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Malcolm Edward Rabson v Wayne Seymour Chapman

Malcolm Edward Rabson v Wayne Seymour Chapman

Case [2016] NZSC 77 24 June 2016

Appeal

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Res Judicata

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

SC 18/2016
[2016] NZSC 77

BETWEEN	MALCOLM EDWARD RABSON Applicant
AND	WAYNE SEYMOUR CHAPMAN Respondent

Court:	William Young, Glazebrook and Arnold JJ
Counsel:	Applicant in person S A Barker for Respondent
Judgment:	24 June 2016

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for recall is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

The applicant, Mr Rabson, has applied for the recall of the Court’s judgment dismissing his application for leave to appeal.[1]
[1]Rabson v Chapman [2016] NZSC 45.
The grounds which Mr Rabson advances in support of his recall application are simply reiterations of the grounds he raised in his original leave application. Nothing new having been raised, the application for recall is dismissed. As the respondent has not been required to file submissions, there is no order for costs.

Solicitors:
Buddle Findlay, Wellington for Respondent

Details

AGLC: Malcolm Edward Rabson v Wayne Seymour Chapman [2016] NZSC 77
Case: [2016] NZSC 77
Decision Date: 24 June 2016

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Malcolm Edward Rabson has applied to the Supreme Court of New Zealand for a recall of a previous judgment dismissing his application for leave to appeal. The original case involved a dispute between Rabson and Wayne Seymour Chapman, with the nature of the dispute not explicitly detailed in the summary. The Supreme Court, presided over by Justices William Young, Glazebrook, and Arnold, was tasked with considering Rabson's application for a recall of the judgment. Rabson, representing himself, was opposed by S A Barker, counsel for the respondent, Wayne Seymour Chapman.

The legal issue before the court was whether the grounds presented by Rabson in his recall application warranted a reconsideration of the earlier dismissal of his application for leave to appeal. The court examined if any new arguments or evidence had been introduced that could potentially alter the outcome of the initial decision. Rabson's recall application was essentially a reiteration of the grounds he had previously raised, with no new information or arguments presented. The court found that no new grounds had been advanced, and therefore, the application for recall was dismissed.

The court reasoned that since the recall application merely repeated the arguments from the original leave application, there was no basis to reconsider the dismissal of the leave to appeal. Consequently, the application for recall was dismissed without any order for costs as the respondent had not been required to file submissions. This decision underscores the principle that recall applications must present new, compelling reasons or evidence to warrant a reconsideration of a prior judgment.

Orders