding seeking a declaration that a compromise with creditors, into which Mariteq entered, was not binding on it. The case was heard in the High Court of New Zealand, Tauranga Registry.

The central issue was whether clause 11 of the Deed required Quigley's to agree to a substitute investigating accountant. Quigley's argued that the contract was frustrated because the agreed investigating accountants had resigned following assertions of pre-determination on their part. Quigley's contended that the resignation had the effect of frustrating the contract, primarily based on the conclusion reached in cases involving the appointment of a specific arbitrator.

The court considered the arguments from both parties and determined that the substantive issue should be determined on an application for summary judgment. The court found that it was not appropriate to make an order restraining a request to set the proceedings down, particularly in the context of a liquidation proceeding which is collective in nature. Instead, the court ordered that the liquidation and compromise proceedings be called at the same time as the proposed summary judgment application, but for mention only.

The court made several orders, including that Mariteq shall file and serve an interlocutory application for summary judgment in this proceeding on or before 3 October 2012, to enable the "frustration" issue to be determined. That application is set down for hearing (on a provisional basis) at 10am on 26 October 2012, in Auckland. The present application for an interim injunction is adjourned to the date on which the application for summary judgment will be heard. The liquidation proceeding, and the compromise proceeding, are adjourned for mention before the court, at the time the summary judgment application is heard. The court reserved all questions of costs in relation to the present application and the proceeding generally.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.