Malcolm John Rabson and Richard John Creser v Transparency International

IN THE SUPREME COURTOF NEW ZEALAND

SC 22/2015
[2015] NZSC 56

BETWEEN	MALCOM EDWARD RABSON AND RICHARD JOHN CRESER Applicants
AND	TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (NEW ZEALAND) INCORPORATED Respondent

Court:	Glazebrook, Arnold and O'Regan JJ
Counsel:	Applicants in person D R Kalderimis and K E Yesberg for the Respondent
Judgment:	8 May 2015

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
B Costs of $2,500 are payable to the respondent.

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REASONS

The applicants seek leave to appeal against a High Court judgment of Mallon J dated 3 March 2015.[1] In that judgment, Mallon J struck out the applicants’ statement of claim seeking judicial review of various decisions of Transparency International (New Zealand) Inc.
[1]Rabson v Transparency International (New Zealand) Inc [2015] NZHC 334.
Under s 14 of the Supreme Court Act 2003, the Supreme Court must not give leave to appeal directly to it against a decision made in a court other than the Court of Appeal unless (in addition to being satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice for the Court to hear and determine the proposed appeal) it is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances justifying taking the proposed appeal directly to this Court.
The applicants argue that the underlying appeal is of significant public importance and that the exceptional circumstances for a direct appeal are reinforced by “an oppressive security for costs regime” which will prevent the applicants appealing against the judgment to the New Zealand Court of Appeal.
The fact an appeal may be of public importance is not an exceptional circumstance justifying a direct appeal to this Court.[2] As to security for costs, as this Court stated in Siemer v Brown, it “is not appropriate to allow a leapfrog appeal to this Court to circumvent the application of the rules applying to appeals to the Court of Appeal, in particular, the requirement to pay security for costs”.[3]
[2]In any event, the respondent submits the underlying allegations that are the subject of the proceedings are trivial, moot and lack seriousness.
[3]Siemer v Brown [2015] NZSC 41 at [6].
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed and costs of $2,500 are payable to the respondent.

Solicitors:
Chapman Tripp, Wellington for Respondent

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Malcolm John Rabson and Richard John Creser v Transparency International, the applicants sought leave to appeal a decision made by the High Court. The applicants, Rabson and Creser, aimed to challenge a judgment issued by Mallon J, who struck out their statement of claim seeking judicial review of certain decisions made by Transparency International (New Zealand) Inc. The Supreme Court, comprising Glazebrook, Arnold, and O'Regan JJ, was tasked with determining whether to grant leave for the direct appeal to proceed. The applicants argued that the appeal was of significant public importance and that exceptional circumstances justified bypassing the Court of Appeal due to an oppressive security for costs regime.

The legal issues before the Supreme Court were twofold: whether the appeal was of such public importance to warrant a direct appeal, and whether the security for costs regime constituted exceptional circumstances. The applicants contended that the underlying appeal was of significant public importance and that the security for costs regime was oppressive, preventing them from appealing to the New Zealand Court of Appeal. However, the Court noted that the public importance of an appeal does not constitute exceptional circumstances. Furthermore, the Court referred to its previous decision in Siemer v Brown, where it was held that leapfrog appeals are not permissible to circumvent the rules applying to appeals to the Court of Appeal, including the requirement to pay security for costs.

The Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, concluding that the applicants had not demonstrated exceptional circumstances justifying a direct appeal. Additionally, the Court found that the underlying allegations were trivial, moot, and lacked seriousness, as argued by the respondent. As a result, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and costs of $2,500 were ordered to be paid to the respondent.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established