IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
CIV-2011-409-000810 [2012] NZHC 944
BETWEEN NICOLA JAYNE MARCHAND, JACQUES RENARD MARCHAND AND PATRICK GREGORY COSTELLO
First Plaintiffs
ANDNICOLA JAYNE MARCHAND AND JACQUES RENARD MARCHAND Second Plaintiffs
ANDJOHN F JACKSON Defendant
ANDIAG NEW ZEALAND LIMITED Third Party
Hearing: 29 March 2012
Appearances: G A Hair for Plaintiffs
B R D Burke and K Hill-Dunne for Defendant
G S A Macdonald for Third Party
Judgment: 2 May 2012
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE MATTHEWS
[1] In September 2010 and February 2011 the plaintiffs’ home, and a substantial part of its contents, along with the land on which the home stands and other improvements, were substantially damaged in two earthquakes.
[2] In May 2009 they had engaged the defendant to arrange insurance cover for them on their home and contents, their motor vehicles and the assets in the first- named plaintiffs’ medical practice. Although the defendant assured the plaintiffs that cover had been arranged with New Zealand Insurance (NZI), that was not the case.
This came to light after the earthquake in September 2010. The plaintiffs have
NICOLA JAYNE MARCHAND, JACQUES RENARD MARCHAND AND PATRICK GREGORY COSTELLO V JOHN F JACKSON HC CHCH CIV-2011-409-000810 [2 May 2012]
brought this proceeding alleging breach of contract, breach of a duty of care owed in tort and breach of certain provisions of the Fair Trading Act.
[3] At material times the third party was the indemnifier of the defendant for professional liability. The defendant alleges that the third party should indemnify him for any loss on the part of the plaintiffs for which he might be found liable. The third party denies liability. It has brought an application for summary judgment in its favour on the defendant’s third party claim, relying on one or other of two exclusion provisions in the policy. The issue on this application is whether either of these exclusions applies.
Principles of summary judgment
[4] Rules 4.7(2) and 12.2 of the High Court Rules provide that the Court may give judgment against a defendant if a third party satisfies the Court that none of the causes of action in the defendant’s claim can succeed. The onus is on the third party to establish this position to the satisfaction of the Court: see, for example, Garnett v Tower Insurance Ltd.1
[5] In this case, as will be seen, it is necessary to have regard to two principles in relation to the evidence before the Court, first that the Court need not accept uncritically evidence which is inherently lacking in credibility (for example where it is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or is inherently
improbable): Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan,2 and secondly, that evidence must be
considered in a robust and realistic manner: Bilbie Dymock Corporation v Patel.3
[6] As will also emerge, it is alleged by the third party that in certain respects the actions of the defendant which are relevant to this case were dishonest. Bearing in mind that an application…
Continue reading Marchand v Jackson
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- Marchand v Jackson [2012] NZHC 944
- Case
- [2012] NZHC 944
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.